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At the heart of the research underpinning this thesis is the question of why moral rights 
doctrine in common law jurisdictions ignores the possibility of creators having a legitimate 
claim to protection when faced with the destruction of their creative works. It is a question 
rarely examined or analysed in depth by the courts or legal commentators. The thesis posits 
that this lacuna in the doctrine undermines its threefold role as protector of a creator’s 
personality rights, a buttress against the erosion of cultural heritage, and a counterbalance to 
the overtly utilitarian and commercial nature of the copyright regime in common law 
countries. The thesis also critically examines the standard arguments raised against the 
recognition of such a right for creators. In the process, the research engages with a variety of 
sources from without the common law, namely, the ontology of art, the Roman concept of 
Iniuria, and anthropological studies on the concept of honour: sources not previously 
examined and applied in the context of this question. The research question is examined in 
the context of the United Kingdom’s utilitarian copyright regime, whose weak moral rights 
doctrine arguably undermines the nation’s artistic and cultural heritage.  Lessons are sought 
from an appraisal of the cultural settings and moral rights regimes in other common law 
countries: Singapore, US, Australia and India. The underlying interdisciplinary and 
comparative law methods employed in the research ultimately aim to construct a case for the 
United Kingdom to embrace a widening of its moral rights, allowing its creators to object to 
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Part I: Research Context 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
It is not a legal question. It is a moral question. They have violated two fundamental 
elementary rights, the right of the artist to create, to express himself, and the right to 
receive the judgment of the world, posterity.  




It might strike one as strange that, while the law is likely to protect fibreglass geese from having to 
wear ribbons,
2
 it may be powerless to protect the same fibreglass geese, or indeed any work of art, 
from total destruction at the whim of its owner.
3
 This is, however, the likely position in most 
jurisdictions, and the number of instances in which valuable or important works have been 
deliberately destroyed, leaving their creators bereft of any recourse, is considerable. A well known 
example in the United Kingdom (UK) is the destruction of Graham Sutherland’s portrait of Sir 
Winston Churchill, reportedly within a year of its unveiling in 1954, another the destruction of a 
portrait of Bernard Breslauer painted by Lucien Freud, whose artworks are guaranteed a seven figure 
reserve price whenever they are placed on the market.
4
 It was widely believed that Breslauer himself 
destroyed the painting as he had objected to how the famous artist had depicted his distinctive double 
chin.
5
 In Canada, Corridart, an ambitious eight kilometre long installation, created by fifty Quebec 
artists specially for the Montreal Olympic Games in 1976, was destroyed by the city days before the 
Games began, on the basis that ‘too many of the works showed unfavourable images of the city, its 
people, its growth.’
6
 In 2013, graffiti artists appealed in a New York court against the demolition of 
5Pointz: the Institute of Higher Burnin’, a sprawling warehouse used, since the 1990s, simultaneously 
as an outdoor exhibit for legal graffiti and as a complex of artist studios. The appeal failed and on 19 
                                                             
1
  ‘Row on Rivera Art Still in Deadlock’ The New York Times (New York, U.S.A., 11 May 1933). 
2
  These are the facts in the Canadian case of Snow v The Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982) 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105. 
Flight Stop, by sculptor Michael Snow, is a giant mobile of geese in flight, suspended from the galleria in 
the Eaton Centre shopping complex, Toronto, Canada. When the necks of the geese were adorned with 
ribbons for the Christmas season in 1981, Snow invoked his right to object to this act on the basis that it 
breached the integrity of his work. An injunction was granted by the Ontario High Court. 
3
  As noted by Stina Teilmann, ‘Framing the law: the right of integrity in Britain’ (2005) 27 European 
Intellectual Property Review 19. 
4




  ibid. 
6




November 2013, the visually dramatic artwork on the exterior walls of 5Pointz was whitewashed 
overnight and in August 2014, the entire complex was finally demolished.
7
   
The loss of even one work of art may be keenly felt, not only by the aficionados of art, but by 
the national or indeed the world community at large. As Professor Joseph Sax articulated in the 
introduction to his book, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt,  
...to destroy a work of art is an act of vandalism, a triumph of ignorance over genius; 
so there is the rending of a value that is important to the community, a symbolic loss 
that can occur to others even though the thing destroyed was not theirs.
8
  
The area of law in question is that of copyright generally, but more specifically, moral rights doctrine, 
which encapsulates a bundle of rights that aim to protect a creator’s relationship with his creation. 
While copyright law governs the economic rights of a creator, for example, by granting the creator 
exclusive rights to make copies of his own work, or to distribute copies of his work, moral rights 
doctrine focuses on the creator’s personal and spiritual relationship with his work, even after he has 
divested himself of his copyright, for example, by ensuring that his works are correctly attributed to 
him, or that they may not be treated in a derogatory manner. The scope and variety of moral rights 
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
9
 Where the destruction of creative works is concerned, the 
relevant moral right is the right of integrity, which is generally the right of the creator to object to the 
mutilation or distortion of his work.  
In jurisdictions which recognise moral rights in some form or other, including the right of 
integrity, it is generally accepted that the creator may object to a mutilation or deformation of his 
work, which is the traditionally accepted ambit of the integrity right. However, most of these 
jurisdictions fail to consistently recognise the author’s right to object to the complete destruction of 
his work. Why this is so is curious. Unlike the mutilation of a work, the act of destroying a work is 
irreversible and leaves absolutely nothing behind which may be salvageable. Thus, it is surely 
reasonable to imagine that destruction would have a more detrimental impact on creators than mere 
mutilation and as such, there is a case for recognising a creator’s right to object to destruction of their 
work. Whether moral rights doctrine can legitimately encompass such objection is a question that 
                                                             
7
  On 12 February 2018, the artists at 5Pointz were awarded $6.7 million in damages. This case is discussed 
in more detail in chapter 9.  
8
  Joseph Sax, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt: Public and Private Rights in Cultural Treasures 
(University of Michigan Press 1999) 2. 
9
  Elizabeth Adeney, The Moral Rights of Authors and Performers: An International and Comparative 




even civil law jurisdictions where moral rights receive extensive recognition, such as France and 
Germany, have yet to resolve satisfactorily.
10
  
2. Aims of Thesis 
It will be argued that the failure to recognise an author’s right to object to the complete destruction of 
his work, consistently and robustly, suggests a logical inconsistency in the interpretation of the 
integrity right; one which undermines the aims of moral rights doctrine.  Destruction has been 
described as the ‘ultimate form of mutilation’,
11
 and as with acts of mutilation that leave the work in 
existence and salvageable, the clear subtext to a destruction of a work is, in the absence of a valid and 
legitimate reason, one of utter disrespect to its author. If the underlying ethos of moral rights doctrine 
is protection of the personality rights of the author,
12
 then it might appear reasonable for the courts to 
interpret the right of integrity as including a right to object to an act of destruction that is disrespectful 
to the author. Since this interpretation is not applied in many jurisdictions that recognise moral rights, 
and is reluctantly and inconsistently addressed in the remainder, it is argued that there is a 
fundamental flaw in the right of integrity, one which may indicate a problem with the moral rights 
framework as a whole.
13
 
In tandem with the role of moral rights in protecting the personality rights of the author, one 
should also consider the potential cultural role of such rights. The destruction of a unique work of art 
deals a blow not only to the unique cultural heritage of a particular country, but also to international 
cultural diversity. The destruction of an unique work of art, whether a wholly unique and one-off 
                                                             
10
   J.H. Merryman, ‘The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet’ in J.H. Merryman (ed), Thinking About the Elgin 
Marbles - Critical Essays on Cultural Property Art and Law (Kluwer Law International Ltd 2000) 316, 
327. The recognition of such a right is either denied outright or considered ambiguous according to some 
scholars: Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli, ‘Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative 
Legal and Economic Analysis’ [The University of Chicago Press for The University of Chicago Law 
School] (1997) 26 The Journal of Legal Studies 95, 110; Cyrill P. Rigamonti, ‘Deconstructing Moral 
Rights’ (2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 353, 371; Martin A. Roeder, ‘The Doctrine of 
Moral Right: a study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators’ (1940) 53 Harvard Law Review 554, 
569. According to others, there is clear recognition in some countries: Gillian Davies and Kevin Garnett, 
Moral Rights (2nd edn, Thomson Reuters (Legal) Limited 2016) 245. 
11
  Jacques de Werra, ‘Le droit a l'integrite de l'oeuvre. Etude du droit d'aauteur suisse dans une perspective 
de droit compare’ in H. Hausheer (ed), Etudes de droit suisse (Staempfli Editions 1997), translated by 
Teilmann-Lock in Stina Teilmann-Lock, British and French Copyright: A Historical Study of Aesthetic 
Implications (First edn, DJOF Publishing 2009) 207. Alternatively, it is considered as an act of utmost 
contempt: William Patry, Copyright Law and Practice, vol 2 (The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1994) 
1044 fn 128. 
12
  This is a widely accepted concept. See Adeney (n 9) 3 para In.07; Mira T Sundara Rajan, Moral Rights: 
Principles, Practice and New Technology (1st edn, Oxford University Press 2011) 7-9; Davies and 
Garnett (n 10) 5; Susan P. Liemer, ‘Understanding Artists' Moral Rights’ (1998) 7 Public Interest Law 
Journal 41, 44; John Henry Merryman, ‘The Moral Right of Maurice Utrillo’ (1995) 43 The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 445, 446; Merryman (n 10) 316, 318. 
13
  Fiona MacMillan, ‘Artistic Practice and the Integrity of Copyright Law’ in Morten Rosenmeier and Stina 




piece such as a painting or sculpture, or a musical score which has yet to be copied or recorded, 
arguably represents an irretrievable loss to future generations. The moral rights lacuna surrounding 
the destruction of works raises questions about the role of the law of moral rights in preventing such 
losses, and its ongoing effect upon cultural heritage preservation and future artistic development. 
The argument for a two-pronged role for moral rights as firstly, a protector of the creator’s 
personality rights, and secondly as a bulwark against the dissolution of cultural heritage, although 
rarely made, is not an entirely new one.
14
  Sundara Rajan, for example, is the most recent advocate of 
this approach.
15
 In Moral Rights, she argues strongly that the integrity right ‘has two distinct 
objectives: the preservation of cultural heritage, and the protection of an author’s reputation.’
16
 In her 
article on moral rights in India, she emphasised that ‘moral rights can make an important contribution 
to culture’, particularly in developing countries.
17
  
However, there is also a possible third string to the doctrine’s bow: that of performing as an 
effective counterbalance to the overtly commercial and utilitarian leanings of the common law 
copyright regime.
18
 Essentially, this might address a common criticism of the copyright regime in the 
common law, which is that it overemphasises the economic rights of creators and ignores or pays little 
heed to the inner or spiritual drives of the creator.
19
  
This thesis seeks to show that, by countenancing destruction, the roles of moral rights are 
effectively undermined. In making this point, this thesis will focus on the United Kingdom’s 
implementation of moral rights within its Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA), the 
reasons for which are set down below.  
  
                                                             
14
  Cheryl Swack, ‘Safeguarding artistic creation and the cultural heritage: a comparison of droit moral 
between France and the United States’ (1998) 22 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 361, 364; Arthur 
L. Jr. Stevenson, ‘Moral Right and the Common Law: A Proposal’ (1953) 6 Copyright Law Symposium 
89, 92; Adeney (n 9) 4; Hector L. MacQueen, ‘Copyright Law Reform: Some Achievable Goals?’ in 
Fiona MacMillan (ed), New Directions in Copyright Law, vol 4 (Edward Elgar Publishing 2007) 55, 66 
(stating that ‘…copyright’s cultural purpose is most evident in the moral rights.’).  
15
  Rajan (n 12) 45-47. 
16
   ibid., 45. 
17
  Mira T Sundara Rajan, ‘Moral Rights in Developing Countries: The Example of India - Part I’ (2003) 8 
Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 357. 
18
  Fiona MacMillan, ‘Public Interest and the Public Domain in the era of Corporate Dominance’ in Birgitte 
Andersen (ed), Intellectual Property Rights: Innovation, Governance and the Institution Environment 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2006) 61-62; Rajan, ‘Moral Rights in Developing Countries: The Example of 
India - Part I’ (n 11) 357; Fiona MacMillan, ‘Hans Christian Anderson and copyright today’ in Helle 
Porsdam (ed), Copyright and Other Fairy Tales (Edward Elgar 2006) 88. 
19
  Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Soul of Creativity: Forging a Moral Rights Law for the United States 
(Stanford University Press 2010); Burton Ong, ‘Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic 




2. Structure of Thesis 
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I, which consists of this chapter, as well as chapters 2 and 3, 
puts the research query into context. Part II, consisting of chapters 4 to 7, interrogates the traditional 
arguments which have been raised against the recognition of any right to object to destruction, while 
Part III, consisting of chapters 8 and 9, examines relevant moral rights legislation in Singapore, the 
USA, Australia and India, in the context of their particular cultural backgrounds. The concluding 
chapter 10 offers a summary of the preceding chapters, emphasising the key points and arguments 
raised, before recommending other directions research in this area may usefully take.  
Part I – Research Context 
Chapter 2 firstly examines the roles and aims of copyright and moral rights in the UK in more depth 
and detail. It will argue that the failure of moral rights to consistently recognise a creator’s right to 
object to the destruction of his work, undermines each of these roles, and ultimately, the very premise 
of the moral rights doctrine. Chapter 3 aims to explain why the destruction of art is damaging to 
artistic evolution and development, the preservation of culture and to society in general. It exemplifies 
this by highlighting some notable examples of art destruction. By evoking the brutality, senselessness 
and finality of destroying Botticellis, Picassos and other masterpieces, it aims to show that the sense 
of loss is keenly felt. It then focuses on the question as to why the fine arts are intrinsically valuable, 
which serves to underpin the claim that this thesis ultimately makes: that the fine arts are deserving of 
protection from destruction, and that moral rights doctrine is the means to address this claim.      
Part II – Deconstructing Traditional Approaches to the Integrity Right and Destruction 
The core originality of the thesis lies in Part II, which critically appraises the traditional arguments 
against the recognition of a right to object to destruction and identifies key counterarguments. These 
arguments are as follows: 
1.  As an artistic work, once created, remains in existence at least conceptually and in the 
public’s perception, despite the destruction of its physical state,
20
 it has been argued that it is 
redundant to create a right to object to destruction. This thesis argues that this contention fails 
to take into account the idea that the physical structure of an artwork is an integral part, and 
that both its physical and conceptual aspects are inseparable,
21
 which is prima facie the case 
                                                             
20
  Augustin Waisman, ‘Rethinking the moral right to integrity’ (2008) 3 Intellectual Property Quarterly 
268. 
21
  Terry Barrett, Criticizing Art: Understanding the Contemporary (Second edn, Mayfield Publishing 
Company 2000) 63; Arnold Isenberg, ‘Perception, Meaning and the Subject-Matter of Art’ (1944) 41 
The Journal of Philosophy 561; David F. Bowers, ‘The Role of Subject-Matter in Art’ (1939) 36 The 






 Essentially, two questions are posed in dealing with the definition of ‘work’ 
where artistic works are concerned, firstly the question as to whether the material aspect, i.e. 
the medium, of a work of art is a fundamental and essential element of the same, and 
secondly, whether art can be destroyed, both of which are issues which have been subject to 
considerable scrutiny by art philosophers. A discussion of the ontology of art is therefore an 
important contribution to the present debate, where issues regarding the law and those 
regarding art intersect. 
2. It is generally accepted that the integrity right is the right of the creator to object to acts of 
mutilation, distortion, modification or other derogatory treatment of his work ‘which would 
be prejudicial to his honour or reputation’.
23
 Hence, mere modification or mutilation will not 
infringe the integrity right; it has to be also prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the 
creator. It has been argued that, because destruction of a work leaves nothing behind which 
may affect or prejudice the reputation of the creator, it follows that the act of destroying the 
work cannot be an act which affects or prejudices the reputation of the creator.
24
 While it 
remains arguable that the creator’s reputation may not be affected in this way, the authorities 
are silent as to whether honour remains unaffected by destruction. It will be argued that 
honour should be considered as fully as reputation. We should explore more fully the question 
as to whether the destruction of a work prejudices the honour of its creator. To this end, the 
thesis firstly draws an analogy with the Roman law concept of Iniuria in formulating a 
definition of honour, supported by insights gleaned from seminal anthropological studies on 
honour before contending that the destruction of a work will prejudice its creator’s honour.     
3. It is argued that property rights trump the moral rights of creators, in that owners of creative 
works possess the prerogative to do as they wish with those works. In countering this 
argument, this thesis argues that the owners of unique pieces of fine art are placed in a 
position of responsibility, indeed stewardship, for the maintenance of such works.  
4. It has been argued that the wording of s.80 CDPA, which implements Art.6bis Berne 
Convention and sets out the integrity right, precludes a right against destruction. A close 
analysis of both provisions will reveal that such an interpretation is not necessarily definitive.  
These arguments will be examined primarily in the context of the common law jurisdictions, in 
particular, the UK for the following reason. While it will be argued that the moral rights regime 
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provides a critical and perhaps essential counterpoint to the more utilitarian approach of the common 
law copyright regime as a whole, it is clear that moral rights doctrine has never developed fully in the 
common law countries. In contrast, the establishment and role of moral rights in the civil law 
countries is already well known, as are the tensions between the civil and common law jurisdictions 
over the nature and scope of the legal protection to be afforded to creators for their creative work. 
Much has already been written about these differences in the moral rights regimes between the civil 
and common law countries,
25
 and the thesis will not explore these differences in detail.  Reference to 
the existing literature on this aspect will of course be made in informing the research and thesis but 
only where this is relevant and necessary.  
While inspiration and ideas may be gleaned from the civil law countries, it is not argued that the 
moral rights regime in the common law countries would benefit from a slavish copying of the moral 
rights regime in their civil law counterparts. It is instead argued that the reason why the destruction of 
works has been overlooked is that moral rights regimes in common law jurisdictions have placed 
undue emphasis on the ‘reputation’ of authors. This reflects the approach of the common law 
jurisdictions in formulating their copyright law and moral rights doctrines, which places primary 
emphasis on a utilitarian approach to protecting the economic incentives in producing creative work 
e.g. the ability to prevent reproduction of works.  As a result, copyright law and moral rights doctrine 
as practised in these countries fail to adequately recognise other aspects of the creative process. 
Moral rights in the civil law jurisdictions extend further, seeking to protect the more personal 
aspects of the creative process, i.e. the respect due to the author and the integrity of his work.  This 
reflects the position that creators are not solely concerned about the copies made by others and 
resulting lost sales, but are equally, if not more, concerned with the integrity of their works.  The 
dominance of the common law approach to intellectual property in the Twenty-first Century, 
however, means that the more expansive civil law understandings regarding moral rights have perhaps 
received less legislative and judicial attention in the common law world than they merit. 
One of the aims of this thesis is to demonstrate that even if a jurisdiction recognises a right to 
object to mutilation which upsets the integrity of an author’s work, this alone does not go far enough. 
A right to object to mutilation which amounts to the utter destruction of the work must also be 
recognised if the moral rights doctrine is to fulfil its role as an effective counterbalance to the 
utilitarian approach of the copyright regime in common law countries. The UK, as the ancestral seat 
of the common law, has conceived a copyright regime based on utilitarian aims and has only 
relatively recently and reluctantly enshrined a version of moral rights doctrine within its copyright 
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legislation, despite its rich artistic and cultural heritage: such it encompasses a novel set of factors that 
makes it an ideal jurisdictional case-study.  
Part III – Evaluating the different approaches and influences of selected legal regimes 
In its third and final part, the thesis engages in an analysis of the moral rights regimes in Singapore, 
the US, Australia and India. The US and Singapore provide interesting points of contrast with the UK 
where moral rights are concerned. While, unlike the UK, the US does not recognise the moral rights 
doctrine in its entirety, certain states have nevertheless recognised the integrity right to some extent, 
and in 1990, federal legislation, the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) of 1990, recognised the right to 
object to the mutilation and destruction of artworks of stature. Singapore, although it has 
enthusiastically promoted itself as a staunch defender of intellectual property rights, does not 
recognise moral rights, and in the name of development, has permitted the destruction of public 
artworks or removal of site-specific works with impunity. The question explored here is why these 
jurisdictions have approached the issue in such contrasting ways, taking into account their cultural and 
social backgrounds.  
Singapore is a relatively young nation and is routinely accused of giving scant attention to the arts 
or cultural heritage.  By contrast the UK has a long and proud cultural and artistic heritage, yet where 
moral rights are concerned, the protection the UK affords its artists is little better or stronger than that 
offered by Singapore. While the lack of moral rights in Singapore may be explained by its young age 
and even younger arts and cultural scene,
26
 it is hardly the case in the UK, with its long and rich 
history of protecting and encouraging the fine arts.  Lessons however may be learned from the US’ 
experience since its enactment of VARA, and to ascertain if their approach towards the integrity of art 
works and rights of artists would be suitable for the UK.  
 
Reference will also be made to the relevant legislative provisions of India and Australia, both also 
jurisdictions within the common law system. India, through a few High Court cases, has recognised a 
right to object to destruction on the basis of protecting cultural heritage,
27
 while Australia has very 
recently amended its copyright legislation to allow for a right to object to destruction of works in 
limited circumstances, subject to certain conditions and restrictions. Again, ideas as to their approach 
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4. Research Questions 
In addressing the aims which are articulated above, and developing an argument that the failure to 
recognise a right to object to the destruction of works within the moral rights framework is 
indefensible, the questions this thesis will examine are: 
1. Does moral rights doctrine recognise a right to object to destruction? Should it? Why is there 
uncertainty as to the existence of the right? 
2. What are the aims of moral rights? Does failure to recognise a right to object to destruction 
undermine such aims? 
a. If an aim of the moral rights doctrine is to protect the integrity of authors and to 
recognise their personality rights, does failure to allow authors to object to destruction 
of their works undermine that aim?  
b. If an aim of moral rights doctrine is to assist in preserving cultural heritage, does 
failure to allow authors to object to destruction of their works undermine that aim?  
3. How does destruction of artworks affect artistic and cultural heritage? Is it a pernicious idea 
or is it actually beneficial to the development and progress of art? Does the failure to fully 
protect authors from mutilation or destruction have an effect on the social fabric of the society 
in which the authors reside?  
4. If the moral rights doctrine were to recognise a right to object to destruction, then what form 
should this right take, should there be any exceptions to the right, and what might be 
considered the best practice? 
5. Taking the United Kingdom as the main focus, critical insights drawn from the other common 
law regimes in the US, Singapore, India and Australia, how have cultural and social issues 
shaped how different common law jurisdictions have approached a right to object to 
destruction, and what have been the outcomes?  
5. Limitation of Query to fine art 
While the thesis will make reference to all types of creative works, literary, musical or artistic works, 
it is intended to focus the query in the thesis mainly on the destruction of visual fine art works, as 
opposed to the other types of creative works which are protectable under copyright law. For the 
purposes of this thesis, ‘fine art’ is given its contemporary ordinary meaning, and takes its definition 
from the Oxford English Dictionary: ‘the visual arts, esp. painting and sculpture, [whose products are 






  The reasons for this limitation are as follows. Generally, especially in the age of 
digitisation, the impact of destruction of textual works, such as literature or music, is minimal. For the 
purposes of copyright law and moral rights, the protectable essence of textual works lies in their 
content, not their physical embodiment, of which copies are almost invariably made, and increasingly 
stored and reproduced digitally.  
The same might possibly be said of artworks, i.e. that the representation, imagery, or subject-
matter is the protectable aspect of an artwork, not its physical support. Copies are frequently made of 
famous paintings, as postcards, calendars or prints. The destruction of the original painting would 
leave the content intact, and furthermore, through their copies, their protectable content would remain 
accessible indefinitely.    
However, the reality is that an original artwork is a wholly unique entity, which once destroyed, is 
utterly irreplaceable. It is obvious that the effect of destruction of even the first edition of a literary 
work is nowhere near as devastating and irrevocable as that of an original artistic work, hence the 
reason for focusing on artworks: their requirement for moral rights protection is more pressing.  
It should also be noted that where countries have legislated on destruction of copyright works, 
they have invariably focused on the destruction of artistic works,
29
 probably recognising that the total 




The primary focus of the research is moral rights doctrine, a well established legal doctrine situated 
within the law of copyright. On the basis that the doctrine as implemented in the UK appears to lack 
any recourse for the destruction of creative works, its validity is questioned and analysed in this 
thesis, by employing the following approaches: 
1. An interdisciplinary approach in analysing the extent to which copyright law and the 
moral rights doctrine impact upon creators and their works, utilising perspectives drawn 
from relevant non-legal disciplines, such as art philosophy and anthropology as well as 
other legal fields, for example Roman law, the law of property and personality rights.     
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As the main purpose is to study the encroachment of copyright law into the artistic realm, 
it is inevitable that the thesis should also engage with the works and opinions of artists 
and art philosophers. In a sense, because of this encroachment, this thesis is situated 
within the fledgling interdisciplinary area of ‘art law’,
31
 which is in reality, a series of the 
law’s encounters with art rather than a homogenous body of law.
32
  The law and the arts 
have crossed paths in countless instances, ranging from issues relating to copyright, 
obscenity, customs and duties, and taxes. Problems in aesthetics have therefore 
necessarily been the subject of considerable judicial deliberation, although unfortunately 
usually without the assistance of or reference to any of the established aesthetic theories 
or expert opinion.
33
 The courts’ reluctance to enlist the help of experts in the field is 
explained by Lord Simon in Hensher,
34
  
...the court will endeavour not to be tied to a particular metaphysics of art, partly 
because courts are not naturally fitted to such matters and partly because 
Parliament can hardly have intended that the construction of its statutory 
phrase should turn on some recondite theory of aesthetics...  
Since the interpretation of art is left to the courts’ own devices and the instances in which 
aesthetic problems arise vary enormously in terms of their legal context, the law has not 
been able to fashion a universal definition or conception of art.  Different statutes govern 
these instances, and dictate how art is defined according to their various underlying 
policies. It is not the intention to argue here that the law should necessarily forge a single 
unifying meaning of art, an impossible task given the number of conflicting art theories 
which abound and the difficulty with which art philosophers, scholars and artists 
themselves have in pinning down and agreeing on a single definition. Instead this thesis 
is premised on the belief that the law should not ignore these theories and should instead 
embrace and engage with them, in order to arrive at the best result for any particular set 
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of circumstances which presents itself before the court.
35
 At the present moment, the 
law’s treatment of art in all these varying instances not only lacks coherence but also 
lacks validity as the law employs uniquely legalistic tools, such as precedent, analogy 
and common sense, to deal with artistic problems,
36
 instead of employing art theories and 
definitions which would be more readily understood by the people and institutions most 
affected by legal decisions made on artistic problems and cases.
37
 As a result, the law’s 
current approach to artistic issues not only results in jurisprudential uncertainty which 
may impact unduly upon key players in the art world,
38
 but also contributes to the 
handing down of unsatisfactory judgements.
39
 It has long been recognised that the 
traditional approach of the law toward art is unsustainable and that a more imaginative 
response is required in order to address pressing legal problems.
40
     
The tendency of the law to treat art with dispassion and objectivity has been the subject 
of scholarly scrutiny in the field of art law. The first major law journal in the wider 
interdisciplinary field of Law and the Humanities, of which art law may be considered a 
subset, the Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities was launched to explore such issues 
as well as to counter and question the rival interdisciplinary field of Law and Economics 
which purports to inject a ‘scientific’ approach to the study of law. In its pilot issue, the 
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journal’s editors reasoned that ‘the study of law must be informed by an examination of 
the socio-cultural narratives that shape legal meaning and empower legal norm’.  
In recognition of that stance, this thesis adopts a cultural analysis of the law in the area of 
copyright, rather than an economic or scientific approach. Rather than endeavouring to 
demonstrate the economic impact of the destruction of valuable works of art, it is 
intended to demonstrate the social and cultural value of such works, the consequent 
damage wreaked on the public through the destruction of such works, and the failure of 
copyright law to prevent or ameliorate such damage. Much of the current discourse on 
the copyright regime and the moral rights doctrine is set within a Law and Economics 
framework,
41
 but in adopting that framework, ideas, knowledge and culture are assessed 
in purely monetary terms, and social benefits e.g., ‘scientific progress’, ‘a more vibrant 
public sphere’, are priced at zero, a trend criticised by some copyright scholars.
42
 More 
pertinently, while acknowledging that moral rights can be analysed and understood 
through an economics framework, Ong argues that it fails to fully account for the respect 
and recognition moral rights accord to artists.
43
 It has also been argued that ‘aesthetics 
offers the law a rich and vibrant debate about both the nature of art and definitional 
approaches’ and that ‘the result would be more open and thoughtful resolutions of these 
cases’,
 44
 and this thesis therefore adopts an interdisciplinary approach in addressing the 
problem that it has posed, seeking inspiration from relevant fields outside the law.  
The adoption of an interdisciplinary approach means that not only will art philosophy 
inform the law in this chosen area, but where the concept of honour is concerned, 
reference will also be made to the field of anthropology. Honour, as it will be shown, is a 
vital element of the moral rights doctrine, and no study of honour can be complete 
without reference to anthropological studies as anthropologists are widely acknowledged 
as experts on this very subject.
45
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Further insight into the concept of honour may also be gleaned from German insult laws, 
Anglo-Saxon laws and the Roman concept of inuiria. The practice of using foreign laws 
in helping to elucidate problematic issues is well established and acknowledged. 
According to James Gordley, foreign jurists ‘were struggling with common problems, 
guided by similar concepts’ and that ‘we can learn much by seeing how others have faced 
similar problems.’
46
 Legal problems are both universal and perennial, and hence there is 
much that foreign laws as well as seemingly antiquated laws such as Anglo-Saxon and 
Roman law may offer in furthering our understanding of the problems such as those 
posed in this thesis. 
2. A comparative approach to ascertaining and analysing the different jurisprudential 
approaches to the issues in question, drawn from selected common law jurisdictions, 
namely the US and Singapore, with references made to the approaches in India and 
Australia. Inspiration and lessons from these other common law countries will assist in 
ascertaining the best practice for the UK. Progress in the field of moral rights has been 
achieved in the US, Australia and India, countries which all share a common legal 
background with the UK. It is intended to concentrate on these specific common law 
jurisdictions as despite the fact that the common law regime is traditionally resistant to 
any expansion of moral rights, they have made considerable strides in unpacking and 
addressing the problems identified in this thesis and may provide practical examples on 
which the UK may draw.  
7.  Summary and Contribution of Research 
This research is intended to determine the boundaries of the integrity right of the moral rights 
doctrine, to ascertain the defensibility of the traditional objections to extending the right to integrity to 
recognise a right to object to the destruction of works. The research provides evidence to support the 
thesis that a jurisdiction which overlooks this fundamental right or applies this inconsistently, severely 
undermines moral rights doctrine and the roles it plays variously as a protector of the individual rights 
of the creator, a protector of cultural rights and as a counterweight to the utilitarian aims of copyright 
law. This issue is examined in using UK law as the primary jurisdiction and contrasting the UK 
approach with that taken in specific common law jurisdictions, the US Singapore, Australia and India.  
The conclusion will summarise findings and crystallise the contributions made by the 
research undertaken. Certain key findings and arguments central to this thesis have been published 
elsewhere in three peer-reviewed journals. A version of chapter 5 on the concept of ‘honour’ and the 
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role it plays in the integrity right appeared in the 2016 summer issue of the Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies.
47
 An article form of chapter 6 on the definition of ‘art’ in copyright law was awarded the 
John McLaren Emmerson QC Prize in 2015 by the Intellectual Property Society of Australia and New 
Zealand and was subsequently published in the society’s own journal, Intellectual Property Forum.
48
 
Finally, an article version of chapter 7 on the interrelationship between property rights and moral 
rights was published in the Intellectual Property Quarterly in 2016.
49
   
This thesis will culminate with the proposal of a new section 80A to be inserted in the UK 
CDPA, a draft of which is offered in the concluding chapter, together with explanatory notes. This 
new section offers authors a new right against destruction in relation to artistic works. Not only does it 
encapsulate the findings of the research, it also endeavours to resolve certain key issues surrounding 
similar legislative provisions which have been enacted in other jurisdictions and which are discussed 
in chapter 9. The right is only offered to creators of artistic works, which reflects a viewpoint 
advanced in the present chapter: that the problem of destruction has a particularly devastating impact 
upon artistic works, while other creative works which are offered in multiple platforms and media are 
less affected. As such the proposed draft section 80A focuses solely on artistic works.
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Chapter 2 – Legal Context: Aims and Roles of Moral Rights and Copyright 
Law 
Only one thing is impossible for God: to find any sense in any copyright law on the planet. 
Mark Twain, Mark Twain’s Notebook, 23 May 1903 
1. Introduction 
This chapter attempts that which Twain claimed to be impossible: to make some sense of UK 
copyright law and moral rights doctrine, so far as they relate to the overarching aims of the thesis. In 
order to do so, some comparison with civil law copyright is inevitable, as the way UK copyright law 
and its version of moral rights are viewed and understood is influenced by the way they relate to their 
counterpart in civil law regimes.
1
 A key difficulty lies in how copyright law and moral rights doctrine 
are viewed as irreconcilably different in terms of their historical origins, scope and focus, not just as 
between the two major systems of law, i.e. the common law and civil law systems, but also between 
different jurisdictions even those situated within the same legal system.
2
  
As set out in the previous chapter, this thesis demonstrates that where a jurisdiction 
countenances the destruction of creative works with impunity, it exposes jurisprudential flaws in 
cracks in both copyright law and moral rights. In other words, it is difficult to reconcile the permissive 
stance towards destruction with the aims and roles of both copyright law and moral rights doctrine. 
This chapter examines those aims and roles.   
What this chapter intends to demonstrate is that firstly, the natural law origins of moral rights 
have never been alien to UK copyright law and secondly, that moral rights doctrine does not oppose 
the UK copyright goal of public interest; rather, it is essential in attaining it.   
It begins by offering a historical overview of the development of moral rights doctrine and its 
relationship to copyright law, before mapping out their perceived aims and roles, as well as those of 
copyright. The historical background provided is relatively brief as there is an abundance of existing 
literature on the topic.
3
 The purpose here is to demonstrate that historically the UK has not always 
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been as inimical to the idea of moral rights as is commonly thought.  As such it questions why the UK 
should have been ’compelled, kicking and screaming’ to adopt moral rights,
4
 or ‘caught by surprise’ 
at the Rome Conference in 1928 when Art.6bis was introduced into the Berne Convention,
5
 when 
there is evidence that moral rights, or at least, the sentiments associated with moral rights, had been 
known to UK lawyers for some time prior to the 1928 Conference.   
It will also be shown that civil law copyright and common law copyright are not that 
divergent,
6
 in that they stem from common roots, although they may have each evolved differently, 
with common law copyright seemingly placing the public interest to the fore,
7
 while the author is 
central to civil law copyright. Furthermore, it is clear that these two regimes are gradually converging 
under the influences of international harmonisation.
8
 Essentially, it is a contention of this thesis that as 
moral rights have a long established pedigree in common law copyright, and is not as ‘foreign’ as is 
traditionally thought to be, then there should be little objection to an expansion of moral rights in the 
UK. 
The chapter then moves on to examine the aims and roles of copyright and moral rights. The 
currently accepted predominant role of moral rights doctrine is that it is a source of personality rights 
for creators, which are non-economic in nature, as opposed to those rights endowed by copyright, 
which are economic in nature. While there has been some dispute as to whether the public interest 
was truly the aim of the Statute of Anne, it is commonly accepted that common law copyright law has 
been operating on this basis ever since.
9
  
In order to demonstrate that moral rights support copyright’s public interest goals, it will be 
shown firstly that the public interest in the ‘encouragement of learning’ stipulated in the Statute of 
Anne, is only achieved partially through the economic rights granted by copyright. The economic 
rights, such as the reproduction right, only serve certain creative industries well, particularly those of 
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a commercial nature and which deal with works which may be replicated easily, such as books and 
music. However, such rights are essentially meaningless for visual artists who typically produce one-
off works or in limited editions. Furthermore, copyright protects works which are not created through 
economic inducements e.g. student works, personal letters etc. It is clear that economic incentives are 
not the only inducements for certain works.
10
 
It will be argued that economic rights alone do not work effectively as incentives for creators. 
Moral rights are just as important in that they address crucial non-economic concerns shared by 
creators: that the integrity of their works is protected. If copyright’s aim of ‘encouragement of 
learning’ includes a fostering of the arts, then moral rights are essential in fulfilling this aim. As the 
key to understanding the role of moral rights in fostering the arts is an understanding of just what 
exactly is entailed in the creative process,
11
 part of this chapter is devoted to understanding this very 
process.  
Essentially, this chapter argues that moral rights doctrine, properly interpreted and applied, with a 
more robust integrity right, will not only dovetail neatly with the key aims of UK copyright law, but 
will actually serve to fulfil and underscore these aims. 
2. Background and history of Copyright Law and Moral Rights Doctrine in the UK – a search 
for the foundation of moral rights in the UK 







  The predominant conceptual model of the moral rights doctrine was 
developed in parallel in these two countries, but primarily through a series of mid-19
th
 century court 
decisions in France,
13
 subject to the influence of French and German jurists, such as Morillot, Gierke 
and Kohler, and the philosophers Kant and Hegel, who espoused the view that a creation was the 
embodiment of its author’s personality.  
In France, droit moral emerged from numerous debates which took place on the nature of 
droit d’auteur in the late 18
th
 century. The notion that droit d’auteur was a natural right is credited to 
the French Revolution, during which time it was strenuously argued that droit d’auteur did not stem 
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from any royal privilege, but was instead a natural right arising from the author’s act of creation.
14
 
The acceptance of this notion laid the foundation for the development of droit moral i.e. non-property 
rights which belong to the author, which gradually evolved through the French courts throughout the 
19
th
 century, until by 1880, the droit moral rights of droit de divulation, droit a la paternite, and droit 
au respect de l’oeuvre were well established in French jurisprudence.
15
 In the development of the 
doctrine in these court decisions, it is clear that the courts had sought recourse to the natural law.
16
 
Therefore, moral rights doctrine, as it was first recognised, then later matured and finally codified in 
France, was based on natural law principles,
17
 which was also the source of moral rights in the 
common law (see below).  Similarly in Germany, the initial conception of moral rights as natural 
rights was developed in the writings of legal scholars, notably Kohler and Gierke, which in turn were 
influenced by the underlying Roman Law and natural law precepts in the German legal system.
18
 The 
theoretical grounding for moral rights was thus nurtured in these two countries, eventually finding 
expression in Art.6bis of the Berne Convention.   
Although France and Germany developed and articulated the theoretical basis for the moral 
rights doctrine, it is also clear that at some point English law recognised the features of moral rights 
independently, on the basis that these were natural rights belonging to the author. That point arguably 
came during The Battle of the Books, a series of cases involving authors, publishers, book-sellers and 
the courts in the eighteenth century, which culminated in a definitive judicial construction of the 
Statute of Anne 1710, generally regarded as the first English copyright statute.
19
 It is noted that these 
cases and contemporary legal commentaries pre-date those French court decisions referred to above, 
and even the writings of Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer, which first expressed and then developed 
                                                             
14
  Russell J. DaSilva, ‘Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in France 
and the United States’ (1981) 28 Bulletin Copyright Society of USA 7-8. According to Ginsbrug, ‘mixed 
motives underlay initial French copyright laws’, although she acknowledges the presence of ‘a strong 
authors’ right in the revolutionary laws’. See Ginsburg (n 6) at 1014.  
15
   ibid., 10. 
16
  Robert Hauhart, ‘Natural Law Basis for the Copyright Doctrine of Droit Moral’ (1985) Catholic Lawyer 
53, 64. 
17
  DaSilva (n 14) 4. 
18
  Davies and Garnett (n 12)  para 2-004  20. 
19
  Although the Statute of Anne 1710 is generally regarded as the first copyright statute, it was preceded by 
a number of copyright related statutes e.g. Star Chamber Decrees of 1586, 1637, the Licensing Act of 
1662 etc. However these early statutes were censorship laws primarily and the Statute of Anne itself was 
fundamentally legislation to regulate the book trade. See Patterson (n 3) for a historical description of 




moral rights, suggesting that common-law juridical conceptions of moral rights may actually have a 
much older pedigree than those developed in the civil law countries.
20
     
The first clear English articulation of moral rights can be found in one of the Battle cases, 
specifically Lord Mansfield’s judgment in Millar v Taylor (1769).
21
 Lord Mansfield’s description of 
the evils which may befall an author was clearly a precursor of moral rights:   
He is no more master of the use of his own name. He has no control over the correctness of 
his own work, He can not prevent additions. He can not retract errors. He can not amend; or 
cancel a faulty edition. Any one may print, pirate, and perpetuate the imperfections, the 
disgrace and against the will of the author; may propagate sentiments under his name, which 
he disapproves, repents and is ashamed of. 
Lord Mansfield argued that ‘It is an injury, by a faulty, ignorant and incorrect edition, to 
disgrace (the author’s) work and mislead the reader.’ These perceived injuries were described 
alongside clearly more pecuniary wrongs which may also befall an author: ‘[The author] can reap no 
pecuniary profit, if, the next moment after his work comes out, it may be pirated upon worse paper 
and in worse print and in a cheaper volume....The author may not only be deprived of any profit, but 
lose the expense he has been at.’ Clearly, Lord Mansfield envisaged copyright as a composite of 
economic and moral rights.
22
 Indeed, Rose argues that Lord Mansfield had reached his judgment 
based on an early and still developing concept of authorial control, which was ‘based on honor and 
reputation rather than on specifically economic interests’.
23
  
Furthermore, in the same case, Mr Justice Aston opined that the common law was ‘...founded 
on the law of nature and reason...’, indicating the natural law origins of English common law, which 
included embryonic forms of moral rights as described by Lord Mansfield, and not just the economic 
rights with which UK copyright law is identified today. Essentially Millar recognised the natural 
rights which authors had in their literary works, and that such rights had always existed at common 
law.
24
 There is other evidence that English copyright originated from natural law theories; 
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Blackstone’s restatements on literary property refers to Gaius, whose treatise on Roman Law cites 
natural law theory as the basis from which literary property may be derived.
25
  
In any case, just because copyright law has been enshrined in legislation, it does not 
necessarily follow that the rights afforded by copyright should be considered merely discretionary and 
not natural rights.
26
 It could be argued that as the general function of legislation is customarily to 
codify pre-existing rights, then particularly in the common law system, statutes function to 
reformulate pre-existing law and not supplant the common law or rules of equity.
27
 The Statute of 
Anne and subsequent copyright legislation do not in themselves overturn the hypothesis that English 
copyright law was originally rooted in natural law. There is in any case some evidence that the Statute 
of Anne was not always perceived as a source of purely commercial or economic rights. Rose argues 
that an early Statute of Anne case, Pope v Curll,
28
 invoked the Statute for personal as well as 
economic interests, and furthermore, that such personal rights were akin to what we recognise today 
as moral rights.
29
 Another early case, Burnet v Chetwood,
30
 was concerned with what Rose terms as 
‘propriety’ issues,
31
 i.e ‘author’s control over the form and content of his writings’,
32
 rather than 
economic concerns.     
Lord Mansfield’s affirmation of such rights at common law was however overturned five 
years later in Donaldson v Beckett,
33
 which held that the common law right was supplanted by the 
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Statute of Anne, and apparently laid to rest the question of the existence of common law rights at least 
post Statute of Anne. Scholars remain in dispute as to whether the House of Lords in Donaldson in 
fact also denied the prior existence of common law copyright.
34
 
The orthodox view is that, at most, the effect of Donaldson was to extinguish common law 
copyright, not deny its existence altogether, either pre or post Statute of Anne.
35
 Apart from some 
evidence that cases preceding the Statute of Anne had referred to the existence of copyright at 
common law,
36
 the basis for this orthodox view lies in the opinions proffered by the twelve common 
law judges who were summoned by the House of Lords for their expert views. Of the twelve, Lord 
Mansfield, who, we may recall, had expounded on the natural rights of the author in Millar v Taylor, 
remained conspicuously silent.
37
 Little is known as to why he refused to give his opinion,
38
 although it 
may be reasonably surmised that he simply retained his views which were already made known in 
Millar. Owing to the inconsistency in reporting at the time of Donaldson, it is hard to pin down with 
any accuracy what each judge had actually said.
39
 There is some evidence that the reporter may have 
miscounted the judges’ votes and that a majority had actually ruled that the common law copyright 
had survived Anne.
40
 Indeed, the very thorough analysis of Donaldson by Judge Thompson, 
dissenting judge in Wheaton v Peters,
41
 (a US case heard in 1834 on the question of common law 
copyright) concluded that the issue is not as clear as it seems. He argued that the twelve judges in 
Donaldson were actually equally divided in their opinion on the question of the continued existence of 
common law copyright. Only eleven judges had voted, with the exception of Lord Mansfield. But as 
pointed out above, Judge Thompson also surmised that Lord Mansfield had not voted because his 
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opinion was already clear and had not changed since Miller v Taylor. This meant that instead of a 6-5 
vote in favour of the Statute of Anne taking away common law rights, the true import of Donaldson 
was that, if Lord Mansfield had voted, in conformity with his opinion in Millar, the judges were 
equally divided on this question. Judge Thompson concluded thus: ‘That the law in England has not 
been considered as settled, in conformity with the vote on this last question [i.e. whether common law 
is taken away by the statute of Anne] is very certain.’ 
However, modern legal scholars, from an analysis of the individual judicial opinions, are in 
general agreement that a majority of the eleven judges who offered their opinion acknowledged the 
existence of the common law copyright but that it was simply overridden by the Statute of Anne. It is 
thus generally accepted that the final decision by the House of Lords was that the Statute of Anne had 
extinguished common law copyright,
42
 although according to Deazley, the House of Lords denied 
altogether the pre-existence of common law copyright for public interest reasons (see below).
43
  
It is significant that US copyright law, steeped in utilitarianism, having descended from the 
Statute of Anne,
44
 also originally recognised natural rights.
45
  In the years prior to the enactment of the 
US Constitution (ratified in 1788), there is evidence that twelve states had recognised the notion that 
authors possessed natural rights.
46
 For instance, the law of Massachusetts in 1783 recognised that 
authors, scientists and other creators should be encouraged by securing the fruits of their intellectual 
labour, and explicitly declared that such security lay within the natural rights of all men.
47
 The 
preamble to the New Hampshire statute utilises similar language while the preamble to the 
Connecticut statue of 1783 refers to the ‘principles of natural equity and justice’.
48
 James Madison 
declared that the ‘copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of 
common law’.
49
 Eventually, as in the UK, in the US case of Wheaton v Peters,
50
 common law rights 
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were for the first time expressly denied, and from that point onwards, copyright law in the US, like the 
UK, began to distance itself from its natural rights roots. The point remains that Anglo-American 
copyright laws were founded in natural law. Yet, in analysing Anglo-American copyright 
jurisprudence, Yen concludes that ‘the natural law concepts which inspired common law copyright 
and early copyright statutes remained part and parcel of copyright jurisprudence.’
51
 Yen is not alone 
in arriving at this conclusion; other legal scholars also maintain that the basis for the justification of 
Anglo-American copyright law, although ostensibly utilitarianism, as initially described and 
emphasised in both Donaldson and Wheaton, may be more correctly described as a combination of 
utilitarianism and natural rights theories.
52
  
According to current academic orthodoxy therefore, two propositions can be established; 
firstly that common law rights were merely supplanted by the Statute of Anne, and secondly that the 
common law rights were based on natural law theory. Further, it has also been pointed out that the 
judges in Donaldson were focused specifically on the duration of copyright, i.e. the perpetuity of 
copyright, and the right to re-print one’s works.
53
 It should also be remembered that the Statute of 
Anne itself only prohibited the ‘printing and re-printing of books’. Therefore, a third proposition may 
be made. If there were any other common law rights which were not specifically dealt with in 
Donaldson, it could be argued that these rights were not supplanted by the Statute of Anne.
54
   
Indeed, according to Hauhart, commentaries from this period continued to recognise the 
natural law and common law right to literary works,
55
 suggesting that common law rights continued to 
subsist despite Donaldson’s apparent interpretation of the Statute of Anne. Hauhart makes reference 
to Enfield’s Observations on Literary Property, written in 1774, which concluded that the rights of 
authors were founded in natural justice, as well as the dissenting opinion in a Scottish case 
contemporary with Donaldson,
56
 which expressed the view that the author’s right had its origin in 
natural law, and was not removed by the Statute of Anne. Based on these sources, Hauhart thus also 
makes the point that the rights of authors in Britain were derived from the same source that droit 
                                                             
51
  Yen (n 10) 531. 
52
  Orit Fischman Afori, ‘Human Rights and Copyright: The Introduction of Natural Law Considerations 
into American Copyright Law’ (2004) 14 Fordham Intellectual Property Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 497, 505-506; Stewart E. Sterk, ‘Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law’ (1996) 94 Michigan 
Law Review 1197; J. Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright 2.0 and You (Oxford University Press 
2011), 53; R.P. Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press 2011) 3, 9.  
53
  Patterson (n 3) 173-75; Hauhart (n 16) 66. 
54
  Patterson (n 3) 175. 
55
  Hauhart (n 16) 65; Reddy (n 25) 538. 
56




moral sprang from: natural law.
57
 If indeed the Statute of Anne did not supplant common law 
copyright in its entirety, it arguably left untouched vestiges of natural law and common law copyright, 
which would include the moral rights first identified by Lord Mansfield. While a succession of 

















 and in 1988,
66
 each one an expansion of copyright and its term of protection, the last 
remaining vestige of common law copyright, moral rights, was not officially legislated, save for a 
brief appearance in the Fine Arts Copyright Act of 1862,
67
 which is discussed below, until their 
inclusion in the CDPA in 1988.  
The eventual 1988 codification of moral rights in the UK was initially set in motion at the 
1928 Rome Conference of the Berne Convention. The historical development of the Berne 
Convention and the UK legislation is discussed in more depth in Chapter 4 and a brief account 
suffices here. The original text of the Berne Convention did not provide specifically for moral rights 
until the 1928 Rome Conference when the concept was first proposed, apparently much to the surprise 
of the common law countries, and was ‘coldly received’ by the British countries.
68
 The British 
contingent was eventually won over when the other delegates pointed out that what was proposed 
already existed in the common law.
69
  
The UK’s compliance with the Berne Convention underwent the scrutiny of the Gregory 
Committee in 1952 and that of the Whitford Committee in 1977. The Gregory Committee review 
judged that the Art.6bis rights were addressed adequately in other areas of UK law, (e.g. defamation, 
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contract etc) and concluded that it was not necessary to formally recognise moral rights. The stance 
adopted by the Gregory Committee was arguably contradictory to the British position, taken at the 
Rome Conference, which was that moral rights were foreign and antithetical to the common law. 
Generally the UK’s stance was inconsistent during this period. On the one hand, the UK viewed moral 
rights doctrine as foreign and incompatible with the common law,
70
 on the other, the UK’s position at 
the time of the Rome Conference or at the time of the Gregory Report, was that it had always readily 
provided for these rights in various areas of the common law, and hence such rights were not actually 
unknown or ‘foreign’ to the common law, and that therefore there was no need to specifically enact 
for moral rights.  The Whitford review however found that the UK had not met its obligations under 
Art.6bis despite the findings of the Gregory committee. The eventual enactment of the CDPA, 
including sections relating to moral rights, finally heralded the formal recognition of moral rights 
within the UK.  
The above account demonstrates the inconsistent, ambiguous and ambivalent relationship that 
the UK has always had with moral rights, from initially recognising such rights judicially in 1769, to 
expressing surprise, ignorance and scepticism when presented with the same rights in 1928, and to 
finally reluctantly endorsing the rights, albeit in their most minimal form, in legislation in 1988. Yet, 
underlying this turbulent relationship, is the point that moral rights have always been recognised to 
some extent and in one form or another in the history of UK copyright law, notwithstanding the 
commonly accepted view that the moral rights ‘is relatively new and unfamiliar to UK copyright 
law’,
71
 or that it is ‘unknown to our jurisprudence’.
72
  Plainly it was not unknown or unfamiliar to the 
UK long before the enactment of most recent copyright acts in 1956 and 1988.    
As an example of the UK’s familiarity with moral rights, in the 19th century, artists received 
protection against unauthorised alteration and the fraudulent affixing of signatures to their work under 
a parliamentary statute: the Fine Arts Copyright Act 1862. Davies and Garnett argue that these 
provisions were not in any way related to recognising rights belonging to artists, only that these were 
undesirable activities which deserved to be treated and penalised as criminal offences,
73
 and that any 
claim that the Act introduced basic notions of moral rights is unsubstantiated.
74
 Yet, in the years 
immediately preceding the enactment of the Act, there was evidence that the legislators had the 
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artist’s personal feelings and reputation in mind. Deazley,
75
 in arguing that the Act did introduce a 
new form of moral rights, makes reference to Lord Chancellor Westbury’s House of Lords speech 
which was made in support of the 1862 Act. The Lord Chancellor made it clear that the provisions 
related to fraudulent signatures and unauthorised alteration of works, were intended to be legislated 
with the artist’s reputation and feelings in mind.
76
 In a separate speech, the Lord Chancellor, in his 
capacity as Attorney-General at the time, also stated that these endeavours to introduce such 
legislation were ‘an attempt for the first time to do justice to the artists of this country’,
77
 not simply to 
fulfil a purely utilitarian aim. While these acts may have been framed as criminal offences rather than 
as infringements of private rights, these above statements taken together would suggest that these 
proto-moral rights were introduced and justified in 19th century UK on the basis of natural rights 
accorded to creators.    
While it could be argued that unlike France and Germany, the UK ‘recognised no doctrine of 
moral rights’ in that the doctrine had not been systematically described or theorised in the UK,
78
 it is 
equally arguable that it is not entirely accurate to say that ‘...its laws sometimes happened to protect 
it’ as observed by some academics.
79
 As discussed above, apart from the existence of laws such as the 
laws of defamation and passing-off, which have been held to be approximate or at least 
supplementary to moral rights,
80
 there were independent and explicit pronouncements of rights, by 
Lord Mansfield and later Lord Chancellor Westbury, which could not be described as merely 
coincidentally related to moral rights, being clearly moral rights as conceived by French and German 
jurists.     
The above historical account of common law copyright, droit d’auteur and moral rights 
demonstrates that the economic rights of modern copyright law and moral rights arguably arose from 
a common ancestor, natural law. Spinello and Bottis also make the point that both droit d’auteur and 
Anglo-American copyright, even when recognised in statute, were from the outset ‘tied to the author’s 
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life’ and as such, indicates that the nature of copyright in both systems is that of a natural law right.
81
 
Where the UK is concerned, copyright and moral rights have each pursued their own path, agenda and 
development. While each may have its origin in natural law,
82
 both now arise through positivist 
legislation in the UK, which still remains underpinned by the utilitarian aims and principles first set 
out in the Statute of Anne i.e. ‘...the encouragement of learning...’. Such aims were to be achieved by 
means of a social contract between the author and the public, under which the author obtains a limited 
monopoly in return for making his work available to the public.   
The issue to be explored next is whether the original utilitarian aims of UK copyright law set out 
in the climate of 1710 still endure in the modern day, or whether there are other public interest aims to 
be expected of copyright law today. More specifically and more pertinent to the broader objectives of 
this thesis, the key questions are firstly, whether, and if so, how moral rights doctrine might assist UK 
copyright law in achieving these aims, and secondly, what aims are pursued by moral rights doctrine 
itself and how these aims complement those aims of copyright law.  
3. The Aims of Copyright Law and Moral Rights Doctrine 
a.  Aims of Common Law Copyright and Civil Law Copyright 
It is noteworthy and perhaps surprising that the Berne Convention does not attempt to define 
copyright, which appears to support Mark Twain’s grouse about the impossibility in making sense of 
copyright.
83
 However, the Berne Convention does explain why it does not attempt the impossible: 
‘…the very concept of copyright from a philosophical, theoretical and pragmatic point of 
view differs country by country, since each has its own legal framework influenced by social 
and economic factors. To define it in a manner binding on all member countries would be 
difficult if not impossible.’
84
 
These differences in ‘theoretical, philosophical and pragmatic’ viewpoints of copyright refer 
to the diametrically opposing conceptions of copyright in civil law and common law regimes. While 
civil law countries, typified by France and Germany, view copyright as an author-centric set of laws, 
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copyright in common law countries may be described as public or society-centric, 
85
 a position which 
stems from the Statute of Anne.  
The ‘encouragement of learning’ exhorted in the Statute of Anne, and reflected in the US 
constitution’s copyright clause,
86
 is fulfilled by the social contract mentioned above, whereby 
exclusive rights are given to authors in order to reward them, and to induce them into producing 
further works. The aim is that the public will benefit from the production of new works. Apart from 
the production of new works, a corresponding aim is to maximise the dissemination of and access to 
these works, which means that the rights given to authors as a reward and incentive, should not hinder 
such dissemination and access unnecessarily, thus preserving the public domain. The public interest, 
not the author’s, is the main focus of copyright in the UK and US.
87
  
The utilitarian leanings of common law copyright would appear to contrast sharply with civil 
law’s veneration of the author, which is reflected in the French term for its copyright, droit d’auteur. 
The basis for emphasising the author lies in the Romantic notion of the author as a creative genius, 
whose creative work is viewed as an extension of his personality. This unique and special relationship 
which exists between an author and his work in turn justifies the author’s right in exercising total 
control over any use of his work. If the analogy of a parent and child is used, whereby the author is 
the parent and his work his child, it becomes easier to understand the nature of the bond which exists 
between author and work;
88
 it is one that is deeply personal and protective. It is thus apparent why 
moral rights doctrine developed naturally from droit d’auteur.  
However, notwithstanding the commonly accepted distinction between common law and civil 
law copyright, recent scholarship have eschewed such a strict delineation. Apart from evidence that 
both common law and civil law copyright have their roots in natural law, both possess more features 
in common than is apparent at first glance. For instance, in respect of civil law copyright, the work is 
viewed essentially as a set of property rights and the author’s rights are property rights. French jurist, 
Le Chapelier, declared that ‘the most personal of all forms of property is the work, the fruit of a 
writer’s thoughts’.
89
 In contrast, common law copyright is viewed essentially as a set of monopoly 
rights granted by statute. However, the distinction is not so clear and secure in practice. Author’s 
rights are arguably not true property rights as they are temporary and consist of prerogatives expressly 
                                                             
85
  Ginsburg (n 6) 991-92. 
86
  Congress is vested with the power ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries’. 
87
  See Davies (n 7) generally. 
88
  Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Soul of Creativity: Forging a Moral Rights Law for the United States 
(Stanford University Press 2010) 2; Strowel (n 46) 235, 245. 
89




specified by law, quite unlike property rights in more corporeal entities. As for copyright, it has also 
been argued time and again that it is a property right, not a mere monopoly.
90
 Yet, at the same time, 
both author’s rights and copyright can be described as monopolies, as they both grant exclusive rights 
over works. The distinction between the two thus is not clear.
91
  
While it has been argued that both copyright and droit d’auteur originate from natural law 
roots, but have diverged from these origins and still appear divergent today, they are undoubtedly 
converging in terms of the scope of protection, duration and other aspects of copyright, principally 
owing to harmonising treaties and conventions.
92
   
However, one area above all remains divisive: moral rights. In justifying the continued 
recognition of moral rights, or conversely, in dismissing them altogether, civil law and Anglo-
American jurists tend to retreat to their respective recent philosophical underpinnings: natural law and 
utilitarianism.
93
 As the objective of this thesis is to seek cogent arguments in support for an expansion 
of moral rights in the UK, the next section focuses on the currently accepted basis for its copyright 
regime, utilitarianism.  
b. The public interest in UK copyright regime 
The Statute of Anne was enacted with the aim of ‘...the encouragement of learning...’. Two questions 
arise from the pronouncement of such a lofty goal. Firstly, what was the impetus for such a goal, and 
secondly, how was it meant to be achieved via copyright.  
The history of how the Statute of Anne came to be is well established and a brief account 
suffices here. The Stationers’ Company, a group of booksellers and printers, had petitioned 
Parliament when their official licence, provided under the Licensing Act to publish,
94
 expired in 1694. 
From the day the Licensing Act expired, they issued a series of petitions/bills to ensure their 
monopoly over the printing and publishing of books. Most of the early petitions/bills, which were 
rejected, were based on censorship laws.
95
 Their tactics then changed course on 26 February 1706 
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when they issued a petition this time emphasising the securing of authors’ rights by law.
96
 Their 
strategy was simple: once authors’ perpetual common law rights were recognised, in practice the 
authors’ copyrights and their manuscripts would then be purchased by the stationers, thus giving them 
a perpetual monopoly on the printing and re-printing of the authors’ books. As their new found cause 
was also now supported by illustrious writers such as Jonathan Swift, Alexander Pope and Daniel 
Defoe,
97
 their petitions gained credence. Furthermore, the basis for the legal recognition of such 
authors’ rights was that it was in the public interest: by securing their rights, authors would thus be 
incentivised to produce more works.  
Parliament went along with the public interest argument but also recognised that if the public 
were to truly benefit from the endowment of authors’ rights, not only should an increased production 
of new works be encouraged, there should also be more widespread dissemination of created works. 
Thus the statute endowed authors with rights, in order to encourage them to produce books, but also, 
to the chagrin of the booksellers, imposed a temporal limit on these rights, ensuring that after a certain 
period of time, their books would enter the ‘public domain’.
98
 The statute also provided that there 
should be price controls on books,
99
 and that a copy of each new book should be deposited in the nine 
privileged libraries,
100
 both of which were clearly attempts at ensuring easier access to books. 
Unfortunately, save for the fact that Jonathan Swift drafted the original Bill, and the various petitions 
issued by the booksellers, no record exists of the subsequent debates and editing, and the true 
intentions of the drafters of the Statute of Anne may only be conjectured from the final form of the 
statute itself.
101
 In sum, the public interests ostensibly envisaged by Parliament thus were to 
incentivise authors to produce more works and to ensure the widespread dissemination of those works 
to the reading public, both of which were deemed to be essential to achieving the overall aim of ‘...the 
encouragement of learning...’.   
Deazley has argued, that it was with the public interest in mind, that the House of Lords in 
Donaldson denied the existence of common law copyright altogether. By so doing, they were 
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‘...acting in furtherance of much broader social goals and principles.’
102
 According to Deazley, the 
‘common good’ was and should ever be the overriding principle of the copyright regime.
103
 He cites 
the Universities Act of 1775, which granted perpetual copyright to educational institutions, including 
the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, in support of this contention. Although it may appear at 
first glance contradictory that perpetual copyright would be granted to universities at around the same 
time perpetual copyright was also denied in Donaldson, this apparent contradiction can be reconciled 
as follows.  The granting of perpetual copyright to the universities clearly promoted the overriding 
public interest of advancing education and learning.  Deazley takes this as evidence that the House of 
Lords’ prevailing sentiment at the time was that a public interest in promoting education was the 
paramount concern of copyright. This explains why perpetual copyright generally was denied in 
Donaldson. The fear was that perpetual copyright would result in locking up works in the hands of 
booksellers. While it was desirable from a public interest standpoint that the universities, being seats 
of learning, were granted perpetual copyright, it was equally desirable that booksellers were denied 
perpetual copyright. Indeed, Lord Camden’s speech on the Statute of Anne was concerned with the 
undesirable prospect of perpetual copyright locking up works in the hands of booksellers.
104
  
It would appear that Donaldson was essentially a policy decision, concerned with the 
consequences or utility of copyright, rather than the revelation of an overriding legal principle or 
rationale, which disregarded the evidence of eminent common law judges and the pre-Anne cases 
which clearly spoke of a pre-existing common law or natural law copyright.  Sherman and Bently also 
recognised that Donaldson was not so much concerned with the nature of copyright but with its 
consequences.
105
 To Coombe, while Donaldson may have appeared to settle questions about the 
Statute of Anne, it failed to provide any rationale for its decision.
106
 Despite misgivings about the 
unresolved debate over literary property, natural law or common law copyright, it is this underlying 
policy which has been sustained through the centuries to the present day, and which are the cards with 
which creators, owners, and users are dealt.   
In summary, in light of available evidence and prevailing opinion, copyright in the UK was 
initially rooted in natural rights or the common law; that natural/common law copyright was 
subsequently supplanted by the Statute of Anne, and the extinguishment (which is debatable) of 
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natural rights in literary works by Donaldson was a decision based on policy considerations, not legal 
theory or principles.   
If the public interest in the encouragement of learning, and not the recognition of natural rights in 
creative works, is the true goal of present day UK copyright law, it may seem logical to ask how such 
a goal is to be achieved and whether, and to what extent stronger moral rights might pose an obstacle, 
to the achievement of such goal. Yet, there are cogent arguments to support the view that stronger 
moral rights are in fact essential to the attaining of this goal, and that the failure to recognise a right 
against destruction actually undermines it.  
4. The public interest in the encouragement of learning: the role of copyright 
How is the public interest in the encouragement of learning to be achieved through copyright? Firstly, 
the economic returns derived from the exercise of the exclusive right to make copies provide an 
incentive to creators to produce more works.
107
 Secondly, copyright law is designed to ensure that 
works are widely disseminated and communicated to the public.
108
 It can be seen that both aims 
involve respectively, the attainment of money and the expenditure of money leading one copyright 
observer to opine bluntly: ‘Mostly, though, copyright is about money.’
109
 This view is true today in 
practice, and in the midst of the multitude of high stakes copyright infringement litigation and the 
multi-million pound deals forged in the profitable copyright industries, the lofty fundamental aim of 
copyright in either ‘the encouragement of learning’ or to ‘promote the progress of science and useful 
arts’ is too easily forgotten.
110
 
The reasoning behind copyright’s emphasis on economic rights is that economic rights would 
allow the copyright owner to exploit his rights efficiently, thus also ensuring efficient distribution of 
his works to the public, which is the main beneficiary of copyright. The copyright work is viewed as a 
product, a mere commodity,
111
 while the public is its consumer. Additionally, it is reasoned that the 
economic returns afforded by copyright function to incentivise the further creation of new works. 
Moral rights doctrine, on the other hand, has different aims which focus on the author. It ensures that 
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his work remains true to his vision first of all; it is not a mere product but a creative endeavour which 
emanates from his personality. From the viewpoint of creators therefore, while copyright aims to 
maximise monetary returns in exchange for their work, moral rights doctrine aims to preserve their 
vision and spiritual relationship with their work.  
It can thus be seen why moral rights doctrine mean so much more to artists who work in the 
fine arts and performing arts, rather than those who work in more commercial lines, such as graphic 
design. This is because the former aim to communicate a message or a vision, whereas the latter aim 
to please clients. In this regard, Kwall has identified how moral rights doctrine not only recognises but 
values the ‘intrinsic dimension of the creative process’,
112
 as well as the author’s personal message 
embodied within his work,
113
 which the copyright system fails to acknowledge. In failing to fully 
understand what creative works mean to their creators and how and why creative artists work and 
innovate, the copyright system with its emphasis on economic rights and minimal recognition of 
moral rights, fails them fundamentally.  
a. What do creations mean to their creators? 
In order to ascertain what ‘encouragement of learning’ meant in 1710, and what it means to us today, 
it is instructive to appreciate the state of literature and the fine arts at the time, and also what these 
works meant to their creators and to society. The following brief survey of selected opinions rendered 
at the time gives us an impression.   
For instance, according to Milton, ‘books are seen as the embodiments of authors and authors 
are presented as living in their books.’
114
 At around the time immediately preceding the Statute of 
Anne, Milton wrote Areopagitica, primarily as a response to the enactment of the Licensing Order of 
1643, which decreed, among other things, that books deemed offensive were to be seized and 
destroyed. Although primarily a treatise against censorship, the imagery Milton conjures in the 
Areopagitica reflects his own perception of literary works, that they are ‘embodiments of authors’:  
For books are not absolutely dead things, but do contain a potency of life in them to be as 
active as that soul was whose progeny they are; nay, they do preserve as in a vial the purest 
efficacy and extraction of that living intellect that bred them.
115
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During the same period, Defoe wrote a series of pieces to put forward the view that it was 
authors who deserved the law’s protection against copying.
116
 In one of his Reviews,
117
 Defoe used the 
analogy of parent and progeny to describe the relationship between the author and his book: ‘A 
Book… tis the Child of his Inventions; the Brat of this Brain’.
118
  In An Essay on the Regulation of the 
Press, Defoe does make reference to the ‘due Reward’ of authors, which is robbed from them when 
copies of their books are printed without their authorisation.
119
 Interestingly, he is particularly 
concerned with the publication of imperfect copies of books, which are strewn with ‘surreptitious and 
spurious corrections and innumerable Errors’, calling such an act ‘a most injurious piece of Violence’, 
which results in ‘the Design of the Author’ being ‘inverted, concealed or destroyed, and the 
information the world would reap by a curious and well studied Discourse, is dwindled into 
Confusion and Nonsense.’
120
 Defoe was clearly concerned about the integrity of his works, anxious 
that they would not end up mangled and mutilated, either deliberately or callously, which would 
invert, conceal or destroy his message. This echoes the concerns raised by Lord Mansfield in Millar v 
Taylor which today are addressed by the right of integrity.  
Taken together, these passages of Defoe and Milton display deep anxieties which occupied 
their minds. To Milton, books embodied the soul of their authors, while to Defoe, the integrity of his 
message was paramount.  These concerns of creators were as significant as the economic incentives 
promised by copyright.  
On the other hand, Samuel Johnson is reported to have been against perpetual copyright, and 
thought that authors should be given a reward in exchange for the free dissemination of their works, 
even though he acknowledged that authors had a ‘metaphysical right of creation’ which is ‘stronger 
than that of occupancy’.
121
 Johnson mulled over the role of the author and his claims to copyright 
constantly.
122
 He strongly believed that books should be universally disseminated, for the general 
good of society, and perpetual copyright would pose an obstacle to this. In furtherance of his belief of 
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what was good for society therefore, he opined that the author should retain the sole right of printing 
and selling of his work for his lifetime (and also belong to his heirs for a fixed period after his death) 
on the basis that ‘this is agreeable to moral right, and inconvenient to the publick, for who will be so 
diligent as to the author to improve the book or who can know so well how to improve it?’
123
 
Johnson’s reasoning was that not only would such a right provide the author with a source of income, 
it was also because only the author would publish the work accurately and indeed, make 
improvements upon it if necessary.  Ultimately, for the good of society, the accuracy of the author’s 
work was foremost to Johnson. This is reflected in his involvement in the publication of Lives of the 
Poets. A group of eminent booksellers had commissioned him to write the book in order to compete 
with another publication on poets produced at that time. This other publication was criticised in a 
letter dated 26 September 1776 from Johnson to Boswell,
124
 as not only having type which was 
‘extremely small, that many people could not read them’ but that ‘the inaccuracy of the press was 
very conspicuous’
125
   
Income to authors, important as it was at the time of Milton, Defoe and Johnson, and still is 
today, was arguably something that was necessary, to keep body and soul together. What was of 
critical importance however, even to a practical minded man like Johnson, was the accuracy, the 
integrity of one’s work.  
b. What drives the creative process?  
It is contended that economic returns have never been crucial to creators in the sense of encouraging 
the creation of more works. On the contrary it has been suggested that an abundance of wealth would 
have the opposite effect. According to the 19
th
 century writer, William Benton Clulow, ‘Competence 
of fortune, and a mind at ease, have in thousands of instances given the death-blow to literary 
ambition and success.’
126
 Clulow argued that adversity actually encouraged more prolific output, ‘in 
countries where plenty is most widely diffused, and a general equality of social condition prevails, 
few writers of eminence ever arise.’ In support of his contentions, he claimed that Lord Bacon wrote a 
considerable amount when unemployed and that Machiavelli composed his notable political treatises 
under similar circumstances. Indeed, he wrote, the world might not have acquired works such as 
Paradise Lost or Robinson Crusoe had their authors enjoyed a much more prosperous living.
127
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This is not to say that authors should never be rewarded for their output, the point is rather 
that wealth may be neither crucial to their continued creativity, nor of utmost importance to them. 
Orwell in Why I Write lists four motives for writing: egoism, aesthetic enthusiasm, historical impulse, 
and political purpose, but misses out wealth, claiming that ‘serious writers,…[are] less interested in 
money.’
128
 How then, and why, do authors, artists and composers create their works? They arguably 
do so from an impetus far removed from the mere prospect of economic success. For instance, 
although impecunious for most of his adult life, Mozart continued to produce unparalleled 
masterpieces.  According to Abert, a Mozart scholar, the urge to create was Mozart’s most basic form 
of existence and needed no external stimuli.
129
 Tchaikovsky described the creative urge as a 
formidable force, which if left uninterrupted, was wont to break the creator.
130
 In a letter describing 
his method of composing, he acknowledged the differences between works created as a result of a 
purely internal creative urge and those created merely in fulfilment of an external commission, the 
main difference being that the former are invariably the artist’s best and most perfect works.
131
 
Significantly, Tchaikovsky admitted that his commissioned works were not necessarily of the highest 
quality. 
Modern legal scholars have recognised the creative urge as being instrumental in the creative 
process and also acknowledged the spiritual importance of the creator’s work.  In The Soul of 
Creativity,
132
 Kwall argues against the postmodern scepticism with the idea of the unique or single 
individual author. This latter view rejects the idea of the creative individual genius and questions why 
he should have any rights to what he creates. She says that ‘the postmodern critique ignores the reality 
that when an author borrows from the cultural fabric in crafting her work, it is still the unique 
combination of past efforts and the author’s original contributions that invests the author’s work with 
its autonomous unique and inviolate stamp.’
133
  
The individual and deeply personal stamp which an artist imprints upon his work is a notion 
which is taken up by art philosopher Denis Dutton. He makes two points about this. Firstly, it is this 
stamp which distinguishes the fine arts from the mere crafts, which are more commercial in nature. 
Dutton, relying on Collingwood’s famous art/craft distinction,
134
 argues that the craftsman has a 
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preconceived idea of the end product, whereas the artist embarks on a creative process which 
meanders until he achieves a form which encapsulates his personal message perfectly or conveys 
exactly the emotional feeling he wished to impress upon his audience.
135
  
Dutton also goes on to make the point that the ‘high-art traditions demand individuality’,
136
 
that ‘the work of art is another human mind incarnate: not in flesh and blood, but in sounds, words 
and colours’,
137
 echoing Milton’s thoughts similarly expressed in Areopagitica more than three 
centuries before. Upon taking receipt of a work of art, the audience also gains, not only a mere 
reflection or impression of the artist’s personality, but his personality itself. The work is not only a 
part of the artist; it is the artist personified. There is perhaps no stronger advocate of moral rights than 
John Merryman, whose rationale for the recognition of moral rights, also refers to the personality of 
the artist, 
The primary justification for the protection of moral rights is the idea that the work of art is an 
extension of the artist’s personality, an expression of his innermost being. To mistreat the 
work of art is to mistreat the artist, to invade his area of privacy, to impair his personality.
138
   
Social psychologists have both conjectured and then empirically demonstrated the futility of 
reward in motivating artistic creativity. Indeed, they have demonstrated the converse, that reward may 
demotivate artistic endeavours,
139
  and have advocated that the intrinsic dimension is key to artistic 
creativity.
140
 Amabile and Tighe have thus proposed that ‘a creative society can only be nurtured if 
people are intrinsically motivated.’
141
 
Therefore, not only are economic incentives often insufficient on their own in encouraging 
creativity, it appears that, as Clulow averred, they may have a negative impact on creativity. An 
example of the capacity of copyright, with its emphasis on the economic to harm creativity is offered 
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by Suggs’ study of the jazz movement,
142
 which demonstrates a correlation between a diminished 
capacity for innovation in jazz music, and the expanding scope and term of protection in copyright 
law.
143
 Suggs argues that this is because current copyright law fails to appreciate the true significance 
of cultural works which lie in their ‘social, psychological and even physiological’ effects, rather than 
the economic revenues they generate.
144
 Where jazz was concerned, he suggests that by creating 
formalities such as fixation and emphasising the value of recorded copies rather than live 
performances, an important element in the creation of jazz music, copyright law led to the slow 
demise in the development and evolution of jazz as an art form. In failing to recognise this, copyright 
not only fails creators but also fails to encourage the development and progress of certain art forms, 
such as jazz. His proposals for reforms may be different from those suggested here, but nevertheless 
he makes the same compelling points made in this thesis, i.e. that the emphasis of copyright law on 
economic rights clearly disregards inconvenient realities about the creative process.  
The external stimuli of commissions and economic success is also referred to by Sentfleben, 
who argues for a recalibration of the current copyright model on the basis that it conflicts with 
Bourdieu’s theoretical description of the social structures set within the literary and artistic field.
145
 
Essentially, according to Senftleben, Bourdieu explains that society consists of autonomous social 
spaces, or fields, which possess their own rules, norms and dominance structures. However, such 
internal workings are constantly tested by external influences, and the level of autonomy experienced 
by a field depends on the extent to which it resists or embraces these external influences.
146
 According 
to Bourdieu, as explained by Senftleben, the social construct of the literary and artistic field dictates 
independence from economic and political powers.
147
 In other words, monetary success is rejected as 
a standard of success. The quality standards set within the field are therefore independent of external 
stimuli, and instead are shaped by those who dominate the field. Those who dominate the field are 
essentially those artists who have been judged by their peers to be first among equals. It follows that 
the very highest quality works are those which are created entirely autonomously by artists who care 
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Sentfleben argues that copyright with its offer of monetary rewards for creative work is 
therefore at odds with Bourdieu’s theoretical model.
149
 Copyright is a hugely influential external 
factor that threatens to disrupt the autonomy of the literary and artistic field, risking an increase in the 
production of inferior works. Artists who are lured by commercial success would be inclined to 
produce more profitable, more mainstream works, instead of remaining true to their aesthetic 
sensibilities.
150
    
It must be emphasised that it is not argued that the economic benefits of copyright are completely 
unimportant or irrelevant to creativity, as after all artists do need at least the basic amenities. 
However, the intrinsic quality of artistic activity also needs to be acknowledged on at least an equal 
footing with economic rights, and that it is moral rights which motivates and encourages the best work 
from artists and writers, not copyright. Artists do not live by bread alone. ‘Writing for money and 
preservation of copyright are,...the ruin of literature’ according to Schopenhauer.
151
 Clearly, money 
has not always been the main driving force behind creative endeavours in any case; after all, as Suggs 
points out, ‘...expressive culture pre dates the invention of both money and mercantile trade.’
152
 It is 
the deep desire to create something which embodies one’s personality or to communicate a unique 
message, as described by Dutton above, which drives artists to do what they do, not mere economic 
rewards. Leonard Bernstein explains this drive thus: ‘(t)hey write, they paint, they perform, produce, 
whatever, because life to them is inconceivable without doing so.’
153
  
5. The public interest in the encouragement of learning: the role of moral rights 
We have seen above that the economic incentives of copyright do not always fulfil an artist’s needs, 
apart from providing them with a living. The question therefore is whether moral rights might play a 
bigger role in this aspect. Moral rights protect a creator’s interests in attribution and integrity. It will 
be argued below that these interests are just as important, if not more, to creators. In relation to 
copyright law’s utilitarian goals of ensuring that social benefits flow from the protection of authorial 
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works, moral rights play a vital role in protecting attribution and integrity interests and as such foster 
a climate which is conducive to creativity.
154
  
An empirical study carried out by Kenyon and Wright demonstrates that creators, particularly 
visual artists, see their interests in their works quite differently from how law makers perceive their 
interests to be.
155
 Although this study was conducted with particular aims in mind i.e. Australian law 
reform in respect of fair use provisions, the responses of the participants, who were all practitioners 
within the cultural and creative communities, were revealing in terms of how they wished themselves 
and their works to be treated. It was telling that not all creators interviewed desired payment for all 
types of public use. The reason they gave was because use by museums and similar institutions would 
generate other types of benefit which were more valuable than monetary payment, such as publicity 
and in particular, preservation.
156
 The revelation lies in just how much creators value the preservation 
of their works. This demonstrates the importance which creators attach to maintaining not only the 
integrity of their works, but also the lifespan of their works, and which reflect that which creators 
truly desire from copyright laws.  
As we have already seen above, literary authors also emphasise the importance of the 
integrity of their work. Balzac for instance has grumbled incessantly about dramatists who turned his 
work into theatre pieces, grumbling that his work has been ‘butchered, drawn, stripped, quartered, 
grilled on the footlights.’
157
 As for musical composers, while we will never know what Mozart might 
make of the use of his music as the soundtrack to Amadeus, music critics have described the 
soundtrack as amounting to a ‘mutilation’ of his music, while Disney’s Fantasia has been described 
as ‘musical blasphemy’. 
158
 Pop and rap/hip-hop musicians too have objected to the use of their music 
in what they consider to be inappropriate contexts. Connie Francis objected to the use of her works for 
‘sexually themed’ films,
159
 while hip-hop artist ‘Pitbull’ objected to the distortion of one of his works 
by an Australian DJ.
160
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Artists and other creators do not live by bread alone, but lead rich and productive lives by 
simply being able to experience the deeply satisfying process of creating art works, although it is 
acknowledged that there are artists who thrive on the commercialisation of their works e.g. Andy 
Warhol. What matters more to most creators is the preservation of their precious creations, not merely 
their commercialisation. This is where moral rights come into play.  Basically moral rights doctrine 
encapsulates a bundle of rights which aim to protect a creator’s relationship with his creation, while 
copyright law governs the economic rights of a creator, for example, by granting the creator exclusive 
rights to make copies of his own work, or to distribute copies of his work. Moral rights doctrine 
focuses on the creator’s personal and spiritual relationship with his work, even after he has divested 
himself of his copyright, for example, by ensuring that his works are correctly attributed to him, or 
that they may not be treated in a derogatory manner.  
It is an understatement to simply define moral rights as a set of personality rights as they do 
so much more. Adeney for instance has outlined the many different functions of moral rights. In 
addition to protecting personality, some of these include the following: to uphold human rights, to 
prevent consumer deception, to maintain reputations, and ‘as a guardian of civilisation and the arts, 
and as a bulwark against the dilution of the arts’.
161
 Vaver has also argued a public interest role for 
moral rights, on the basis that firstly, moral rights ensure the authenticity of works, secondly, that they 
function as a social reward to creators, thirdly by ensuring the continuous record of country’s culture, 
and finally they empower creators with the ability to have a say over their creations.
162
 For moral 
rights thus to countenance the destruction of creative works would be to undermine any or all of these 
identified functions.  
Moral rights thus complement and supplement the protection given by copyright law. This was 
recognised by Richard Serra, whose work Tilted Arc, was destroyed in 1989,
163
 shortly before the 
enactment of the US Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) in 1990. He regarded the economic protection 
afforded by copyright law to art works as insufficient and that the moral rights bill introduced by 
Senator Kennedy (eventually enacted as VARA) would be a ‘legal acknowledgement that art is 
something other than a mere commercial product’.
164
  
Moral rights thus may just as equally stimulate creativity through offering protection for the 
creator’s works. Furthermore, the public is also served by moral rights in that they can be assured in 
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the authenticity of works served up for their consumption.
165
 Public interest lies not only in the 
increased availability of works or the ease of dissemination, the oft stated goals of copyright, it also 
lies in ensuring the accuracy and longevity of the works made available to the public. If the public has 
an interest in learning, it surely makes sense that they have access to works which accurately reflect 
their creators’ vision and the lessons that their creators wish to impart. However, not only is the 
accuracy of the public’s learning important, the continued existence of works which may contribute to 
their learning is also important. The destruction of a work of art today means that it is lost to future 
generations who might have been able to generate new insights or inspiration from it, which in turn 
would have contributed to the growing body of knowledge available to the public. In this way, if 
moral rights do not also include a right against the destruction of any creative work, including art 
works, their role in supplementing copyright’s public interest role in the ‘encouragement of learning’ 
is somewhat undermined.     
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to clarify the aims of the UK copyright system, through an analysis of its 
historical development, from its beginnings with the enactment of the Statute of Anne through to the 
present day. What emerges from this analysis is evidence for the fact that the principles embodied by 
moral rights have always been a substantive and important element of UK copyright law. As such, 
there is scope for moral rights to play a much larger role within the UK copyright system, not least, in 
supporting and achieving the perceived aims of copyright.  
Moral rights primarily serve to supplement the economic character of the current UK 
copyright regime. Simply rationalising the copyright system solely on the basis that it provides 
economic incentives raises several issues which may be addressed by moral rights. Firstly, if the goal 
is to disseminate new works for the benefit of the public, then it is arguably counterproductive for 
misleading or inaccurate works to be communicated to the public.
166
 Moral rights would serve to 
correct this, specifically through recognition of the integrity right in particular.  Society is not 
necessarily best served by a surfeit of works; what also matters is the quality and authenticity of the 
works which are on offer for public consumption.   
Secondly, as we have seen above, purely economic rewards fail to recognise the main driver 
behind human creativity. Artistic creators are driven by an innate compulsion to create without the 
need for external incentives. This is evident from the testaments of famous creators such as Mozart, 
Tchaikovsky and Bernstein, as well as recent empirical research conducted by social psychologists. 
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Furthermore, creators are profoundly concerned about the welfare, integrity and posterity of their 
creations, such concern stemming from their identity with their works. They view their creations as 
deeply personal messages and are anxious to ensure that these messages remain intact and true to their 
visions. Moral rights, in offering protection to the integrity of a creator’s work, embrace these 
impulses fully and thus offer as much incentive, if not more, to creators as economic rights.  
However, in order for moral rights to effectively perform its proper role in upholding the 
public interest in the creation and dissemination of new works, not only should the UK copyright 
system give more consideration to moral rights than it currently does, the existing inconsistent 
approach towards the destruction of works of art has to be resolved.  The central question that is 
addressed by the thesis is why the integrity right should stop short of acknowledging the devastating 
impact of destruction, which is permanent and irreparable.   
This chapter thus underpins the aims of this thesis, which is to make the point that it is 
exceedingly difficult to reconcile copyright’s public interest goals of encouraging new works, of 
‘enhancing the common store of culture’,
167
 with a corresponding failure to protect works against 
destruction. The following chapters will reveal that current reasons for rejecting a right for artists to 
object to the destruction of their works are unsustainable, and that such rejection exposes a persistent 
emphasis on the economic aspects of UK copyright law, which in turn fails to consider the non-
economic attributes of the creative process.  Indeed, it will be shown in chapter 8, which uses 
Singapore as a case study, that by emphasising economic rights over moral rights, this may lead to an 
actual diminishing of the artistic and cultural scene. However, before all these issues are dealt with, 
the following chapter will outline and plead a case for the vital importance of art to society, which 
should be recognised by any copyright regime. Essentially, copyright’s failure to protect against the 
destruction of creative works is illogical and unreasonable, given its devastating consequences, not 
only in terms of the irreversible loss of a work of art, but also in terms of the undesirable wider 
message that the absence of a right to object to destruction delivers: that acts of ‘cultural vandalism’
168
 
may escape censure.  
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Chapter 3 – Social Context: The Destruction of Art and its Impact on Art 
and Society 
‘Immodest figures should not be painted, lest children be corrupted by the sight. What 
shall I say to you, ye Christian painters, who expose half nude figures to the eye? But ye 
who possess such paintings, destroy them or paint them over and ye will then do work 
pleasing to God and the Blessed Virgin’ 




The previous chapter explored the aims of copyright, and the extent to which moral rights doctrine 
serves to fulfil those aims. The failure of moral rights doctrine to recognise a right against destruction 
not only demonstrates its inherent inconsistencies but is also testimony to the doctrine’s failure in 
upholding the role it plays in supporting and supplementing copyright law. This chapter follows up by 
explaining why the destruction of creative works, in particular artistic works, is ultimately damaging 
to society. If the principal aim of copyright is to encourage the production of more creative works for 
the good of society, then it is argued that it should not permit the destruction of creative works 
without good reason, as this is likely to have negative outcomes for society.  
The key objectives of this chapter are as follows, firstly to assess the importance of art to 
society, and secondly, to ascertain the extent of the impact that destruction of art inflicts upon society. 
In order to attain these objectives, this chapter will first outline and make reference to historical 
instances of deliberate art abuse, while emphasising the repulsion with which these acts have been 
greeted by society. The point here is that if was not considered important to society, then such acts of 
destruction would not have been greeted with such public condemnation. It also emphasises the fact 
that men can be so moved as to incinerate paintings or pulverise statues reveals firstly, the depth and 
intensity of passion which art instils in us and secondly, the significance of its role in society. This is 
why this initial section focuses on instances of destruction rather than starting the enquiry with an 
outline of art history or an examination of the meaning of art, which might be considered a more 
traditional or conservative route. An account of Cromwell smashing a stained glass window at 
Peterborough Cathedral,
2
 or of the Nazis setting ablaze works they labelled as degenerate art, or 
recently the Taliban toppling the Bamiyan Buddhas, surely evokes a greater sense of just what it is 
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about art that inflames the passions of both the attacker and the onlooker, while at the same time 
hopefully engendering an understanding of why art might deserve the protection of the law.  
The analysis moves on to focus on those characteristics of art which make it so intrinsically 
valuable, rather than the more readily quantifiable economic or utilitarian benefits conferred by the 
arts (for example increased numbers of tourists lured by art galleries, museums and exhibitions) which 
tend to be relied upon and valued by policy and legislation makers in justifying state support for the 
arts. This is not to say that economic or utilitarian benefits are irrelevant, but as discussed in chapter 8, 
using the example of Singapore’s cultural policy, a heavily utilitarian or economic perspective on the 
benefits of the arts tend to favour those sectors of the arts which are more commercial, to the 
detriment of the purely fine arts. Once these issues are identified, it then becomes clearer as to why 
the fine arts, which tend to be unique one-off creations, are deserving of protection and why 
lawmakers and other parties interested in copyright, moral rights and art should address the issue of 
destruction with a serious sense of urgency. 
2. Examples of Destruction 
This section surveys a brief selection of the countless instances of mutilation, vandalism and wanton 
destruction of works of art in history, and maps out the reasons as to why people have felt the need to 
commit such atrocities, and the effect that such acts have had on art and society.
3
 While traditionally, 
art historians have tended to sideline the issue of art destruction,
4
 on the basis that the intention behind 
a destructive act is irrelevant when an artistically or culturally significant work has been irredeemably 
destroyed,
5
 others have pursued a study of this phenomenon,
6
 on the belief that such a study helps to 
shed more light on the functions of art.  Art historian Freedberg has published extensively on these 
themes,
7
 seeing value in assessing the ‘dialectic between material image and beholder’,
8
 although 
Reau’s engagement with destructive acts was purely to ‘denounce the destruction, regardless of 
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 Gamboni, in his seminal study on art destruction,
10
 states at one point that there are broadly 
two kinds of destruction in history: iconoclasm and vandalism. While iconoclasm revolves around a 
condemnation of the beliefs symbolised by the art work, vandalism on the other hand does not offer a 
particular reason, intention or justification. It is gratuitous and baseless. However, Gamboni eschews 
the use of these terms and adopts a neutral approach in his own examination of destructive acts, in the 
hope that these acts themselves reveal much more than the assumptions adopted in the use of such 
terms, and in the process reveal the power and potency of art. The ambition of this chapter is similar 
but on a smaller scale. 
It should be noted that alongside tales of censorship, vilification, mutilation, and destruction, 
there are also tales of people who have risked their lives in protecting art throughout history.  
Examples include the Monuments Men, a group of men and women who worked tirelessly, and at 
considerable risk to themselves, to protect cultural treasures from the Nazis during the Second World 
War.
11
 The recent example of renowned Syrian scholar, Khaled al-Assad, who was beheaded by ISIS 
in 2015 for refusing to reveal the whereabouts of valuable archaeological artefacts,
12
 serves to remind 
us that, sadly, art and those closely associated with art, are just as vulnerable today as they have been 
for millennia. While the passions and ideologies which give rise to destructive acts are instructive, so 
too are the courageous acts of these heroic individuals, as they serve to underscore the responsibility 
which people feel that they owe to the preservation of art and cultural heritage. When the Nazi 
authorities hosted an art auction of works they considered degenerate in 1939, Joseph Pulitzer, Jr. was 
among the bidders. It was not just an opportunity to add to his collection. Pulitzer explained that ‘to 
safeguard art for posterity, [he] bought – defiantly! The real motive in buying was to preserve the 
art.’
13
 It is necessary to understand why people destroy art or conversely risk their lives to protect art, 
in order to understand the importance and value of the arts to society. It is a crucial prelude to the 
question as to why, or indeed, whether art is deserving of any protection.  
This section does not profess to be a comprehensive study of the reasons why people destroy art. 
There are a myriad of causes and reasons: religion; iconoclasm; political ideology; changing tastes; 
vandalism; controversial art; poor preservation techniques; commercial reasons; and destruction 
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perpetrated by the artists themselves. Notwithstanding the wide variety of reasons, the end result 
remains: the irreversible loss of a work of art.   
a. Mass Destruction of Art: The Bonfire of the Vanities, 1497 and 1498; Nazi Bonfires, 30 
March 1939 and 27 July 1942 
In Renaissance Florence and in Nazi Germany, mass burnings of art and books took place. The works 
which were destroyed in these events were works which today are overwhelmingly accepted as 
priceless masterpieces. Those destroyed in Florence included works by Di Credi and Botticelli, while 
those destroyed by the Nazis included works by Klimt and Picasso.  
These are well-established, indeed canonical works, which have been obliterated and lost to 
us forever. Because of their indisputable and widely accepted worth and esteem, their destruction 
serves to communicate more poignantly and more clearly the irredeemable loss suffered when the 
destruction of art is permitted, hence why this chapter begins with an account of these events, before 
proceeding onto more contemporary works, whose worth have been subject to more debate or have 
not had the luxury of time in which to establish themselves.  
Bonfire of the Vanities 
The Bonfire of the Vanities referred to in the title to the thesis, is the name given to the great purges of 
artistic and literary treasures instigated by Girolamo Savonarola in Renaissance Florence. Savonarola 
was a puritanical Dominican Friar who preached zealously against the excesses of the day. When the 
Medici fled Florence in 1494, Savonarola was propelled to the helm of Florence for a brief period, 
during which time, he pushed on with his reforms, at first enacting legislation banning non-Christian 
art and literature, culminating in the two bonfires instigated by him.
14
 In the first bonfire of 1497, 
artistic and literary treasures together with items considered to be responsible for corrupting morals, 
such as mirrors, perfume and cosmetics, were piled into a wooden pyramid more than 60 feet high. 
Among the masterpieces lost forever included paintings by di Credi, Botticelli, Donatello and 
Leonardo da Vinci, as well as writings by Boccaccio, Plato and Dante. According to a contemporary 
eye witness, ‘sculptures of great value, paintings of admirable beauty’ perished in the flames.
15
 By 
also attacking the Pope and the Catholic Church for its excesses, Savonarola’s reign was brought to a 
premature end, which culminated in a trial for heresy barely a year after the second bonfire. 
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Savonarola was hanged and his body burned on a pyre, which flames were ironically fuelled by copies 
of his own writings.
16
   
The important questions here are firstly, what drove the owners of art and artists themselves 
to consign their precious works to flames, and secondly, to what extent has Savonarola and his 
bonfires affected the development of art in Renaissance Florence.  Although the events took place 
some 500 years ago, fascination in the bonfires prevails today. As recently as 2012, an important 
exhibition hosted at Palazzo Strozzi in Florence showcasing masterpieces by Renaissance artists, 
culminated in a display of the bonfires together with Botticelli’s late works which were clearly 
influenced by Savonarola’s puritanical views.
17
     
The political and religious context in which the bonfires took place should be understood. 
Savonarola’s bonfires were not the first to be carried out. Other burnings had taken place previously 
in Bologna, Florence, Milan, Perugia, Rome, and Siena.
18
 In Florence, the opulence and lavishness of 
the lifestyle of the rich and powerful, epitomised by the Medici, aroused the ire of the ordinary 
populace. Furthermore, there was a growing suspicion of idolatrous paintings and sculptures, perhaps 
in part owing to the patronage of such works by the Medici. Savonarola’s sermons reflected this 
sentiment: ‘...they nowadays make for churches which are done with such craftsmanship and are so 
ornate and elaborate, that they obscure the light of God and true contemplation, and people do not 
consider God, but only the craft within the image.’
19
 Apart from the perceived corrupting influence of 
paintings and sculptures depicting the naked human body, Savonarola was concerned about the 
distraction posed by highly embellished paintings and ornately carved sculptures. To him, art should 
‘reflect the basic virtuous simplicity of the original church.’
20
 This view, exhorted in Savonarola’s 
fiery sermons, was widely shared at the time,
21
 lending support to his calls for reform. Essentially, his 
stirring sermons together with a charismatic personality combined to whip up a frenzied support for 
the eventual mass destruction of perceived indecent and idolatrous objects. Underpinning his 
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entreaties for penitence and austerity was an unflinching vision of an apocalyptic future for sinners.
22
 
Fear of hell and damnation ensured that the bonfires of artistic and cultural riches were greeted with 
unbridled enthusiasm, even hysteria by the Florentines.
23
   
If the foregoing explains the inflamed passions which led to the destruction of artistic 
masterpieces, the following endeavours to describe the effect of Savonarola’s preaching and his 
bonfires on Florentine art at least, if not the development of Renaissance art. At the time of 
Savonarola’s arrival in Florence, the city was home to exceptionally brilliant artists, including da 
Vinci, Botticelli and Michelangelo. The transformation of Botticelli’s art in particular would attest to 
the rise and fall of the artistic scene in Florence pre and post the bonfires. Much has been made of the 
fact that he had tossed several of his own works into Savonarola’s bonfires.
24
 However, prior to 
Savonarola’s descent upon Florence, Botticelli enjoyed the patronage of the Medici and his most 
celebrated paintings, such as The Birth of Venus (c.1485) and Primavera (c.1482) reflected the 
Medici’s interests in humanism and mythology. The subsequent stylistic change in his work together 
with the dramatically reduced output of his secular works in the late 1480s have been attributed to the 
growing influence of Savonarola’s preaching.
25
  The richly ornamental backdrops in his earlier works 
were no longer utilised in his later works, which now assumed a more ascetic style.
26
  According to 
Giorgio Vasari, the first Italian art historian, Botticelli was ‘of [Savonarola’s] sect so ardent a partisan 
that he was thereby induced to desert his painting, and having no income to live on, fell into very 
great distress.’
27
 Rothko in describing Savonarola’s profound influence on the artists of his day, in 
particular, Botticelli, as well as the influence of the Reformation (of which Savonarola was part) on 
art, concludes that ‘this change constituted its own type of vandalism, for it contributed greatly to the 
decline of great classical art.’
28
 As for the effect on Florence itself, that jewel of the Italian 
Renaissance, art historian Joost Keizer records that because of the bonfires and Savonarola’s 
influence, patrons no longer commissioned new works, causing many artists to flee elsewhere, 
resulting in ‘one of the most benighted moments in the history of Florentine culture.’
29
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The Nazi Bonfires  
The Nazi art auction at Lucerne attended by Pulitzer in 1939 displayed 126 paintings and sculptures 
including works by Picasso, Matisse, Gauguin, and Chagall, undoubted modern art masters. The Nazi 
authorities who hosted the auction had regarded these works as degenerate but nevertheless were 
aware of their monetary worth, and were not above selling them in order to raise money for the Reich. 
The works were among thousands of art works gathered from Germany’s major public galleries in 
order to ‘purify’ them,
30
 all denounced as degenerate and a testament to ‘cultural decadence’.
31
 What 
exactly did the Nazis mean by ‘degenerate’ however? 
The infamous ‘Degenerate Art’ show which took place in the summer of 1937 was held in 
order to explain to the public as to what exactly was deplorable about modern art.
32
 Essentially, Hitler 
believed that modern art trends, which included Expressionism, Impressionism, Dadaism, Cubism, 
and Futurism, had a ‘disintegrating influence on the life of the people’ and sought to cleanse Germany 
of such influences.
33
 He gave a series of inflamed speeches about the debilitating influence of modern 
art, and accused Jewish art dealers of promoting such undesirable works for their own benefit. At a 
Nazi sponsored pageant celebrating German art, or more specifically Nazi approved forms of art, he 
claimed that ‘degenerate’ artists were ‘stupid or sick’, 
34
 and thundered, ‘…prehistoric Stone Age 
culture-barbarians and art-stutterers can return to the caves of their ancestors…’
35
 For the first two 
days of the pageant, the Nazi authorities exhibited several hundred works of approved art, which 
consisted of banal paintings depicting idealised German peasants and heroic scenes. On the third day, 
the Nazis launched the Degenerate Art show. The 650 works destined for this show were removed 
from their frames and crowded together on the walls in dimly lit exhibition rooms, clearly designed to 
be displayed in the worst possible light.
36
 The 650 works on display were only the tip of an iceberg of 
works confiscated by the Nazis.  
It is estimated that almost 16,000 works of art were seized by the Nazis from public collections 
alone. Of these, approximately 5000 works were consigned to flames on 20 March 1939,
37
 while on 
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 works by Picasso, Ernst, Dali, Miro, Klee and Leger perished in another bonfire.
39
 As 
for the impact of such atrocities upon our artistic heritage, the mere roll call of such illustrious names 
suffices to demonstrate the incalculable loss we bear today.  
b. Destruction by patron-owner: Diego Rivera, ‘Man at Crossroads Looking with Hope 
and High Vision to the Choosing of a Better Future’ 
While inflamed religious passions essentially caused the destruction of great artistic masterpieces in 
Renaissance Florence, an irreconcilable difference in political ideologies accounted for the destruction 
of a sixty-three foot long fresco painted by Diego Rivera, who was Mexico’s most revered and 
celebrated artist. Rivera’s works still command a large following and worldwide respect today. In 
2016, a number of global exhibitions centred on or featuring his works were sold out.
40
 A 2016 
exhibition at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, entitled Picasso & Rivera, featured the 
Mexican artist sharing top billing with Picasso, who is universally regarded as the world’s greatest 




 demonstrating the high esteem in which Rivera is regarded in the art 
world.
42




In 1932, the Rockefeller family commissioned Rivera and two other artists to produce nine 
murals for the lobby of the Rockefeller Centre in New York. The Rockefellers were admirers and avid 
collectors of Rivera’s work. Despite Rivera’s known communist leanings, the Rockefellers, exemplars 
of capitalism, were not unduly concerned at their choice of artist at first. Rivera’s brief was to portray 
man looking at the future with uncertainty but with high hopes for a better and brighter future. This 
was to reflect the theme of the Rockefeller centre, ‘New Frontiers’ and the Rockefellers’ vision of the 
future. However, it came to be that Rivera’s vision did not coincide with that of the Rockefellers’.
44
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Indeed, soon after Rivera commenced work on the mural, it became evident that Lenin was to 
be portrayed within the work, and that the developing mural was beginning to look very different 
from the early sketches he had produced at the start of the project. One half of the mural depicted 
workmen and Lenin holding hands, appearing serene and content, while the other half depicted John 
D. Rockefeller Jr. downing hard liquor, surrounded by police and soldiers attacking street protestors. 
The media immediately picked up on this, mocking both the mural and also the Rockefellers for 
unwittingly sponsoring a communist propaganda piece,
45
 thereby creating much unwanted publicity 
for the Rockefellers. As a result of press coverage, there was growing public interest in the work, and 
crowds would gather to watch Rivera work.
46
 In the face of the growing tension, Rivera was asked by 
Nelson Rockefeller to substitute Lenin’s face with that of an unknown man. He flatly refused to relent 
on his communist ideals, and after a brief impasse, Rivera was ordered to cease work and was 
escorted ignobly from the premises on 9 May 1933.
47
 Almost immediately there was a huge uproar 
and protests were mounted by three hundred people on the same evening.
48
 The mural was then 
covered over and would remain so for about ten months, during which period, intense campaigns were 
waged by intellectuals, workers, artists and activists on both sides of the controversy. During this 
time, Diego Rivera reportedly became increasingly despondent and resigned to the mural’s fate.
49
 
Attempts at saving the mural failed and on 10 and 11 February 1934, it was sandblasted and 
completely obliterated.  
There was widespread condemnation of the destruction. An open letter signed by a group of artists 
in March 1934 condemned the destruction and criticised the Rockefeller’s decision to ‘establish an 
Art Center in the very building where a monumental work of art was destroyed by them’.
50
 Even non-
artists expressed profound disgust. The intense feelings aroused by the destruction is summed up in a 
letter written by a private individual to John D. Rockefeller Jr. which stated ‘about midnight [when 
the mural was destroyed] last Saturday, your family achieved a little measure of immortal fame...as 
long as the towers of Rockefeller Center stand, they will stand as a grandiose and mocking monument 
to this piece of vandalism.’
51
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c. Public disapproval and government sanctioned destruction: Richard Serra, site specific 
public sculpture entitled ‘Tilted Arc’  
Bestowed with countless international honours and awards for his work,
52
 Richard Serra has been 
hailed as the ‘greatest living sculptor’,
53
 voted as one of the six greatest living artists in the world 
today in a poll conducted by Vanity Fair of 100 art experts and connoisseurs,
54
 and his latest 
exhibition at Gagosian in London in 2016 was a triumph, receiving rave reviews in The Guardian and 
the Financial Times.
55
 Yet, even with such esteem and considerable credentials, Serra was powerless 
in preventing the destruction of his monumental work, Tilted Arc in 1989.  
In 1979, the General Services Administration (GSA), a US federal agency responsible for the 
commissioning and acquiring of public art associated with Federal Buildings, awarded Richard Serra 
the commission to create a work to be installed at the Federal Plaza, New York.
56
 The result was a 
mammoth wall constructed from steel, tilting one foot off its vertical axis. The aesthetic effect 
intended by Serra was to make the viewer ‘aware of himself and of his movement through the 
plaza.’
57
 The physical effect on the site was that the view of the plaza from the doors of the main 
federal building flanking the plaza was obscured.
58
 The material from which Tilted Arc was 
constructed did nothing to endear itself to the public for it was made of Cor-ten steel, a metal which 
was designed to rust quickly. Furthermore, the positioning of Tilted Arc meant that workers intending 
to cross the plaza had to circumvent the wall, which measured 120 feet in length. According to Storr, 
it was ‘placed directly in the path of people largely ignorant of and for the most part alienated by 
modern art.’
59
  In this context, and without any attempts by the GSA at forewarning the local populace 
of the arrival of Tilted Arc,
60
 it can be seen why the immediate reaction of the workers to this steel 
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behemoth on their doorstep was one of hostility and extreme negativity.
61
 Not only were ordinary 
workers unimpressed and inconvenienced by Tilted Arc, it also did not escape censure from art 
cognoscenti. Tilted Arc was savaged as an ‘awkward bullying piece...conceivably...the ugliest outdoor 
work of art’ by the then arts editor of the New York Times.
62
   
As public resentment towards Tilted Arc mounted, a series of panel hearings, legal suits and 
campaigns ensued over the following years. A petition bearing more than 1200 signatures was 
presented to the GSA, but the GSA refused to consider removing the work.
63
 However, a new regional 
director of the GSA, one William Diamond, was appointed a few years later and its policy towards 
Tilted Arc began to change. At Diamond’s behest, the GSA decided to hold a three day panel hearing 
in March 1985, with Diamond chairing, to decide the fate of the sculpture. In preparation for the 
hearing Diamond launched an aggressive campaign, including the posting of a thousand flyers 
generating interest in the hearing, as well as placing petitions for the removal of Tilted Arc in the 
lobby of the buildings surrounding Federal Plaza.
64
  
Although the survey commissioned by the panel was in favour of retaining the sculpture, and 
despite compelling pleas from luminaries such as artist Oldenburg,
65
 and composer Philip Glass,
66
 
Diamond reached the decision to relocate, which was approved at federal level.
67
 In response, Serra 
instituted a legal suit to stay the destruction.
68
  Serra’s stance was crystal clear: ‘[Tilted Arc] was 
commissioned and designed for one particular site: Federal Plaza. It is a site specific work and as such 
not to be relocated. To remove the work is to destroy the work’.
69
 
The thrust of Serra’s legal suit, primarily premised on breach of contract (on the 
understanding that Tilted Arc was to be a permanent installation) and freedom of speech, sought 
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compensation for harm to his career and reputation. The suit and the appeal that followed failed, with 
the courts finding that Tilted Arc had been sold to the government and as such became its property in 
1981, which allowed it to be used and disposed of as the government saw fit.
70
  On 13 March 1989, 
Serra made another attempt to stay the execution of Tilted Arc in order to give his lawyers sufficient 
time in which to study the newly enacted Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988.  However, 
very quickly, Serra and his legal team realised that the Act had omitted implementation of Article 6bis 
Berne Convention, which they had hoped to invoke.
71
 On 15 March 1989, Tilted Arc was cut into 
three pieces, dismantled and removed to a scrap metal yard warehouse.   
While ostensibly the considerable public distaste for the work was the main reason for the 
eventual demise of Tilted Arc, there were questions raised over Diamond’s role in the saga. Although 
he maintained that he was merely protecting the right of the people who had to face the ‘menacing 
and overwhelming’ sculpture daily, 
72
 it was clear that in time, Tilted Arc may well have withstood the 
public’s hostility,
73
 and indeed the initial outcry died down soon after it was first installed.
74
 It was 
thus questionable when Diamond called for a panel hearing, over which he not only presided but also 
to which he appointed non-artists, which suggests that he was trying to ensure a voting majority.
75
 
Furthermore, he expressed disapproval of the work, ordered petitions for the removal of the work, and 
despite the survey results coming down in favour of retaining the work, he ordered its removal. It has 
been suggested that Diamond, as a Republican, had ambitious political plans and that this was an 




Thus, widespread public ignorance,
77
 hostility, and distaste, together with an individual’s 
political ambitions, may all have played a part in the destruction of Tilted Arc, echoing aspects of 
Savonarola’s Bonfires. The import of the Tilted Arc controversy is significant. It brought to the fore 
important questions of legal, moral and public policy issues, involving the precedence of property 
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rights over artistic rights,
78
 the integrity of art works,
79
 the boundaries of artistic freedom,
80
 and the 
functions of public art,
81
 issues which have been debated constantly ever since.
82
     
As for the aesthetic effect stemming from the removal of Tilted Arc, Federal Plaza reverted to 
its previous nondescript self, with the addition of commonplace park benches and planters,
83
 while  
Tilted Arc, hailed as a ‘bold and masterful work’ by the Museum of Modern Art and the Guggenheim, 
is no longer with us.
84
 They were not the only ones to have labelled Tilted Arc as such. At the time of 
the panel hearings on the removal of Tilted Arc, artists, art critics, art historians and art academics 
hailed the work as ‘a great work of art’,
85
 ‘beautiful, though...an unconventional beauty’,
86
 ‘an 
excellent example of Minimalism’,
87
 and ‘a major work by a major American artist’
88
.  
Certainly, it is regrettable that Tilted Arc, was not allowed to stand the test of time, as ‘(t)he more 
controversy there is at the time it is created by a tried-and-true artist, the more chance there is that it is 
a significant statement.’
89
 Judging from the amount of controversy generated over Tilted Arc, there is 
a chance of Tilted Arc being a ‘significant statement’, indeed a masterpiece.  
3. The Value and Function of Art 
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While the above examples demonstrate the seeming ease with which masterpieces may be destroyed 
at the whim of a religious fanatic (Savonarola), billionaire art owner (the Rockefellers) or a 
government agency (GSA) for a variety of reasons, the question is whether such losses are really that 
significant, whether to the world of art, cultural heritage, society or humanity. It is contended that 
such losses are indeed significant because art has intrinsic as well as instrumental value.  
For the sake of clarity, as is the case for the rest of the thesis, the focus here is on the visual arts, 
for reasons already specified in the preceding chapters. Much scholarly work embraces the arts as a 
whole (including visual, literary, musical and performing arts) when discussing values, whether 
instrumental or intrinsic. The points made in such discussions are however no less pertinent and 
applicable to the visual arts on its own. The principal point of this chapter is that, ultimately, the 
intrinsic value of art matters more than, if not just as much as, instrumental goals. There is substantial 
scholarship which attests to the intrinsic value of the arts, yet it is always the instrumental values 
which drive cultural policies or underpin copyright systems. By disregarding the intrinsic qualities of 
art, perhaps it is no wonder that the current copyright regime places more emphasis on the economic 
and instrumental goals of creative works, and hence, gives more prominence to copyright, as opposed 
to moral rights.   
a. Intrinsic v Instrumental values in art 
The quest for an instrumental value in art, i.e. how it benefits certain non-artistic goals, such as public 
welfare or the economy, is one which has been at the heart of cultural policies of most modern 
governments.
90
 A review conducted by the Arts Council in England in 2014 into the value of the arts 
(including visual, literary and performing arts) to society identified four areas in which the arts have 
substantial value: the economy, health and wellbeing, society and education.
91
 According to the 
review, the arts contributed £5.9 billion to the UK’s economy in 2011, art appreciators and theatre 
goers were more likely to report good health, the arts contribute to ‘community cohesion’ and there is 
heightened levels of literary and numeracy amongst school children as a result of exposure to the arts.  
The instrumental value of the arts has also long shaped American cultural policy, in the belief that the 
arts are a form of ‘cultural spinach’ to improve society.
92
  
But the arts are not only a means to social and economic development. Even if it is arguable 
that the arts have an instrumental value, it does not necessarily mean that their value is directly 
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involved with elevating such tangible goals as the economy, community, health or education.  It may 
be that the arts do contribute to these goals, but they operate in a much more subtle and indirect 
manner than policy makers understand them to do so. Empirical studies which purport to demonstrate 
direct correlations between the arts and social or economic benefits have been criticised as spurious,
93
 
or demonstrated to be methodologically weak or lacking in specificity.
94
 Certainly such a criticism 
may be levied for instance to the above finding that ‘art appreciators and theatre goers were more 
likely to report good health’.  
Kees Vuyk for instance argues that while it is no bad thing that the arts are deemed to have an 
instrumental value, as that in itself means that the arts do matter, he does not think that the 
instrumental value of the arts lie directly in social and economic development.
95
 There are, he says, 
better ways of enhancing wealth and welfare after all. This is not what the arts do. According to Vuyk, 
we should recognise the true value of the arts, which is to function as a window to new perceptions 
and new ways of thinking, thus opening up our ability to be more creative and innovative, which in 
turn would eventually contribute to our social and economic development. However, Vuyk’s view that 
the arts may serve an instrumental value through enriching our lives and in turn fostering a generation 
of people who are more creative and innovative, is clearly dependent on the intrinsic value of the arts, 
which is essentially the enriching experience which the arts offer to us.  
Chris Higgins, in challenging the instrumentalist view of aesthetic education for instance, 
exhorts us to understand first, what it is exactly that we wish to get out of education, and then, 
ascertain that which the arts can offer us in terms of achieving these goals.
96
 If education is about the 
mere acquisition of skills and information in order to equip us with the tools required for navigating 
the everyday obstacles of life, i.e. we live in order to work in order to earn money in order to spend 
money in exchange for material comforts and goods, then the arts are a mere decorative diversion for 
us, a bonus or luxury. However, if education is tasked with ensuring that each one of us is able to 
answer the question Socrates posed in the Republic, ‘How should I live?’,
97
 or the question, ‘what sort 
of person do I want to become?’, then the arts enable us to do this, by opening up new vistas of 
experience and perspectives in our lives. Higgins uses various examples from the depiction of tables 
and chairs in Van Gogh’s works to Duchamp’s Readymades, illustrating how these pieces provoke 
our senses and challenge us to perceive much more in ordinary objects than merely recognising and 
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labelling them. We do not just see a chair in Van Gogh’s work; we see rich swirls of colour, lines and 
shapes, and much else besides which make up the humble chair.
98
 We then have a richer, much more 
meaningful relationship with everyday encounters, because art teaches us to see more in everyday 
things and events.  We learn to appreciate the aesthetics of everyday life.  
In Culture Counts, Roger Scruton argues for the preservation of an essential classical cultural 
education, in which young people are schooled in the canonical works of Western culture, and in so 
doing, defends the intrinsic value of the aesthetics vigorously.
99
 Culture, high culture in particular 
which has stood the test of time, consists of moral judgments and emotional knowledge i.e. we know 
what we should do and what we should feel, values which are fundamentally essential and precious to 
our way of life. The constant exercise of passing judgments is part and parcel of culture; we judge 
works constantly and rigorously, and we strive to appreciate and understand them thoroughly before 
subjecting them to judgment, eventually resulting in the careful and reasoned selection of the 
canonical masterpieces in our culture. This habit of judging sincerity, profundity, obscenity, beauty 
and elegance in our culture, Scruton argues, is essential to our moral development.  This is illustrated 
clearly in literature, which entreats us to sympathise with characters and their emotions, to imagine 
their lives, and through such imagination, we attain what Scruton terms as ‘emotional knowledge’, 
which prepares us for our own encounters in life.
100
  
b. Evolutionary foundation for the arts 
While Scruton’s views are grounded within aesthetic philosophy, his views bear much similarity to 
those held by scholars in the field of evolutionary psychology, anthropology and biology, specifically 
those involved in the study of aesthetic Darwinism. These scholars explore what it is that make us 
desire the arts, from an evolutionary perspective. In other words, they ask if our desire and passion for 
the arts is a biological or evolutionary necessity.
101
  A consideration of these issues serves to 
underscore the main thrust of the argument in this chapter. If the arts are intrinsically valuable to us as 
shown above, and that furthermore, our desire for the arts are naturally ingrained within us because 
they confer a natural evolutionary benefit upon us, then, a fortiori, the demand for more robust laws 
for the protection of art is justified.    
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Scruton’s views are similar to those held by Joseph Carroll,
102
 a scholar in English literature 
and literary Darwinism, in his spirited response to Steven Pinker’s famous charge that the arts are 
analogous to strawberry cheesecake i.e. that they merely give us sensual pleasure, and are otherwise 
quite unnecessary for our being.
103
 In short, Pinker says that the arts are pleasurable but they are not 
necessary for our survival and as such are biologically functionless and are mere by-products of other 
adaptations. But he stands alone in his view among other evolutionary psychologists and 
anthropologists. Carroll has responded, saying that the arts play a vital role in our healthy 
development and makes use of characters in Dickens’ Hard Times and other novels, to illustrate his 
point: children deprived of art and literature, or the space and freedom to exercise their imaginations, 
grow up to become emotionally stunted adults, for the arts fuel our imaginations, which enable us to 
adapt successfully in the wider world and become better human beings.
104
  
While it is possible to argue that the effects of literature on our moral development apply 
similarly to the visual arts, there have been separate studies conducted on the beneficial effects of the 
visual arts. Evolutionary anthropologist, Dissanayake, in arguing that the arts have an adaptive 
function,
 105
 refers to the work of neurologists, specialising in neuroaesthetics,
106
 who study the 
biological mechanisms which allow our brains to engage aesthetically with works of art, landscapes, 
architecture, food, other people and other objects of beauty,
107
 in particular, Semir Zeki’s work in this 
area. Zeki’s work is apposite to the present discussion as it centres on the visual arts, exploring what it 
is that artists attempt to do and also what effect visual art has on the viewer, from the perspective of 
neurology. 
Zeki, in Art and the Brain, concludes that the function of art is ‘a search for the constant, lasting, 
essential and enduring features of objects, surfaces, faces, situations and so on...’
108
 Neuroscience 
explains that because our vision constantly moves, because our bodies are in constant motion and 
light is always shifting, the basic function of vision is to seek out the essential elements of whatever 
we are seeing at that very moment, in the process discarding all other extraneous information, as we 
try to make sense of the thing that we are seeing. Art extends this function even further. The artist 
                                                             
102
  Carroll (n 101) 63. 
103
  Pinker (n 101) 525. 
104
  Carroll (n 101) 68. 
105
  Dissanayake (n 101) 8. 
106
  Neuroaesthetics is the study of ‘the neural processes underlying our appreciation and production of 
beautiful objects and artworks’ - Anjan Chatterjee, ‘Neuroaesthetics’ The Scientist <https://www.the-
scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/39802/title/Neuroaesthetics/>. 
107
   ibid. 
108




seeks out the essence of the thing that he chooses to represent in art, discarding all other constituents 
that make up the thing. Zeki also draws parallels in the language used by philosophers and artists with 
the language utilised by neuroscientists, arguing that they are all talking about the same phenomenon, 
that art serves to distil from the constantly shifting angles and images, the essential character of the 
subject-matter being captured in a work of art.
109
 Why do artists do this and why are we so fascinated 
by art and what do we gain from looking at art? Zeki’s answer is that this seeking of constancies and 
essences is fundamentally a pursuit for truth and knowledge in that which surrounds us.    
4.  Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it aimed to impart a sense of tension and shock by 
describing the events which led up to the destruction of important works of art, as well as a sense of 
loss at the finality, and futility, of such acts. Secondly, it focused on the intrinsic value of art, by 
referring to a wide variety of different studies, ranging from art philosophy, evolutionary studies to 
neuroaesthetics.   
The loss of Botticellis, da Vincis, Klimts, and Picassos in the Florence and Nazi bonfires 
described is keenly felt because they were works by artists who are widely established and regarded 
as some of the greatest masters of art, and in any case, some of these destroyed works are known to us 
as masterpieces. The sense of despair and loss we experience lies in the realisation that they are lost to 
us forever and that we and future generations will never have the chance to acquaint ourselves with 
them. As for the more contemporary examples of destruction involving Rivera and Serra, they are 
examples of works by acknowledged masters, but which have not had the benefit of time in which to 
establish their worthiness or value. However, in view of the immense reputation enjoyed by both 
artists, as well as the opinions of those acquainted with both works, it is possible that the world has 
lost two great masterpieces.  
This chapter’s focus on the intrinsic rather than the instrumental values of art is intentional. 
Cultural and copyright policies have always been informed by the instrumental values of the arts i.e. 
the tangible benefits bestowed upon us, and which are calculated in quantitative terms, such as visitor 
numbers and box office takings, which in turn translate into a tangible contribution to the nation’s 
economy. What appears to be missing from consideration is the intrinsic value of the arts. The Arts 
Council Review of 2014 itself makes reference to the intangible qualities of the arts, saying that ‘we 
should always start with the intrinsic – how arts and culture illuminate our inner lives and enrich our 
emotional world. This is what we cherish.’
110
 However, the report goes on to report the hard facts and 
numbers which can somehow be linked to an appreciation of the arts, so that we can understand the 
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contribution that the arts make to our lives. This thesis will argue however, that the problem with 
depending heavily on or focusing on the instrumental values of art, is that policies, and the laws which 
reflect and regulate those policies, lose sight of that which is truly valuable about the arts i.e. how they 
enrich our lives and contribute to our personal, spiritual and moral development. After all, and this is 
a point raised by Vyuk above, there are other, better and more appropriate ways in which to generate 
wealth or improve our health or educational standards. We value and cherish the arts for other 
reasons. Copyright law is blind to these intrinsic qualities and that is why it focuses on strengthening 
its economic rights, not moral rights.  
This chapter seeks to make clear those intrinsic qualities which elude policy and law makers. 
The arts challenge us to view the world from different perspectives, for instance where the visual arts 
are concerned, by being able to appreciate that strokes of amber coloured oil on canvas may represent 
a chair or conversely, that an urinal may be regarded as a work of art, which in turn enables us to see 
things differently and to see things anew each time we see them, rather than merely recognising and 
instantly dismissing the things that surround us. Visual art, in this manner, firstly awakens our senses 
to new perspectives and secondly, provokes us into pursuing the truth within things and events that we 
encounter. Not only do art philosophers and psychologists show this to us, such findings, at least the 
function of art in interrogating our senses, are now backed up by empirical research carried out by 
neurologists.  
Furthermore, when faced with so many artistic works and performances, in order to extract 
the most out of them, we engage with them critically, forming judgments constantly, sifting the good 
from the bad, or the worthwhile from the mediocre or the depraved and contemptible, choosing those 
works which represent the best of our culture.  Armed with a secure knowledge of the highest 
standards of the arts, each time we confront a work, we hone our skills in analysing and judging 
aesthetic standards against these highest standards, which are the same skills in which we judge our 
moral actions and behaviour, in order to ‘do the right thing’. These, not the apparent tangible impacts 
of the arts,
111
 are the reasons why the arts, and by implication, the visual arts are invaluable to society, 
and it is those qualities which the law should also serve to protect.   
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Part II: Deconstructing the Traditional Approaches to the 
Integrity Right and Destruction  
Chapter 4 - Implementation of s.80 UK Copyright Designs and Patents Act 
1988 
When the right of integrity is enacted, it would be desirable to deal with this issue [destruction] 
clearly...The issue may be difficult to resolve, but it should not be glossed over.  




This chapter focuses on the UK’s adoption of moral rights in its copyright legislation and will 
examine the implementation and application of s.80 of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 
(CDPA) in particular. It begins with a critical examination of the background of events leading up to 
the UK’s eventual recognition of moral rights, starting with the International Copyright Conference of 
1928 (Rome Conference), through to the International Copyright Conference of 1948 (Brussels), 
before critically examining the parliamentary debates on the CDP Bill and finally subjecting s.80 
itself to critical scrutiny.  The aim here is to examine the intentions behind the introduction of moral 
rights through the Berne Convention as well as its adoption in the UK, in order to ascertain evidence 
of the following: 
a. the nature and boundaries of moral rights as envisaged by the members to the Berne 
Convention; 
b. the idea that moral rights may protect cultural rights/heritage; 
c. the reasons for inserting ‘honour’ and ‘reputation’ in Art.6bis; 
d. the UK legislature’s position on moral rights and what they were intended to 
encompass; 
e. the extent to which ‘destruction’ may be embraced within s.80 CDPA 1988 
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first examines the proposed adoption of moral 
rights into the Berne Convention at the Rome Conference in 1928, as well as debates on the same at 
the Brussels Conference in 1948, paying close attention to the common law countries’ response to the 
proposal, in particular that of the United Kingdom. An examination of the civil law countries’ 
contributions in the debates at the revision conferences is also instructive as those countries were 
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instrumental in introducing the concept of moral rights and no doubt influential in informing the UK’s 
perception of moral rights. This is followed by a consideration of the reports of the UK Gregory 
(1951) and Whitford (1977) Committees on copyright law. The aim of this part is to ascertain both the 
scope of moral rights as originally envisaged, and the UK’s early perception of, and relationship with, 
the concept of moral rights.  
The second part focuses on s.80 CDPA as it reads today. The wording is closely analysed with 
reference made to Parliamentary debates on the CDP Bill, where relevant. In particular, the analysis 
aims to explain firstly, why a claim against destruction appears prima facie to be restricted under s.80 
and secondly, why on close inspection, such restriction is arguably not as absolute and 
insurmountable as originally perceived. Following on from this examination, chapter 5 will focus 
more specifically on the requirement of ‘honour’ in s.80.   
2. The Berne Convention, Art.6bis 
The source for moral rights in the UK is the CDPA, which implemented Berne Convention Art.6bis. 
In order to understand the ethos behind the Berne Convention’s conception of copyright and moral 
rights, as well as its approach towards resolving conflicts engendered by differing copyright 
philosophies and principles, it is useful to understand the principles which underpin the Berne 
Convention. In the preface to a special edition book to celebrate the centenary of the Berne 
Convention (1986), the then Director General of WIPO, Arpad Bogsch, asserted that the underlying 
principle was a sense of justice, which served both authors and the interests of the public.
2
  
The Berne Convention was born of a campaign encouraging greater international recognition 
for authors’ rights. The momentum for this was an ever increasing focus on authors’ rights in 
copyright law. Prior to the Berne Convention, copyright laws were territorial in nature. The precursor 
to modern day copyright was the system of privileges, which privileged booksellers, not authors, 
whereby booksellers were bestowed an exclusive right to print and sell copies of manuscripts. There 
was initially little recognition for authors’ rights. As outlined in chapter 2, this infant form of 
copyright gradually evolved over time, perhaps in slightly different directions in the common law and 
civil law regimes, but common to both regimes, there was an increased recognition of rights for the 
author. Empowered by this enhanced acknowledgement of their worth and rights, authors increasingly 
took it upon themselves to demand more comprehensive and universally recognised rights. In 1858, a 
group of authors from several countries met in Brussels, forming the Congress of Authors and 
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 which later became the Association Litteraire et Artistique Internationale (ALAI), 
established in 1878 by Victor Hugo.
4
 The aim of this group was to press for legislation which 
recognised international rights for authors. Their resolutions were to form the bedrock for the Berne 
Convention. Essentially, the aim of the Berne Convention was to establish universal copyright 
protection for authors, although the initial approach was gradual and cautious, primarily owing to the 
differing philosophies of the participating countries.
5
 
In the years prior to the Rome Conference, there had been numerous resolutions passed at 
various conferences and congresses appealing for the international recognition of moral rights: the 
International Press Congress (Rome) 1899, International Literary and Artistic Association 1898, and 
the International Literary and Artistic Association 1927 as well as the Berne Convention revision 
conferences: the Paris Conference of 1896, and the Berlin Conference of 1908,
6
 The time was thus 
clearly ripe for international action designed to stimulate national protection of such rights.    
a. Rome Conference 1928 
i. The debates surrounding Art.6bis 
The original text of the Berne Convention did not provide specifically for moral rights until the Rome 
Conference of 1928 when the Italian delegation’s report presented a passionate, but coherent 
argument for their inclusion.
7
 The Italian delegation report set out several reasons as to why it was a 
particularly appropriate time to protect the moral rights of authors.  
Firstly, the report noted that despite the different theories on the nature of copyright, moral 
rights had begun to assume a more coherent and precise constitution, consisting at the minimum of 
rights of publication, authorship and integrity, and were thus increasingly capable of recognition by 
all countries.
8
 By the time of the Rome Conference, several of the convention countries had already 
legislated or were about to legislate on moral rights.
9
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Secondly, the report recognised the argument that, because of the increased uniformity of 
moral rights and universal acceptance, there was no further need to codify them, but countered that it 
was nevertheless imperative that such rights be formally safeguarded primarily because they tended to 
be in conflict with other legal rights, notably the rights of copyright assignees or, where artistic works 
were concerned, their owners.
10
 Indeed the latter observation is of key importance to this thesis – as 
the well-being of artistic works is particularly at the mercy of their owners, where the works may be 
threatened with poor conservation, mutilation or destruction, it is vital that artists’ rights are properly 
defended.   
Finally, the report highlighted the increasing prevalence of developing technologies and 
practices likely to have a significant impact on the author, such as reproduction of works in the mass 
media, the adaptation of musical works and broadcasting of works on radio. The report emphasised 
that these uses of works should be subject to the protection of moral rights.  
The Italians were not the only delegation to have proposed wording for Art.6bis. Others had 
either proposed their own or suggested amendments to the Italian suggestion. The original Italian 
suggestion was ‘The right to object to any alteration of the work that would be prejudicial to his moral 
interests.’
11
 It is noted that the Italians were at pains to emphasise that the right should not allow 
claims based on the ‘excessive sensitivity’ of authors,
12
 an issue which is discussed later in chapter 5, 
where it is argued that employing the correct interpretation of ‘honour’ in the final formulation of 
Art.6bis and in s.80 CDPA would address such concerns.
13
 Because of the reference to ‘any 
alteration’, the scope of the treatment intended to be captured was unclear, and only envisaged 
alterations which were ‘prejudicial to [an author’s] moral interests.’  It is also not clear as to what the 
Italians had intended by the phrase ‘moral interests’, which was deemed too vague by the common 
law countries.  It was subsequently acknowledged by all present that ‘more intelligible wording’ was 
required.
14
 Some guidance as to the ‘moral interests’ envisaged can be found in the Italian 
memorandum. They suggested that it encompassed the author’s ‘more delicate interests of his 
scientific, literary or artistic personality’.
15
 However, it is doubtful that this addition of the idea of 
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‘delicate interests’ did much to aid in clarifying the nature of ‘moral interests’, described as ‘elusive’ 
by Adeney.
16
   
Other delegates proposed alternative wording which went some way to demonstrating the 
sentiments of the other convention countries.  Poland’s suggestion was that the author should have the 
right to object to any distortion of ‘the way in which his work was intended to be presented to the 
public’, which suggests that they were very concerned with the author’s intentions. This contrasted 
with the Romanian delegation’s suggestion that only modifications which were ‘prejudicial to [the 
author’s] reputation’ should be encompassed. The Belgian contingent were concerned about any 
modification which would ‘alter the character’ of the author’s work while the Czechoslovakian 
delegates emphasised that any proposal should be resolved in favour of ensuring the work’s integrity. 
Clearly, the Polish, Belgian and Czechoslovakian delegations were all concerned that the author’s 
vision of his work should be preserved, independently of whether his reputation was affected. A 
similar sentiment was expressed at the previous conference held in Berlin in 1908, at which the right 
of translation was debated. Although the translation right is traditionally viewed as one of the author’s 
exclusive economic rights, the French delegate expressed his opinion from a moral rights viewpoint: 
‘The author is the best judge of whether his work can be translated and which translator is the most 
competent to do so: in this way, he is in a position to prevent any distortion of his thought’.
17
 There 
was a clear concern that the author’s vision should not be altered.  
Adeney describes the approaches of the delegations at the Rome conference on this point as 
‘highly varied’.
18
 However, although the terminology utilised by the various delegates was indeed 
varied, it is submitted that the Polish, Belgian and Czechoslovakian delegates were all essentially 
addressing the same thing. There is arguably a common theme in their initial approaches, in that the 
author’s creation is paramount and that he has the right to object to any act which interferes with his 
creation or distorts the message which he wishes to convey without needing to make any reference to 
his reputation. Although the final version of Art.6bis accepted at Rome made reference to ‘distortion, 
mutilation or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to the author’s honour or 
reputation’,  the application and operation of ‘honour or reputation’ in the final version was not 
without question.  
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ii.  The requirement of ‘honour or reputation’ 
One of the first matters of contention concerned the French wording of Art.6bis. Because in the 
definitive French version of Art.6bis, ‘qui serait prejudiciable’ [‘which would be detrimental’] was in 
the singular, it was thought that honour and reputation were only applicable to one of the listed 
treatments in Art.6bis, namely ‘modification’,
19
 and that distortion and mutilation were objectionable 
per se.  There was no need to also show prejudice for these acts, which reflects the position of some 
countries today.
20
 At the Brussels Conference in 1948 however, a plural construction was substituted 
in the French version of Art.6bis, 
21
 and it would appear to be the generally accepted position today, 
i.e. that all treatments were to be similarly affected, not just modification.  In the UK, the 
conventionally accepted interpretation of s.80 CDPA is that all acts, including distortions and 
mutilations, are subject to the requirement for prejudice, 
22
 although there does exist judicial opinion 
to the contrary.
23
   
The question still remains as to why it was initially thought important that the author’s vision 
should be protected even if the treatment of it does not harm his reputation. There was at least, at the 
time of the Rome Conference and thereafter when the interpretation of Art.6bis was being scrutinised 
and debated,
24
 some degree of opinion that some treatments of an author’s work were objectionable 
without requiring the author’s reputation to be harmed. Although it has been argued in some quarters 
that the initial French wording was possibly a drafting error,
25
 it is submitted that there is some merit 
in acknowledging the original French wording at face value and accepting that some treatments were 
at least initially thought to be objectionable per se. Indeed, those treatments which were initially not 
subject to the ‘honour or reputation’ limitation had a negative or damaging connotation in any case: 
distortion and mutilation. As stated above, in some Berne Convention countries today, for example 
Belgium, France, and Greece, the integrity right is not restricted to acts which are prejudicial to 
honour or reputation of the author.
26
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What did the delegates at the time consider to be the harm that is caused by any act affecting 
the integrity of an author’s work per se? Indeed, why do some countries today still refrain from 
restricting the integrity right, even after Art.6bis was amended at Brussels? The answer to this 
question may lie in the general perception of the value of moral rights in these countries.  
Firstly, the theory underpinning moral rights doctrine in these countries is that the author 
imbues his work with his personality and forges an intimate unbreakable bond between himself and 
his work. This combination of the authorial bond, his message and the creative process in which the 
message is produced and the importance of recognising these elements in formulating safeguards for 
creative works have already been discussed at length in the preceding chapters. The point made here 
is that because an author’s work encapsulates his personality, any interference with the work, 
prejudicial or not, necessarily interferes with this bond and would distort the author’s personal vision 
and message.    
Secondly, although the safeguarding of the author’s personality is paramount in civil law 
countries, there is also evidence that moral rights are meant to protect much more than just the 
author’s personality. The perpetuity of moral rights in France and other countries suggests that moral 
rights also play an important role in cultural protection.
27
 If moral rights are merely solely personality 
rights and hence only intended to protect the author as an individual, it is difficult to discern any harm 
or prejudice which he may suffer personally from a post-mortem act. Why then are such rights 
protected beyond the author’s death? Even in countries which do not recognise perpetual moral rights 
today, they at least allow moral rights to endure for as long as the copyright period which typically 
endures beyond the author’s lifetime, which is also the position in the UK. While it may be argued 
that, as moral rights serve to protect the author’s personality as reflected in his creation, and hence 
can theoretically and justifiably endure beyond his death, the question remains as to how the author 
should be compensated for any post-mortem infringement or what the appropriate remedy should be. 
The author is now dead and hence personally suffers no loss. McCutcheon argues that without any 
personal loss to the dead author, the recognition of post-mortem moral rights is incoherent.
28
 
Therefore, she argues that post-mortem moral rights may be more appropriately justified by protecting 
the public interest in its cultural heritage.
29
 Her views reflect Martin Roeder’s, who back in 1940, 
argued that ‘the real reason...for protection of the moral right after the creator’s death lies in the need 
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of society for protection of the integrity of its cultural heritage’.
30
 As an author’s work is a legacy to 
the cultural heritage of a nation, any act which diminishes his work in any way, is an assault on the 
nation’s cultural heritage.  
Indeed, at the time of the Rome Conference, there was a growing interest in the protection of 
cultural heritage, particularly in Germany and Italy. German lawyers Marwitz and Kohler expressed 
the view that authorial works were also cultural objects, and were part of the culture of the 
community.
31
 There was also acute concern with the effect of technology, such as reproduction and 
broadcasting technology on the state of culture.
32
 Evidence of this interest in the protection of cultural 
heritage at the Rome Conference was particularly clear when delegates debated the issue of post-
mortem moral rights. The Sub-Committee on Moral Rights expressed the hope that in time ‘every 
citizen [has] the right to claim respect for works that are the common heritage of mankind’ and on that 
note passed a resolution which encouraged the convention countries to adopt protective measures 
which would operate post-mortem.
33
 The cultural protection idea was therefore certainly at the 
forefront of the debate over the introduction of moral rights at the Rome Conference. If cultural 
protection is a key aim of moral rights in some of the Berne Convention countries, this would account 
for the absence of the ‘honour or reputation’ restriction in their moral rights legislation.   
A third answer may lie in the inclusion of ‘honour’ in the finalised version of Art.6bis. There 
are questions surrounding its inclusion. The requirement of both ‘honour’ and ‘reputation’ was in 
response to the British delegation’s lukewarm reception of the Italian’s initial proposal. Despite the 
Italian delegation’s confidence that the countries of the Union were in unanimous appreciation of 
moral rights, their proposal had taken the common law countries by surprise, and was, as mentioned 
in chapter 2, initially ‘coldly received’ by the British countries.
34
 The vagueness of ‘moral interests’ 
was part of the reason for this chilly reception, and ‘moral interests’ was altered to ‘honour or 
reputation’ in the final version, mainly to accommodate the common law countries’ defamation 
laws.
35
 Although the common law countries were clearly familiar with the concept of ‘reputation’, 
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there is some question over the inclusion of ‘honour’. Adeney reports that it was ‘suggested by 
nobody but which evidently satisfied all parties at the time’,
36
 which is curious as ‘honour’ was as 
unfamiliar a concept as ‘moral interests’ to the common law countries, and yet was not questioned but 
allowed to remain. Apart from some reports that the common law countries were sceptical of the 
proposal to include moral rights, there appears to be limited information available on their actual 
objections, and regrettably little information regarding their opinions on the concept of ‘honour’.  
According to Adeney, the term ‘honour’ had been previously referred to in French and 
German cases.
37
 It is possible to postulate that ‘honour’ was a reflection of the French conception of 
moral rights, which was premised on a ‘right to respect’, now codified in its intellectual property 
code.
38
 The 1978 WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention also confirms that the right of integrity is also 
sometimes referred to as the ‘right of respect.’
39
 Marcel Plaisant, the French delegate, expressed his 
views on ‘honour’, saying that it was to ‘prohibit deformations which risk prejudicing the reputation 
of the author, or even more simply, altering the moral physiognomy under which the author presents 
himself to the cultivated public’
40
 thus employing a rather wide interpretation of the restriction and 
was evidently concerned with any changes which would misrepresent an author’s work, and thus his 
personality, to the public. Plaisant’s take on ‘honour’ clearly reveals a concern with the author’s 
control over any representation of his work.  
The conclusions that can be drawn from the above discussions are, firstly, that many of the 
civil law countries were in favour of moral rights which addressed the integrity of works per se, 
without the need to subject to a requirement for prejudice. Based on the views expressed by the 
representative delegates of these countries, they were clearly concerned about the integrity of the 
author’s message, in other words, the work’s completeness. The inclusion of ‘honour or reputation’ 
aimed to appease the common law countries but did not truly reflect their preferred approach. Indeed, 
many Berne Convention countries have chosen not to include this restriction in their legislation today. 
If the completeness of a work is paramount in interpreting the integrity right, then in line with the 
underlying premise of this thesis, the destruction of a work will fall foul of this.  
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Secondly, it is clear that at the time of the Rome Conference, many countries were concerned 
with the role played by moral rights in protecting cultural heritage. It is reiterated that the protection 
of post-mortem moral rights may only be justified logically on this basis. This point is in line with the 
contention of this thesis: that the cultural protection role of moral rights should not be overlooked.  
iii. Input of the UK and common law countries 
The civil law countries led the debates surrounding the formulation of Art.6bis and the development 
of an international conception of moral rights. The influence of the British contingent on the 
development of the Berne Convention, especially the introduction of Art.6bis was curiously limited, 
or in Ricketson’s view, merely reactive,
41
 considering the extensive wealth and dominance of the UK 
at the time. The reasons why, are unknown, and the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the UK 
and other common law countries were, albeit grudgingly, ultimately accepting of the general concept 
of moral rights.   
b. Brussels Conference 1948 
If the UK and the other common law countries failed to take the initiative at the Rome Conference 
and were not particularly involved in the formulation of Art.6bis, their approach at the Brussels 
Conference was markedly different. The delegates were apparently adamant that the provision should 
not be reinforced or developed any further.
42
 For instance, it was proposed by the civil law countries 
that authors should be able to object to any utilisation of the work but this was strongly objected to by 
the British delegation. The definitive French version adopted at the conference, ‘a toute autre atteinte 
a la meme oeuvre’ [‘to any other violation of the same work’] thus referred instead to ‘atteinte’ which 
can be translated as ‘violation’.
43
 However, it is interesting to note that the official but not definitive 
English version merely refers to ‘action’, which is surely broader and less specific than ‘violation’, 
and was very likely an oversight, as the word ‘derogatory’ was inserted before the word ‘action’ at the 
Stockholm Conference in 1967 in order to bring it in line with the French version. In respect of the 
proposal to extend the duration of moral rights beyond the expiration of the copyright term or at least 
until the death of the author, the UK insisted that member states should be left to decide on the term.    
Thus the UK delegates were far more rigorous in their approach post the Rome Conference, 
reflecting their concerns over the scope of moral rights. Given the UK’s much more robust objections 
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at this time, it is somewhat surprising that the UK was apparently open to the idea of including 
‘destruction’ within the right of integrity as will be discussed below.  
i. Debates on Destruction 
The Hungarian delegation proposed extending the right of integrity to encompass destruction, arguing 
that this could be logically included as it ‘would complete the notion of mutilation’.
44
 Interestingly, 
the British delegation is recorded to have expressly agreed to and supported the use of the word 
‘destruction’.
45
 According to the New Zealand delegate’s report, there was such considerable debate 
on this point, that it clearly indicated the Conference’s desire ‘to protect works effectively against all 
derogations’,
46
 including destruction. In the end, the term ‘destruction’ was not expressly included. 
However, it should be noted that the Italians had argued that the words ‘a toute autre atteinte a la 
meme oeuvre’ were sufficiently wide to include destruction and that importantly, not one delegate at 
the conference opposed this interpretation.
47
 Additionally, a recommendation was passed urging 
member countries to include destruction expressly within their own legislation.  
The conclusion thus is that firstly, destruction was clearly contemplated, and indeed desired 
by the delegates, including the British representatives. Secondly, even though Art.6bis was not 
amended to specifically refer to destruction, the wording of the recommendation passed at the 
conference suggests that countries wishing to find implicit prohibition of destruction within the article 
could do so. The recommendation was worded as follows: 
Noting that Article 6bis of the Convention, though it permits the author to object to any 
deformation, mutilation or other modification of his work, or to any other violation of the 
same work which would be prejudicial to his honour or to his reputation, does not prohibit in 
express terms the destruction of works [emphasis author’s], the Conference makes the 
recommendation that the countries of the Union should introduce into their domestic 
legislation dispositions prohibiting the destruction of literary and artistic works. 
The words ‘does not prohibit in express terms the destruction of works’ implies that destruction 
has merely not been expressly prohibited but that all the same, such prohibition is warranted under the 
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 In any case, there is an express recommendation that convention countries should allow 
for such a restriction.       
3. UK Implementation of Art.6bis 
The UK’s copyright laws, and its compliance with the Berne Convention underwent two reviews, by 
the Gregory Committee in 1952 and the Whitford Committee in 1977.  The Gregory Committee were 
satisfied that Art.6bis rights were met with adequately in other areas of UK law, although the 
Whitford review was of a different opinion.
49
 In particular, where the integrity right was concerned, it 
was recognised by both committees that the UK had to rely on the law of defamation in order to fulfil 
its obligations. However, the Whitford Committee pointed out that in comparison with the integrity 
right formulated in Art.6bis, the law of defamation failed authors in at least two ways, firstly because 
for a defamation action to succeed, the public must have known that the claimant was the author and 
secondly, an action for defamation dies with the person defamed, unlike the integrity right which 
endures beyond the death of the author.
50
 It was not until the enactment of the CDPA in 1988, which 
included sections relating to moral rights, that moral rights were formally recognised within the UK.  
a. Parliamentary debates on the Copyright Designs and Patents Bill 
The debates on the moral rights provisions of the CDP Bill were lively and impassioned in parts, 
particularly so in the House of Lords. The clear sentiment underpinning the bill as a whole was the 
recognition of creativity as a valuable asset to society. In the House of Commons, Mr Toby Jessel 
declaimed that ‘to be creative seems to me to be fundamental. The creativity of artists, performers, 
composers and writers is basic to the enrichment of people’s lives.’
51
 In introducing the Bill for a 
second reading, Mr Kenneth Clarke pointed out that the aim was to ‘promote and protect creative 
talent’.
52
   
As for moral rights in particular, both Houses recognised their importance to creators. The 
proposed Act was ‘to help authors and directors to establish and defend their artistic reputation’.
53
 At 
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first glance therefore, the debates would appear to centre on the ‘reputation’ of authors. For instance, 
the Earl of Stockton said that ‘moral rights are of great importance to authors and other originators of 
copyright works, who value their artistic reputation as much as their financial rewards for their 
works.’
54
 This was not the only reference to ‘reputation’, and it should be noted it is used as a contrast 
to ‘financial rewards’. Lord Morton of Shuna and Lord Hutchinson also claimed that moral rights 
were to do with reputation, although as it will be seen later, they used the word in support of 
compensation for injured feelings, which in turn suggests that they did not consider ‘reputation’ as an 
economic criterion. In general, the parliamentary debates on moral rights were centred on reputation, 
which nevertheless arguably has an economic dimension,
55
 a point which is made in chapter 5 of this 
thesis.  
Lords Morton and Hutchinson made their reference to reputation in response to the 
Government’s spokesman, Lord Beaverbrook’s proposal to insert a clause excluding claims for injury 
to feelings, on the basis that such a clause would defeat the purpose of moral rights, which was to 
protect reputation not economic rights. Lord Beaverbrook’s reply to Morton and Hutchinson on this 
point was that as the loss of reputation was an economic loss, it would still be protected adequately 
despite the exclusion clause.   
  Thus it is interesting to note that while the members in both Houses made reference to the 
term ‘reputation’ in the debates on moral rights, it appears that there may have been a divergence in 
opinion about the precise character and scope of ‘reputation’. On the one hand, Lord Beaverbrook, as 
the Government’s representative, clearly saw reputation as embodying economic rights while the 
other members appeared to use the word reputation in direct contrast to economic rights. Other 
members who did not make express reference to reputation focused on the proposed sub-clause to 
avoid compensation for injured feelings. Baroness Birk expressed disapproval of the proposal, saying 
that ‘there must be some compensation if we are to have this scheme of moral rights’,
56
 while Lord 
Willis wondered why copyright owners should not be compensated for injured feelings if other areas 
of law recognised such a remedy. Lord Graham pointed that ‘the point of moral rights is that emphasis 
should be placed on the artistic and creative integrity of directors and writers and not only on 
economic criteria’.
57
 However, Lord Beaverbrook replied to these objections saying that he had been 
advised that compensation may not be obtained generally for injured feelings in law. This was a 
somewhat surprising response as it was then, as it is now, possible to obtain damages for injured 
feelings in other areas of the law, and thus was specifically provided for in the Race Relations Act 
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1976 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, both of which were highlighted later in the debates by 
Lord Morton and Lord Williams of Elvel.
58
  
Indeed, Lord Williams set out several cogent reasons for leaving out the proposed exclusion 
clause. Firstly, he argued that the UK’s obligations under the Berne Convention should not be limited 
by such an exclusion and if the reason for this was to discourage frivolous actions, then the courts 
were more than able to deal with them. He then pointed out the other areas of law in which injured 
feelings are compensated and concluded that ‘we do not think that injured feelings are to be taken 
lightly’. Lord Lloyd supported this view saying that as the infringement of moral rights is likely to be 
in the nature of a tort, then as tort recognised damages for injured feelings, he could see no reason 
why such exclusion should be made.
59
  
The extent to which the debates considered this issue of injured feelings is telling. It at least 
goes to show the regard that several members of the House of Lords had for moral rights, in that they 
understood that there was a subjective element to this set of rights, and that they stood in stark 
contrast to the economic rights afforded to copyright owners. The slight ambiguity in the members’ 
understanding of ‘reputation’ also demonstrates that although the participating members were all 
talking about ‘reputation’, they may well have been approaching the concept from different angles. In 
any case, the idea of compensating injured feelings was clearly of prime importance to the debaters of 
the copyright bill when considering the proposed moral rights provisions. This in turn suggests that 
despite the Government’s emphasis on the economic elements of copyright law and also moral rights, 
the actual legislators who debated the bill were clearly more mindful of the non-economic concerns of 
authors and artists.  
b. Providing for ‘destruction’ in s.80 CDPA 1988 
Unfortunately, the parliamentary records do not reveal any reference to the inclusion of ‘destruction’. 
We have to examine the relevant provisions in the CDPA and cases to ascertain if ‘destruction’ may 
possibly be contemplated under UK moral rights provisions.  
Not only is there no express provision for destruction under the CDPA,
60
 it is also possible to 
argue that the reason why the integrity right does not include the act of destruction is the fact that 
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nothing remains behind post-destruction which may affect the author’s honour or reputation. This 
argument is examined and challenged in chapter 5 and will not be discussed further here. Apart from 
this, other reasons have also been posited. It has been argued firstly that the narrow and exclusive 
definition of ‘treatment’ under s.80 is unable to encompass destruction, and secondly, that the 
additional requirements of s.80 subsections (3), (4), and (6), which call for the public communication 
of the derogatory treatment, would exclude at least private acts of destruction. It is contended below 
that they are not as obstructive as it may be thought. 
i. Definition of ‘treatment’ 
The first argument proceeds as follows: the definition of ‘treatment’ within s.80 is a closed category 
of four distinctive acts: addition to, deletion from, alteration or adaptation, none of which may at first 
glance conceivably include ‘destruction’. However, several challenges may be raised against this 
view.  
Firstly, it may be argued that the words ‘deletion from’ could include ‘destruction’ in the 
sense that the entire work has been deleted from itself. In ordinary language, this is not as much as a 
stretch than it might first appear. After all, in arithmetic, the act of taking away the quantity of 1 away 
from itself leaves 0. This is arguably further supported by s.89(2) which states that the rights 
conferred by s.80 apply in relation to ‘the whole or any part of a work’. While this subsection was 
presumably inserted to clarify that ‘addition to’ or ‘deletion from’ are not necessarily subject to any 
requirement of substantiality,
61
 and that therefore even the smallest addition or deletion may be 
considered ‘treatment’, it is argued here that s.89(2) can also operate conversely, i.e. that the ‘whole’ 
work may be deleted from itself.
62
  
Secondly, there has been judicial commentary on s.80(2) which suggests that s.80(2) should 
not be narrowly construed.  To date, there has been no case on the destruction of a work in the UK, 
thus still leaving open the question of the UK courts’ likely interpretation of s.80 where destruction is 
concerned. HHJ Fysh has however commented that ‘treatment’ was a ‘broad, general concept; de 
minimis acts apart, it implies a spectrum of possible acts carried out on a work, from the addition of 
say, a single word to a poem to the destruction of an entire work.’
63
 HHJ Fysh further ventured that he 
saw ‘no legislative intention to limit the meaning of the word’ notwithstanding the wording of s.80(2), 
and that any limit to the generality of ‘treatment’ would arise from any prejudice which may result to 
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the honour or reputation of the author.
64
  HHJ Fysh also referred to the judgment delivered in Amar 
Nath Seghal v Union of India,
65
 which stated that destruction could be considered the ultimate form of 
mutilation.
66
 This is meaningful as the relevant section of the Indian Copyright Act is similar to 
Art.6bis of the Berne Convention.  
Thirdly, it has been suggested that destruction of a work may be considered to be distortion or 
mutilation carried out to its fullest extent, 
67
 or the ‘ultimate infringement of [artists’] moral rights’.
68
 
Professor Jacques de Werra states that to destroy is to ‘nier purement et simplement l’existence de 
l’oevre, forme ultime de l’irrespect’ i.e. to ‘deny the work its existence: the ultimate form of 
disrespect’.
69
 Hence, it is arguably erroneous to conclude unreservedly that ‘treatment’ does not 
include the act of destruction.
70
 
ii Further requirements in s.80 CDPA 
The requirements set out in subsections (3), (4), and (6) of s.80 CDPA are a deviation from the 
requirements of Art.6bis of the Berne Convention. Subsections (3) and (4) provide that infringement 
only occurs if the derogatory treatment of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is published 
commercially, exhibited, or performed in public. The subsections also specify the issuing to the public 
of copies of the film, sound recording, graphic work or photograph of the treatment.  s.80 (6) provides 
that, in relation to a film, infringement occurs when the derogatory treatment is shown in public or 
copies of the derogatory treatment are distributed to the public. 
Therefore, while Art.6bis states that the author has the right to object to derogatory actions 
per se, under UK law, ss.80(3), (4) and (6) provide that the author may only do so if a further act has 
taken place, i.e. that basically the derogatory treatment of his work is publicised. The author in the UK 
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has no redress against derogatory treatment per se, surely a departure from the intention of Art.6bis.
71
 
However, it must be pointed out that although it may be very attractive to interpret s.80(1) as implying 
a right to object to derogatory treatment itself, Adeney, in examining the legislative history behind 
s.80, thinks it highly unlikely that Parliament intended this outcome, and that it had always intended 
to limit the integrity right as set out in the subsequent subsections in s.80.
72
 The manner and extent to 
which subsections (3), (4) and (6) may affect destruction are discussed below.  
The requirement in subsections (3), (4) and (6) that a further act of publication has to take 
place before infringement may be established, may present an obstacle to authors wishing to protest 
against the destruction of their works. This is especially so if, following the intricate analysis of the 
term ‘derogatory treatment’ by Davies and Garnett in Moral Rights, ‘derogatory treatment’ is 
interpreted as ‘the result of an action’, rather than ‘the action of treating a work’.
73
 Davies and 
Garnett assert that the use of ‘derogatory treatment’ in the CDPA is ambiguous and is used in both 
possible senses. However, where subsections (3), (4) and (6) are concerned, the authors construe 
‘derogatory treatment’ as clearly being ‘the result of an action’.
74
  
Evidently, if this is the case, total destruction of a work would leave nothing behind, i.e. there 
will not be any tangible result post act, and thus, it could not be ‘commercially published’ for the 
purposes of s.80(3) or form the subject of a photograph or graphic work for the purposes of s.80(4)(c). 
It is submitted that this particular interpretation of ‘derogatory treatment’, even for the purposes of 
subsections (3) and (4), is not absolutely clear and consistent. While it may be arguable that perhaps 
only the result of a treatment may be ‘commercially published’, ‘exhibited’ or be the subject of a 
photograph, the other acts stipulated in the subsections do not necessarily imply the same. For 
instance, s.80(3) also lists ‘performs in public...a derogatory treatment of the work’, which seems to 
suggest the action of treating a work. In such a situation, the public burning of a book or painting may 
fulfil this requirement. It could also be argued that the showing of a film of burning an artwork may 
fulfil s.80(4)(b).
75
 Therefore, it is arguable that the public destruction of a work of art may fulfil these 
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The preceding sections endeavoured to present intelligence gleaned from an analysis of the 
implementation of Art.6bis and s.80 CDPA 1988, and to utilise these findings to answer the queries 
set out at the start of this chapter. Essentially the chapter aims to demonstrate on a textual and 
doctrinal analysis of the relevant legislation surrounding moral rights, that firstly, the nature and 
minimum boundaries of moral rights as envisaged and generally accepted by members of the Berne 
Convention, including the UK, are such that ‘destruction’ may well be contemplated within its 
purview and secondly, that the exclusion of ‘destruction’ from s.80 CDPA is not as defensible as it 
seems. 
A close analysis of the records of the Rome Conference and Brussels Conference proceedings 
reveal the varying views of the Berne countries. What has emerged is that a number of countries laid 
emphasis on the integrity of the author’s work, without necessarily involving the author’s reputation 
or even honour. The concern was the integrity, in other words, the purity and completeness of the 
author’s vision and message as embodied within his work. While it is accepted that a change in this 
vision would likely affect its author’s honour or reputation, this was not a necessary condition for 
many Berne countries. Additionally, it would appear that ‘honour or reputation’ was included to 
appease the common law countries, and that there was little evidence of substantive reason, either as 
matter of policy consideration or legal argument, for their inclusion. It could be argued, perhaps, that 
these terms reflected defamation laws in the common law countries. However, as highlighted earlier 
in this chapter as well as in chapter 2, defamation laws are not entirely successful in protecting 
authors in the way as intended by moral rights, and while reputation may possibly give a nod to UK 
defamation laws,
77
 the inclusion of honour remains somewhat of a puzzle.  If an overriding concern of 
moral rights was arguably to protect the integrity of the work per se, then arguably, the entire 
destruction of a work would destroy its integrity.   
Furthermore, there was at the time of the Rome Conference, evidence of much faith in the 
ability of moral rights to safeguard cultural heritage. Indeed, the very acceptance today, in both civil 
law countries and common law countries, of the endurance of moral rights beyond the author’s death, 
indicates a conception of moral rights which embraces a cultural heritage protection component. If so, 
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then arguably, the destruction of a work would leave an irreparable void in the cultural heritage to 
which it belongs.  
Finally, the close interrogation of the premise and wording of s.80 has revealed the following. 
Where the underlying premise of s.80 is concerned, the parliamentarians who debated the moral rights 
provisions were not only, not in entire agreement as to the concept of ‘reputation’, they were certainly 
concerned with two things: the contribution of moral rights to the protection of cultural life in the UK, 
and the injured feelings of the author. The concern expressed in the debates therefore was focused 
very much on the non-economic features of moral rights, and with exception of the UK government’s 
representative, Lord Beaverbrook, the members of parliament involved appeared to emphasise the 
importance of these features. Lord Beaverbrook’s response that reputation was not to be excluded 
from compensation because its loss can be equated to an economic loss is thus very revealing of the 
government’s perception of copyright and moral rights. Prominence is given to the economic rather 
than the non-economic in copyright and moral rights. However, this does not really reflect the views 
of all the members who participated in the debates. It shall be seen later in chapter 5 that because of 
the economic emphasis however in the UK’s perception and application of its copyright law, little 
attention is given to honour and in turn, little attention is paid to what creators truly require where the 
protection of their creations is concerned, a point which has been raised and discussed in chapter 2.  
As regards the argument that the definition of ‘treatment’ in s.80 excludes destruction, it has 
been countered that there is little reason to accept this view. Destruction is arguably the ultimate form 
of ‘mutilation’, and there is little logic to treat ‘destruction’ of a work more favourably than acts such 
as ‘addition to, deletion from, alteration or adaptation’ which comprise the definition of ‘treatment’ in 
s.80. HHJ Fysh, a High Court IP specialist judge has already ventured as such. If so, then there is no 
reason to exclude ‘destruction’ from the ambit of ‘treatment’.  
Finally, the argument that the public communication requirements in subsections (3), (4) and 
(6) would exclude destruction fails on two grounds. Firstly, these requirements are foreign to Art.6bis 
Berne Convention and it could be argued that the UK has therefore failed to implement the Berne 
Convention correctly and faithfully.
78
 Secondly, regardless of the validity of these additional 
requirements, it has been shown that even if these requirements may exclude acts of private 
destruction, they arguably do not exclude public destruction of works, and hence present no real 
obstacle to recognising ‘destruction’ as an act to which creators may object.    
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Chapter 5 - Honour in UK Copyright Law is not ‘A Trim Reckoning’ – its 
Impact on the Integrity Right and the Destruction of Works of Art 
‘What is honour? A word. What is in that word honour? What is that honour?  Air.  A 
trim reckoning!’ 
William Shakespeare, Henry the Fourth Part I (V, ii, 132) 
1. Introduction 
Falstaff in Henry the Fourth views honour as a mere word, ‘air’, ‘a trim reckoning’, a trifling with no 
concrete or substantial meaning. The character dismisses ‘honour’ and its abstract notions – (‘Doth he 
feel it? No. Doth he hear it? No.’) - as having no use whatsoever in real life.  Falstaff’s speech on 
‘honour’ is revelatory of at least one aspect of the concept of honour – its elusiveness. Nowhere does 
the meaning of honour elude us more than the reference made to it in s.80 of the UK Copyright 
Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA). In chapter 4, the general wording of s.80 was examined in 
light of parliamentary debates surrounding its enactment. In this chapter, the specific reference to 
‘honour’ is closely examined.  
The present wording of s.80 is owed to the UK’s implementation of Art.6bis (1) of the Berne 
Convention, which reads as follows, 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, 
the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, 
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, 
which would be prejudicial to his honour (author’s emphasis) or reputation.  
The reference to honour in Art.6bis has been viewed as an unnecessary appendage in the 
common law, leading to at least one common law jurisdiction precluding any reference to honour 
altogether in its moral rights legislation.
1
 The omission of ‘honour’ from the WIPO Performance and 
Phonograms Treaty too has led one common law academic to observe that the concept was obsolete.
2
 
According to Adeney, ‘honour’ is commonly regarded as adding nothing to the concept of 
‘reputation’ and the term ‘remains unused and undefined in the United Kingdom.’
3
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The concept of honour is relatively unknown in the common law, except for recent interest in 
cases involving honour killings, in discussions on the concept of reputation as used in the law of 
defamation,
4
 and its inclusion in s.80 CDPA. However, despite its inclusion in s.80, it has curiously 
been overlooked by law academics, save for a handful of articles, mostly penned by antipodean 
academics in their analysis of amendments to the Australian Copyright Act,
5
 and discussions in UK 
practitioner and specialist texts.
6
  Much of what has been written about honour however appears to 
focus on the role it plays in imbuing the moral rights provisions with subjectivity, rather than 
engaging in an in-depth study of its meaning and in what circumstances it would be prejudiced, in 
contrast to circumstances where reputation is being prejudiced. Furthermore, judges in the few UK 
cases on the integrity right appear to treat ‘honour’ as synonymous with ‘reputation’, generally 
neglecting to give full consideration to the concept of ‘honour’ itself.
7
   
It is peculiar that such a specific criterion prescribed in the legislation has been given such 
scant attention and application. This chapter thus aims to shed further light on the meaning of honour 
as it is positioned within s.80, from the perspectives of Roman Law, in particular its formulation of 
iniuria, and of anthropological studies on honour.  It is hoped that fresh insights into the concept of 
honour  will help to clarify the boundaries of the integrity right, in particular, the question of whether 
destruction of a work amounts to a breach of the integrity right as it reads as present. 
 At present, the conventional view is that as destruction leaves nothing of the original work 
behind, there can be nothing left that can affect the author’s reputation, unlike a work which has been 
maltreated or deformed in some way, which does leave behind a misrepresentation of the author’s 
work.
8
 However, even if destruction does not affect the author’s reputation, it is arguable that it can 
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impact upon his honour. It is contended that there has been disproportionate emphasis or reliance on 
‘reputation’ where the integrity right is concerned, and that equal weight should be afforded ‘honour’.  
One of the main reasons why ‘honour’ has not been referred to or applied as much as 
‘reputation’ lies in the uncertainty surrounding its meaning,
9
 while that of reputation has been well 
established, particularly within the law of defamation. In the few instances ‘honour’ is defined or 
applied however, it is usually defined as ‘what a person thinks of himself.’
10
  If so, this has a strongly 
subjective element, which poses the risk of allowing unreasonable claims by hypersensitive artists. A 
re-interpretation of ‘honour’ is offered which will allow for a more objective approach, thus avoiding 
the aforementioned difficulty regarding oversensitive artists. Essentially, it is suggested that prejudice 
to honour amounts to an insult, and that the destruction of an author’s work clearly amounts to an 
insult to the author, and hence prejudicial to the honour of the author.  It will be shown, from 
examining the influence Roman Law had on the early development of the common law, and from 
applying the theoretical insights of Frank Henderson Stewart, an eminent anthropologist,
11
 that the 
concept of ‘insult’ as a viable cause of action is not as alien to the common law as is presumed, and 
hence it would not be too much of a stretch to accept that the common law is capable of recognising 
affronts to honour, and that it is not an obsolete concept.  
If prejudice to honour amounts to an insult, the question is whether the destruction of a work 
amounts to an insult to its author and is prejudicial to his honour. The answer is arguably in the 
affirmative, taking into account, the depth of feeling an author possesses for his creations, and the 
investment of the author’s energy, creativity and personality into the creation of the work. The author 
not only utilises his work to communicate a personal message, it also symbolises his personality. His 
desire to maintain the integrity of his work is understandable.
12
 Destruction of a work is therefore akin 
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to destroying not only the message the author wishes to convey but also something which is an 
embodiment of his personality. The act of destruction demonstrates utter disregard and contempt for 
the work, and hence utter disregard and contempt for the author’s message and personality. 
Destruction of a cherished work surely insults and dishonours its author.  
Furthermore, as mentioned above, while much has been made of the subjectivity or 
objectivity of the moral rights provisions in judicial pronouncements and academic studies on the 
integrity right, it is submitted that, as there can be no ambiguity whatsoever as to the effect that 
destruction wreaks upon a work, any destruction of any work would amount to prejudice to an 
author’s honour without the need for evaluating the subjectivity or objectivity of the treatment meted 
out to the work.  
Any study of the word ‘honour’ will be fraught with considerable difficulty, as it is a concept 
which is not easily discernible. It has been described as a word ‘rich in connotations, but poor in 
denotation’.
13
 Elsewhere, a study on the history of ‘honour’ refers to the ‘virtual disappearance’ of the 
word ‘honour’ in vocabularies of English and other European languages.
14
 It is ultimately contended 
that by giving full countenance to the word ‘honour’, the destruction of an author’s creation does 
amount to an infringement of the integrity right.   
2. Method, Sources and Structure 
It is necessary at this juncture to outline and explain briefly the reasoning behind the method and 
choice of sources employed in formulating the argument set out in this chapter, relying heavily as it 
does on uncommon sources, such as anthropological studies on honour, insult laws in Germany, early 
Anglo-Saxon and Norman laws, and the Roman law concept of iniuria.   
The aim here is to seek out authoritative sources for alternative and workable meanings of the 
concept of ‘honour’. As there is a paucity of legal material on the concept, it is necessary to draw 
inspiration from a variety of sources from without the modern common law. The first of these sources 
are studies carried out by anthropologists, who are renowned for their extensive research into the 
meaning of honour. The seminal work on this area is Honor and Shame,
15
 a collection of essays edited 
by Pitt-Rivers, which represent the first systematic studies ever conducted on the concept of honour, 
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most of which were based on ethnographic fieldwork undertaken in the Mediterranean.
16
 The choice 
of the Mediterranean as a focus of scholarly research for anthropologists was not, as it may be 
thought, a purely and uniquely academic and reasoned decision, but the practical result of tumultuous 
world affairs which occurred during the same period in which this particular group of scholars were 
active. The Second World War and the upheaval it caused in many countries for decades to come 
ensured that many regions were inaccessible to anthropologists.
17
 Decolonisation of many African 
states also meant that those areas were out of bounds.
18
 Thus, for practical purposes, the 
Mediterranean was the geographical area of choice, particularly for scholars writing in English.
19
  It 
was in this area of the world that the first and most rigorous study on the concept of honour was 
undertaken, and also where the majority of anthropological research studies on ‘honour’ has taken 
place.
20
 Hence, in any study of ‘honour’, it would be necessary to refer to the work of Pitt-Rivers in 
the first instance, and draw out general and universal themes from their findings, despite the fact that 
their work was centred in the Mediterranean and not within an Anglicized or even Northern European 
culture or setting, which might appear to be more relevant to the present focus. It is contended that the 
features of Mediterranean honour as discovered and described by the anthropologists are more 
universal in application than it would appear. A recent comparative study conducted in Spain and the 
Netherlands concluded that Mediterranean notions of honour were present in Dutch culture and 
society, and vice versa.
21
   
  Pitt-Rivers’ thesis will be briefly considered before going on to consider Stewart’s work on 
‘honour’, which is no less esteemed. His work, which proposed that honour is a right to respect or not 
to be insulted, was heavily influenced by German jurists and German insult laws. It is of course not 
maintained that simply because the work of German lawyers happened to influence Stewart in 
formulating his particular take on ‘honour’, it should similarly be applicable in English common law. 
Taking a cue from Lord Reed, who said that ‘foreign law may ... be treated as an authority, as an 
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empirical fact, or as a source of ideas...’,
22
 it is suggested that Stewart’s and German ideas on honour 
are sources of ideas, from which inspiration may be taken in order to enlighten us on the meaning of 
‘honour’.  Such use of foreign law will, as advised by Lord Reed, ‘assist the judge to elucidate the 
issues under domestic law, and to identify possible options for their resolution’.
23
 The value of 
learning and seeking inspiration from other legal systems is encapsulated in what Gordley has written 
about studying foreign law, that ‘...the jurists in all these so-called [legal] ‘systems’ were struggling 
with common problems, guided by similar concepts ... not expressed clearly in their national legal 
systems’, and that ‘...we can learn much by seeing how others have faced similar problems’.
24
   
Finally, on the basis that ‘honour’ may be interpreted as a right to respect or right not to be 
insulted, this chapter will go on to examine the Roman law concept of iniuria i.e. disrespect, insult or 
outrage, and draw from it insights which would assist in framing a workable approach to interpreting 
‘honour’ as it is placed within moral rights law.  The use of Roman law to assist modern day common 
lawyers is not uncommon at all despite its obvious antiquity. A recent paper analysed the use of 
Roman law by the House of Lords in three relatively recent and important decisions, and argued that 
the influence of Roman law on the development of English common law is pervasive and of 
considerable value.
25
  The same paper posits that the value of Roman law (or indeed any foreign law) 
rests in the fact that legal problems are both universal and perennial.
26
 It is hoped that just as iniuria 
has proved valuable in informing the development of the common law of obligations, it will prove 
equally helpful in elucidating the concept of ‘honour’ in moral rights law.  
3. Honour and Destruction in s.80 CDPA and the Berne Convention 
It is firstly necessary to examine the current legal landscape in which the concept of ‘honour’ resides, 
before we look beyond the law for inspiration.     
The original proposed wording of Art.6bis put forward at the 1928 Rome Conference to revise the 
Berne Convention referred to acts ‘which (are) prejudicial to moral interests’. The phrase raised grave 
concerns among the common law delegates who felt that the words were too vague to give any useful 
guidance or instruction. The wording was eventually amended to refer to acts ‘which would be 
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prejudicial to his honour or reputation’,
27
 which apparently was accepted without demurrer by the UK, 
and sealed its acceptance of Art.6bis notwithstanding its initial hostility to the proposal. 
In addition to the in-depth discussion in chapter 4 of the conference debates regarding the 
wording of Art.6bis and parliamentary debates on s.80, a few preliminary observations may be made 
here on the inclusion of ‘honour or reputation’ in both Art.6bis and s.80. Although the phrase ‘moral 
interests’ in the original wording of Art.6bis was deemed too vague, the inclusion of ‘honour’ has not 
served to remove ambiguity either, as its meaning is hardly consistent or settled. In contrast, 
reputation has a more established or familiar definition,
28
 owing especially to its application in 
defamation law. This may also explain why judicial considerations of the integrity right appear to 
have focused on reputation rather than honour. For instance, in Tidy v Trustees of the Natural History 
Museum,
29
 in which the plaintiff’s cartoons were reproduced in a reduced size and colourised, Rattee J 
could not conclude that there was prejudice to honour or reputation in the absence of any evidence 
from the public as to how the coloured reproduction would affect the plaintiff’s reputation.
30
 This 
point regarding the need for evidence was raised in Confetti Records v Warner Music,
31
 in which the 
defendants had superimposed a rap, which referred to violence and drug-taking, onto the claimant’s 
track. As there was no evidence offered of prejudice to the claimant’s honour or reputation, Levinson 
J could not conclude that there was a breach of s.80.  
While HHJ Fysh, in Harrison v Harrison, a case concerning copyright infringement of a 
guide book to care homes, neither distinguished between honour and reputation nor explained the 
concepts in any detail, he made a similar point, referring to Confetti Records, saying that it was not 
easy to assess honour and reputation of which there had to be evidence. HHJ Fysh specifically 
referred to professional honour or reputation, although no further explanation is given for this 
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 As evidence of professional honour or reputation would generally come in the form of 
public opinion, again this echoes the test for reputation in defamation law. 
Academic writers have also focused more on reputation. Although the authors in Copinger & 
Skone James attempt to distinguish between reputation (by defining it as ‘what is generally said or 
believed about the person’) and honour (by defining it as ‘associated with reputation and good 
name,...respect and position’), it is submitted that since their definitions of both concepts utilize very 
similar terms, they have not succeeded in making the distinction.
33
 Furthermore, they list examples of 
libel cases to serve as guidance and assert that a claim under s.80 would require evidence that 
members of the public are likely to think less of the author, which echoes the test in defamation law, 
and which relates to ‘reputation’ rather than to ‘honour’.
34
 Indeed, the authors do assert at the start of 
their discussion that the requirement for prejudice to honour or reputation bears ‘close resemblance to 
existing personal rights under the law of defamation and passing-off’.
35
 The word ‘reputation’ is also 
used on its own several times in the relevant passages on this issue, without reference to ‘honour’. 
HHJ Overend, in discussing the meaning of ‘honour and reputation’ in Pasterfield v Denham,
36
 
referred to Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, who explained that the concept in the Act is ‘akin to libel’,
37
 
while Cornish, writing on the introduction of moral rights in the CDPA, thought that the reference to 
‘honour or reputation’ had only a marginal advance, if any, on the concept of defamation.
38
  
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the concept of honour, the fact remains that ‘honour’ is 
specifically included in not only an international treaty but also in the national legislation. Academic 
and judicial disregard for the same is therefore questionable. If honour is to be disregarded, there must 
be good reason for doing so. At present, there is little rationale for this treatment. 
Another explanation for the scant attention paid to honour lies in treating ‘honour’ as 
synonymous with ‘reputation’. The interpretation of ‘honour and reputation’ favoured by judges and 
academics alike seem to favour the definition of reputation as it is established in libel law. The 
possible reason for such interpretation lies in the wording of s.80, i.e. ‘prejudicial to the honour or 
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reputation of the author or director’. It mirrors the English version of Art.6bis but is subtly different to 
that of the French version of Art.6bis i.e. ‘prejudicial to his honour or to his reputation’.  While it is 
possible for ‘honour’ and ‘reputation’ to be treated interchangeably in the English version and the UK 
legislation, there is no such ambiguity in the French version.
39
 If there is a divergence in 
interpretation, the question is which text should take precedence. While the Paris text of the Berne 
Convention provides that both the English and French versions of the Berne Convention are 
authoritative,
40
 Art.37(1)(c) provides that, in differences of interpretation, the French version shall 
prevail, which renders the French version of the Berne Convention as the final and most authoritative 
version of the Berne Convention.
41
 Therefore, if preference is given to the French version in this 
regard, then it is clear that ‘honour’ and ‘reputation’ have different meanings and that they play 
different roles. According to Adeney, the fact that the delegates at the 1948 Brussels Conference in 
considering a revision of Art.6bis opted to retain both ‘honour’ and ‘reputation’ clearly indicated that 




The question that remains is what exactly is the definition of ‘honour’? As stated above, there 
is a myriad of definitions of honour, and scholars in different fields have expounded conflicting 
theories on the concept of honour. While it would not be possible to seek out a definitive conception 
of honour, for present purposes, a more constructive approach would be to seek out a theory of honour 
which would be of most assistance to common law lawyers, particularly those interested in the 
concept as applied within moral rights 
4. Tracing the Meaning of ‘Honour’: the Anthropological View 
It must be cautioned that even within the field of anthropology, where the concept has been given 
more coverage and attention than it has been given in the legal field, the concept is nevertheless 
subject to numerous disagreements among anthropologists.  
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Anthropologists have researched into the concept in great depth, by participating in 
ethnographic research of various communities in the Mediterranean in particular. Indeed, 
‘anthropologists now seem to be considered the experts on the subject [i.e. ‘honour’]’.
43
 Not all 
variations of the concept as defined by anthropologists will be relevant to moral rights law, being as 
they are, concentrated on issues related to social phenomena such as battlefield bravery, shame in 
adultery, honour killings and duels. However, it is possible to tease out the central and general themes 
which may be of assistance to lawyers.  This is by no means the first and only attempt to make 
reference to anthropology in ascertaining the meaning of honour; John Beckerman, for instance, refers 
briefly to the work of anthropologists in his essay on honour and trespass,
44
 although not in any depth. 
Julian Pitt-Rivers, the renowned anthropologist, is regarded as ‘the leading authority on 
honour’,
45
 and considered as ‘anthropology’s chief explicator on honour and shame’.
46
 As such, it is 
necessary to engage in the first instance with what he had to say on the subject, before proceeding to 
consider other notions of ‘honour’, in particular the definition expounded by Stewart, which as will be 
argued, is central to the thesis developed in this chapter. Pitt-Rivers’ seminal essay, Honour and 
Social Status,
47
 was a study of Andalusian pueblo, a series of towns or villages in Spain.  He 
discovered different variations on the meaning of honour as it manifested in these communities, 
ranging from the loss of honour as a result of cuckoldry, preservation of honour through the 
preservation of a woman’s virtue and the differences in the systems of honour as understood between 
the upper and lower strata of society. His essay was not only an observation of these different 
manifestations of honour, but it also provided, in its first part, a brief description of honour as 
understood in Western European society generally. Indeed, through his study, he concludes that ‘not 
only what is honourable but what honour is [has] varied within Europe from one period to another, 
from one region to another and above all from one class to another.’
48
  Notwithstanding his 
observation of honour as a shifting and variable concept, he does, at the start of his essay, drill down 
the basic themes of honour, which is defined thus: ‘Honour is the value of a person in his own eyes, 
but also in the eyes of his society. It is his estimation of his own worth, his claim to pride, but it is also 
the acknowledgement of that claim, his excellence recognised by society, his right to pride.’ In this 
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definition, apart from references to the subject’s perception or estimation of his own value, honour 
does take on features which are more familiar to the concept of reputation. The question is whether 
Pitt-Rivers’ definition is, being as it is formulated by someone who is regarded as a leading authority 
on honour, the final word on the matter?   
Whilst Pitt-Rivers’ reputation as a leading exponent of the concept of honour is undisputed, 
there is criticism to be made about his approach to studying the concept, in particular, his declaration 
that very little has been said on the subject,
49
 apart from medieval and chivalric references to 
honour.
50
 As fellow anthropologist Stewart points out in Honor, much sophisticated work on the 
concept has been undertaken by jurists, in particular, German jurists in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, whose works appear to have been ignored by Pitt-Rivers.
51
 Hence, it would appear that Pitt-
Rivers’ definition, authoritative as it may be, is not absolute. Stewart presents an alternative theory 
which, influenced as it is by legal writings, may be of considerable assistance to common law lawyers 
who are interested in the concept of honour. 
Essentially, Stewart’s concept of honour is that it is a right to respect or as having a certain 
worth.
52
  By viewing honour as such, it accounts for insults, which he says the Pitts-River account 
does not. As mentioned above, Pitt-Rivers’ two pronged definition of honour involves self-evaluation 
as well as valuation by society, in other words, there is an inner quality of honour as well as an outer 
one. He was not the only one to have explained honour as such.  Schopenhauer, in The Wisdom of 
Life, declares honour as ‘on its objective side, other people’s opinion of what we are worth; on its 
subjective side, it is the respect we pay to this opinion.’  Stewart attacks this formulation of honour, 
what he calls the ‘bipartite’ theory of honour. He says that it does not account for the meting out of 
insults, which is still an offence in much of Europe.
53
 He cites the example of being called a ‘swine’. 
Such name calling, under the bipartite formulation, would neither damage the inner quality of honour, 
nor the outer quality of honour, especially if not made in public. However, such name calling is 
clearly an insult, which amounts to an offence. His solution, to recognise honour as a right, essentially 
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a right (or claim) to respect,
54
 would account for insults, in other words we have a right not to be 
insulted. While honour may be a right or claim by the individual to respect, the world has a duty to 
treat the bearer of honour with respect.
55
  
The utility of the concept of honour as a right to the fields of anthropology and ethnology is 
that it is a feature which is widely shared among different cultures.
56
 Where the law is concerned, by 
framing the otherwise nebulous concept of honour as a right, it appeals naturally to lawyers, and could 
serve to clarify honour’s meaning and utility when calls for its application are made, as is in the case 
of Art.6bis and s.80. It is also appealing for lawyers to apply Stewart’s conception of honour as a 




Stewart’s model of honour thus owes its formulation to German juristic literature on German 
insult laws.  As recent as the 1950s and 1960s, the German courts defined honour as a right. 
According to Stewart, a German Federal Court defined honour as ‘the right of a human being that 
their personality be respected’. 
58
 Stewart very briefly traces the lineage of this right in German law 
back to Kant’s axiom which declared that ‘[e]very man has a legitimate claim to respect from his 
fellow man’,
59
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on his work: Talal Asad, ‘Book review of Honor by Frank Henderson Stewart’ (1996) 116 Journal of the 
American Oriental Society 308; Walter P. Zenner, ‘Book review of Honor by Frank Henderson Stewart’ 
(1999) 6 Islamic Law and Society 119 
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  Stewart (n 11) 151. 
59
  The Metaphysics of Morals. Kant, in referring to the right to respect, was however talking about his 
concept of dignity as opposed to what he perceived as the concept of ‘honour’ which was respect based 
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See R.J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge University Press 1989) 197; Rachel 
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60




There is therefore a school of thought, rooted in philosophy, law and through Stewart, 
anthropology, which has actively advanced the idea that honour is simply a right to respect. Indeed, a 
paper published in 2001 on ‘honour’ in the Australian Copyright Act also puts forward this claim, 
although on different basis, by simply referring to the definition of the word ‘honour’ in the New 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,
61
 and to the Australian Attorney-General’s speech on the 
amendments to the Australian Copyright Act.
62
 Interestingly, although it is mentioned earlier that 
according to Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria ‘honour and reputation’ is ‘akin to libel’, they also make the 
point that ‘any treatment of a work which tends to trivialise it and to diminish the respect (emphasis 
author’s) in which either the work or the author is held runs the risk of a successful action being 
brought.’
63
    
Respect in turn is defined as either the ‘deferential regard or esteem felt or shown towards a 
person’ when used as a noun,
64
 or as a verb, ‘to bear in mind, think of, consider’.
65
  It is surely 
uncontroversial to assert that, more often than not, the destruction of an artist’s creation neither 
reflects deep admiration or esteem of the artist on the one hand, nor due regard for his feelings or 
wishes on the other.  Indeed, destruction of the work clearly amounts to an insult or contempt for the 
author of the work.
66
  
5. The Right to Respect or Right not to be Insulted in early English common law 
While there is a case for defining honour as a right to respect, the difficulty for common law lawyers 
lies in recognising the existence of such a right in the common law. The closest cause of action to a 
right or claim to respect is defamation, which is well established in the common law, and which 
explains the tendency among common law judges and academics to refer solely to reputation when 
dealing with s.80. However, there is a reason why the Berne Convention referred to both honour and 
reputation, instead of simply one or the other, or why the authoritative French wording of Art. 6bis 
                                                             
61
  ‘Honour’ is defined as ‘high respect, esteem, deferential admiration; an expression of this;...’ and when 
used as a verb, as to ‘pay respect or do honour to by some outward action; ...regard with honour, respect 
highly’ in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary cited in Ellionson and Symonds (n 5) 625. 
62
  The Attorney-General in his Second Reading Speech stated that the moral rights provisions acknowledge 
‘the great importance of respect for the integrity of creative endeavour’, cited in ibid., 625. 
63
  Prescott and Vitoria Laddie, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs (4th edn, Butterworths 2011) 
1017. 
64
  OED online . 
65
  OED online . 
66
  It is acknowledged that occasionally, works of art may be destroyed to bring attention to laudable issues, 
and it may argued that such acts are not necessarily contemptuous of the works or artists themselves. For 
instance, a museum director once destroyed several works in protest against funding cuts, although it 
should be noted, with the consent of their creators. See John Hooper, ‘Naples Museum Director begins 





made a distinct demarcation between honour and reputation. If the inclusion of honour was regarded 
as tautologous, it would neither have been included in the first formulation of Art.6bis in 1928 nor 
retained in subsequent revisions to the Berne Convention.  Hence, it is arguable at least that the 
intention of the drafting committee in 1928 as well as that of the delegates to subsequent conferences 
on the Berne Convention must have been to introduce two distinct terms, and therefore, honour is not 
and should not be treated the same as reputation.  
It will be shown that honour, defined as the right to respect, has played at least an historical 
role within English common law, and that it is not a completely alien concept. The general position 
however is that ‘Anglo-American law today is extremely chary of redressing injuries to feelings, 
honor, or reputation’.
67
 Generally, an action lies only if there is loss or damage to some interest which 
can be adequately compensated in monetary terms.  Even the law of defamation is based on the 
economic loss to the claimant as a result of injury to his reputation, rather than the affront caused by 
the libel to personal dignity.
68
  The question is why the common law has developed this aversion to 
recognising injuries to feelings or honour,
69
 and whether this is truly the position in the common law.  
What is clear is that legal historians have unveiled evidence of the recognition of such rights 
or claims at certain points in the course of England’s history.  Beckerman, in particular, has observed 
that while the common law does appear to have ignored insults or affronts to honour altogether, at 
some stage in its history, honour played a more central role.
70
 For instance, he notes that it is well 
established that Anglo-Saxon laws paid more attention to the injured feelings or wounded honour of 
the victim rather than to the actual conduct of the wrongdoer.
71
  Moreover, the satisfaction of honour 
remained an important part of the settlement of any dispute from the Norman Conquest until at least 
the thirteenth century.
72
 While pleas in the royal courts in the thirteenth century rarely included claims 
for dishonour, they appeared more frequently in those brought before the local courts.
73
 The claims 
for dishonour were in relation to a wide range of wrongs (including breach of contract, defamation 
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and assault for example) and were awarded damages separate from those claimed for the actual 
wrong.
74
 Further, in a few cases, the amount claimed for dishonour far exceeded that claimed for the 
actual wrong, thus indicating that the crux of such claims concerned the dishonour itself, similar to 
claims brought for iniuria under Roman law, i.e. the insult caused by the wrong.
75
    
6. Iniuria in Roman Law 
Iniuria, translated as ‘insult’ or ‘outrage’ may be defined as ‘any contumelious disregard of another’s 
rights or personality’,
76
 as opposed to economic loss. Whilst originally the concept focused on 
physical assaults, it widened to include specific wrongs loosely similar to sexual harassment and 
defamation, and eventually was grounded by an unifying principle of contumelia or contempt.
 77
 
Essentially, by the classical period (from 1
st
 century CE), the wide variety of wrongs that were 
brought under the umbrella of iniuria, were related by the contempt shown to the victim.
78
  
Iniuria is so called from that which happens non iure (i.e. unlawfully); for everything which 
does not come about iure is said to occur iniuria. This is general. But specifically, iniuria is 
said to be contumelia.
79
  
Contumelia, was equated in Justinian’s Institutes to the Greek hubris,
80
 which in turn has been 
referred to by Peter Birks as ‘a kind of arrogance or pride’,
81
 or simply contempt in English.  The 
delict interfered with one’s right to an equality of respect,
82
 or is simply ‘disrespect’.
83
 The 
contemptuous act is exercised without taking into account the interests or feelings of the victim.
84
 
While it was a condition of iniuria that there must be an intent to insult, contumelia could also be 
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presumed from the intentional commission of the act, although this was a rebuttable presumption.
85
 It 
should also be noted that in relation to pre-classical (second and third period BCE) iniuria, special 
edicts were pronounced to impose liability in new previously unrecognised situations.
86
 It would 
appear that for two of the special edicts issued, only acts which were contra bonos mores i.e. those 
contrary to the social mores of the prevailing standards, attracted liability.
87
 Further, a special edict 
which dealt with infamia or ‘shaming’ required the subjective intent of the offender in order to attract 
liability.
88
 This was to deal with seemingly lawful acts which are intended to cause offence to the 
victim of such acts, as ‘some shades of intent could turn lawful conduct unlawful’.
89
  
Another condition for the operation of an action based on iniuria was that the victim must 
have expressed his dismay or anger as soon as he was apprised of the facts pertaining to the offence.
90
 
It was insufficient to show he was the victim; he must react to the offence. The idea behind this rule is 
not clear and is subject to several possible theories, 
91
 detailed discussion of which is beyond the 
scope of this chapter.  
The role that iniuria plays in the common law has been explored to a great extent by scholars 
in Roman law, as well as scholars of laws pertaining to those jurisdictions which have evolved laws 
rooted in Roman law, famously, Scotland and South Africa.
92
 Peter Birks, in his lecture Harassment 
and Hubris,
93
 thought that ‘the common law is much nearer than is often thought to a full recognition 
of the Roman tort,...’. The scholars in these fields have found that analysing the common law through 
the lens of the Roman tort to be instructive, for instance, it can be seen through this lens that the 
availability of enhanced or aggravated damages reflects the common law’s recognition that insulting 
behaviour or attitude deserved to be penalised.
94
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It is not intended to present the various arguments and lines of evidence which showcase the 
extent to which features of iniuria appear within the common law. There is already a body of 
scholarship which has made the point.
95
 The recognition of iniuria like principles within the common 
law enables the recognition of sub-interests such as privacy for example, which hitherto have never 
enjoyed full protection or recognition in the common law.
96
 Lawyers and judges in the common law 
need not exercise their creative powers in stretching the scope of established categories of tort in order 
to encompass cases which, although clearly involving the commission of a wrong of some type, do 
not however tick all the boxes of any of the established torts.
97
  
General concepts therefore such as contumelia, the right to respect, or affronts to honour, 
have not been entirely alien to the common law. These themes, originally formulated and rooted in 
Roman law, have manifested themselves in various guises in the common law. Just as studying and 
understanding how iniuria operated assists in helping the common law of tort to evolve, likewise, it 
furnishes us, for our present purposes, at least some guidance as to how ‘honour’, as it is provided for 
under s.80, may be applied.  
7. Revised interpretation of honour, and its effect on the destruction of works 
a. The revised interpretation 
Honour, thus, can be seen to mean the right to respect, not only as a mere definition in a dictionary, 
but also in the fields of anthropology and the law. This is, despite its many variations, its consistent 
key characteristic. Further, as stated above, iniuria, which is arguably a source of personality offences 
in modern law, appeared to focus on the offender’s act, rather than the victim’s actual feelings. What 
this means is that for an action to be established in iniuria, although it was necessary that the victim 
felt belittled or angered or offended in some way, and that he made known his feelings,
98
 it was also 
sufficient and it was not necessary to examine his feelings any further than that in order to ascertain if 
they were reasonably held. The delict instead focuses on the intention of the offender so that even if 
he had committed a strictly lawful act, this could attract liability if he had acted with contempt 
towards his victim.  
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Thus, instead of interpreting ‘honour’ as ‘what a person thinks of himself’,
99
 we can interpret 
honour in s.80 as underscoring the author’s right to be treated with respect, in relation to how his 
work is treated by third parties.
100
 While the victim’s actual feelings are obviously important as they 
constitute the injury which has been suffered, by focusing more on the offending nature of the act 
itself and also requiring an objective inquiry into the intent of the offender, i.e. by asking if the 
offender’s act was clearly meant to be offensive, it lessens the subjectivity element in s.80. Simply 
put, instead of having to ask if the victim actually feels offended by the act in question and whether it 
was reasonable for him to have felt so, it would only be necessary to ask if the defendant’s act is 
objectively insulting according to prevailing norms, i.e. contra bonos mores, an approach which may 
also be borrowed from pre-classical iniuria.   
As Stewart has noted, calling someone a swine is obviously offensive, and the victim of the 
name calling should have the right not to be offended as such. Obvious offence is, for instance, also 
conveyed by intentionally spitting in another’s face, although it may not necessarily be so by the 
actual hitting of another, even though the extent of physical injury meted out by hitting would be 
greater than that caused by spitting.
101
 This is because there may be some very good and inoffensive 
reason for hitting another for example, in self-defence or in jest perhaps, but it is difficult to think of 
an inoffensive reason for deliberately spitting in another’s face however. Spitting in another’s face is 
obviously meant to be offensive. Such an approach would not only assist in addressing concerns in 
allowing the unreasonable claims of oversensitive writers and artists,
102
 but would also capture acts 
which are objectively offensive but not necessarily detrimental to reputation. For example, a parody 
of a work would rarely be mistaken by the public as the work of the original author, and hence not 
affect his reputation.
103
 Aside from the fact that the original author might feel offended by the parody, 
it is clear that a parody is generally obviously intended to generate mirth at the expense of the original 
work and its author, and at best, poke gentle fun at them. There is an obvious element of offence 
meant in such a situation.
104
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Colourisation of films too is an issue which may be addressed by this. If done skilfully, and in 
today’s sophisticated film studios and computer laboratories this is usually the case,
105
 it is unlikely 
that the audience would think any less of the original film maker, and hence his reputation would 
most likely remain intact. There are economic reasons why broadcasting companies colourise films 
and television programs. The main reason is that it is increasingly difficult to syndicate black and 
white films, and by colourising them, there is scope for airing them to a much wider audience. 
However, there has been much opposition to this process,
106
 not only for films made in the non-colour 
era, but also in the period when coloured film technology was readily available. Particularly when 
colourisation was an option at the time the film was made, and the film was consciously filmed in 
black and white, the colourisation would be objectively offensive to the film director as it has not only 
altered the integrity of his work, it has altered the director’s artistic vision, and questioned his choice 
of artistic medium.  According to Woody Allen, who has chosen to create some films in black and 
white, ‘[t]o change someone’s work without any regard to his wishes shows a total contempt for film, 
for the director and for the public’.
107
 The film director’s reputation with film audiences may well 
remain intact especially if the colourisation was performed skilfully and tastefully, or if the audience 
is made aware that the colourisation was effected by a third party, but not only would the director be 
likely to feel offended, the colourisation of his black and white artistic vision is objectively offensive 
and therefore prejudicial to his honour. 
Further, by looking at the intention of the offender, seemingly lawful conduct may become 
unlawful, as we have already seen above in the discussion on iniuria. It can be seen that this aspect of 
the delict in particular, if applied to moral rights, would play a significant role. For instance, prima 
facie, the owner of an artwork has private property rights over that artwork and ostensibly has the 
right to do whatever he wishes with it. Should he choose to maltreat or even destroy it however, he 
would be perfectly within his legal rights to do so.
108
 The maltreatment/destruction is therefore a 
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lawful act. However, in maltreating/destroying the artwork without due regard for the feelings of its 
author, the owner has acted contemptuously, and such an act could conceivably be an iniuria.  
It has to be pointed out here that care must be taken in automatically drawing this conclusion. 
There is an inevitable tension between the owner’s property rights over an artwork and the moral 
rights of the artist. It is recognised that there are situations in which the owner’s reasons for 
destroying the artwork are not only understandable, but also good and valid, and more importantly 
they reasonably override considerations of any regard for the artist, and hence not necessarily 
constitute an iniuria. Indeed, Paul in D.47.10.33 seemed to regard contra bonos mores as an essential 
element for liability in iniuria:  
Where something is done in the public interest according to sound morals, even though it is to 
the disrespect of someone, nevertheless, because the magistrate does it not with a mind to 
doing iniuria but to assert public maiestas, he is not liable to an action iniuriarum.  
While the text is a little confusing because the reference to the magistrate is not explained, 




For instance, if the owner either merely takes a dislike to the artwork or rejects it on some 
ideological ground, it is an understandable reason for destroying it, but it is not necessarily a good 
and valid reason to simply destroy the artwork without more, or indeed, a sound public interest 
reason. Indeed, if the reason for destroying the work is based on ideological grounds, this amounts to 
an outright rebuff of the artist’s vision. Destroying an artwork under such circumstances demonstrates 
utter disregard for the artist’s feelings and hence is contumelious.  There are many examples of this, 
ranging from the destruction by Lady Churchill of Sutherland’s portrait of Winston Churchill (which 
is discussed below), to the destruction of Diego Rivera’s mural, Man at Crossroads at the behest of its 
commissioner, the Rockefellers.
110
 Another example is the insidious practice of cutting up artworks 
into pieces, mainly for profit, as the separate sales of individual pieces may add up to more than the 
asking price for the artwork in its entirety. Such a travesty occurred in 1986 when a Picasso linocut 
print was cut up into 500 separate pieces by an Australian mail order company.
111
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On the other hand, an example of a good and valid reason which could legitimately override 
any concern for the artist would be public health and safety. In 2010, for health and safety reasons, 
security staff at the Royal College of Art destroyed a student artwork which consisted of a stairway 
erected between the college’s building and a fish and chip shop next door.  Although sympathetic 
towards the student artist’s plight, the college rector emphasised that the safety of students and 
visitors would not be put at risk for the sake of maintaining the work.
112
 However, health and safety 
reasons have been raised in the past on spurious grounds, primarily as a smokescreen for the true 
sentiments behind the destruction of artworks. Jacob Epstein’s nude statues on the British Medical 
Association’s headquarters sparked intense controversy from the moment they were unveiled. For a 
period of almost thirty years, a continuous campaign was waged from different quarters against the 
statues. When finally part of one statue fell onto the street below, this gave the then owner of the 
building a reason to destroy the works. Mundy, art historian and Head of Collection Research at the 
Tate Modern, laments that ‘...what had been a grand public statement by one of the greatest modernist 




Nowhere is the tension between property rights, public interest and moral rights more 
apparent than in legal dispute which raged over Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc, discussed in chapter 3. To 
recapitulate, Tilted Arc was a monolithic steel wall which traversed Federal Plaza in New York. 
Office workers from the surrounding buildings were infuriated with the structure, and petitioned its 
removal. The federal agency which commissioned the sculpture held a public hearing, at which 
almost two hundred artists and experts gave testimony in the sculpture’s favour. The panel, after 
hearing views from the public as well as those of the art world, chose to remove the sculpture. A 
furious Serra then sued the agency, claiming a breach of his moral rights. The court dismissed his 
claim, ruling that it was the property of the agency and therefore it had the right to dispose of the 
work. According to Serra, the legal outcome ‘[affirmed] the government’s commitment to private 
property over the interests of art or free expression.’
114
  
The above discussion demonstrates the inherent tension between property rights and moral 
rights, an issue which deserves a more in-depth discussion and which will be explored further in 
chapter 7. This section merely makes the point that while the owner who destroys an artwork in his 
possession may simply be exercising his legal rights, unless there are good, valid and overriding 
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reasons for the destruction, it amounts to a contumelious disregard for the artist. A further point may 
also be made that the owner of a work of art is its guardian, responsible for its posterity.
115
  
Further, as discussed above in the introduction, the product of a creative process practised in 
the fine arts is the embodiment of its author’s personality, and hence callous destruction of the product 
would amount to callous disregard for the personality of its author and is prima facie insulting. Any 
maltreatment or the destruction of the artwork may therefore raise at least a presumption of contempt 
towards the artist, attracting liability.  It should be remembered that only a rebuttable presumption is 
raised, so that in a few instances, such an act could possibly be deemed inoffensive. An example 
would be when an artist, with the full consent of another artist, destroys the work of the second artist. 
Exactly such a situation occurred when Robert Rauschenberg, with Willem de Kooning’s permission, 
erased one of de Kooning’s works, in order to create a ‘new’ work. In an interview, Rauschenberg 
explained that he ‘...erased the de Kooning not out of any negative response.’
116
  This arguably was 
not a situation where the destroyer clearly intended to offend the author of the destroyed work. 
It is important at this juncture to briefly contrast the aforementioned examples of parodies and 
the colourisation of films with the act of destruction generally. It could be argued that parodies and 
the colourisation of films are arguably creative works in their own right. Much skill and creativity 
goes into the creation of a good and humorous parody, and above all, they also play a valuable role as 
a form of criticism of the work on which they are based, and as such it has been argued that the law 
should recognise protection for such forms of work. 
117
 Again, much skill and creativity goes into the 
selection of the appropriate hues and contrasts in producing a sympathetic colourised version of a 
black and white film, and colourised versions will make black and white films more palatable and 
accessible to modern audiences today. Arguably there are possible public interests in these activities. 
There is therefore an argument that caution should be exercised in imposing restrictions on activities 
which are arguably creative and socially beneficial, and that an author’s honour may not necessarily 
override such public interests. Destruction on the other hand leaves nothing in its wake. Apart from 
the Rauschenberg episode, there is nothing creative about destroying a work of art, and generally, one 
                                                             
115
  Julius S Held, ‘Alteration and Mutilation of Works of Art’ (1963) 62 The South Atlantic Quarterly 4, 26. 
116
  Vincent Katz, ‘A Genteel Iconoclasm - Robert Rauschenberg’ (Tate etc, 2006)   
<http://www.tate.org.uk/context-comment/articles/genteel-iconoclasm>. 
117
  Much has been written on the impact of copyright and moral rights on parodies. See for example, Geri J. 
Yonover, ‘The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use’ (1996) 14 Cardozo Arts and 
Entertainment Law Journal 79; Maree Sainsbury, ‘Parody, Satire, Honour and Reputation: The Interplay 
between Economic and Moral Rights’ (2007) 18 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 149; Tania 
Cheng, ‘The Power of Potter: Copyright Law and its Influence on Sequels and Parodies’ (2013) 49 




is hard pressed to find a public interest in the destruction of a creative work.
118
  A detailed discussion 
of the relative merits of parodies, colourisation and ‘destruction as art’ is beyond the scope of this 
section and it suffices to remind ourselves that, in the absence of a clear statutory exception, and 
bearing in mind the above arguments, the courts may exercise restraint in deeming creative acts such 
as parodies and colourisation as treatments prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the original 
authors.  
b. Honour v Reputation – the effect on destruction of works 
Honour, in contrast to reputation, is not concerned with public knowledge of the act which interferes 
with his work. As stated above, reputation is, unlike honour, essentially economic in character. The 
ruination of an author’s public image or his reputation will in turn impinge upon his future income. 
Thus, this is why the courts, in discussing cases involving the author’s integrity right, have been so 
concerned with the final ‘product’ after the alleged maltreatment by the defendant. Does the work, 
after being subject to the defendant’s treatment, have the capacity to prejudice the author’s reputation? 
In other words, would the public, upon seeing the end result, have a markedly negative perception of 
the author and his works? The answer is never clear as some treatments may not only simply have 
little or no effect on the public’s perception of the author but may even enhance the author’s 
reputation. For example, substantial editing of a written work in which fundamental errors of fact or 
simply bad grammar are corrected, would possibly amount to a substantial treatment of the original 
work under s.80, but would arguably not prejudice the author’s reputation.  Where destruction of a 
work is concerned however, the consequence of such an act is unmistakable. The end result of an act 
of destruction is the same, no matter what the subject-matter involved is – the work is simply no more 
and need not be subject to the same level of scrutiny by the courts.  
However, as already stated above, destruction leaves nothing behind which can affect the 
author’s reputation, and as such, there is a considerable body of academic and judicial opinion that 
destruction does not amount to a breach of the integrity right.
119
 This is for example reflected in the 
following statement by Roeder, 
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‘To deform [the creator’s] work is to present him to the public as the creator of a work not his 
own, and thus make him subject to criticism for a work he has not done; the destruction of the 
work does not have this result.’ 
120
 
Further, the House Report related to the enactment of the US Visual Artist’s Rights Act 
(VARA) in 1990 noted that 
‘Some Berne members do not include destruction of a work within the right of integrity 
because theoretically, once the work no longer exists, there can be no effect on an artist’s 
honor or reputation.’ 
121
 
In Carter v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., a US case in which the plaintiffs invoked VARA, the 
Second Circuit remarked that ‘...destruction is seen as less harmful than the continued display of 
deformed or mutilated works that misrepresent the artist.’
122
    
The idea behind the sentiments articulated above is that something else other than the author’s 
original work is represented as his, which is communicated or conveyed to the public and hence harms 
the public’s perception of him and his work. Similarly, harm to reputation in defamation occurs only 
when the libellous words are published. Until then, there is no harm. It should also be remembered at 
this juncture that additional requirements in s.80, subsections (3), (4) and (6) discussed earlier in 
chapter 4 emphasise the requirement for public knowledge of the treatment meted out to the work. It 
makes the author ‘subject to criticism’ by the public according to Roeder above, in other words, 
subject to a negative evaluation by the public, which is, simply put, a slight on his reputation. The 
maltreated, mutilated or deformed work influences or works on the mind of the public and hence has 
an effect on the author’s reputation, and it is thought that continued display of the mutilated work 
causes more harm than simply destroying it entirely.  By contrast, evidently after destruction, there is 
nothing left that can be communicated or conveyed to the public, and therefore nothing that can affect 
what the public thinks of the author. It can be seen that the focus is on the public’s perception, in other 
words, the effect on the author’s reputation. 
It is therefore manifest that what various commentators had in mind, when they opined that 
destruction leaves nothing behind which can harm the author, is reputation. As already mentioned 
above, in analysing cases involving the right of integrity, academic texts and judicial opinions 
emphasise the effect of the treatment of a work on the reputation of the author, and any academic or 
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judicial attempts at defining the honour limb of s.80 simply echo definitions of the concept of 
reputation, instead of attempting to distinguish honour from reputation. Honour appears to have been 
left on the wayside to all intents and purposes.     
While reputation may not be affected by destruction, it is submitted that honour may be 
prejudiced by such an act.  Contumelia which has been defined as the act of treating the victim 
contemptuously, or without regard to his feelings or interests would similarly describe the situation 
here. The person who destroys a work of art has not taken into account the feelings of the work’s 
author, or if he has, he has simply dismissed them as unimportant before proceeding to destroy the 
work. The destroyer may have good reason to want to destroy the work. For instance, the Churchills 
famously had an intense dislike of Winston Churchill’s portrait painted by Graham Sutherland,
123
 and 
had it destroyed. Although Sutherland was magnanimous in saying that he was not ‘unduly 
distressed’, as he might well be, he strongly denounced the act as ‘without question an act of 
vandalism’, strong terms indeed, thus revealing the true depths of his feelings about the matter.
124
 
Even if Sutherland himself was not really distressed, the very act of destroying the portrait was a 
display of the contempt the Churchills had for the portrait, and even Sutherland himself. Putting aside 
difficult and ambivalent issues regarding property ownership,
125
 the ethics of destroying artworks and 
the potential loss of cultural heritage,
126
 it is at least clear that the effect such an act would have on the 
artist is profoundly upsetting, which is best described in the following statement by Roy Strong, 
director of the Victoria and Albert Museum, ‘...an artist tears something out of himself when he paints 
a portrait and to burn it is like burning a chunk of Sutherland’.
127
 This statement is not as incredible as 
it sounds, especially if we understand the author’s work to be ‘an embodiment of the author’s personal 
meaning and message’,
128
 or even something akin to an offspring of the author’s,
129
 and therefore it 
would be obvious and natural to most that the destruction of the author’s work is obviously deeply 
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offensive and wounding at worst, insensitive and tactless at best, redolent of the features of 
contumelia.  
Whilst Sutherland’s honour may have been acutely prejudiced by the destruction of the 
Churchill portrait, his reputation appears not to have been affected much by the incident, apart from 
some short term notoriety in the popular press.
130
 His standing, however, as an important artist, 
remained generally unsullied. A few years after the presentation of the portrait, Sutherland was 
awarded the Order of Merit,
131
 and even though his style of painting gradually became unfashionable 
in some quarters, his works have been regularly exhibited long after his death in 1980.
132
 When asked 
if the Churchill controversy would have the effect of clouding Sutherland’s memories, Sir Kenneth 
Clark, in an interview held in 1980, replied firmly in the negative.
133
 Even if destruction had been 
recognised at the time as a breach of the integrity right,
134
 Sutherland may have found it difficult to 
establish his claim as there was evidence that his reputation was not unduly affected by the 
destruction, even though the requirement is that the treatment is prejudicial, not that it has prejudiced 
the reputation of the author. However, as we have seen above, destruction of an artwork is clearly an 
act which is insulting to the artist, and as such, prejudice to honour could have been a basis on which 
Sutherland could have made his claim.  
It is not to say that the reputation of an artist can never be affected by destruction of one or 
more of his artwork. In fact, it is abundantly evident that, despite the absence of something tangible 
which may affect public opinion, the destruction of an artist’s work can also affect his reputation 
profoundly. First of all, the destruction of an artwork would reduce the corpus of the artist’s life work, 
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as well as possibly his financial standing,
135
 hence giving the prima facie impression that the artist has 
a smaller repertoire than he has actually produced.
136
  According to Stamtoudi, 
In other words, the destruction of a work may diminish the professional image and standing 
of the author by eliminating one of his creations. Especially in cases where the reputation of 
an author depends on a limited number of creations, the destruction of even one of them may 
substantially affect his status.
137
  
Secondly, the knowledge that an artwork has been deliberately destroyed would surely at least 
raise questions in the public’s mind regarding the worth of the artwork, especially if the destruction 
had been carried out by a notable personage, particularly one who is a patron of the arts or with some 
substantial background in the arts. To the public, there must have been some reason that the work was 
not worth preserving. That said, even if it is true that an artist’s reputation can never be affected by the 
destruction of one of his artworks, which is disputed as argued above, the artist’s honour has surely 
been prejudiced at least.  
By re-interpreting honour as a right to respect, UK moral rights law is in a position to give 
full countenance to not only the legal rights of artists, but more importantly to the respect which they 
seek and in most cases, of which they are deserving. It is not always the case that monetary rewards 
incentivise creative enterprise among writers and artists; respect is equally, if not more, important to 
such authors. Such a viewpoint has been expounded robustly in Kwall’s The Soul of Creativity. 
138
 
According to her work, by commodifying creative works and focusing solely on the economic 
incentives, the law has lost sight of what is truly important to the writers and artists in society. Ong, in 
discussing why moral rights matter,
139
 also expressed his concerns for the growing interest in 
emphasizing the economic efficiency and value maximization of moral rights.
140
 He questioned an 
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innovative study by Hannsmann and Santilli,
141
 which engaged in an economic analysis of moral 
rights, pointing out that their thesis assumed that the integrity right protected reputational interests, 
thus unduly elevating the pecuniary interests of the author, while marginalising the non-pecuniary 
ones.
142
 Re-interpreting honour in s.80 would assist in recognising the respect which should be 
accorded to UK’s authors, and also enable UK copyright law to focus beyond merely the economic 
rights of authors.  
In this respect, there is a further lesson to be learnt from the Romans. There is evidence that 
the Romans recognised the non-economic character of honour on the one hand, and conversely, the 
economic character of reputation on the other. According to Pound, three general forms of iniuria 
were recognised: real or physical injury, symbolic injuries such as affronts to honour, and pecuniary 
interests, which included injuries to reputation.
143
  Thus, a distinction was made between injuries such 
as affronts to honour and injuries such as damage to reputation, the latter being of an economic 
character. As already mentioned above, injury to a professional person’s reputation can result in harm 
to his financial standing, in that he not only stands to lose his current clients or customers, he may also 
lose potential clients or customers.
144
 The damage to one’s honour however cannot be as easily 
quantified in monetary terms, but is nevertheless just as palpable an injury which should not be 
ignored.  
8. Conclusion 
Honour is a very different creature from reputation. Interpreted as a right to respect, it need not 
require a public display of the act in question, and furthermore would encompass the entire 
destruction of works, which at the moment is not recognised as treatment which is prejudicial to 
honour or reputation under moral rights. While the victim’s feelings are relevant and important, the 
court need not base their judgment wholly on them, which is arguably undesirable as unreasonable 
claims by hypersensitive artists might be allowed. However, if the focus is trained on the act itself, in 
order to ascertain if it is objectively offensive, then this would ameliorate the risk of allowing 
unreasonable claims by hypersensitive artists. Where destruction is concerned, it has been argued 
above that, unlike mutilations or other modifications, the effect of destruction on a work is 
unambiguous, and the prima facie intent behind the act is, at least, disrespect or a complete disregard 
for the honour of the artist. The argument that destruction is at least prima facie insulting or 
                                                             
141
  Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli, ‘Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and 
Economic Analysis’ [The University of Chicago Press for The University of Chicago Law School] 
(1997) 26 The Journal of Legal Studies 95. 
142
  Ong (n 139) 307. 
143
  Roscoe Pound, ‘Interests of Personality’ (1915) 28 Harvard Law Review 445 at 449-50. 
144




contemptuous to the author, has been noted by William Patry, ‘One could argue however that 
destruction of a work shows the utmost contempt for the artist’s honour or reputation’.
145
 Despite the 
reference to both honour and reputation, Patry makes the point that destruction is clearly a 
contemptuous act. Hence, destruction constitutes a clear prejudice to the honour of the author, even if 
his reputation remains unaffected.    
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Chapter 6 - Can a Work of Art be Destroyed under Copyright Law – an 
analysis of the legal definition of ‘artistic work’ 
Art is not, as the metaphysicians say, the manifestation of some mysterious idea of beauty or 
God; it is not, as the aesthetical physiologists say, a game in which man lets off his excess of 
stored-up energy; it is not the expression of man’s emotions by external signs; it is not the 
production of pleasing objects; and, above all, it is not pleasure; but it is a means of union 
among men, joining them together in the same feelings, and indispensable for the life and 
progress toward well-being of individuals and of humanity.  




This chapter continues with the task initiated in chapter 4, which was a doctrinal analysis of the 
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA). Whilst chapters 4 and 5 subjected s.80 to rigorous 
scrutiny, this chapter is concerned not only with s.80 but also with the definition of ‘work’, 
specifically ‘artistic work’, for copyright purposes. This chapter will focus on the question as to 
whether, according to copyright principles, a work in abstract can be destroyed, as opposed to any 
particular tangible incarnation of it, whether original or copy. To date, legal scholarship on this 
question has answered it in the negative i.e. that the protectable work for copyright purposes being the 
abstract content of a book, musical composition or painting may not be destroyed even when the 
physical receptacle of the content is destroyed. It then follows that because a copyright work cannot 
be destroyed, artists may not claim against the destruction of their work, even if the physical substrate 
of their painting or sculpture is destroyed.   
In querying this perception, this chapter will survey the legal scholarship on this issue, and test its 
conclusions against established theories of art ontology. Reference will also be made to empirical 
research carried out previously by psychologists and philosophers, which test the hypothesis that 
ordinary practices and beliefs in the art world reflect those propounded by philosophers of art.  
By employing art philosophy and by extracting the findings of empirical research previously 
undertaken in this area, it is intended that this chapter will shed more light on the reality surrounding 
the destruction of artworks, and question whether copyright law’s assumptions about artworks still 
hold true. The philosophical debates and research demonstrate that there are significant doubts that 
either lay people or art experts/philosophers regard the singular arts such as paintings and non-cast 
sculptures in the same light as literature and music. Why then should copyright law treat all works, 
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whether literature, music or sculptures, in the same manner?
2
 Ultimately this chapter makes the case 
that the way copyright law currently perceives and treats artistic works, especially the destruction of 
such works, undermines the goals of copyright law and moral rights doctrine.  
a. The relationship between copyright definition of work and the integrity right 
The CDPA specifies eight categories of works subject to copyright protection.
3
 These works are 
subdivided generally into authorial works, i.e. literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, and 
entrepreneurial works, i.e. sound recordings, films, broadcasts and typographical arrangements. For 
the purposes of copyright law and moral rights, it is generally accepted that the protectable essence of 
authorial works like novels, poems, symphonies etc lies in their intangible content, not their physical 
embodiment.
4
 Copyright arises and attaches to a work the instant it is created and fixed in a material 
form.
5
 It has therefore been argued that for the purposes of copyright, the work then remains in 
existence even if its physical embodiment is destroyed.
6
 This principle apparently applies in relation 
to all types of works, textual works such as literary and musical works, and also artistic works. It is 
based on the accepted principle that it is the creative content, i.e. words, plots, descriptions, characters 
etc of a novel which constitute the protectable core, not the printed paper or electronic-ink. Similarly, 
it is argued that the picture is the protectable aspect of an artwork, not its physical embodiment, e.g. 
the canvas and pigments of a painting. It follows that the destruction of the first edition of a book or 
the original painting or any of their copies would still leave the content intact. Furthermore, through 
their copies, their protectable content would remain accessible indefinitely, and the relevant work 
cannot be destroyed.
7
 This undermines any claim that a creator might have against the destruction of 
the work under the integrity right, for if it cannot be destroyed, there can be no breach.
8
  It is this 
conclusion i.e. that a ‘work’, including artistic works, cannot be destroyed, which this chapter seeks to 
challenge.   
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b. Framework of chapter 
To ascertain if copyright works may be destroyed, this chapter must examine the ontological status of 
copyright works, which copyright scholars accept as being unstable.
9
 Griffiths explains that English 
copyright law has evolved over time to embrace the abstract nature of the copyright work.
10
 However, 
Sherman recognises that ‘[b]y focusing on the intangible, at the expense of the tangible, we lose sight 
of the material dimension of the work and the way that this interacts with the intangible’,
11
 and argues 
that the copyright work cannot be seen in either purely intangible terms or purely material ones.
12
  
Until the enactment of the Copyright Act 1911, UK copyright statutes had provided legal 
protection to specific types of works e.g. the Statute of Anne covered ‘books’, while the Sculpture 
Copyright Act 1814 covered ‘sculptures’. The 1911 Act introduced the abstract concept of ‘work’, 
which was an all-encompassing notion that covered all creative forms; no distinction was to be made 
between books, paintings, engravings or sculptures.  
The flexibility in focusing on an abstract notion of work is useful in modern times. We cannot 
rely on the approach of early copyright law, which was to refer to specific subject-matters (e.g. books, 
paintings) as such an approach can hardly account for the increasing variety in media today. However, 
an overarching abstract definition of ‘work’, although affording us the flexibility we require, leaves us 
needing clearer guidance on what constitutes a ‘work’. Unlike in ‘real’ property law, there are no 
bright-line rules to assist us,
13
 and perhaps we cannot expect any as, even in pre-modern copyright law 
days, there were problems with defining the protectable subject-matter.
14
     
What contemporary copyright scholars are in agreement about is that although the modernist 
approach in treating ‘works’ as an abstract concept was the correct progression in the evolution of 
copyright law,
15
 we still cannot answer the question of what ‘work’ means with any degree of 
certainty, and that legal scholarship on this area of law is relatively unexplored.
16
 This state of affairs 
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is concerning as, according to Wei, ‘the stronger and more extensive the rights, the tougher the 
remedies, the greater the need for certainty and predictability as to what is protected.’
17
 
 This chapter does not propose to question the entire scholarship surrounding the concept of 
‘work’ in copyright law, which either deal separately with the various delimiting factors such as the 




 fair use doctrine,
20
 and 
questions regarding miniscule works,
21
 or short phrases/titles/slogans,
 22
 or more generally with all the 
various principles, guidelines and rules which the courts have at their disposal in ascertaining the 
boundaries of the copyright work.
 23
  Rather, it highlights a particular problem with treating artistic 
works, such as paintings and sculptures, in the same manner as textual or notational works such as 
novels, poems and symphonies. This is, that by making the same assumptions about artistic works and 
other types of works, copyright law is in danger of ignoring firstly how art philosophers and other 
interested participants involved with art, treat works of art, and secondly, the everyday realities of 
how ordinary people actually perceive and treat creative works, whether literary, musical, dramatic or 
artistic. Because such assumptions have a real effect on artworks, and people heavily involved with 
art, such as artists, art collectors, historians and curators, it is important that we remember that 
copyright is an intellectual property right which is ‘created by law and regulated by law’,
24
 and that 
further, the subject-matters protected by copyright are in turn described by those authoritative in 
copyright law,
25
 but who are not experts in art. Such assumptions should not be immune to constant 
questioning, scepticism and criticism.  
It is proposed that artistic works are fundamentally different in nature to textual works, and 
that it is unsound to treat them in an identical fashion under copyright law, especially where 
destruction is concerned. This is reflected in the way we ordinarily treat works like music and 
literature as contrasted with the way in which we treat works like paintings and sculptures. It will be 
argued later in this chapter that people identify the latter with their original physical embodiment and 
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feel an incalculable loss when the original physical work is destroyed. To all concerned, it is simply 
lost forever and no one would think that the art work is not destroyed. People do not however 
ordinarily identify the original manuscript on which Mozart wrote his 40
th
 Symphony with the 40
th
 
Symphony itself. There is no such depth of profound loss if the original handwritten manuscript for 
Mozart’s 40
th
 symphony is lost. There is of course a great sense of dismay but that is only because of 
the provenance accorded to the manuscript. While there is also provenance associated with original 




 Symphony is still performed and enjoyed in numerous concert halls 
throughout the world, and is recorded in the numerous copies of its musical score. One may argue that 
we should treat all works alike, and could likewise consider that Mozart’s 40
th
 Symphony may be 
completely destroyed in the event the very last copy of its manuscript or recording of the last 
performance of the symphony is destroyed, and when all memories of the symphony have completely 
faded. It must be appreciated however, in the present digital age in which reproduction techniques are 
exceptional, such a consequence is highly improbable. The above views are supported by the results 
of the empirical research discussed further below.  
It is intended to take issue with the concept of work as applied to artistic works, primarily on 
the premise that the physical matter i.e. the paint and canvas and other materials, takes on a 
fundamental and necessary role in the creation of an artistic work. It is argued that the purely 
immaterial element cannot function, on its own, as the entire artistic work, and that contrary to the 
view that a copyright work cannot be destroyed, destruction of the material will simultaneously 
destroy its immaterial content. It will also be argued that although an artistic work can be destroyed, 
copyright protection is not necessarily extinguished upon its destruction. This is because of two 
principles of copyright law: firstly, copyright protection arises the moment a work is created, and 
secondly, permanence of form is not a requirement for copyright protection to continue to subsist. 
Further, s.153(3) of the CDPA states that once qualifying requirements are met, ‘copyright does not 
cease to subsist by reason of any subsequent event.’ 
Therefore, two questions are posed in dealing with the definition of ‘work’ where artistic 
works are concerned, firstly whether the material aspect i.e. the medium, of a work of art is a 
fundamental and essential element of the same, and secondly, whether art can be destroyed. Both are 
issues subject to considerable scrutiny by art philosophers. A discussion of the ontology of art is 
therefore an important contribution to the present debate, where issues regarding the law and those 
regarding art intersect. The ensuing discussion is not purely a discussion of metaphysics for its sake, 
but a matter of how the purposes of copyright protection and moral rights doctrine in relation to art 




Finally, the point must be made that, even if the legal concept of an artistic work is that it is 
an immaterial concept, the reality is that an original artwork is a wholly unique entity, consisting of 
both the immaterial subject-matter and the material support which encapsulates the subject-matter, 
which once destroyed, is utterly irreplaceable. Due to the unique nature of artworks such as paintings 
and sculptures, their very destruction constitute an irretrievable loss of an unique piece, a fate that 
rarely befalls the other forms, such as literary and musical works, which are purely abstract works 
independent of the paper on which they are created, and of which multiple copies are invariably made, 
especially in the age of digital technology. It is obvious that the effect of destruction of even the first 
edition of a literary work is nowhere near as devastating and irrevocable as that of an original artistic 
work, hence the reason for focusing on artworks, as their requirement for a solution is far more 
pressing.  
c. Reference to the ontology of art – can a work of art be destroyed? 
The question of whether a work of art can be destroyed is a question which features in any query 
investigating the nature of art works. The query is not so much a question as to what conditions a 
work must fulfil in order to be classified as an artistic work (for e.g. it meets some standard of Beauty, 
or standard of craftsmanship), than a focus on asking what type of entity is a work of art. In other 
words, we ask if a work of art is perhaps a purely physical object, a feat of imagination, or a sensory 
experience for both artist and spectator? Destruction enters into the equation in that if a work of art is 
a purely physical object, then clearly it can be destroyed, but not if it is an abstract entity. These 
questions have been debated by aesthetic philosophers, including Wollheim, Collingwood, Margolis 
and Thomasson, and it is from the works of these philosophers that inspiration is sought in order to 
address the issue in copyright law.  
These same questions do also crop up in copyright law, but they have not been debated to the 
same depth in legal circles. That is not to say that legal scholarship has completely denied the 
metaphysical nature of such enquiries in copyright law. Indeed, recognition of the need for 
metaphysics is reflected in a well known dictum by US Judge Story, who opined that copyright [and 
patents] ‘...approach, nearer than any other class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what 
may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtle 
and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent’.
26
 
While in general judges and academics have certainly debated in much depth and detail, the 
criteria which must be met by a work before it can be considered as an artistic work for copyright 
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 they have not considered the issue of destruction to the same extent, which is unfortunate 
as the issue is important particularly in considering whether an artist has a right to object to the 
destruction of his work. The following section will deal with the legal perspective on artistic works, 
before proceeding to a consideration of the key texts on the ontology of art by aesthetic philosophers.  
2. Legal Perspective 
The law and the arts have crossed paths in countless instances, ranging from issues relating to 
copyright, obscenity, customs and duties, and taxes.
28
 Problems in aesthetics have therefore 
necessarily been the subject of considerable judicial deliberation, although unfortunately without the 
assistance of or reference to any of the established aesthetic theories or expert opinion.
29
 The courts’ 
reluctance to enlist the help of experts in the field is explained by Lord Simon in Hensher,
30
  
...the court will endeavour not to be tied to a particular metaphysics of art, partly 
because courts are not naturally fitted to such matters and partly because Parliament 
can hardly have intended that the construction of its statutory phrase should turn on 
some recondite theory of aesthetics... 
A few law academics on the other hand have increasingly taken up with art theorists in their 
discussions on art. Karlen refers briefly to the work of Collingwood, Margolis and Goodman in his 
general discussion on aesthetic theory in relation to legal problems involving art.
 31
 Pila, in writing on 
the categorisation of copyright works,
32





while also making brief references to art philosophers such as Thomasson, Dickie and Levinson.  
Very recently, Alexandra George has explored metaphysical issues relating to intellectual property in 
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 Although not a lawyer, Darren Hicks, a philosophy professor, 
has written on aesthetic issues which arise in copyright law, observing that ‘while copyright law 
assumes some metaphysical basis to its objects, this basis tends to go largely uninvestigated’,
36
 
contending further that ‘copyright law does, or should, grow from an understanding of these 
objects’,
37
 a view strongly advocated in this chapter. 
The engagement of law academics with the question of destruction specifically has however 
generally been incidental, arising primarily from discussions relating to two perspectives. Firstly, 
when law academics (Derclaye, Pila, Garnett and Davies) consider the broader question of the 
requirement for fixation or permanence of copyright protected works, where those academics have 
questioned the nature of these works. Legal academic debate here readily accepts that destruction of 
the material form of a work does not destroy the ‘copyright work’ itself. Secondly, and closely related 
to the above legal query, other legal academics (Liu, Waisman) have focused more pointedly on the 
material or physical aspects of artistic works, generally concluding that the physical material is a 
separate and distinct feature, which when destroyed, does not destroy the work of art. In arriving at 
the above conclusions, legal academics in general appear to accept rather too eagerly that destroying 
the physical work, even if it is a ‘singular’ work i.e. works of which there is only one instance, like a 
painting or sculpture, does not destroy the work of art itself, notwithstanding that this is a stance 
which has been debated at length by art philosophers and which has not been as readily accepted by 
them.  
The legal debates will be considered in the following sections, the underlying premise being that 
their conclusions on destruction thus far have been both premature and unsatisfactory. 
a. The Requirement for Fixation or Permanence?  
The question of whether an artistic work may be destroyed is linked to numerous debates which have 
centred on the requirement of fixation, i.e. that the work is recorded in a material form, which is a 
long established principle of copyright law.
38
 In copyright cases pre-dating the CDPA, where the 
fixation requirement appears in s.3(2), the fixation principle has been expressed generally in terms of 
the necessity for certainty, firstly of existence of the work itself, and secondly, for ascertaining the 
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boundaries of the work claimed.
39
 s.3(2) CDPA, which refers to fixation only in relation to literary, 
dramatic and musical works, simply states that copyright does not subsist in these works unless and 
until it is ‘recorded in writing or otherwise’, and is also deemed to arise at the time the work is made. 
The Act merely goes on to define ‘writing’,
40
  but does not give any further guidance beyond this.  
Artistic works are presumably not subject to the same requirement as they exist ordinarily in a 
physical material form, and not in an ephemeral state.
41
 It is somewhat ironic that while the absence of 
any reference in s.3(2) to artistic works reflects the CDPA’s ostensible acceptance of artistic works as 
naturally existing in physical or material forms, the persistent view of copyright legal scholarship is 
that copyright protects intangible works and that includes artistic works.    
The issue of destruction arises where debates on the fixation requirement have centred on the 
question of whether the fixation itself must also be in a permanent form. This requirement for 
permanence was raised initially by Lawton LJ in Merchandising v Harpbond,
42
 in which the pop star 
Adam Ant claimed copyright protection of his stage make-up. This requirement was applied again in 
the Australian case of Komesaroff v Mickle,
43
 involving ‘sand-pictures’, works consisting of glass 
containers filled with air bubbles, different coloured sands and liquids, which create different images 
every time the container is moved. The permanence requirement was also applied in Creation Records 
Ltd News Group Newspapers Ltd,
44
 which involved a temporary assemblage of object trouves.   
However, notwithstanding the above court decisions, Copinger & Skone James categorically 
confirms that permanence is not a requirement,
45
 and indeed nowhere does it say in the CDPA that 
fixation ought to be permanent.
46
 It appears that, notwithstanding the abovementioned cases, the 
courts in other cases have not been so certain, of either the necessity for artistic works to be fixed or 
that the fixation should be permanent.
47
 Derclaye, on having studied relevant cases and legal 
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commentary on this issue, has also concluded that permanence is not a requirement,
48
 but that, despite 
the absence of any reference to artistic works in s.3(2), fixation may well be a requirement for artistic 
works to the extent that the work for copyright purpose at least has to be static or accessible to some 
extent.
49
 Stokes, who has similarly referred to and analysed several of the same cases referred to by 
Derclaye, concludes that the current position is unclear.
50
    
While it appears from case-law and academic opinions that permanence is not a requirement 
and that fixation may be a requirement for artistic works, underlying the debates surrounding the 
fixation of works and the issue of permanence lies the question of the fundamental nature of the 
works which are protectable under copyright law. In other words, what is the nature of artistic works? 
More specifically, is its physical or material form an integral part of an artistic work? Where literary 
and musical works are concerned, it is trite to state that it is clearly the novel or symphony that is 
protected not its printed material. But it is unclear if the same proposition extends equally to the visual 
arts. However, while the creative content of a novel can clearly be distinguished from its material 
fixation, i.e. the physical printed material, it does not also follow that a painting is not constituted of 
paint and canvas materials. It is proposed that a painting or a sculpture is constituted of its physical 
material, and therefore if the physical painting or sculpture was destroyed, the painting or sculpture is 
clearly and certainly destroyed.  
This is in contrast to the position taken by Davies and Garnett, who state (in relation to all 
types of copyright works, including artistic works), ‘First, it should be borne in mind that the integrity 
right is related to a copyright work, and a copyright work cannot itself be destroyed: it remains in 
existence even if the original embodiment or fixation of it is destroyed.’
51
 The underlying reason for 
this bold statement appears in Copinger & Skone James on Copyright,
52
 in which the authors 
emphasise that copyright law’s requirement for a material form should not be confused with a 
requirement that such form be permanent as the relevant work which is protected by copyright is an 
entirely separate entity from its physical material embodiment.
53
 The authors in Copinger & Skone 
James then conclude that ‘destruction of the material form in which the work was fixed does not 
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destroy the work itself, nor the copyright which came into existence upon its being fixed’.
54
 Hence it 
would follow that destruction cannot breach the integrity right as the work cannot be destroyed.  
In order to address the position articulated in Copinger and Skone James, it is firstly 
suggested that there is a difference between the protectable work for copyright purposes and the 
copyright protection afforded to works. In other words, artistic works which can be protected under 
copyright law can be destroyed and further, just because a copyright-protectable work is destroyed, it 
does not also necessarily mean that the protection that is afforded to the work by copyright is also 
destroyed. Academic debate on the issues of fixation, permanence, nature of copyright works and 
their destruction conflates the work which is protected under copyright with the protection itself. It is 
further argued that, as noted above, there is a difference between literary and musical works on the 
one hand and artistic works on the other. Generally, it is argued that literary and musical works are 
works which cannot be destroyed because of their abstract nature; the notation on printed paper 
merely represents them, and destroying the printed notation does not harm the work itself.  It is 
further argued that this is not true of artistic works.   
The question as to what happens to the copyright of a work when it is destroyed has been 
raised by legal academics,
55
  but it has not received much in-depth attention, even though it is not a 
question which has yet been afforded a definitive answer, hence there is very little literature on this 
issue. When this issue is raised however, it does appear that two different but related creatures are 
discussed: the ‘copyright work’ or simply the ‘copyright’ in the work. It is not always clear as to what 
exactly is at the heart of the issue, as academics have either asked if a copyright work may be 
destroyed, or as to what happens to copyright if a work is destroyed, and on occasion, as mentioned 
above, the two are conflated in discussions.   
This is important for the interpretation of the integrity right as legal academics have argued 
that because a ‘copyright work’ cannot be destroyed, an artist cannot object to the destruction of his 
painting or sculpture, because the ‘copyright work’ in his painting or sculpture survives the act of 
violence and continues to exist. However, it appears that the same academics have simply made the 
assumption that the work cannot be destroyed simply because copyright protects the creative content 
or core of a work. It is not at all certain that this is the logical conclusion, simply based on what 
copyright protects or chooses to protect. In other words, copyright law, according to these academics, 
appears to dictate its own ontology of art works, not on any logic or reason but by simply and only 
stating that because it protects the creative content of a work, be it literary, musical, dramatic or 
artistic, then even if the very last and only manifestation of the work is destroyed, the work in 
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question is not. To judge from the wide literature on this matter generated by art philosophers, to 
adopt such a simplistic position fails to grasp the depth and nuance to the question comprehended by 
other disciplines.  
While the legal assumption may ring true for works like novels or symphonies where the 
printed paper or CD media are obviously simply receptacles, there are ample valid arguments which 
stress that the paint strokes on a canvas or the carved marble are not simply receptacles, but are 
actually the art works themselves, or are at least significant parts of the art works. The legal 
assumption cannot hold true for all works. Copyright law appears to simply assume and accept that all 
works under its purview are abstract entities, without fully explaining why. It is contended here that 
copyright law should not regard all works in the same manner. Literary, dramatic and musical works 
are fundamentally different from artistic works and should be treated differently. 
Pila, in discussing the requirement for the material fixation of copyright works, raised the 
issue of destruction, saying that ‘strictly speaking, if a work is constituted by its material form, 
destruction of that form will destroy the work, and consequently destroy its copyright as well’,
56
 and 
hesitantly adds, ‘this, however, seems not to be so’, relying on Lucas v Williams,
57
 which clarified that 
the existence of the material form of the work was a question of evidence, and that its absence would 
not necessarily defeat a claim of infringement.  In a subsequent article,
58
 Pila points out that s.153(3) 
CDPA resolves this conundrum neatly as it provides that if all of the qualification requirements of the 
act are satisfied, then ‘copyright does not cease to subsist by reason of any subsequent event’. Two 
issues may be raised in relation to Pila’s brief discussion of Lucas and s.153(3).  
Firstly, it is not certain that the destruction of a work will necessarily or consequently destroy 
copyright in any case, with or without relying on s.153(3). s.153(3) simply confirms the nature of 
copyright, and all its fundamental principles i.e. when all the conditions are met, copyright protection 
arises and there is no reason why it should not continue to exist until its expiry, notwithstanding the 
destruction of a singularly unique painting or the one and only manuscript of a piano concerto. If a 
work has been created according to the accepted principles of copyright law i.e. it is a literary, 
musical, dramatic or artistic work, and it has been fixed in some material form, and it meets all the 
formal qualification requirements (e.g. nationality of author or place of creation etc), then copyright 
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protection arises. Why should copyright protection necessarily cease if the work has been destroyed 
or no longer exist in a physical form? 
Secondly, Pila is correct to say that the main practical role fixation plays is that of evidence, 
and that is the main import of Lucas v Williams. However, Pila relies on Lucas for the proposition that 
‘artistic works are distinct from their material fixation, in which case paint ought not to be essential 
for the existence of a painting.’
59
 It is submitted that it is not clear that Lucas goes so far as to make 
this proposition or that such a proposition may necessarily be implied. The judgement merely noted 
that just because a physical copy of a painting was not available, it did not mean that infringement 
could not be proved. In Lucas, as long as there was some other available evidence, in that case oral 
evidence by a witness who claimed to have seen the original painting, then that was sufficient 
evidence for an infringement claim. Lucas makes an important point on the law of evidence,
60
 but it is 
submitted, no more than that. It is quite another thing to say that paint and canvas are not essential for 
a painting, which is the point under discussion in this chapter. Indeed, Karlen asks a similar question 
to that posed by Pila but couches it clearly in terms of evidence solely: ‘..what happens when the 
original is lost or destroyed? Does the artist lose all protection, or is something like the Best Evidence 
rule imposed...?’
61
   
The question that Pila asked is related but essentially different to that raised by Garnett and 
Davies, who, without making reference to s.153(3), contend authoritatively that a copyright work 
cannot itself be destroyed and ‘it remains in existence even if the original embodiment or fixation of it 
is destroyed’, on the basis that ‘a copyright work and the first physical embodiment of it are not the 
same things.’
62
 As already pointed out, this point can be appreciated, particularly for literary and 
musical works where the destruction of the first manuscript of a novel or a symphony would not 
destroy the novel or symphony itself. The protectable core of the novel or symphony lies arguably in 
their content, not in the printed strokes of their manuscripts or copies thereof. However, and Garnett 
and Davies admit as much, it is difficult to say the same of artistic works which exist as unique 
singular works because of their aesthetic value, although they still maintain that the point nevertheless 
applies to artistic works without further explanation.
63
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To summarise, Garnett and Davies refer to ‘work’, while both Pila and s.153(3) refer more 
specifically to simply ‘copyright’. The judges in Lucas v Williams did not refer to the work, but were 
making a point about infringement, i.e. copyright protection of the work, saying that copyright can 
still be infringed even in the absence of the work itself. What appears to be asserted according to 
s.153(3) and Lucas, read together, is that copyright protection remains whatever happens to the work 
itself. It does not necessarily mean that the ‘copyright work’ remains in existence, whatever 
‘copyright work’ means.  
The next question that arises is whether artistic works are truly distinct from their physical form, 
which is considered next.  
b. Is the physical embodiment of an artistic work material to its existence? 
Other legal academics have focused more on the apparent distinction between the artistic work and its 
physical existence. Waisman, in discussing the integrity right, reiterates and extends the view held by 
Garnett and Davies, that the work protected by copyright and its physical embodiment are not the 
same thing,
64
 and that an artistic work, once created, remains in existence at least conceptually and in 
the public’s perception, despite the destruction of its physical state.
65
 Liu argues that even where it is 
difficult to distinguish between a work and its physical embodiment, especially in the case of 
sculptures, it is nevertheless still possible to draw a distinction,
66
 and hence destruction of the physical 
embodiment does not destroy the work itself.  
The arguments by Liu and Waisman, while persuasive, fail to consider the idea that the 
physical structure of an artwork is an integral part, and that both its physical and conceptual aspects 
are inseparable,
67
 which is prima facie almost certainly the case for sculptures at least,
68
 and arguably 
the case for paintings. They also fail to appreciate that the original creation will be lost to future 
generations who would benefit from encountering the work in its original entirety not only on the 
basis that the original has incalculable social or historical value, but also that the experience of 
encountering the original work cannot be replicated in encounters with mere copies.  
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It is intended to take issue with these arguments primarily on the basis that the physical 
matter i.e. the paint and canvas and other materials, takes on a fundamental and necessary role in the 
creation of an artistic work, and forms the copyright protectable creative content. The purely 
immaterial element cannot function, on its own, as the entire artistic work. Prints and postcards 
merely depict the subject matter of an oil painting but are ineffective in representing the nuances 
conveyed by the roughness and texture of the individual brushstrokes. Ultimately, it is maintained that 
the conceptual and physical aspects of an artistic work should not be treated separately, and that 
destruction of the original physical support does destroy the artistic work for the purposes of moral 
rights. 
In support of his argument that the material and immaterial of art are completely separate, Liu 
quotes from Iris Murdoch and Bindman, an art historian . In the quote,
69
 Murdoch opines that a work 
of art is not a material object, although in the same quoted passage, she does accept that, at least to 
some extent, the relation between material object and the art object seems close, especially so for 
sculptures. The statement does not conclude that the material and art are incontrovertibly distinct and 
separate. It may therefore be argued that the relationship between material and art is close or at least 
remain open to question.  
It should, however, be noted that shortly after the quoted passage, Murdoch goes on to say 
that, 
The accessible existence of art, its ability to hang luminously in human minds at certain times, 
depends traditionally upon an external being, a fairly precise and fixed sensory notation or 
‘body’, an authority to which the client intermittently submits himself. If this notation is or 




In the quote relied upon by Liu, Bindman observed that there was a tendency among 
Neoclassical artists to ‘disdain material as being of lesser importance than the idea’.
71
 His statement 
essentially described the neoclassical sculptors who regarded material as secondary to the idea behind 
a sculpture. It is noted that the statement is made in relation specifically to neoclassical sculptors. At 
first glance therefore, it can be said that this chosen statement of Bindman’s, is not necessarily of 
universal application.  
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Liu poses the example of creating the same sculpture in different materials: wood, bronze and 
marble. In other words, the posture of the figure and all other details are exactly the same in all three 
products. They differ only in relation to the material used. Liu says that the same statue may be made 
in any of these materials. The destruction of the wooden sculpture, he argues, will not destroy the 
work of sculpture, only the physical wooden embodiment of the sculpture is destroyed. The same goes 
for the sculpture in bronze or marble. Read together with the quotes from Murdoch and Bindman, 
Liu’s argument is that the material is not important. It is submitted that there are two closely related 
arguments which may be raised against Liu’s conclusion. Firstly, it is clear that there are fundamental 
differences between the natural properties or ‘make-up’ of wood, bronze and marble, hence it is 
arguable that these differences would result in different characteristics in the sculptures, making each 
sculpture a unique work of art, even if the composition is exactly the same for all three. In other 
words, the sculptures in wood, bronze and marble are all different works of art. John Rood, a 
specialist in wood sculptures, illustrated the difference by way of an example.  
‘... what would you do if you wished to make a figure of Daniel Boone? Would you choose 




Further, according to Rood, the difference does not stop there. There is even a difference 
between the different types of wood and sculptors would choose from the different varieties of oak, 
walnut, cherry, apple, cedar etc.  
Secondly, it is contended that the physical medium is important in terms of the artistic choice 
made by the artist, and it plays a fundamental part in the artwork. The artist’s choice of wood, bronze 
or marble is not random, but purposive. This view is endorsed by Alec Miller, a master sculptor active 
during the Arts and Crafts movement at the turn of the 20
th
 century, who explained, ‘...wood as a 
medium for portraiture has many conspicuous qualities. It has a warmth and richness of surface beside 
which marble and stone seem cold and unsympathetic.’
73
 The natural characteristics of each material 
contribute meaningfully to the resulting artwork.  
 
Thus the importance of the medium cannot be dismissed lightly.  For instance, John Dilworth, 
in his article ‘Medium, Subject-Matter and Representation’, discusses the relationship between an art 
medium and ideas, and generally theorises that the medium plays a functional role in the artwork, as 
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an expression of the artist’s commentary on the subject-matter.
74
 It may be distinct from the subject-
matter of a painting, but it is no less important, and it is an integral part of the work of art as a whole.  
 
The importance of medium can also be discerned from the language employed in Professor 
James Elkins’ book What Painting Is,
 75
 in which he discusses the act of painting, and the ‘kinds of 
thought that are taken to be embedded in paint itself.’
76
 He exhorts that every painting captures ‘...a 
certain resistance of paint, a prodding gesture of the brush,..’,
77
 and that paint ‘records the most 
delicate gesture and the most tense.’
78
  Elkins explains that 
Paint is a cast made of the painter’s movements, a portrait of the painter’s body and 
thoughts.... Painting is an unspoken and largely uncognized dialogue, where paint speaks 
silently in masses and colors and the artist responds in moods. All those meanings are intact 
in the paintings that hang in museums: they preserve the memory of the tired bodies that 




The medium is thus not necessarily devoid of meaning, or a role in an artwork, whether it 
serves as commentary on the subject-matter or as a reflection of the painter’s moods and thoughts. A 
painter’s choice of watercolour or oil or acrylic for a painting is not made randomly. The thick and 
slick surface of an oil painting differs considerably from the thin and washed out appearance of a 
watercolour. The choice of medium is made to evoke a certain aesthetic experience on the part of the 
beholder. According to John Dewey, ‘...each art has its own medium and that medium is especially 
fitted for one kind communication. Each medium says something that cannot be uttered as well or as 
completely in any other tongue.’
80
 The physical manifestations of these different mediums play an 
integral part of the work as a whole.  
 
Furthermore, the impact on the viewer of simply the sheer size of some great artworks, 
Monet’s large-scale Water Lilies series, for instance, cannot be reproduced in art books, prints or 
catalogues – nothing can reproduce the unique artistic experience of being in the actual presence of 
the originals. In relation to art that is destroyed, as quoted above and to reiterate it here, Murdoch has 
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said that ‘no reproduction does it justice’. As will be discussed below, several art philosophers also 
argue that the original art work offers an artistic experience which simply cannot be replicated by a 
copy, no matter how good a copy.   
 
Walter Benjamin, in his famous essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction which chronicles the effect of technological reproduction on the aesthetic experience,
81
 
recognised that with the advent of film and photography, the ‘aura’ of original artworks is whittled 
away in the reproduction of millions of copies circulated to the masses.
82
 ‘Aura’ according to 
Benjamin is that intangible atmosphere or impression that surrounds a revered artwork which 
commands respect and awe. Being utterly unique, the original artwork thus becomes detached and 
distant from its audience who fear its loss or destruction, hence generating and encouraging its aura. 
No reproduction, no matter how perfect a copy, may possess the aura of the original. For Benjamin, as 
a Marxist intellectual, the possibility of issuing millions of copies of artworks was a desirable effect 
on society, for reproductions had the ability to break down the detached authority possessed by 
original, unique works, be it a masterpiece painting or a towering cathedral, and hence widely 
accessible to the masses. However, the political connection made by Benjamin is not at issue here, 
rather, the point is that he understood that the original work possesses an aura which copies do not. 
83
 
Turning to Waisman’s arguments as outlined above, they are based on the simple proposition 
that if we accept that the destruction of a reproduction clearly does not destroy the artistic work, 
likewise we should accept that destruction of the original canvas which houses the work should not 
destroy the work itself. He uses the example of mass produced postcard reproductions of paintings, 
saying that there should be no difference between the destruction of a postcard copy of Picasso’s 
Guernica and the actual original canvas, because ‘the work as original expression exists 
independently from the material support that embodies it; that is precisely why works protected by 
copyright are a form of intellectual property.’
84
 He observes that destroying the postcard would not 
destroy Guernica but however goes on to argue that if the destruction of the postcard does not destroy 
Guernica, why should the destruction of the original canvas do so? He develops this point by also 
citing the example of a U2 fan who breaks her CD of U2’s songs, and points out that obviously 
breaking the CD does not destroy U2’s works.
85
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There are several problems with Waisman’s argument and the examples he has used in 
support. The first is that he has not actually explained why there is no difference between the 
destruction of a postcard and that of the original canvas. Indeed, he simply says ‘...there are no 
reasons why the conclusion should be different if the destroyed support is not a postcard but the 
canvas painted by the author’s hand.’
86
 While Waisman has not only ignored the vast body of 
literature which question the aesthetic value of copies and debate the ontology of art, he has also 
ignored the reality of such a scenario. While we would be indifferent to the thought of someone 
ripping up his postcard copy of Guernica, we would be rather horrified at the thought of the original 
Guernica meeting the same fate.  It is a reality that cannot be ignored and must be confronted in any 
discussion of the law which affects creators and their works of art. In response to Waisman’s 
statement, obviously there are reasons why the conclusion should be different, which reasons he has 
not explored in any depth.  
Indeed, it appears that Waisman’s only reasoning is that ‘the work as original expression 
exists independently from the material support that embodies it; that is precisely why works protect by 
copyright are a form of intellectual property.’ Waisman does not explain how he rationalises that a 
work exists independently from its material support except to say that this is why such works are a 
form of intellectual property. Again, as we have seen above in discussing the approach of other law 
academics on this issue, there is a propensity to draw such conclusions merely on the basis of what 
intellectual property law, or more particularly, copyright law protects or seeks to protect, rather than a 
more exhaustive and objective enquiry into the issue. The issue of whether the destruction of the 
original canvas destroys the work of art itself is a query which is not unique to the law, and is one 
which has to be comprehended not only at a metaphysical level but also as an appreciation of how we 
ordinarily regard works of art in reality.   
Further, there are many reasons why the U2 CD example does not lend support to Waisman’s 
point that destroying an original canvas does not destroy the work itself.  A CD is a recording, which 
is the result of a technological process operated by a sound engineer. The production of a CD is not 
even a step in the process of creating any of U2’s songs. It is not an essential step in the creation at 
all. In this regard, the CD is purely and clearly a mere receptacle or device for the performance of U2 
songs. In contrast, the canvas on which Picasso worked was necessary in expressing Guernica. There 
is at least a case for arguing that the canvas is an integral part of the work and that destroying the 
canvas would destroy the work, whereas none discernibly exists for the CD. This example in fact 
serves to highlight the fundamental difference between the nature of works such as music and 
literature, which are presented in mere receptacles such as CDs, and that of works like paintings and 
sculptures, whose physical embodiments are an integral part of their being. 
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The question as to whether copies have the same aesthetic value as the original has vexed art 
philosophers. In essence, the question is dependent on how aesthetic value is assessed, and whether 
the aesthetic value of an artwork survives its destruction in the form of mass-produced copies.  This 
will be considered further below when discussing the views of art philosophers. It is contended that 
there is a difference between destroying a postcard and destroying the original. At the very least, 
considering the sheer importance, value and indispensability of the original physical embodiment to 
the artwork, it is arguable that to destroy the original physical embodiment of a work of art would 
destroy the work itself.   
 
Waisman goes on to explain that ‘the previous example [i.e. the hypothetical destruction of 
Guernica] shows that at least one of the ways of altering the physical support, destruction, does not 
fully extend to a work and thereby cannot be considered an alteration of a work.’
87
 Turning to this 
point that destruction does not amount to alteration of the work, Waisman’s statement was made in 
the context of his main contention, which is that the infringement of the integrity right lies not so 
much in the altering or modifying act in question itself than in the effect of the act carried out.
88
 His 
article endeavours to prove that if the purpose of the integrity right is to be correctly realised, not all 
modifications can be considered an infringement. In fulfilment of this endeavour, he proposes a set of 
criteria by which all modifications may be assessed. The key criterion appears to be the instant a 
particular modification of a work has also created a modified perception in the beholder’s mind. In 
other words, just because a work has been tinkered with is not good enough to constitute 
infringement. The point is whether the tinkering has also created a different perception in the public’s 
mind.
89
 This criterion fulfils the additional requirement that an infringing modification to the creation 
harms the reputation of the creator.
90
 As the creator’s reputation is dependent on how the public 
perceives his work, then Waisman’s proposal that we have to ascertain if the perception of the 
beholder is also necessarily altered by the act in question would certainly serve this additional 
requirement. Therefore, to Waisman, since destruction of the physical support or embodiment of a 
work of art would not alter the perception that the public already possesses of the work, it may not 
harm the reputation of the creator, and hence does not amount to infringement of the integrity right.  
 
Waisman’s point regarding destruction firstly presupposes that the perception of the original 
work has been widely held in the public’s eye at large, and secondly, ignores the points already made 
above i.e. that we ordinarily accept the physical embodiment as part and parcel of the work of art. It 
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also places much emphasis on the additional requirement of reputation. It is contended that first of all, 
reputation can be harmed by destruction. One reason is that, according to art historian, Albert Elsen, 
‘...even a lost work’s survival by the best reproduction diminishes the artist’s reputation because the 
serious judgment of quality depends on confrontation with the work itself.’
91
 Secondly, even if it is 
thought that reputation may not be harmed by destruction, there still remains the additional 
requirement of honour, which may be harmed by destruction, as discussed in chapter 5.
92
  
3. The perspective from art philosophy 
a. Ontology of art theories 
As identified above, questions concerning the ontology of art which have vexed philosophers are 
highly relevant to the questions concerning art’s status in the realm of copyright law. Amie 
Thomasson has identified practical reasons for caring about such issues, observing that such theories 
of art have implications for the practical problems experienced in various activities, such as curation 
and restoration, or in trading or collecting art.
93
 It is contended that the problems she has identified 
also involve issues of law, such as the problem of the extent to which a painting is considered altered 
or destroyed, if at all, by restoration, which not only involves ontological issues but also moral rights 
doctrine. Another is the problem of establishing the conditions which determine if a new song is the 




As such, this chapter advocates that copyright law may benefit from considering art theory in 
depth, and in this particular instance, theories concerning the ontological status of art. However, this 
chapter similarly cautions that the question is an extraordinarily difficult one, one which has attracted 
an astonishing variety of different theories. Bearing this in mind, this chapter briefly surveys the 
major competing theories, before extracting the theory or theories which will serve the purposes of 
copyright law best.  
Theorists fall into roughly two camps when concerned with the ontology of art. While some 
contend that all works of art are purely abstract entities or activities, others make a distinction 
between works like music, literature and drama on the one hand, and singular pieces like paintings 
and non-cast sculptures. This chapter aligns itself primarily with the latter view, and ultimately will 
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depend on Thomasson’s observation that the problem with current theories is that they conflict with 
common sense views of art.
95
  
Chief among the proponents that works of art are purely abstract entities is RG Collingwood, 
who argued that works of art are not physical entities at all, but are purely the imaginative experience 
of the artist.
96
 To him, the canvas with its pigments and sounds which emit from the orchestra are 
merely the means by which artists reconstruct their imaginary experience. As such, since essentially 
the work of art exists only in the mind of its artist, it cannot be destroyed. Likewise, presumably if it is 
purely abstract, the work cannot be bought or sold, performed or read either, which are the sort of 
activities that we ordinarily indulge in.   
Similarly, Gregory Currie claims that all works are abstract entities, each capable of multiple 
instances.
97
 The canvas or the musical score are not works of art, but instead the work is the action 
taken in producing the canvas or the musical score. His account directly counters that of Wollheim 
who theorises that, paintings and non-cast sculptures are physical entities while works of literature 
and music are types, of which their copies or performances are tokens.
98
 Currie rejects the view that 
‘singular’ works of art such as paintings and non-cast sculptures are aesthetically privileged by 
arguing that their reproductions, if molecule for molecule exactly the same as that of the original, are 
just as aesthetically valuable.
99
 As such, according to Currie, paintings and sculptures are not 
‘singular’ works as is commonly perceived, and that although we treat them as such, it is possible that 
we are mistaken about this.   
Levinson, in his review of Currie’s work,
100
 argues against the contention that works of art are 
mere action types, saying that appreciators of artworks, appreciate the end result, not just the work or 
activity that has gone into the production of the work. We appreciate or experience art as the physical 
object or sensory experience that they clearly are. ‘...in art we primarily appreciate the product 
[author’s emphasis], viewed in its context of production; we don’t primarily appreciate the activity of 
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production, as readable from the product.’
101
 Levinson is not saying that we do not appreciate the 
activity that has gone into a work, but rather he is saying that Currie has got it back to front. We 
appreciate the product first and foremost.  
That Levinson is conscious that appreciators also appreciate the activity behind a work is 
borne out in his argument against Currie’s view that true copies are just as aesthetically valuable as 
the original, saying that mechanical copies are not substitutes for the original as they do not convey 
the artist’s unique achievement. The actual manner of production of a work of art plays a vital and 
important role in how we appreciate that work of art. According to Levinson, ‘the original canvas is a 
unique repository of the painter’s achievement; indiscernible canvases produced otherwise are not. An 
original painting puts one in more intimate contact with the artist’s manual action than a copy 
produced from it even by a counterfactually reliable method can do.’
102
  
Some philosophers, such as Lessing and Koestler,
103
 argue that if a copy is in every respect 
perceptibly identical to the original, then the copy is not aesthetically less valuable than the original. 
However, it may be countered that the highly skilled forger, or technologically advanced copying 
machine is merely displaying technical skill in reproducing the original, not creativity. Jenkins argues 
that one i.e. the copy, is merely a display of technical skill, while the other, i.e. the original, is an 
example of creation.
104
  Alternatively, it may be argued that even though there is no difference in the 
aesthetic value of a copy, there is still a difference in the artistic value. Gough argues that as the 
aesthetic value ‘[embodies] all matters perceptual, [it is] logically distinct from the concept of art’ and 
that what makes a work artistically valuable is quite different from what makes it aesthetically 
valuable.
105
   
Dutton argues that we celebrate original works because we celebrate what the artist can do, 
his achievements, skill and creativity.
106
 Armed with the extra knowledge that the work in front of us 
is a copy or forgery changes our perception and appraisal of the work, not because of snobbery or 
elitism, as claimed by Lessing,
107
 but because we admire extraordinary displays of creative skill, not 
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mere technically flawless reproductive skills, which give us an elevated sense of pleasure.
108
 Thus the 
original painting or work of art cannot be substituted by its copy, no matter how technologically 
perfect a copy, which in turn suggests the singularity in the nature of such works.  
Instead of attempting to put forward a unified theory on the ontology of art, accounting for all 
of the different arts, Wollheim and Wolterstorff have sought to distinguish between paintings and 
non-cast sculptures on the one hand and the other arts, such as music and literature, on the other.
109
 
Essentially paintings and sculptures are physical entities while literature and music are not, and 
therefore can outlast the destruction of any of their copies or performance.  
Thomasson takes issue with all of these theories, reminding us of how we ordinarily conceive 
the arts. She observes that where paintings and sculptures are concerned in particular, people 
ordinarily treat them as individual entities and identify them with the originals, not their copies.
110
 
These original entities are bought, sold, and moved physically, and are also capable of being 
destroyed.
111
 In contrast, works of music and literature are conceived differently, that they survive the 
destruction of their original manuscript, but subject to Thomasson’s caveat that it survives only as 
long as a copy of it remains.
112
 The main point is that Thomasson has correctly observed a divergence 
in how different types of works of art are treated and that therefore there is a possibility that they may 
not all be of the same ontological type at all.
113
 Further, she observes that all the major theories on the 
ontology of art have serious conflicts with our commonsense and ordinary beliefs and practice of the 
arts.
114
 Her conclusion is that ‘consistency with such beliefs and practices is the main criterion of 
success for a theory of the ontology of works of art.’
115
 According to Thomasson, any theory which 
purports to describe the arts, but also violates or conflicts drastically with our everyday beliefs and 
practices, may not actually be describing our works of art at all. 
Where paintings and sculptures are concerned, Thomasson, taking into account our everyday 
practices and beliefs, argue that they are essentially physical objects but ones which come into 
existence through human intention. They are not purely ‘imaginary objects or abstracta, they are 
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perceptible, are materially constituted by certain physical objects, and may be destroyed if their 
constituting base is [author’s emphasis].’
116
  
The fact that Thomasson, in making the above meaningful observation, had taken into 
account our everyday practices and beliefs, suggests that her approach, more so than those of the 
other major philosophers, is eminently apposite for the purposes of copyright law.  It has to be 
remembered that it is also Thomasson who understands that the ontology of art has a profound 
bearing and application in our everyday engagement with the arts, not least, the engagement too of the 
law with the arts.
117
  
b. Empirical research 
As mentioned above, there is empirical research which bear relevance to the issues discussed here. 
One was carried out by a philosopher and psychologist jointly at the University of Texas with the aim 
of ascertaining if the views of ordinary lay persons in relation to their experience of art works and the 
destruction of art aligned with the major theories of art philosophy.
118
 In this project, two experiments 
were conducted, the first, with a sample of 62 lay people, sought to ascertain if people believed that 
the original artwork was privileged, while the second utilising a sample of 32 lay people, sought to 
ascertain the extent to which people believe that an artwork still exists after it has been destroyed.
119
 
Hypothetical scenarios were posed in relation to the different types of art: visual, literary and musical, 
to which the reactions of the participants were recorded.  
The results of both experiments demonstrated that people do believe that original visual 
artworks hold a privileged status, in that in comparison with other types of works, visual art forms 
were more often thought to be destroyed only if its original form was destroyed,
120
 and that while the 
participants were clearly willing (almost 100% of those polled) to accept that literary and musical 
forms continue to exist post destruction of their original manuscripts, considerably fewer people (50-
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60%) were willing to accept that a visual artwork still existed after its original has been destroyed.
121
 
This appears to be in line with what is believed to be ordinary and everyday artistic practice.   
However, it should also be noted that the results of the experiments have also thrown up a 
slight anomaly with one of the hypothetical scenarios involving the Mona Lisa, where slightly more 
than half of the participants were willing to accept that the work Mona Lisa would still exist post 
destruction of its original.
122
  While the results of the experiments do not actually explain the reasons 
for this slight anomaly, the authors speculate that perhaps where famous visual art works are 
concerned, people may believe that they are some type of ‘public shared experience.’
123
 It is 
contended that the Mona Lisa example may possibly be explained away and also should be treated 
with caution. Firstly, only a handful of artworks, perhaps for example The Scream, Last Supper or 
Night Watch, might possibly enjoy such iconic status. The vast majority of Kandinsky’s works for 
example may possibly not, despite being one of the world’s most notable artists. It is interesting to 
note that the other visual art example used in the experiments was Michelangelo’s David, which one 
would expect to be as much an icon as the Mona Lisa, did not appear to have been regarded in the 
same way as the Mona Lisa. As such, it is arguable that, if the researchers’ reasoning was accurate, 
only an incredibly iconic artwork is capable of possibly creating a ‘public shared experience’, i.e. a 
work so famous and its image so ubiquitous that hardly anyone can deny any knowledge of its 
existence, at least in the developed world. Such exalted status is conferred on a very precious few and 
is not applicable to the vast majority of artworks. Even David was not regarded in the same light, 
which suggests that the responses regarding the Mona Lisa in particular was utterly unique. 
Notwithstanding the anomaly surrounding the Mona Lisa, the dominant conclusion of the experiments 
remains that original visual artworks, as opposed to literary and musical works, are privileged and are 
deemed no longer existing should their original form be destroyed.  
The other research project, undertaken by members of the Department of Psychology at Yale 
University, endeavoured to evaluate ordinary people’s assessment or valuation of original art 
works.
124
 Essentially, their research sought to identify the psychological processes which motivate 
their valuations. Five separate experiments were conducted, demonstrating that duplicates of artworks 
were deemed to be of considerably less value than their originals, as compared with the perceived, if 
any, drop in value of duplicate non-artistic, everyday artefacts (such as a chair or car). It is thought 
that beliefs in the difference in time and effort needed to create artworks and artefacts (i.e. it takes a 
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considerably long time and much skill and effort to produce an artwork, but not an artefact) as well as 
the understanding that artefacts were mass produced unlike artworks, were key factors underlying the 
conclusions at which the participants arrived. This in turn underscored the intuition that originals are 
particularly important or valuable where artworks are concerned.  
The researchers then sought to ascertain why this should necessarily be the case. Their final 
experiments were therefore carried out with this aim in mind, testing two separate hypotheses: firstly, 
people view artworks as the result of a ‘unique creative performance’ a la Dutton, and secondly, 
people value the degree of physical contact that the artist had with his original work, something the 
researchers dubbed as ‘contagion’, and which is absent from its duplicates. The results of the final 
experiments support the validity of the hypotheses tested, which in turn endorse Dutton’s theory that 
original paintings and sculptures are the end results of creative performance of creative artists whom 
we admire, and as we admire such creativity and such artists, we in turn treat their original works as 
uniquely singular works. 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
The initial question posed was whether the integrity right encompasses a right to object to destruction. 
In seeking answers to this question, it has been necessary to ascertain the question as to whether an 
artistic work is destroyed when its physical embodiment is destroyed, which has been the aim of this 
chapter. Current conventional copyright scholarship suggests that the artistic work, at least for 
copyright protection purposes, is not so destroyed even though its physical embodiment is. Hence, 
according to Garnett and Davies in Moral Rights,
125
 this prima facie undermines any basis for having 
a right to object to destruction. This approach however goes against the grain of our ordinary and 
conventional beliefs and practices: if the painting which is exhibited in the Louvre and known to the 
world as the Mona Lisa is burned to ashes, we are unlikely to accept that the work still exists. Further, 
copyright scholars appear to have conflated copyright protection with that of the work that is 
protected by copyright. The CDPA simply states that an eligible work qualifies for copyright 
protection upon meeting certain requirements and that copyright shall not cease to subsist by reason of 
any subsequent event. Copyright law is otherwise silent on the existence of works which are protected 
by copyright. The fact that an original work is destroyed brings nothing to bear on whether its 
copyright can be enforced.  Further, other copyright scholars have argued that the physical 
embodiment of an artistic work is immaterial, and that therefore its destruction does not affect the 
existence of the artistic work. This chapter has argued, in reliance on the views of artists and art 
scholars alike, that the physical medium of a work is a vitally important and integral part of its whole.   
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More fundamentally, copyright scholars appear to have very readily accepted, without more, 
the continued existence of artistic works in the event of their destruction, a query of metaphysics 
which requires much more in-depth debate. Their stance reflects the stance of some of the major 
philosophers in the arena, Collingwood and Currie for instance, who have theorised that all works of 
art, including singular ones like paintings and sculptures, are essentially abstract entities. However, in 
contrast, Wolterstorff and Wollheim have established elementary differences between music and 
literature on the one hand, and paintings and sculptures on the other, essentially viewing the latter as 
physical entities, which are capable of being destroyed. The point is that the major philosophers 
engaged in this ontological debate on the arts have themselves struggled with question of the nature of 
art, and it behoves copyright scholars to similarly engage in such debate or at least take cognizance of 
these theories.  
However, the most crucial point of this thesis is that ultimately there is a difference between 
the purpose of the law and that of philosophy. Although the premise of this chapter is to urge a more 
exhaustive, less superficial approach on the part of copyright lawyers to the question of artistic works 
and its existence, and to be receptive to established theories in metaphysics, it must always be borne 
in mind that the law bears upon real life problems and issues. It has a real influence and effect on art, 
artists and other players in the art world. The task then for copyright lawyers is to seek out theoretical 
underpinnings which do not detract too far from our commonsense beliefs and practices. In this 
regard, the observation by Thomasson that theories which conflict too violently with our 
commonsense beliefs and practices must necessarily fail in their goal of describing the arts accurately 
and completely is instructive for copyright lawyers. Among the theories which she has identified as 
diverging too far from our ordinary beliefs are those which envisage the singular arts as purely 
abstract entities which cannot be destroyed. Copyright law’s apparent treatment of artistic works, 
especially those of a singular nature, as abstract works which cannot be destroyed is at variance with 
how we ordinarily treat such works. Furthermore, this point is substantiated by the results of the 
empirical research discussed above.  
This chapter has made the point that it is not only instructive but also imperative that 
copyright lawyers look to beyond the law for inspiration and other viewpoints which are relevant to 
the difficult issues they face. The issue in the present chapter is whether a work of art can be 
destroyed, which in turn will affect the issue as to whether or not artists should have the right to object 
to the destruction of their work. This in turn calls into question the underlying ethos of copyright law 
and moral rights doctrine. By merely accepting that the work of art is divorced from its canvas or 
marble block, and that it therefore cannot be destroyed, copyright law not only ignores the reality of 
our ordinary practices as argued above, but also, it fails to give proper consideration to what the 
singular nature of certain works of art ultimately represents. Wasiman has implied that there is no 




difference in aesthetic value between that of an exact copy and that of the original, hence underlining 
his main contention that all arts, including paintings and sculptures, are abstract entities which cannot 
be destroyed. However, it was Dutton who has argued passionately that the reason we react differently 
to mere copies or forgeries is because we regard the original work as something quite special and 
unique, and that it has a human origin which a copy does not, and hence has an aesthetic value which 
no copy will ever have. Although Dutton’s thesis was in relation to the problem of forgeries and 
copies, the point he makes about how we appreciate works of art is also relevant here: ‘Every work of 
art is an artefact, the product of human skills and techniques’.
126
 Further, in articulating exactly that 
which the original possesses but a forgery or copy lacks, Jenkins says, 
There is another more cognitive meaning of originality involving creativity which involves an 
unique idea and the execution of that idea. This is a working out of a solution to a particular 
problem that belongs only to that person at that particular time in the sense that only they can 
do it, and is a creative act.
127
 
 Dutton and Jenkins have each identified the goal of copyright law and its related doctrine of 
moral rights. The law serves to acknowledge and protect the product of human creativity, endeavours 
and achievement. The original canvas of Guernica, which is the unique product of Picasso’s skills and 
techniques, is the work Guernica which we all admire today. We cannot divorce the canvas from 
Guernica nor the marble block from David.  Destroying either canvas or marble will destroy precious 
works of art. Perhaps it is time that the law recognises and more importantly, protects against such 
losses.       
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Chapter 7 - A Work Of Art Is Not Just A Barrel Of Pork* – The 
Relationship Between Private Property Rights, Moral Rights Doctrine And 
The Preservation Of Cultural Heritage  
‘Works of art are the property of mankind and ownership carries with it the obligation to 
preserve them. He who neglects this duty and directly or indirectly contributes to their 
damage or ruin invites the reproach of barbarism and will be punished with the contempt 
of all educated people, now and in future ages.’  




On 15 May 1990, at Christie’s in New York, Japanese paper tycoon Ryoei Saito, purchased Van 
Gogh’s Portrait of Dr Gachet for US$82.5 million, and two days later made another bid for and won 
Renoir’s Au Moulin de la Galette, this time at Sotheby’s for US$78.1 million.
2
 At the time, Saito 
made headline news as not only was the combined sum of US$160 million an astonishing amount of 
money even for paintings as celebrated as these two, the sale price for Dr Gachet had set the world 
record for the highest sum ever paid to date for a work of art. Saito made headlines again a year later 
when he announced that he wished to have the two paintings cremated with him on his death, so as to 
save on inheritance tax, sending shockwaves throughout the art world.
3
 Such was the public’s 
horrified reaction that Saito backtracked and claimed that he had only been joking.
4
 Since Saito’s 
death in 1996 however, while the Renoir has been accounted for,
5




The principal issue which arises in the above scenario and instantly springs to mind is the 
question of whether the owner of a work of art, particularly one which is so celebrated and revered, 
should have the right to destroy it. The right to destroy is an ancient right, encapsulated in Roman law 
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as ius abutendi, a right of full dominion over property, including the right to abuse or destroy the 
same.
7
 The principle reflects the recognition of a sacrosanct right to private property with which third 
parties should not interfere, and is a principle which is ensconced within the liberal conception of 
property rights in Anglo-American law.
8
 Numerous legal scholars have described the scope of private 
property rights, and leading scholars such as Honore and Roscoe Pound have certainly acknowledged 
that private property rights include the right to destroy.
9
 However, the question is whether works of 




This is not only a question of private property rights but also a bigger ethical question as to 
whether the world at large has a moral interest in preventing the destruction of such masterpieces, or 
indeed in the general disposal of such works, even though these works are in private ownership. The 
tension is obvious: private property rights are generally accepted to be absolute, and they include the 
right to destroy. However, works such as the Van Gogh and Renoir can be seen to be part of our 
common cultural heritage and hence it is arguable that they deserve special protection, even against 
sacrosanct private property rights. The most passionate and articulate advocate for such special 
protection is Joseph Sax, who in Playing Darts with a Rembrandt acknowledges the tension, saying 
that ‘the very idea that things can be both private goods serving private needs, and at the same time 
objects in which the public has a crucial stake, can be difficult to grasp’.
11
 However, he argues that 
even though a Rembrandt owned by a private individual does not belong to us in the first place, and 
that its destruction would not actually deprive us of anything, nevertheless it is a ‘symbolic loss that 
can occur to others even though the thing destroyed was not theirs’.
12
 In his book, Sax makes an 
impassioned plea for special consideration of culturally valuable or important items. This chapter 
focuses on this very tension, from the particular angle of moral rights.  
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Thus far, this thesis has examined the several reasons which have been put forward for not 
recognising the right.
13
 This chapter focuses on another of these reasons: the potential prevalence of a 
private property right to destroy over the creator’s moral right to object to destruction, or at least the 
tension between the artist’s moral rights and the owner’s property rights over an artistic work.
14
 It 
would seem that the integrity right, in its traditionally accepted scope, would in principle prevail over 
private property rights to alter, mutilate or to otherwise transform a work in a derogatory fashion. 




Although France and Germany recognise relatively robust moral rights, to the extent that 
there is no requirement to show that the treatment of a work affects the creator’s honour or 
reputation,
16
 in practice, the courts have always conducted an exercise in balancing the conflicting 
interests of the parties involved: the private property interests of the owner on the one hand, and the 
moral rights of creator on the other, and in such balancing exercises, private property rights have 
generally prevailed.
17
 This general approach reflects the views of French jurists regarding private 
property rights i.e. that the private property rights of individuals should not be readily compromised 
even in the pursuit of a public good, except in exceptional cases.
18
 There is thus no bright line rule 
that the integrity right takes precedence over private property rights and cases in France and Germany 
have generally resolved conflicts on an ad hoc basis with no clear set of guidelines.
19
 Considering that 
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even though the ambit of the integrity right in its most minimalist form clearly encompasses at least a 
right to object to alteration, or mutilation short of destruction, but that such right still plays second 
fiddle to private property rights in jurisdictions which traditionally favour moral rights, it would then 
appear that a right to object to destruction, the acceptance of which is still uncertain, would certainly 
fare badly.  
The concern with moral rights trampling over private property rights is also evident in the 
US’ chequered history of their copyright regime and its interaction with moral rights doctrine, prior to 
their eventual adoption of their Visual Artists Rights Act 1990 (VARA). Perkins, in a discussion of 
Crimi v Rutgers Presbyterian Church in the City of New York,
20
 argued that  
...to require that the defendant retains a work of art, which he does not want, or as the only 
alternative, require him to remove it, or pay damages to the artist, would be in direct conflict 
with the American view that a person can do with his property what he wishes.
21
 
While some American cases pre-VARA support Perkins’ view and that of the court in Crimi, 
i.e. that the American courts were reluctant to recognise the existence of moral rights doctrine in 
American jurisprudence,
22
 other cases in the same era had recognised the need to redress such injuries 
nevertheless, through creative application of other legal principles and theories, such as libel laws and 
fraud.
23
 This indicates at least that, pre-VARA, the American courts did acknowledge the injuries 
sustained by artists, which had to be redressed in some fashion.  
In the debates that surrounded the enactment of VARA, it was felt that the enforcement of 
moral rights would ‘contradict common law property notions of free alienability and absolute 
ownership against the world’.
24
 It has also been argued that because the rights provided under VARA 
conflict with those of property owners, the constitutional legitimacy of VARA is questionable.
25
 The 
US Courts have also been conservative in their interpretation of VARA, in deference to private 
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 Similarly, the UK’s grudging implementation of moral rights has been described as 
‘cynical, or at least half-hearted.’
27
 The rather restrictive and hesitant drafting of the UK’s moral 
rights provisions was in most part influenced by the economic interests of certain groups rather than 
the interests of authors.
28
   
This chapter identifies several problems in this state of affairs. Firstly, mutilation or alteration 
of works of art is rectifiable and restorable, but destruction of the same is not. Hence it is inconsistent 
and ironic that, in principle, an artist’s objections to the mutilation/alteration of his work may possibly 
override the property rights of the work’s owner, but not his objections against destruction.  Secondly, 
the Saito example throws into sharp relief the distressing consequences of allowing property rights to 
prevail over the moral rights of authors. While Saito may not actually have destroyed the paintings as 
he had threatened, nevertheless it was clear that it was within his legal right to do so. The possibility 
of such masterpieces facing destruction is unthinkable. The Saito example highlights the issue in an 
extreme form: two renowned masterpieces with their fate in the hands of a wilful owner. While a Van 
Gogh will likely invoke an extreme reaction from the world, would an unknown piece be met with 
similar opprobrium? The point however, about lesser known pieces, is that they may well be the 
masterpieces of the future, and hence be an indispensable element of our future generations’ common 
cultural heritage.  
There are numerous other instances in which works of art have been destroyed by their owners 
with impunity, some of which have been highlighted in earlier chapters. These include the destruction 
of Sutherland’s portrait of Churchill in the UK,
 29
 the mutilation of a Picasso Lithograph in 
Australia,
30
 and the destruction of Rivera’s mural Man at Crossroads.
31
 Apart from the fact that these 
examples comprise valuable works of art, they also only form the mere tip of an immense iceberg 
comprising innumerable maimed and destroyed works of art in our cultural history, thus 
demonstrating the importance and urgency of the issues raised in this chapter. 
2. Outline of issues and central arguments 
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The central issue is the question of whether private property rights remain a valid objection against 
the recognition of a right against destruction in moral rights doctrine, with particular emphasis on 
artworks. It will be argued primarily that there are cogent reasons why works of art fall within a 
special category of private property, which is not subject to the usual rules of property. Following on 
from Sax’s plea for an exception to the absolute private property principle in favour of culturally 
important items, this chapter will argue that such an exception should be recognised, based on the idea 
that art is a common good.  
This chapter will closely examine the concept of ius abutendi, as a strand of liberal property 
theory, before considering the application of this concept to art ownership. Underlining any rebuff to 
ius abutendi involves the acceptance that the arts comprise a special category of property, deserving 
an exception to the application of ius abutendi. This argument will be made on the basis of the 
following four observations: firstly, that ius abutendi is not always applicable; secondly, that art is a 
common good and therefore it is in the public interest to preserve and protect art; thirdly, closely 
related to the common good argument, it is argued that stewardship is the more appropriate form of 
holding where cultural works are concerned; and finally, there is scope for arguing that cultural works 
possess a ‘special aura of worth’,
32
 therefore requiring and deserving some form of protection.   
In confronting the above issues, this chapter will draw heavily upon the scholarship of 
academics such as Sax, Merryman and Elsen, all being unremitting supporters of the idea that the 
preservation of the arts is indubitably in the public interest, together with a consideration of the 
principles key to the development of the concept of stewardship in property law, as well as the 
concept of the common good as developed by Thomas Aquinas. This chapter will also engage with 
key arguments raised by art philosophers such as Tormey, Young, Sparshott and Goldblatt, who have 
deliberated over the question of whether art objects themselves have rights, including the right not to 
be destroyed.  
The key point is that if the arts are indeed a common good and that it deserves special 
recognition, treatment and protection, thus trumping private property rights, then for moral rights 
doctrine to disregard the right to object to destruction is utterly incompatible with this stand. It has 
been argued in earlier chapters that the question of whether moral rights doctrine offers the creator a 
right to object to destruction is dependent on how the doctrine is perceived. On the one hand, some 
academics argue that moral rights doctrine has a role in protecting cultural heritage and that, in the 
public interest of protecting cultural heritage, it should therefore encompass such a right.
33
 On the 
other, others are adamant that it is merely a bundle of individual or personality rights belonging to a 
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creator, and hence is concerned with only protecting the creator, not his work. Even so, what is moral 
rights doctrine’s rationale for protecting the creator? The underlying justification lies in the public 
interest as well.  
Moral rights complement and supplement the rights afforded by the copyright regime, which 
are fundamentally economic rights belonging to the creator, the impetus for which is driven by the 
public interest in ‘the production of new work...in order to enrich and diversify the whole culture’.
34
 
Moral rights, the integrity right in particular, recognise and protect the intrinsic value, as opposed to 
the purely monetary value, of a work to its creator. They reflect the deeply meaningful relationship 
that a creator has with his work, and as such, it makes sense that the creator would want to protect, 
nurture and preserve his work, and not to see it maimed or destroyed.
35
 By recognising this aspect, 
and not just the commercial aspects of a creator’s relationship with his work, the integrity right sends 
a powerful message that the country’s artists, writers and other creators are highly valued and 
cherished, and it is in the public interest to send such a message.
36
 By protecting and preserving 
creative works, it also fulfils the public interest in ensuring that quality authentic and original works 
are maintained for not only the current generation but also future generations.
37
  
A more robust recognition of a right against destruction would ensure that no work ever fall 
victim to the caprices of the Saitos in the world. In the process, this chapter argues that the role of 
moral rights doctrine lies in the public interest to protect creators, and it can only do so if it also 
values the creator’s right to object to the destruction of his work.  
3. Private property rights and ius abudenti 
This section addresses the question of whether works of art are just like any other entity which might 
be the subject of private property or they constitute a special category of private property which 
deserves special consideration. If works of art constitute ordinary private property, are they however 
exempted from the draconian effects of the application of ius abudenti? If so, on what basis are works 
of art so exempted?   
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The liberal theory of property is the current dominant theory in the West,
38
 which has been 
propounded by theorists such as Locke, Bentham and Austin through to Nozick and Rawls. Private 
property rights in themselves have been justified as far back as Aristotle, who in rejecting Plato’s 
ideals of communal property as being unworkable, explained that ‘where everyone has his own sphere 
of interest, there will not be the same ground for quarrels, and the amount of interest will increase, 
because each man will feel he is applying himself to what is his own’,
39
 which anticipates the 
utilitarian justification for the liberal theory of property. The key justification for Aristotle is that 
having private property over things ensures that the thing is cared for.
40
  
The classical utilitarians justified private property ownership by the measure of human 
happiness such ownership brings. According to JS Mill, ‘...the feeling of security of possession and 
enjoyment, which could not ... be had without private ownership, is of the very greatest importance as 
an element of human happiness’,
41
 while Bentham defines property as an ‘established expectation of 
advantage’ in the thing that is owned. Austin describes property holding in more specific terms: 
‘...any right which gives the entitled party an indefinite power or liberty of using or disposing of the 
subject’, which reflects the wholly autonomous characteristic of the individual, in that he is utterly 
free to do what he will with the thing that he owns. In other words, there is an expectation on his part 
in enjoying every advantage that he can take from the ownership of his property, fulfilling Bentham’s 
vision of property. Presumably then, this indefinite liberty to use or dispose of the subject includes the 
right to destroy.  
Ius abudenti, while having roots in Roman law, is reflected in traditional Anglo-American 
conception of property rights, which generally recognises the principle of full liberal ownership. In 
1766, Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England described property ownership as thus:  
That sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things 
of the world in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe. 
Essentially, a property owner possesses the thing owned so fully and completely that he is at 
liberty to do whatever he wishes with it, as described by Austin and Bentham above. JS Mill was of 
the opinion that it was ‘just and expedient to exercise absolute control – the ius utendi et abutendi – 
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 Ius abudenti thus reflects the ultimate act a property owner may inflict on his 
property: complete destruction. If a property owner may destroy his property with impunity, then he 
clearly has the right to do less dramatic things to his property.  
Honore, in his essay Ownership, famously lists eleven necessary incidents of ownership under 
the liberal concept, one of which is no. 5 in the list, the Right to the Capital, which he describes as 
‘the power to alienate the thing and the liberty to consume, waste or destroy the whole or part of it’.
43
 
The question as to the extent of an absolute right to waste or destroy is questioned very briefly by 
Honore, following his description of the right to the capital: ‘the latter liberty [i.e. to waste or destroy] 
need not be regarded as unrestricted’, and he goes on to observe ‘but a general provision requiring 
things to be conserved in the public interest, so far as not consumed by use in the ordinary way, would 
perhaps be inconsistent with the liberal idea of ownership’.
44
 On the one hand he acknowledges that 
such a right to waste or destroy may be restricted, yet on the other, that this does not accord with his 
liberal conception of ownership.
45
  
The main point is that Honore does acknowledge that the right to destroy may well have 
restrictions. The questions as to what these restrictions are and why we should have them, considering 
that we are supposed to have full liberal ownership of our property, are unfortunately not dwelled 
upon by Honore, as he merely says that ‘most people do not wilfully destroy permanent assets’ 
anyway.
46
 Similarly, Epstein thinks that the risk of people destroying their physical assets is small.
47
 
However, their assumption that most people do not wilfully destroy their assets, while based on 
perhaps a fairly reasonable observation of ordinary people in general, has not taken into account the 
numerous incidents involving the maiming, destruction or neglect of works of art throughout history, 
many of which involve masterpieces by renowned artists.
48
 Even though it is well known that many 
artworks by established artists, certainly those by renowned masters, not only command considerable 
value but also, in many cases, appreciate in value, this has not prevented the owners of art works, 
whether private individuals or museums, from destroying or neglecting their charges. As such, it is 
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Strahilevitz argues that we should have the liberty to destroy, if only to give full countenance 
to our ownership of our property, which in turn underscores our sense of security and liberty with our 
very own lives,
50
 and indeed benefit society generally, in that the freedom to destroy values our right 
to privacy, encourages innovation and risk-taking.
51
 He writes that judicial treatment of our right to 
destroy, certainly in the US courts at least, has been inconsistent, as for example, the courts allow the 
destruction of organs and foetuses, notwithstanding their value to scientific research and to patients in 
need of transplants,
52
 but disallow in some cases, the destruction of houses and personal items.
53
 He 
points out that destruction may also be an expressive act, for example, the person toppling the statue 
of a dictator is expressing his anger at the repression signified by the statue, and thus is an expressive 
act. To prevent this destructive act would be to curtail the destructor’s freedom of expression.
54
  
However, Strahilevitz recognises that destruction achieves little on balance – the act is final 
and how is the creator of the destroyed work able to respond to the message deployed by the act of 
destruction?
55
 ‘Destroying a unique irreplaceable piece of property is...closer to heckling than to 
responding to what he [i.e. the creator of the property] has to say’.
56
 Throughout his article, 
Strahilevitz takes issue with Sax’s position but in the end analysis, even though he is a strong 
advocate of the right to destroy, he is still hesitant about its wholesale application to situations 
involving valuable, ‘unique and irreplaceable’ works.   
There is therefore a substantial case for restricting the right to destroy in situations involving 
unique and irreplaceable works such as works of art. It is unfortunate that Honore and Epstein do not 
confront the consequences of destruction in more depth, but instead simply brush it aside on the basis 
that the risk, although real, is small, primarily on the basis that people would not destroy valuable 
works. However, their observation does not bear up considering the number of not only art works, but 
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also other valuable creative works,
57
 which have been destroyed throughout history. Although 
Strahilevitz makes a cogent case for the right to destroy, even he falters where valuable and unique 
works are concerned. McCaffery questions the wisdom and necessity of having such a right as ius 




In any event, there is precedent for the curtailing of property rights in modern property law. It 
has long be recognised that property rights are not absolute as illustrated by the following examples: 
the ownership of listed buildings; land ownership subject to laws such as nuisance and the Rylands v 
Fletcher rule; real covenants etc. Clearly, property rights may, in the right circumstances, be 
restrained in the public interest. Therefore, if the purpose of moral rights is to serve the public interest, 
then likewise, they pose a valid reason for the curtailment of property rights in certain circumstances 
at least.
59
   
In the following sections, an argument will be made for the value of the arts to society, and why 
the arts should be regarded as a common good or a public interest. Further, if the arts are truly in the 
public interest or are a common good, then an argument will be made for the stewardship of the arts.  
4. Ownership of art: conflicting rights and responsibilities 
Eminent art historian, Julius Held, explained away the various acts of mutilation and destruction 
meted out to art works over the centuries as the ‘widespread conviction that works of art owned by a 
private person are his undisputed property and that he can do with them exactly as he pleases’.
60
 As 
such, Held exhorted that the legal relationship of art to private ownership needed to be clearly 
defined.  
Sax has heeded this clarion call and taken up the mantle as an advocate for the imposition of 
responsibilities and obligations upon the owners of not only fine art, but also other important cultural 
treasures, such as personal letters by historical or important figures or presidential papers.  In Playing 
Darts, he not only advocates a bar on destruction, but also calls for access, not necessarily full and 
unqualified, to works of historical, scientific or cultural importance.   
In Playing Dart’s section on the fine arts, among the examples discussed were the 
Rockefellers’ destruction of Man at the Crossroads, and Sutherland’s portrait of Churchill, discussed 
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in chapters 3 and 5 respectively. Both are admittedly difficult situations because the first involved the 
artist’s commissioning patron, while the second involved an unflattering portrait of an important 
figure. The conflicting rights of the parties involved are plain to see, and differ from the more unlikely 
scenario of an eccentric billionaire disposing of his Renoir. While the latter may argue that his 
personal property rights are sacred, the other parties have other rights which go beyond mere 
proprietary rights. The Rockefellers were understandably perturbed with the communist propaganda 
emanating from the mural, and hence did not want to be associated with it. As commissioning patron 
of the mural, the suggestion was that the Rockefellers were behind the communist sentiments 
portrayed within. As for Churchill, he was repulsed by the way he was portrayed, basically as an old 
man in his twilight years, no longer the great wartime leader that he once was. The conflict here is the 
right of the important subject who wishes to manage the way he is portrayed publicly with that of the 
artist’s own vision of the subject. However, notwithstanding the understandable responses of the 
Rockefellers and Churchill, other less devastating solutions could have been explored for e.g. the 
mural could have been moved or at least recorded by photography,
61
 and Churchill’s portrait either 
kept in storage or returned to Sutherland.     
Apart from Strahilevitz, other scholars have also disagreed with Sax on his call for a legal ban 
on destruction, arguing that there are many social deterrents against destruction in place. Hall notes at 
least two:
62
 firstly, the prohibitive financial loss inflicted by the destruction of a work of art, especially 
if it is by an important artist,
63
 and secondly, the public outcry at such an act,
64
 in addition to Honore’s 
argument that most people would not wilfully destroy their possessions anyway. This is basically why 
academics have dismissed any problems which might arise from the wilful destruction of property.  
It is submitted that this is only a perception, and simply a reasonable expectation of how 
reasonable people are likely to behave. The problem is that it is equally likely that there are a 
considerable number of unreasonable or simply unpredictable people who are in possession of 
important or valuable items. Just because it is perceived that reasonable people are unlikely to destroy 
their possessions, including culturally important ones, it is no reason not to consider a legal solution to 
the problem. There are, after all, a number of cases involving the destruction of important works by 
reasonable parties, whether based on seemingly reasonable grounds (e.g. the removal of Richard 
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 or the demolition of 5Pointz
66
) or personal ones (e.g. the burning of Sutherland’s 
portrait of Churchill or the destruction of Rivera’s mural). Further, a legal solution is also required 
mainly because of the loss to society in the event a work of art is destroyed. Indeed, is this not 
reflected in the second of Hall’s two social deterrents: the public outcry. However, it is doubted that a 
public outcry would necessarily be an effective deterrent to one who is determined to destroy anyway. 
Further, a public outcry surely reflects the depth of feeling on the part of society when something like 
this happens, and hence suggests that this is, at least, a serious problem which requires a solution.  
Sax’s solution is that there should be ‘qualified ownership founded on the recognition that 
some objects are constituent of a community, and that ordinary private dominion over them 
insufficiently accounts for the community’s rightful stake in them’.
67
 One question is what objects are 
considered to be ‘constituent of a community’, and why. Are works of art ‘constituent of a 
community’ and hence require special consideration? Although Sax does not explicitly make 
reference to the concept of common good, it is arguably what he had in mind when framing his 
argument in Playing Darts. Sax was after all, an environmental lawyer, passionate about public rights 
to natural resources. In arguing that natural resources, such as land and water, are a public trust, 
requiring special protection, he drew inspiration from Roman law and English common law, and 
argued against expansive private rights at the expense of public interest. His foray into cultural 
material is argued along the same vein, that art and goods of cultural importance should be subject to 
a kind of public trust, entrusted to guardianship, stewardship and similar notions. 
The next section continues with a discussion of the notion of the public interest/common good as 
it applies to the arts, drawing from a diverse variety of sources, ranging from Aristotle and Aquinas to 
contemporary property theorists. 
5. The value of the arts to society – is it a public interest/common good deserving of 
stewardship 
In a recent interview, Dr Werner Jerke, a renowned collector of Polish contemporary works, echoed 
Goethe’s sentiments: 
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In my opinion, if someone is an owner of a piece of art, it’s not only his property. The 
masterpiece belongs to society in general and I’m only lucky to keep it for a moment.
68
 
A work of art thus ‘belongs to society in general’ and is the ‘property of mankind’ in the words of 
Jerke and Goethe respectively. The ethos behind these exhortations reflects the idea that artworks are 
of such important benefit and value to humanity that the few individuals in possession of them only 
hold them in trust for the rest of society and future generations. In other words, art owners should act 
as stewards, rather than as outright owners in possession of all the property rights which private 
ownership normally entails. This section explores the general idea of the common good or public 
interest, as well as the concept of stewardship, before moving on to consider if art and culture are 
indeed a common good.  
a. Stewardship based on the Public Interest/the Common Good 
The aim here is to formulate and justify an argument for the stewardship of art works on the basis that 
they are in the public interest and/or a common good. The questions are firstly why stewardship is a 
more appropriate form of holding for certain types of property, secondly, what are the common 
features of such properties, and thirdly, whether art and other cultural property fall within such 
categories of property, hence qualifying for stewardship.   
In terms of legal regulation over property, discussions of the concepts of stewardship and the 
public interest have traditionally centred primarily on their application to natural resources. Further, 
until recently, legal debates over property ownership have been dominated by rights and entitlements 
discourse.
69
 However, in tandem with a growing and acute awareness of urgent environmental and 
sustainability issues, in recent academic work on property rights, in particular those over land, the 
stewardship model of property has begun to emerge as the dominant theory, over the liberal or 
absolute property rights model in general.
70
  One reason is the recognition that land ownership, is 
subject to such a range of constraints that it is incompatible with notions of private property rights, 
which embraces full and unencumbered rights of control, exclusion and alienation. Another reason is 
the recognition that certain resources are not only scarce but lie also within a community’s interests to 
be maintained not only for the community but also future generations.
71
 Further, there has been a 
growing recognition that indigenous cultural heritage and land deserve special recognition on the 
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basis that they belong to ‘peoples’ rather than individual persons, and hence are more appropriately 
the subject of stewardship rather than liberal property rights, which narrowly conceived, focuses on 
strong individual rights and entitlements.
72
      
According to Lucy and Mitchell,
73
 stewardship with its connotations of duties and obligations, 
is wholly incompatible with private property rights. They reject any suggestion that land ownership is 
a combination of private property rights and stewardship. What they suggest is that private property is 
‘conceptually and normatively inappropriate’ in accounting for the ownership of land,
74
 and that 
stewardship instead, fully and accurately accounts for any possession of land. In other words, 
stewardship provides a more accurate description of the actuality of the rights and obligations to 
which land owners are usually subject, for example, statutory constraints such as planning restrictions 
or common law ones such as those imposed by the law of nuisance or the Rylands v Fletcher rule.
75
 
This, however, was not the sole aim of their thesis; Lucy and Mitchell make it clear that, by 
recognising land ownership as a form of stewardship rather than the ‘do with it as we please’
76
 form 
of private property, it helps to bridge the expectations of land owners and their actual experience.
77
  
The ownership of art, similarly, is already encumbered with certain legal constraints in 
actuality. For example, unless copyright ownership has also been transferred along with the property 
in the art work itself, the art owner may not make any copies of his property. Even more intrusive 
where the art owner is concerned, are the moral right of attribution, whereby the artist must be 
identified whenever his work is exhibited,
78
 and the droit de suite, whereby the artist is entitled to 
receive a portion of the price for which his work is resold.
79
 These constraints are undoubtedly beyond 
those exhorted by the general ancient maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your own 
property as not to injure that of another);
80
 they actually impose certain positive obligations on the 
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part of the art owner. Not only must an art owner ensure that the artist is fully and properly identified 
each time he exhibits his property, he must also relinquish part of his total takings in the event he sells 
on his property.  
Similar to the aims of Lucy and Mitchell’s article, the aims of this chapter are firstly to 
articulate a clearer and more appropriate understanding of the legal nature of art ownership, so as to 
bridge the expectations of art owners and their experience, and secondly, to also counter the 
‘widespread conviction that works of art owned by a private person are his undisputed property and 
that he can do with them exactly as he pleases’ as lamented by Professor Held.  
Lucy and Mitchell, however, reject the idea that public interest accounts for the range of 
duties and obligations that accompany the ownership of land, on the basis that public interest is too 
vague to define. This is where this chapter and their article diverge. While it is conceded that the 
concept of public interest is rather amorphous and difficult to grasp,
81
 nevertheless, it is contended 
that this in itself should not preclude the role it plays in property ownership. Barnes, like Lucy and 
Mitchell, in examining the ownership of natural resources such as the ocean or fisheries,
82
 argues that 
stewardship is an alternative regime for property holding, although unlike them, he argues that the 
public interest plays a profound role in the formulation of stewardship as a form of property holding. 
Underpinning his argument is the recognition that property ownership is a social institution, serving 
public interests. He counters the arguments raised by Lucy and Mitchell by arguing that, although the 
notion of public interest is at first view a difficult one to pin down, and indeed there appears to be 
little scholarly agreement as to the precise content of public interest,
83
 nevertheless it is possible to 
construct a coherent framework in which we can determine whether or not certain claims are in the 
public interest.
84
 In relation to natural resources, Barnes argues that they comprise what he terms as 
‘first order interests’, 
85
 i.e. according to him, public interests which meet the physical needs of a 
community essential for their survival.
86
 Although he barely refers to other types of subject matter 
beyond natural resources, he does acknowledge the existence of other community interests, the 
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securing of which stewardship may have a role to play, which includes a community’s aesthetic 
interests or cultural values,
87
 thus underpinning the arguments set out in this chapter.  
Giblin and Weatherall also recognise the difficulty in characterising ‘public interest’ but 
generally accepts that it is about ‘recognising that we have an overall shared set of interests as a 
society beyond individual self-interest’.
88
 This point was made in relation to their argument that the 
public interest plays an indispensable role in any attempts at defining or redefining the role(s) of 
copyright.
89
 They quote Ringer, former Register of the US Copyright Office, who defines the public 
interest as ‘the aggregate of the fundamental goals that the society seeks to achieve for all of its 
members’, among which goals include the preservation of culture.
90
 
Drawing from Barnes’ scholarship, this chapter argues that the public interest is sufficiently 
defined and capable of underlining the features of stewardship, and that it includes a community’s 
aesthetic interests or cultural values.  Further, it wishes to draw from property scholarship, such 
notions and principles of stewardship which have been applied to land holding, but which also may be 
readily transferable and applied to the arts and cultural heritage, as well as the idea that there is 
undoubtedly a public interest in the arts.  
The idea of the common good, in particular, how it should be treated, also assists in informing 
the discussions central to this chapter. Essentially, it will be seen that the notions of common good 
will explain how best art owners should act in respect of their art collections vis-a-vis the community 
in which they reside. It is necessary to clarify the meaning of the common good, a term which is 
generally used interchangeably with public interest.
91
 There is, as conceded above, little scholarly 
agreement on the precise meaning of either public interest,
92
 or common good.
93
 That the terms may 
be regarded as synonymous with each other is certainly accepted by Etzioni, who describes the 
common good as those ‘that serve all members of a given community and its institutions, and...that 
serve no identifiable particular group, ...[and] members of generations not yet born’,
94
 an approach 
adopted by this chapter. Although there are subtle variations of the common good, ranging from the 
common good as historically developed by Plato and Aristotle and later in Christian theology, notably 
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by Aquinas, and in economics, law and political theory, the common feature is that recognition of the 
common good is not only good for the community at large, but is also good for each and every 
member of that community, including property owners themselves.  
This chapter is underpinned by the teachings of Aristotle, Aquinas and Etzioni on the 
common good in the following way.  Firstly, it should be understood that the manner of property 
holding advocated by Aristotle is important in fulfilling an important goal: that of living a fulfilling, 
proper and moral life ultimately. Aristotle argued that man is a social and political being, who has to 
live harmoniously within the community, in relation to his fellow citizens.
95
 In order for a person 
therefore to flourish and live a rich and complex life, he has to engage in virtuous activities which 
enable him to live harmoniously with his fellow citizens, contributing to the ultimate goal of a 
fulfilling, proper and moral life. Where property is concerned therefore, private ownership can 
contribute to human flourishing if it is also exercised with generosity. In other words, private 
ownership gives a person power over a thing, but if he chooses not to exercise that power, and instead 
generously shares his possession willingly with others, he is acting with virtue, which contributes to 
his well-being and allows him to flourish in turn. In the context of this chapter, it is in the interests of 
the art owner and the community in which he resides, to generously ‘share’ his collection of art works 
with his fellow members of the community. Only then will he flourish according to Aristotelian 
ideals.      
Aquinas, in developing his common good theory, saw no contradiction between private 
interests and public interests, and proposed that the common good may be achieved without 
necessarily alienating individual or private goods.
96
 While Aquinas’s views are set within a 
theological framework, and that as a matter of theology, he may not have sanctioned private 
property,
97
 he nevertheless justified it on the basis that possessions will be more carefully looked after 
and that property affairs will be administered in a more orderly fashion,
98
 which reflects the views of 
Aristotle. Further, he saw private property as being ‘useful to the achievement of the common good’.
99
  
Essentially, Aquinas thought that property should be privately owned and managed but also readily 
shared for the public good.
100
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Hence, if we accept that a work of art is a common good, the owner of such a culturally important 
work can enjoy private ownership and possession of the same but also has a duty to ensure that the 
public benefits from it too, which in turn means a duty to protect and preserve art works in their 
charge.    
b. Are the Arts a Common Good/in the Public Interest? 
The public interest is a notion which, as already mentioned above, is difficult to define, and arguably 
vague according to Lucy and Mitchell. Even an article entitled ‘The Public Interest in the Arts’ 
published in the Yale Law Journal in 1981,
101
 neither specifies what this public interest is, nor why 
there should be a public interest in the arts, but nevertheless proceeds on the assumption that there is a 
public interest in the arts. However, as discussed above, Barnes has formulated a stable framework in 
which to measure the extent to which a good is in the public interest, which includes aesthetic 
interests and cultural values. 
Although the notion of the public interest or common good may be vague, the notion that 
there is a public interest in the arts is widely accepted. For instance, the argument that the arts, or at 
least cultural values, are held as a good of the very highest order, can be found in teachings of the 
Christian church, which is a source of common good theory. Sison and Fontrodona have, by referring 
to Puelles’ commentary on church social teachings, identified cultural values, defined as ‘technical, 
artistic, intellectual, ethical and spiritual goods’ as being important for ‘authentic human 
flourishing’.
102
 Although cultural values may not present themselves with the same urgency as 
material well-being or peace and concord, they are nevertheless deemed to be superior to these needs 
as they appeal to the higher aspirations of man.
103
 Material well-being and peace and concord are all 
needs only because they allow people to participate in cultural activities.     
Merryman argues passionately that there is an intrinsic quality in the arts which we all value, 
empirical evidence of which lie in the very fact that there are thousands of museums and galleries,  
thousands of dealers, millions of visitors to museums and concert attendees, multitudes of university 
departments devoted to the arts, public organisations representing the arts, laws in place for the 
protection of cultural heritage, and many other entities which exist to protect, serve, and facilitate the 
generation, display and performance of the arts.
104
 He supports his argument by referring to the 
establishment of moral rights law and identifies a dual purpose in these laws: one to protect the 
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individual artist against alteration or destruction of his work and another to protect the public against 
alteration or destruction of their culture.
105
  
More importantly, Merryman points out that the regard for cultural objects is universal. He 
argues that, although certain objects or works are treated with reverence only within the culture to 
which they belong, and not particularly by others outside their culture, nevertheless we can all 
appreciate the ‘human component’ in all cultural objects, and understand its profound value to 
cultures to which these objects belong, and thus in this way, we all value all cultural objects, whether 
or not they belong to our particular cultural landscape.
106
 
Along these same lines, Elsen argues ‘art is a powerful force for uniting a society’
107
 and 
quotes from the 1954 Hague Convention that ‘damage to cultural property belonging to any people 
whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each person makes its 
contribution to the culture of the world.’
108
 Stephen Ladas, in 1938, recognised that the ‘maintenance 




We return to Merryman, for he is the one who provides us with the most comprehensive case for 
recognising the public interest in the arts or that the arts are a common good. He argues that there is 
‘truth and certainty’ in the authentic original objects and that to destroy or alter them would be to 
tamper with such ‘truth’ to which we are entitled.
110
 He also sees a ‘morality’ in cultural objects,
111
 as 
well as a repository of ‘cultural memory’.
112
 Cultural objects evoke emotions and possess ‘pathos’ and 
as they have the capacity to outlive us, they represent ‘humanity’s mark on eternity’.
113
 Finally, 
cultural objects help us create an ‘identity’, and also encourage our participation in a ‘common human 
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6. What rights, if any, do works of art themselves possess? 
Another angle from which the debates surrounding the right to object to destruction may proceed is 
the following viewpoint taken by certain philosophers in the US, i.e. that artworks possess rights. The 
range of potential rights discussed, vary from the right to be interpreted correctly,
115
 and the right not 
to be modified,
116
 to the right to be restored,
117
 all of which bear some relation to the integrity right. If 
there is any possibility that artworks themselves arguably possess rights, including a right not to be 
destroyed, then firstly, this emphasises the unique properties of art works as opposed to those of more 
ordinary possessions, and secondly, it follows that art works, being unique items which bear their own 
rights, should be more properly subject to stewardship, rather than the whims of private property 
ownership.  
The most controversial and prominent advocate of the argument that art works bear rights is 
Alan Tormey, who in Aesthetic Rights, posits that ‘art works are bearers of a special class of rights’. 
In a nutshell, his conclusion is based on an observation of how human beings regard art, and of the 
‘aesthetic pain’ experienced in the event a work of art is maltreated. It follows that, as all rational 
beings are obliged to prevent such pain, and that artworks impose this particular obligation, such 
artworks in turn bear rights. Tormey professes that he is not interested in the justification for such 
rights, but only in asserting that art works de facto have such rights. He brushes aside any objection 
that insensate beings may have rights by simply referring to obvious examples, such as corporations 
and nations, which are generally accepted to have rights. He understands that the most fundamental 
objection to his thesis lies in the fact that the aesthetic pain experienced through a maltreatment of a 
work is felt by interested parties, such as the artist, performer, art-lover or collector, and therefore, 
such aesthetic rights, as there may be, belong to them, not the work itself.  However, he counters this 
by reiterating that ‘it is the work itself that is affronted, distorted, defamed, maligned, insulted or done 
violence to – not the artist, the performer, or the public, even though their interests may suffer...’.  
Tormey’s thesis has been objected to by other philosophers. Young, asks whether it is always 
wrong to destroy art works, taking issue with Tormey’s contention that artworks bear rights.
118
 Young 
claims that artworks themselves do not suffer from the abuse of art and therefore cannot bear rights. 
Goldblatt, questions Tormey’s refusal to engage with the justification of such rights, claiming that 
only the justification of obligations can ensure that such obligations ought to be fulfilled, and that it is 
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no use to only establish de facto rights. Like Young, Goldblatt contends that if it is only art lovers and 
similarly interested people who feel ‘aesthetic pain’ when art is abused, then they are the ones who 
are entitled to such rights.  
Notwithstanding the numerous criticisms, the thesis introduced by Tormey is a stand which 
has been accepted to some extent by other philosophers, who may not necessarily have advocated 
fundamental rights akin to that of human rights, but have called for certain key rights, such as the 
right not to be modified or even a right to be restored. Tormey’s thesis only takes such calls a step 
further.  
Furthermore, although Goldblatt and Young say that as only artists and art lovers are the ones 
who feel ‘aesthetic pain’, and that they should be the bearers of such rights, not the artworks, it is 
contended that people often feel or experience pain on behalf of another who has borne the injury. In 
other words, they feel ‘aesthetic pain’ because it reflects the injury wrought on the cherished artwork 
– that does not make the injury suffered by the artwork any less real. Richard Brilliant, editor of Art 
Bulletin, in drawing a comparison with our dumb animal companions, argues that ‘abused animals can 
reveal their distress with loud cries but art objects are voiceless. Just as animals require human 
champions to voice their right to ‘proper’ treatment, so art objects deserve champions’.
119
  
It is not proposed to offer a normative basis on which to formulate rights for artworks, but it is 
only intended to bring attention to a body of work which has explored this issue, and to suggest that, 
in any serious contemplation of moral rights and the ownership of art, the possibility that artworks 
may bear fundamental rights should not be dismissed so easily.  
7. Conclusion 
We have seen that there is a strong case for treating art and other cultural works as a common good, 
not in the sense as a good which commonly belongs to all in a Marxist sense, but as a common good 
more along the lines developed by Aquinas, i.e. a good for all members of a community. According to 
Aquinas, private property was completely acceptable, save that such holding of property also entails a 
duty to manage them for the good of the community at large. Aquinas’s common good is closely 
aligned to the public interest, and indeed there can be little doubt that cultural works are in the public 
interest; they not only represent the ‘truth’ for mankind as Merryman contends, but they are essential 
for ‘authentic human flourishing’, an important aim of any subject matter which vies as a common 
good in the Aristotelian or Thomistic sense.  
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There is an appreciation that art works, as opposed to ordinary objects, are different entities 
deserving of special treatment.
120
 Pre-VARA, when American courts were generally opposed to the 
recognition of moral rights, there was nevertheless judicial appreciation of the fact that perhaps 
cultural works were different and needed special protection. Justice Seabury articulated such a view 
by saying that the sale of an artistic work was quite different from the sale of a barrel of pork, in that 
while the pork seller is not interested in whatever happens to his barrel after he has disposed of it, an 
artist is not only interested in what happens to his work after sale, but is indeed entitled to see that it is 
dealt with in a manner which is acceptable to him.
121
  
The perception that works of art possess special qualities, which qualify them for special 
protection in the public interest, is supported by the possibility that artworks themselves bear rights. It 
then follows that, if such works are in the public interest or a common good, they have to be treated 
differently to other more prosaic types of property, and are more properly the subject of stewardship 
than outright property ownership. This, in turn, means that owners of art works are more properly 
stewards of these works, rather than outright property owners with absolute rights over them, 
including the right to maim or destroy them. 
In accepting that the ownership of art is more properly stewardship, with all its connotations 
of preserving and maintaining such works for the present community and future generations, then it 
seems incongruous that moral rights doctrine should fail to recognise the creator’s ability to object to 
the destruction of his works. It is incongruous because moral rights doctrine ultimately serves the 
public interest too, not just individual creators. It is argued that, if art owners are stewards, then, in 
contemplating the tension between the integrity right and the owner’s rights in the art work, the courts 
should tread carefully in usurping any of the artist’s rights, including, and perhaps especially, any 
possible right to object to the destruction of his work. By recognising the artist’s right to object to the 
‘ultimate form of mutilation’, moral rights doctrine thus ensures that artists are encouraged to create 
in the knowledge that the law is on their side, and that it serves to protect their creations. This, in turn, 
sends a powerful message to those who possess art, that art is to be cherished, nurtured and protected, 
and that they are stewards, not owners, of our cultural heritage.   
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Part III: Evaluating the different approaches and 
influences of selected legal regimes 
Chapter 8 - The Fine Arts In A Fine City: A Case-Study On Singapore’s 
Weak Moral Rights 
‘Poetry is a luxury we cannot afford.’ 




The title to this chapter is a play on words, ‘fine city’ being a familiar jocular reference to Singapore 
as a city famed for levying fines against a wide variety of petty offences,
2
 and also as a fine city in the 
superlative sense, having famously achieved astounding economic success in a relatively short period 
of time since independence.
3
 Apart from economic success, Singapore has other ambitions, of being 
recognised as a global cultural hub,
4
 or a ‘Renaissance City’,
5
 as opposed to its erstwhile reputation as 
a ‘sterile cultural desert’.
6
 In this sense, Singapore hopes to be identified as a fine city that offers its 
residents and visitors a vibrant and rich cultural experience, ranging from international arts and film 
festivals, concerts and performances to art galleries and museums. Once economic success had been 
achieved, Singapore’s leaders proceeded to initiate an ambitious programme to ensure similar success 
and recognition for artistic and cultural endeavours.  
Against this backdrop, this chapter will focus on Singapore’s conspicuously weak moral 
rights. In contrast to many countries of the Commonwealth which have inherited their copyright 
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regime from the UK, and which are contracting parties to the Berne Convention,
7
 Singapore presently 
recognises only the right to object to false attribution. The integrity right, generally regarded as the 
core moral right,
8
 does not appear in any form at all in Singapore’s Copyright Act (Chapter 63). The 
question that arises is why Singapore has adopted such a stance, particularly in light of its lofty 
ambitions to be an artistic and cultural centre, not only in Southeast Asia, but also the world.  
While it does not mean that the lack of moral rights necessarily suggests that a country is 
completely uninterested in its artists, the recognition of such rights is nevertheless a reflection of a 
country’s strong regard for its artistic community. Conversely, the paucity of moral rights in 
Singapore raises questions about the extent of its regard for its artistic heritage.  A study of the 
reasons behind this phenomenon is enlightening. The reasons for Singapore’s lack of substantive 
moral rights may be attributed to wholly unique circumstances, such as Confucianism, or a stringent 
censorship policy in a semi-authoritarian society, which are not applicable to the UK’s situation. 
Hence it may be posited that while it may be uniquely reasonable for Singapore to eschew moral 
rights, the UK does not possess similarly unusual or unique circumstances which may account for its 
own set of weak moral rights.  
It will also be shown that weak moral rights in Singapore may also be attributable or at least 
linked to a cultural policy that favours the more commercially lucrative creative sector over the fine 
arts. While this may be, to some extent, understandable although not necessarily laudable in a country 
like Singapore, it is prima facie questionable in one like the UK, owing to its very different history 
and cultural background. A brief explanation of this difference follows.  
Until very recently, Singapore was dubbed a ‘cultural desert’. It has a relatively short history, 
having only been founded in 1819 by the British, and only gaining full independence in 1965.
9
 Upon 
attaining independence, Singapore focused on survival initially, and later turned its attention to 
achieving economic success.
10
 Only in very recent years has Singapore channelled its energies into 
cultivating the arts and cultural industries, as such activities were initially deemed as unaffordable 
luxuries by the late former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.
11
 Its status as a cultural exporter was in a 
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 but has developed rapidly, and there is 
a clear ambition to encourage even greater cultural production.
13
 Singapore has always adopted a 
pragmatic view in everything it has pursued,
14
 and thus it is not surprising that it still expects that the 
arts are not only able to pay their own way, but that they should also generate profit,
15
 a mindset 
discussed in more depth below.    
The UK by contrast has a much longer, richer and more complex history, during which time it 
has famously produced numerous men of letters, artists and musicians. It boasts of creative icons from 
across all fields, from literary greats such as Chaucer, Shakespeare, Austen, Dickens and Tolkien, to 
musical geniuses, Elgar, Britton, and Tippett, and artists Constable, Gainsborough, Patrick Caulfield 
and Francis Bacon. Global popular culture is also dominated by the British, by rock/pop artistes such 
as the Beatles, The Rolling Stones, Queen, and very recently, Ed Sheeran.
16
 Other cultural exports 
include Banksy, Andrew Lloyd Webber and television programmes/films from Monty Python’s 
Flying Circus to Harry Potter. It is as much an exporter of creative works as it is an importer, 
probably more so, and has been dubbed a ‘cultural superpower’.
17
 It is reasonable to assume that its 
artists are cherished and valued, or if they are not, then arguably, they should be.  
In light of the above, unlike the position with Singapore, it is inexplicable that there has 
always been a deep seated reluctance to adopt moral rights more wholeheartedly in the UK.
18
 Perhaps 
an explanation may lie in the neoliberal ethos that has been dominant in the UK, since the adoption of 
neo-liberalism as the main guiding principle, according to which the Thatcher government formulated 
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 Neo-liberalism may also account for the situation in Singapore; indeed it has been 
heralded as a poster-boy for neo-liberal governance.
20
 Neo-liberalism has been criticised as an 
incoherent term which defies a consistent definition and lacks any analytic value,
21
 but yet is widely 
accepted as the ‘dominant and pervasive economic policy agenda of our times.’
22
 It is essentially an 
economic theory, which advocates free markets, free trade and competition, which is actively and 
vigorously promoted and secured by the state through robust institutional structures and laws, such as 
strong private property rights.
23
 But the influence and impact of neo-liberalism does not stop at 
economic policies; it is the currently dominant ideology which has the potential to dictate the policies 
of every stratum of society, including cultural policy. Both in the UK and Singapore, neo-liberalism 
may arguably have resulted in highly instrumental cultural policies with economic growth envisaged 
as the end goal.
24
     
In any case, Singapore still retains a yearning to dispel its ‘cultural desert’ image and the UK 
currently nurtures worries about remaining a dominant cultural capital in Europe and the rest of the 
world post Brexit.
25
 It is evident that both countries share an ambition in maintaining a global 
reputation as cultural powerhouses. As has been argued in the previous chapters, moral rights perform 
an essential role in encouraging the creation and dissemination of new artistic and cultural works, and 
therefore, both countries would be well advised to pursue a policy of strengthening this body of rights 
and ensuring that it aligns with the needs and desires of its artists. It will be argued below in this 
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chapter that Singapore’s emphasis of the economic rights over moral rights in its copyright regime is a 
reflection of its bias towards the more lucrative and commercial of its artistic and cultural industries, 
which has arguably resulted and will continue to result in a declining artistic and cultural scene, 
particularly that of the fine arts. The UK should heed this lesson.   
2. Answering the Question: Framework of Chapter 
Perhaps part of the answer to the question posed lies in Singapore’s cultural policies, evolved over 
time since independence, and discernible from government commissioned reports and ministerial 
speeches. While the language emerging from such sources proclaims a desire to transform Singapore 
into a city which is ‘creative, vibrant and imbued with a keen sense of aesthetics’,
26
  or a ‘centre for 
cross-cultural artistic creation in Asia’,
27
 upon closer examination, it would appear that a key driver 
for such transformation lies primarily in the potential economic benefits which may accrue from 
cultural and artistic activities.  
In other words, despite the rhetoric, Singapore’s cultural policy has clearly eschewed an ‘arts 
for arts’ sake’ mentality in favour of an instrumentalist approach in its supports of the arts and culture. 
As argued by Ooi, by subsuming the fine arts within the all encompassing umbrella of creative 
industries, which also covers commercially lucrative activities such as digital media and popular 
entertainment, Singapore’s cultural policy runs into danger of suppressing the fine arts.
28
 This is not to 
say that Singapore’s instrumentalist approach is particularly unique; many governments, in facing the 
constant pressure to justify their support for the arts in times of economic downturn, resort to 
articulating the pragmatic and tangible aims of art and culture in their cultural policies.
29
 However, 
what this means is that the fine arts are a poor cousin to their more commercial and profitable 
relations, and such a stance may go some way to explaining Singapore’s questionable lack of moral 
rights.  
Other answers may be found by examining parliamentary reports and local law academic 
literature, which prima facie indicate a curious lack of interest in moral rights doctrine. These sources 
reveal that the authorities were, at the outset, more concerned with ensuring that the copyright regime 
was sufficiently robust to support Singapore’s fast growing economy in the 1980s, advance the 
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growth of its technology sector,
30
 and to protect Singapore’s trading interests with the US.
31
 Although 
there was a parallel interest in encouraging the arts, mostly out of nationalist fervour, there was no 
corresponding concern about safeguarding the rights of artists. 
It has also been argued by local academics that Singapore’s culture may account for the 
absence of moral rights in its copyright regime.
32
 Where culture is concerned, if we accept, at this 
juncture, ‘culture’ to mean the shared ideas, values, patterns of behaviour, practices, or customs of a 
particular social group,
33
 then it can be argued that Singapore is a Confucian state i.e. it is governed 
based on Confucian principles and that Singaporeans, whether Chinese or non-Chinese, are generally 
influenced by Confucian ideals and values.
34
 Some legal commentators argue that moral rights 
doctrine is alien to Confucianism, and thus inappropriate in Singaporean jurisprudence.
35
 However, 
this chapter will argue that, while perhaps copyright is possibly ‘alien’ to Confucianism, moral rights 
doctrine is arguably harmonious with Confucian values.     
There is another possible reason for the lacuna. It is no secret that Singapore’s governing style 
may be described as soft-authoritarian,
36
 and can sometimes be repressive. The arts in Singapore, have 
on occasion been heavily censored by the authorities,
37
 as well as being defensively prone to bouts of 
rigorous self-censorship.
38
 As moral rights have the potential to be used as a tool to combat 
censorship, it is perhaps unsurprising that they presently remain unrecognised in Singapore. Recent 
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incidents (discussed below) illustrate how both the arts are censored in Singapore and how moral 
rights may impede censorship.
39
  
This chapter thus raises several questions concerning moral rights in Singapore. The primary 
thesis is that Singapore’s copyright policy is influenced by its cultural policy, which explains its 
anachronistic lack of substantial moral rights. Basically, if Singapore has ambitions to be a truly 
artistic and cultural powerhouse, then this ambition should be reflected in, and backed up by, strong 
laws and regulations. If that is the case, it is argued that Singapore’s current position, as regards its 
lack of moral rights and its clearly instrumentalist cultural policy, reflects an overtly utilitarian and 
commercial copyright regime, which would benefit from a more holistic approach that recognises the 
non-monetary incentives which drive creators. This would send a more robust message that Singapore 
cares deeply about its heritage and its artists. 
At present, the message is ambiguous, at least in the eyes of the artistic community in 
Singapore. There have been incidents in the past where public art works have been removed or even 
destroyed without the knowledge of their creators.
40
 While it remains contentious whether the 
destruction or removal of public or site-specific art is an element of the integrity right - the key 
question addressed in this thesis - the seemingly nonchalant manner in which these artworks were 
removed or destroyed is indicative of the indifference of art owners, and the relevant authorities, 
towards artists and art works. The Singapore art community has become increasingly vocal about the 
perceived lack of respect for local artworks, even as foreign artists and artworks are feted.
41
   
The chapter will firstly examine Singapore’s copyright regime to ascertain the intent and 
disposition of its lawmakers and law academics towards moral rights, in particular, the prevailing 
view that Confucianism is antagonistic towards moral rights. The issues raised within this discussion 
will be illuminated by reported quotes and opinions of local artists that reveal the extent of their 
frustration at the lack of moral rights, and examples of incidents involving the destruction/removal or 
generally dismissive treatment of local art works.  
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After a brief discussion of the notion that copyright policy is generally influenced by or at 
least explained by cultural policy, this chapter will examine Singapore’s cultural policy through an 
analysis of various governmental reports and political speeches and documentation, informed by 
sociological studies undertaken on Singapore’s cultural landscape, to ascertain the extent to which 
instrumentalist aims and objectives, rather than aesthetic ones, underpin its cultural policy. It will be 
suggested that Singapore’s cultural policy was influenced in part by the UK’s own cultural policy 
formulated under the leadership of New Labour in the 1990s, which lends an interesting perspective 
considering those countries’ hugely different cultural and historical backgrounds.  
Ultimately, two possible conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, despite Singapore’s cultural and 
artistic ambitions, its emphasis on ‘creative industries’ in cultural policy i.e. pursuing economic and 
instrumentalist aims, has the inadvertent and paradoxical effect of diminishing the status of the fine 
arts if these do not further these aims. This is reflected in significant anecdotal evidence that 
Singaporean creators perceive a lack of support for, and disinterest in local artistic heritage, which 
explains why moral rights doctrine is given short shrift in its copyright regime.  Secondly, the absence 
of moral rights in Singapore’s copyright regime, is not only at odds with other commonwealth 
jurisdictions but discordant with Singapore’s aspirations to be perceived as a cultural capital. 
3. Whither Moral Rights in Singapore? 
This section explores two ostensible reasons for the lack of moral rights in Singapore: Confucianism 
and censorship policy, with the multiple aims of questioning and contesting the soundness of the 
former and of exploring the extent of the influence of the latter on moral rights. A third reason, 
considered later in the chapter is the utilitarian cultural policy adopted in Singapore, which reinforces 
a utilitarian copyright policy that favours economic rights over the more personal rights afforded by 
moral rights doctrine.  
a. Confucianism and Moral Rights Doctrine 
Moral rights doctrine has garnered curiously little attention from the legal profession in Singapore. 
Attention has been focused instead on the robustness of the Copyright Act of 1987. This, according to 
Ng-Loy, was enacted in response to two principal needs: that of the rapidly developing software 
industry which sough IP protection, and the demands by the US for greater IP protection in exchange 
for more favourable trading relations.
42
 Wei further noted that, while trading privileges with the US 
was a factor, Singapore in the 1980s had reached a development position where embracing IP laws 
made political and economic sense, securing her position in the international trade and finance 
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The emphasis thus focused on the economic well-being of Singapore and how copyright 
might serve that well-being, with moral rights doctrine incidental to that perspective. Moral rights 
doctrine neither featured in the parliamentary debates on the copyright bill nor in the Report of the 
Select Committee on the Singapore Copyright Bill,
44
 and local academic commentators have rarely 
engaged with the role of moral rights in any depth. Indeed, disinterest in moral rights continues today: 
the 2016 public consultation paper on proposed changes to the Singapore Copyright regime refers 
only briefly to the attribution right, and makes no mention of the integrity right at all.
45
  
From academic perspective, Wei, in his survey of the development of copyright law in 
Singapore, refers only cursorily to moral rights doctrine, or the lack thereof, simply noting that the 
question whether Singapore should give greater recognition to moral rights is a major issue deserving 
of further study.
46
 Elsewhere, he notes that some countries are not keen on moral rights as they have 
the potential to ‘interfere with commercial exploitation’.
47
 While not actually naming Singapore as 
such a country, his claim can be interpreted as a partial explanation of the absence of moral rights in 
Singapore. Seng makes a similar point, discussed below. Ong has examined the general question of 
why moral rights matter, although not within Singapore’s specific circumstances.
48
 Susanna Leong 
devotes a whole chapter to moral rights in her book on Singapore’s intellectual property laws, but this 
is primarily a general description of moral rights doctrine as it is applied in other jurisdictions, rather 
than a rigorous investigation into the question identified by Wei.
49
 However, she does suggest that a 
stronger set of moral rights would be ‘a sign of Singapore’s commitment to building a strong local 
artistic community’.
50
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In contrast to Leong’s suggestion, Seng, when asked to suggest proposed legal reforms to the 
copyright regime in Singapore, chose to reiterate that Singapore was not obliged to implement 
Art.6bis. He further cautioned against the recognition of moral rights doctrine, on the basis that it 
might ‘cramp the development of a multimedia works industry’.
51
 His appraisal of moral rights was 
dismissive in general: ‘In view of the uncertainty of the scope of such rights, their unclear utility and 
the pending technological developments in electronic rights management, it may be pertinent to 
shelve the implementation of such rights [emphasis mine].’
52
  
Although the questions as to why Singapore does not recognise moral rights and whether it 
should, have not been explored in any depth, it appears that, with the possible exception of Seng, the 
leading IP academics in Singapore believe that the recognition of moral rights merits further in-depth 
study.  
A local study has however advanced an explanation as to why moral rights are not recognised 
in Singapore. In The Law of Reputation and Brands in the Asia Pacific, the authors of the chapter on 
Singapore and Malaysia, Khaw, Tay and Ng-Loy, consider the roles that Islam and Confucianism play 
in relation to moral rights in Malaysia and Singapore respectively.
53
 Where Singapore is concerned, 
they start from the premise that moral rights doctrine is absent in Singapore owing to a concern that 
the inalienable and perpetual nature of the rights may hamper commercial activity.
54
 They then 
consider the question as to whether Confucianism, on which the Singapore government’s leadership 
style is based,
55
 accounts for the lack of moral rights, in that ‘the very notion of authors having rights 
over their works is alien in Confucianism.’
56
  
The proposition that Confucianism accounts for the apparent resistance of Asian countries to 
the implementation of intellectual property rights is not new.
57
 The foremost study of this 
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phenomenon is To Steal A Book is an Elegant Offence by William Alford,
58
 who emphasised the 
Chinese preoccupation with the past and quotes the following saying from the Analects of Confucius, 
‘I transmit rather than create; I believe in and love the Ancients’.
59
 The same quote is also referred to 
in The Law of Reputation and Brands.
60
 The underlying claim is that the concepts of originality and 
authorship are incompatible with Confucianism.
61
 Under Confucianism, it is argued, as a transmitter 
utilising and developing the wisdom of those who have gone before, rather than a creator in their own 
right, no single individual may be regarded as the originator or author of a work. This means that the 
work therefore cannot be the property of any one person (copyright), that it cannot be attributed to a 
named individual (paternity right) and that any changes made to it would not harm anyone’s 
reputation or honour (integrity right).
62
 Furthermore, Alford’s book title implies that Confucianism 
does not recognise copying as an offence.
63
 Apart from this apparent Confucian rejection of both 
originality and the notion that copying is unethical, another contributing factor is the idea that 
knowledge and intellectual creations are more properly public goods, which are subject to collective 
or social ownership, not private property rights.
64
 All these features of Confucian ethics are said to 
account for, among other things, China’s weak IP enforcement record, rife piracy in Asian countries, 
and, of course, the lack of moral rights in Singapore according to The Law of Reputation and Brands.         
However, attractive as the Confucian theory may be, it has been subject to stringent criticism. 
Shao for instance, cautions against a less than secure interpretation of Chinese history and Confucian 
principles in formulating this now rather hackneyed rationale of China’s engagement with intellectual 
property.
65
 He argues that intellectual property experts, including Alford, who are not experts in 
Chinese history and culture, have propagated misleading views, and thus implies that this popular 
theory is built on questionable foundations. Shao, in an earlier paper, had surveyed actual historical 
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incidences in Chinese history in order to demonstrate that copyright principles were not entirely alien 
to Chinese culture.
66
 Shi also questions the inability of the Confucianism theory to account for the 
lower rates of piracy in Japan and Korea (both countries being strongly influenced by Confucianism) 
as compared to China.
67
 Indeed, Alford himself has cautioned against cultural factors or explanations 
being conclusory.
68
 Cultural factors are not irrelevant; on the contrary they may be highly relevant,
69
 
but they must be viewed with prudence. The moral here is that where one is particularly enthused by a 
supposedly explanatory theory, one should be all the more careful to ensure that enthusiasm has not 
caused one to overlook, overemphasise or misinterpret the evidence.   
There are problems therefore with the point made in The Law of Reputation and Brands, 
which relies wholesale on the proposition that Confucianism accounts for the lack of moral rights in 
Singapore. While this proposition has its proponents, more recent and measure analysis of the 
evidence for it suggests that it is a theory which cannot be accepted indiscriminately. It is unfortunate 
that the proposition was given rather slim coverage in The Law of Reputation and Brands, with 
minimal scholarly scrutiny.
70
 It is submitted that, contrary to this proposition, there is ample scope for 
arguing that moral rights doctrine may be wholly acceptable to Confucian ethics and Chinese culture. 
This is premised on two fundamental elements of Chinese culture which have their roots in 
Confucianism: the concept of ‘face’, or mianzi, and the reverential and elevated status of scholars, 
poets and other intellectual creators in Chinese culture.  
An in-depth study of the effects of either mianzi or the deep reverence for intellectuals in 
Chinese culture is outside the scope of this thesis. However, a brief overview of these factors will 
suffice to reiterate the point that firstly, Confucianism does not account entirely for the absence of 
moral rights, secondly, that Confucian principles may actually work in harmony with moral rights 
doctrine, and thirdly, that the thesis in The Law of Reputation and Brands, in failing to take into 
account these extra factors, has arrived at a conclusion which is, at best, premature.  
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The concept of mianzi appears to cover a spectrum of qualities, encompassing self-respect, 
pride, dignity, confidence, image, respectability and status.
71
 Cheng explains that ‘to lose mianzi 
means...that one’s honour is not honoured or one’s honour is not recognised’,
72
 and that face ‘presents 
the identity as well as the individuality of a person’, which echoes the underlying principles of moral 
rights doctrine, with its focus on the creator’s personality. One may also recall that the integrity right 
in particular refers to prejudice to honour or reputation as defined in Art.6bis. Hansen, in drawing 
similar parallels ‘between a violation that causes loss of ‘face’ with a violation that impinges upon a 
creator’s moral rights’, argues that on this basis, emphasising an artist’s honour could lead to a more 
effective enforcement regime in China.
73
 In modern day China, while there has been considerable 
resistance to the adoption of economic rights, the adoption of moral rights has been unproblematic, 
primarily because the idea of protecting reputation and honour resonated well with Chinese culture.
74
  
The other cultural factor is the deep reverence and elevated status for intellectuals and 
intellectual activities or pursuits.
75
 While this factor has been used to explain away the incompatibility 
between Confucianism and copyright, it can also be used however to explain further parallels between 
moral rights doctrine and Confucianism, in addition to those already mentioned above. The anti-
copyright argument hinges on the disdain that Confucianism traditionally heaps upon profit-making 
ventures as opposed to purely intellectual pursuits.
76
 Generally, profit-making pursuits were seen as 
inferior to intellectual ones, and hence any scholar who sought a monetary return on his scholarship, 
akin to the economic rights afforded by copyright, was frowned upon. Further, as intellectual pursuits 
and education were considered to be so important, it was also believed that the fruits of intellectual 
efforts should be shared freely for the benefit of society. Finally, as the act of copying was considered 
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to be a legitimate act of scholarship and learning,
77
 the copying of an earlier work was not only in 
itself desirable, it was also a way of honouring the author of the copied work.
78
   
These arguments, which explain anti-copyright sentiments, clearly reflect not only the regard 
that Confucianism has for learning but also the high esteem in which intellectuals and their works are 
held. Therefore, as moral rights aim to preserve not only a creator’s honour or reputation, but also the 
integrity of the creator’s work itself, it can be argued that, unlike the economic attributes of copyright, 
moral rights doctrine dovetails neatly with these fundamental Confucian principles. While the authors 
in The Law of Reputation may be correct to say that ‘the very notion of authors having rights over 
their works is alien in Confucianism,’ it is only really so perhaps with respect to the economic rights 
conferred by copyright but not really the case with rights associated with moral rights doctrine.  
b. Censorship in Singapore – conflict between Moral Rights and Public Sentiment 
In 2011 at the Singapore Biennale, an international contemporary art exhibition held in Singapore 
since 2006, Simon Fujiwara’s Welcome to the Hotel Munber (2010) was exhibited at the Singapore 
Art Museum (SMA). Munber was a re-creation of a hotel bar owned by the artist’s parents in the 
1970s, under Franco’s dictatorship. Apart from the usual paraphernalia found in a typical hotel bar 
such as glasses and napkins, the displayed artefacts included objects which alluded suggestively to 
male genitalia, e.g. sausages impaled on skewers etc, as well as homosexual erotic magazines. The 
purpose was to examine the brutal oppression and censorship suffered by the gay community under 
Franco’s regime. On the exhibition’s opening, the magazines were removed by the SMA on the basis 
that pornography was illegal in Singapore, thus also ironically displaying the very same bigotry which 
was being attacked by the work i.e. censorship of homoerotic pornography.
79
 Upon learning of this, 
Fujiwara requested the immediate closure of the exhibit.  
 
In removing the magazines, the SMA altered the piece and then exhibited the piece in its 
altered state without having consulted Fujiwara. Apart from a possible breach of the false attribution 
right,
80
 which is recognised in Singapore, the alteration arguably amounted to a breach of the integrity 
right, which is unrecognised. The removal of the magazines was at least a modification of the work 
within Art.6bis Berne Convention. Art.6bis also requires ‘prejudice to honour or reputation’. While 
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this requirement has been transposed into UK law 
81
 it is not a requirement in French law for 
example,
82
 and hence is not by any means a universal and necessary requirement of the integrity right. 
If imposed however, how should such a requirement be applied in this situation? Fujiwara’s view was 
that by removing the erotica, the work was rendered ‘meaningless, almost a tribute to Franco in the 
end.’
83
 According to UK case-law, the fact that the artist himself feels aggrieved is not sufficient.
84
 
That Fujiwara was clearly affronted, as he had demanded the immediate closure of the exhibit, may 




The work was clearly diminished by the removal of an integral element i.e. the pornographic 
magazines; its message and vision utterly disrupted. Fujiwara is a highly accomplished award-
winning artist whose works combine deeply personal and autobiographical elements with historical 
and socio-political events and issues.
86
 In Munber, the homoeroticism prevalent throughout the piece 
was deeply connected to Fujiwara’s own personal life and psyche, being gay himself. The work’s 
stark message of censorship and oppression of gay pornographic material, would be lost if the erotic 
material within his work was removed. The historical and socio-political message, a practice for 
which Fujiwara is known, would also be missing from the work. Its audience would be left to ponder 
only about the eroticism of the work but not its socio-political message. It is arguable that the 
subtraction of these elements, critical to the artist’s vision, would weaken the piece – making it a less 
meaningful and shallower work - meaning Fujiwara’s honour or reputation as an artist would be 
prejudiced, and therefore the alteration of his work was arguably a breach of his integrity right. Apart 
from damages, the key remedy for a breach of moral rights is an injunction to prevent or correct the 
act to which the author objects. In Fujiwara’s case, he could demand that the pornographic material be 
reinstated. Should he succeed, this would surely obstruct SMA’s efforts to censor his work.  
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Although not widely explored, the potential of moral rights doctrine in serving as a shield 
against censorship has been raised before.
87
 More often, however, academics have focused on the 
possible ill effects of moral rights as creators may invoke moral rights in order to prevent others from 
making use of their works, thus stifling creativity as a whole.
88
 Indeed this is exactly what Seng 
cautioned against when invited to present his views on reforming intellectual property laws in 
Singapore.
89
 However, a few have recognised the converse, in that moral rights doctrine may serve to 
protect an artist’s freedom of expression.
90
 Richard Serra, for instance, has written about his 
experiences regarding the notorious dismantling of his work Tilted Arc in 1989,
91
 which he regarded 
as censorship and suggested that if applicable, Art.6bis would have assisted in saving Tilted Arc.  
 
Adler has highlighted Tilted Arc as an example to illustrate the point that artists would always 
want to create and preserve works which the public wish to see destroyed, and therefore the wishes of 
artists may not always accord with public sentiment,
92
 which was an argument against the recognition 
of moral rights as the doctrine would allow artists to ride roughshod over public feelings. Likewise, in 
Fujiwara’s case and other censorship cases in Singapore,
93
 the main rationale for altering or removing 
a work is that the work in question is at odds with the general sentiments of the Singapore public.
94
 In 
Fujiwara’s case, not only was the public display of pornographic material illegal in Singapore,
95
 the 
inclusion of such material was also considered to be too controversial for the palates of the typical 
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  In exercising his moral rights, if they had existed, Fujiwara’s 
insistence on preserving the magazines would have hindered the SMA’s censorship of his work, 
resulting in possibly jarring the perceived fragile feelings of Singaporeans. 
 
More recently, when Zihan Loo’s installation of 81 objects with LGBT connotations, entitled 
Queer Objects: An Archive for the Future, was exhibited at Singapore’s Institute of Contemporary 
Arts (ICA), two of the objects were removed by the director of the ICA.
97
 In this instance, the ICA 
had consulted with the artist prior to the removal of the objects. Again, the removal of the objects was 
on the basis of avoiding offence. In this case, the artist relented. However, as in Fujiwara’s situation, 
Loo could arguably have relied on the integrity right, if applicable in Singapore, to insist on the 
reinstatement of the objects, which would have thwarted the ICA’s attempts at censorship, although 
this may also have incurred the risk of having the entire exhibit shut down and removed.  
 
Adler, however, misses the point. The destruction of Tilted Arc was not clearly and 
necessarily a benefit to the public at large. Likewise, the alteration of Munber, was not clearly and 
necessarily a benefit to museum visitors in Singapore. There are many important issues at play here. 
For instance, the dismantling of Tilted Arc or the modification of Munber, were clearly violations of 
the right to freedom of expression on the part of the artist. Just because the public dislikes the content 




The spectre of censorship is Singapore’s art and culture industry’s perennial sword of Damocles, 
and it is not one likely to disappear in the near future.
99
 According to Lee, Singaporean artists ‘feel 
emasculated by a censorship code marked by ambiguity and fluidity’.
100
 The tensions faced by local 
artists in maintaining artistic integrity while being careful not to disrupt social harmony, were clearly 
articulated in a forum on censorship held at the National University of Singapore in 2003 entitled 
Social Harmony: You Can’t Please Everyone! There, artists recognised that sometimes in order for 
one to be both a true artist and a true citizen, it was necessary to be ‘irresponsible for the sake of 
                                                             
96
  Corrie Tan, ‘Museum Censors Explicit Art Work’ The Straits Times (Singapore, 28 March 2011). 
97
  Jian Xuan Lee, ‘Sex Objects Removed from Art Show’ The Straits Times (Singapore, 16 February 2016) 
<http://www.straitstimes.com/lifestyle/arts/sex-objects-removed-from-art-show>. 
98
  Serra (n 91). 
99
  T. Lee, The Media, Cultural Control and Government in Singapore (Taylor & Francis 2010) 27-28; 
David Birch, ‘Film and Cinema in Singapore: Cultural Policy as Control’ in Albert Moran (ed), Film 
Policy: International, National, and Regional Perspectives (Routledge 1996); Can-Seng Ooi, 
‘Reimagining Singapore as a creative nation: The politics of place branding’ (2008) 4 Place Branding 
and Public Diplomacy 287, 296-297; Chua (n 34) 238-242. 
100




truth’ but that this stance may invoke the ire of the censors.
101
 Faced with such an uneasy and 
uncertain situation, Singaporeans working in the artistic and cultural sectors would be comforted by 
the availability of moral rights in affording them some form of a shield against the unpredictable 
threat of censorship which interferes with their art. Conversely, it is equally understandable why the 
recognition of moral rights doctrine might be disagreeable to censors in Singapore.  
4. A Lack of Respect and a Palpable Need for Moral Rights in Singapore 
This section highlights examples of incidents in which local artists and artworks have been subjected 
to questionable treatment. The examples serve to illustrate situations in which the doctrine might 
assist artists and also to impart some understanding of the general environment and culture in which 
artists in Singapore operate, and the typical attitudes which they face, as well as their own concerns 
about the situation.  
We have already encountered Hotel Munber and Queer Objects, both of which are examples 
of situations where the moral rights, had they existed in Singapore, could have been invoked by the 
artists concerned. Other incidents involve works which have been copied by public authorities. An 
example is a work produced in 2015 by Sport Singapore (a statutory board of the Singapore Ministry 
of Culture Community and Youth) entitled Ping Pong Hustle, which bore an uncanny resemblance to 
Ping Pong Go Round,
102
 a well-publicised work by a Cultural Medallion recipient, Lee Wen.
103
 When 
confronted with the allegation that they may have copied Lee Wen’s work and prompted for an 
explanation, Sport Singapore immediately removed Hustle, claiming that they had not been aware of 
Lee Wen’s work and as a gesture of goodwill, offered to compensate him.
104
 The claim that they had 
been unaware of the work was greeted with scepticism among members of the local arts community 
as the work had been touring the world since 1998, and had been exhibited at the Singapore Art 
Museum in 2012.
105
 Furthermore, Lee Wen claimed that he had submitted a proposal in 2014 to the 
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Ministry to exhibit the work in front of the Singapore Sports Hub.
106
 However, copyright issues aside, 
the most instructive aspect of this incident was the expression of indignation by fellow artists. More 
than 200 artists signed an open letter calling for a discourse on intellectual property rights and artistic 




Similar issues were involved in a dispute between the Singapore Tourist Board (STB) and a 
local design firm, DoodleRoom.  DoodleRoom had designed the covers of the Singapore Art Week 
Guide for the STB in 2013 and later discovered that the same cover had been recycled for the 2014 
edition without either payment for the later use or even acknowledgment. The STB responded that the 
subsequent use was in accordance with industry norms, and they had full contractual rights to reuse or 
modify the same work.
108
 Aware that their actions may have ruffled feathers among the creative 
community, STB also emphasised that they fully respected intellectual property rights as well as the 
development of local creative talent.
109
 Regardless of the legality of the situation, local artists were 
unimpressed with the STB, particularly in light of the fact that the guidebooks were to be used in 
conjunction with Singapore Art Week, an event celebrating Singapore as a cultural hub for the arts.
110
   
The fairly widespread practice of removing or destroying commissioned public art sculptures 
in Singapore is also illustrative of the seemingly dismissive manner in which public art is treated by 
their proprietors.
111
 Swee Lin Tay, general manager of Sculpture Square, a non profit organisation 
which promotes the arts in Singapore, describes the general fate of public art in Singapore as ‘easy 
come easy go’.
112
 An examination of an online database of public art in Singapore, which was 
maintained between 2001 and 2015, indicates that at least 30 artworks have been relocated, modified 
or destroyed.
113
 Although relocation may not fall squarely within the integrity right, it is possible to 
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argue that in relation to site-specific works at least, the mere relocation would modify or even destroy 
the work. For instance, Serra maintained that because Tilted Arc was created especially for Federal 
Plaza, relocation would be utterly meaningless and the sculpture would be as good as completely 
destroyed.
114
 Ooi attributes this dismissive attitude to a pervasive perception in Singapore of visual art 
as being nothing more than decorative ornaments.
115
 It is also fair to say however that despite the best 
intentions, owing to the lack of space for storage and the unfavourable climate, art work is often 
destroyed if it is not sold or otherwise disposed.
116
  
The responses of the local artists who have been affected by such practice reveal varying 
attitudes, ranging from the resigned and stoical to the indignant. Ramon Orlina, who created Wings of 
Victory for a popular shopping centre, was distraught to discover that it had been removed without his 
knowledge. He has not been able to discover anything further about its fate and it is presumed 
destroyed. His recollection of the owners’ attitude to the removal is telling: ‘...they said we own 
everything in the building and we paid for the work, so we can do whatever we want with it.’
117
 
Milenko Prvacki, whose wife has had one of her works destroyed previously,
118
 echoed a similar 
sentiment, ‘Because they own the works, they do what they want, including destroying the works 
when they can be stored or relocated.’
119
   
Prominent local sculptor, Tan Teng Kee, has had at least two of his works relocated,
120
 which 
arguably amounts to a modification in their meaning or expression. His response to these acts was as 
follows: ‘As sculptors we have no choice: those who own property in Singapore don’t know the value 
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of sculpture, and when they want to develop their property, something has to give way.’
121
 Further, he 
thinks it is ‘...plain rude not to inform an artist even if the work is only meant to be moved.’
122
 
These examples demonstrate firstly the rather lackadaisical attitude on the part of those who 
commission and own art in Singapore, and secondly the frustration felt increasingly by local artists 
who are bereft of moral rights which may serve to counter such treatment of their works. Such 
incidents reflect badly on Singapore’s ambitions and cultural policy on becoming a global cultural 
hub, which will be examined in the next section.    
5. Cultural Policy in Singapore 
This section is divided into two parts. The first explores in general the relationship between copyright 
policy and creators/creativity as well as the interrelationship between copyright policy and cultural 
policy, arguing that copyright policy not only reflects the current cultural policy but it also serves as 
an instrument or tool of a nation’s cultural policy. The two are inextricably linked. The general 
hypothesis made here is that copyright legislation which clearly favours the economic rights of 
copyright but ignores moral rights, which is the case in Singapore, reflects a cultural policy which is 
overtly instrumentalist and economic. It is also argued that such a stance is at odds with not only its 
overarching aims but is also incommensurable with the needs and desires of creators. The second part 
examines Singapore’s cultural policy to demonstrate its manifestly economic approach instead of an 
artistic or cultural one, an approach which both reflects, and is reflected in, its copyright regime.   
a. Copyright, Creativity and Cultural Policy 
This section focuses on cultural policy, as opposed to Singapore’s culture, of which Confucianism 
may be said to describe. The concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘cultural policy’ are interrelated, in that cultural 
policy provides a framework for regulating the outputs of culture. Both concepts are however in 
themselves highly variable and contested.
123
  
Culture is a notoriously elusive concept, which may be described as pertaining to the norms, 
behaviour patterns, customs etc of a social group, which is a sociologist’s perception of culture,
124
 and 
which was relevant to the discussion of Confucianism. It depends on the point of view adopted, 
because to an anthropologist, since culture would constitute the ‘way of life’ of a particular social 
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group, then all products are cultural products, including furniture, food, drink, clothing and other 
functional items.
125
 A much narrower definition is ‘the creation and creator of elites’ to include art, 
music and literature.
126
 It can be seen however, that there is commonality between these viewpoints: 
these disparate elements, be it norms or customs, furniture or food, music or literature, comprise a 
form of ‘social glue’ and ‘a common framework of understandings for the members of society to 
organise and interact around’.
127
  For the purposes of this chapter, the discussion of cultural policy and 
copyright here is concerned more with the expressive output of culture, which in this case would 
encompass the less functional but more aesthetic or artistic expressions such as music, art, literature, 
drama etc. While cultural policy regulates the production and dissemination of such expressions, 
copyright provides the legal framework for such production and dissemination.
128
  
That there is a close relationship between copyright law and culture or cultural policy seems a 
universally accepted notion. These are but a sample of various academic statements which have been 
expressed about the relationship between copyright law and culture/cultural policy: ‘Copyright is 
cultural law’.
129
 ‘Culture and Intellectual Property are connected.’
130
 ‘The decision to protect 
intellectual property, and the nature and scope of such protection reflects the value that a particular 
culture places upon the creative act.’
131
 ‘Copyright law is an essential instrument of national cultural 
and information policy.’
132
 ‘Copyright has been fundamental to the cultural industries....’
133
 Copyright 
laws ‘are a component of local cultural...policies. As such they express each sovereign nation’s 
aspirations for its citizens: exposure to works of authorship and participation in their country’s  
cultural patrimony.’
134
 The difficulty lies in extracting the meaning behind these statements. In effect 
they raise further questions: Why is copyright also deemed cultural law? In what way is culture and 
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intellectual property connected? How does copyright operate as an instrument of cultural policy and 
why is it fundamental to cultural industries?  
In order to ascertain a link between Singapore’s apparently economically biased cultural 
policy with its utilitarian copyright policy, it is important to first examine the aims of copyright law. 
The examination here is brief as the aims have already been addressed above in chapter 2 and in 
abundance in academic literature. The more important question is, in view of copyright’s perceived 
relationship with the creative and cultural industries, whether such aims coincide with what creators 
truly want and expect from the law, where their creations are concerned. Further, copyright’s 
increasing importance and role in the establishment of the creative industries, which include creative 
but essentially commercial activities such as advertising, suggests a growing emphasis on the 
economic rather than cultural value of cultural products. It is thus questioned as to whether 
copyright’s emphasis on the economic rather than the intrinsic, fails to acknowledge the true value 
and importance of cultural products and their creators.  
The common law copyright model - Singapore’s legal system is founded on the common law 
- is primarily concerned with encouraging the production of new works,
135
 as reflected in the title to 
the Statute of Anne, ‘An Act for the Encouragement of Learning’. The US Copyright Clause echoes 
similar aims: ‘...to promote the progress of science and useful arts...’ which was to be achieved 
through the dissemination of knowledge.
136
  This utilitarian justification is supported by the view that 
works of authorship are commodities, mere consumer goods,
137
 produced in exchange for economic 
rewards. This stance, discussed in depth in chapter 2 above, explains the overt reliance on economic 
rewards in the copyright system, while dismissing intrinsic ones, such as the protection afforded by 
moral rights. However, there are arguably inconsistencies in rationalising the copyright system in this 
manner. If the goal is to disseminate new works for the benefit of the public, then it is 
counterproductive for misleading or inaccurate works to be communicated to the public,
138
 and it 
would seem difficult to reconcile the lofty goal of creating new works, of ‘enhancing the common 
store of culture’,
139
 with the failure to protect works against destruction.  
Chapter 2 examines how social psychologists have demonstrated the intrinsic motivations that 
underlie creative acts. Kwall also devotes a chapter detailing examples of how artists and writers are 
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motivated by factors other than money.
140
 It is argued that copyright, with its undue emphasis on the 
economic, does not account for these intrinsic factors and is at odds with how creative works are 
produced. If creators are not necessarily motivated by money, then what is it exactly that creators 
want from copyright? Kenyon and Wright’s empirical research revealed that there were other types of 
benefits which were considered to be more valuable to some artists than economic returns, such as the 
preservation of their works.
141
   
If copyright does not serve creators or encourage creativity as effectively as it should, the 
question is why then it is seen as an essential instrument or tool of cultural policy. The aim of any 
cultural policy is to encourage the arts and culture to flourish in order to have a more knowledgeable 
and creative society. Rajan summarises the multi-pronged role of copyright in the formulation and 
operation of cultural policy as follows: firstly, it helps to commercialise cultural products, secondly it 
aims to encourage the production of artistic and intellectual work and thirdly, it sets out a legal 
framework for the expressions of art and artists in society.
142
 The key theme that runs through these 
roles is that of commercialisation: copyright encourages artists to produce by granting them an 
exclusive right to produce copies of their expressions, which are then disseminated for monetary 
returns. Third parties who make copies without permission, usually to either avoid paying for 
authorised copies, or to sell them on for money, fall foul of the legal framework provided by 
copyright law. Artists benefit financially by commercialising their artistic expressions and the public 
benefits from the increased production of such expressions.  
Therefore copyright is seen to serve as an economic incentive to artists and other creators in 
order to fulfil cultural policy aims. However, we have seen above the weaknesses in such rationale as 
economic incentives do not always fulfil an artist’s needs, apart from providing them with a living. 
Kawashima argues that the reason why copyright is seen to be effective as a tool of cultural policy is 
because the copyright system serves particular types of creative industries, such as the media and 
entertainment industry and the software industry, particularly well.
143
 This is because, apart from 
visual art works, the subject matters protectable under copyright law, such as music, books, films, 
designs etc are reproducible in large quantities without loss of quality, each copy generating a not 
insignificant source of income for the rights-holder, which in most cases would be the sound 
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recording producer or the publisher as the case may be. The copyright system by granting exclusive 
rights for the reproduction and distribution of works serves this particular business model well. 
However, such exclusive rights are meaningless for visual artists who typically only produce one-off 
pieces, not copies for sale. Similarly, to Suggs,
144
 Kawashima questions the utility of copyright as an 
economic incentive where the visual arts are concerned.  The use of copyright therefore, as a tool in 
enforcing or supporting cultural policy, thus is narrowly focused, clearly in favour of the more 
commercialised and mass market industries, as opposed to the visual arts. Visual artists do not live by 
bread alone, but their lives are all the more richer and productive simply by being able to create their 
art. The preservation of their precious creations, not their commercialisation, matters to them.     
b. Singapore Cultural Policy 
It has already been argued above that the forms and depth of intellectual property protection 
recognised in a country reflect the country’s cultural policy.
145
 What then does the lack of moral rights 
in Singapore’s copyright system tell us about its cultural policy? It would seem to suggest an overtly 
utilitarian policy, with an emphasis on the more commercialised sectors of the creative industries. 
Certainly a number of sociologists, who have studied Singapore’s cultural scene in depth, have 
described it in such terms.  
The hegemony of the economic over the artistic in Singapore’s cultural policy has been 
evident since the period immediately post-independence to the present day. This was observed and 
chronicled by Bereson in her study of ministerial speeches, government reports and policy papers 
issued between 1957 and 2003.
146
 While the initial objectives of Singapore’s cultural policy, 
formulated whilst a newly independent city state, were clearly related to nation-building, they very 
soon transformed into economic goals. By 1963, in the State of Singapore Annual Report, this was 
already evident, in that it specifically mentioned economic objectives, alongside nation building.
147
  
Also included in the study were the speeches of government officials who did not necessarily hail 
from the cultural or arts related ministries. Bereson demonstrates that the aims of Singapore’s cultural 
policies over the years have been developed and moulded by all government sectors, ranging from the 
finance ministry to foreign affairs, not just its ministry of culture or arts. What this informs us is that 
there have always been underlying motives to Singapore cultural policies, which have not always 
placed the arts at the forefront. Occasionally this approach has been expressed bluntly; according to 
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Mr Lee Khoon Choy, Minister of State for Culture in 1966, ‘the days of Art for Art’s Sake are over’, 
in preference of society building through the arts.
148
  
According to Bereson, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were clear instrumental aims: 
the attraction of foreign investment, increased tourism, enticement of foreign skilled professionals to 
live in Singapore, the retention of highly educated and skilled Singaporeans and the creation of wealth 
through the development of knowledge driven industries. 
149
 Furthermore, although money has been 
invested in constructing the supporting infrastructure, such as the building of the Esplanade by the 
Bay, a state of the art cultural performance complex, Bereson questions just how much this has 
actually translated into an increased production of quality artistic work and performances in 
Singapore.
150
 There still persists an emphasis on economic returns which is reflected in how the 
Esplanade itself has been managed: there is undue prominence given to the retail shops and eateries in 
the complex in comparison to its performing spaces.
151
    









 although all base their views on other evidence derived from different sources. For 
instance, apart from government speeches and reports, Ooi has pointed to the adoption of the concept 
of ‘creative industries’ in Singapore’s cultural policy as evidence of the undue emphasis on the 
economic over the artistic. Although the origins of ‘creative industries’ is not entirely certain, 
156
 the 
most widely adopted definition was originally coined by the UK’s Department for Culture Media & 
Sport (DCMS) in its Creative Industries Mapping Document of 1998, later retained by the later 
Creative Industries Mapping Document of 2001: ‘those industries which have their origin in 
individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through 
the generation and exploitation of intellectual property’. The documents go on to identify the specific 
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industries covered by this definition, which include advertising, crafts, design, designer fashion, 
software etc. While the range of industries is diverse, each with little in common with the others 
selected, what is evident is that some are clearly economically more lucrative than the others. As Ooi 
has pointed out, rock concerts are more likely to generate jobs and wealth compared to the fine arts.
157
  
By being subsumed within the definition of ‘creative industries’, the fine arts are pressured into 
competing on an economic footing with their more commercialised cousins. Ooi believes that by so 
doing, the cultural policy shifts from cultural development goals to economic development ones.
158
 
Singapore has embraced and put into practice the UK definition, and there is clear evidence of 
Singapore’s cultural policy favouring the mass-market and commercial industries. While the digital 
media industry has been allocated funding in the region of S$1 billion for the period between 2006 
and 2015, the arts were allocated up to just S$99 million between 2003 and 2009,
159
 apparently 
because the digital media industry was deemed to be far more lucrative than the fine arts industry. The 
fine arts in Singapore are constantly subjected to quantifiable measurements e.g. ticket sales, visitor 
numbers etc in order to ascertain their value and worth. Such measurements however disregard the 
innate value of the arts.
160
   
6. Summary and Conclusion 
Essentially, this chapter has attempted to explain why moral rights remain to be recognised fully in 
Singapore, a country which prides itself not only on its robust intellectual property regime, but also on 
its reputation of being a global cultural centre. As moral rights play a vital role in both protecting the 
rights of artists as well as in encouraging them to create more works, the extent of recognition 
afforded to moral rights in a country’s copyright regime reflects the extent to which the country 
values creativity. According to Rajan, ‘through moral rights doctrine, copyright law also achieves a 
non-commercial purely legal method of valuing creativity’.
161
 As such, one would expect Singapore, 
with its cultural ambitions, to have robust moral rights.  
In attempting to address the query posed, this chapter has firstly identified possible reasons 
for the lack of moral rights doctrine, namely the Confucian style of governance in Singapore, as well 
as its censorship policy. While the Confucian theory raised by local law academics is rejected, it is 
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plausible that Singapore’s robust censorship policy has played more of a role than is commonly 
appreciated in rejecting moral rights doctrine. Further, lack of moral rights impacts heavily upon 
Singapore’s artistic community, and their absence in its clearly utilitarian copyright regime may be 
attributed to a cultural policy which is heavily economic in outlook and which favours the more 
commercial creative industries to the fine arts. This position does not reflect well upon Singapore’s 
ambitions to be a cultural powerhouse and indeed casts doubts upon the extent to which it truly values 
its artistic heritage and its artists.  
There are myriad reasons why Singapore’s copyright regime lacks robust moral rights, despite 
its cultural ambitions. The absence of strong moral rights threatens to demoralise its artistic 
community; they have lamented at their helplessness in the face of destruction. There are lessons to be 
learnt here. The UK’s position is vastly different from that of Singapore’s. It neither draws on 
Confucian ideologies nor does it have unduly harsh censorship policies which may account for a lack 
of strong moral rights. However, it does possess a rich cultural heritage and it is home to great artists, 




Chapter 9 - Lessons from the U.S., Australia, and India 
Australia’s implementation of moral rights is a model for the enactment of the doctrine. 
Mira T. Sundara Rajan, Moral Rights: Principles, Practice and New Technology, p. 151 
The Visual Artists Rights Act is a somewhat embarrassing nod toward droit moral: a 
minimal grant of rights of attribution and integrity long recognized in civil law copyright 
systems.... is severely limited in scope, marred by some of the ugliest drafting ever,... and 
astonishingly, ridden with formalities,... Still, it is better than nothing... 
William Patry, ‘No VARA Trophy’, The Patry Copyright Blog, 28 June 2006 
...[the] right of integrity ultimately contributes to the overall integrity of the cultural 
domain of a nation. Language of Section 57 does not exclude the right of integrity in 
relation to cultural heritage. The cultural heritage would include the artist whose 
creativity and ingenuity is amongst the valuable cultural resources of a nation. Through 
the telescope of section 57 it is possible to legally protect the cultural heritage of India 
through the moral rights of the artist. 
Pradeep Nandrajog, J., Amar Nath Sehgal vs Union Of India and Another, 21 February, 
2005 
1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the moral rights legislation and case-law of three common law countries, the 
US, Australia and India, which also include anti-destruction provisions, thus extending the rights of 
artists beyond those provided under Art.6bis and s.80 CDPA. The aims of this chapter are to critically 
analyse the relevant legislative provisions and case-law in these countries in so far as they relate to or 
impact upon the issue of destruction, and to evaluate their effectiveness in dealing with issues 
surrounding the destruction of art works. The lessons learned from such a study would be instructive 
in ascertaining the best practice for the United Kingdom. 
A further aim of this chapter is to emphasise the point that, in line with the US, Australia and 
India, as well as other countries which similarly value their cultural heritage and which have also 
accommodated anti-destruction rights, the UK is well-advised to recognise similar rights. The 
examples of the US and Australia are chosen as it is arguable that they share a legal landscape which 
is not completely alien from that of the UK.
1
 This understanding, taken together with the fact that the 
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Berne Convention underpins the copyright regimes of all three jurisdictions, underscores the argument 
that, if the US and Australia are able to find merit in establishing anti-destruction rights, the UK 
should at least begin to think seriously about the recognition of such rights.  
While India’s ancient culture is different from that of the UK, they share a 200-year history and a 
mutual fascination for each nation’s culture.
2
 The rationale behind India’s regard for moral rights lies 
in its deep reverence for its artistic and cultural achievements. Likewise, the UK has a long and proud 
cultural and artistic tradition. The rationale adopted by the Indian judiciary may therefore strike a 
chord with the legal authorities in the UK.   
2. The United States: Visual Artists Rights Act 
a. Background 
The moral rights enshrined in Art.6bis of the Berne Convention were recognised at federal level in the 
US by the signing of the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) in 1990.
3
 VARA provides authors of 
works of the visual arts, the rights of attribution and integrity, including a right to object to the 
destruction of their works. The relevant provision is worded as follows:  
(A) To prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which 
would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, 
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right, and  
(B) To prevent any destruction of a work of recognised stature, and any intentional or grossly 
negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.
4
 
 Prior to the enactment of VARA, the concept of moral rights was acknowledged in the 
American courts by applying a variety of established principles from other areas of law in dealing 
with cases which raised moral rights issues. These principles, derived from the laws of copyright, 
unfair competition, defamation, privacy and contract,
5
 together with the passing of state laws which 
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provided for moral rights to some extent,
6
 formed the basis of the US government’s belief that this 
combination of existing statutory and common laws fulfilled the US’ necessary compliance with Art. 
6bis.
7
 The WIPO Director General at the time also confirmed that the US need not amend its laws to 
adhere to Art.6bis.
8
 It may be recalled that this was also the position assumed by the UK government 
in 1928 when moral rights was first introduced at the Rome Conference.  
However, several commentators have argued that these laws did not represent an adequate 
adherence to Art.6bis in any substantive or meaningful way.
9
 The reasons for the US’ initial refusal to 
amend its copyright law so as to incorporate or codify moral rights, and thus satisfy Art.6bis in a 
clearer fashion, were essentially two-fold. Firstly, principal copyright stakeholders, such as film 
studios and publishers were wary of any recognition of rights beyond the economic ones that they 
controlled,
10
 and secondly, the concept of moral rights was deemed too foreign to the US’ property 
and copyright law, which are focused on protecting the economic interests in a copyright work.
11
  The 
US’ utilitarian view of intellectual property stems from the US constitution’s clause which grants 
Congress the power to ‘promote the progress of science and the useful arts’.
12
 The aim of copyright is 
to further this course by ensuring that information and creative works are disseminated and utilised 
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easily and freely. Moral rights are deemed incompatible with this because they may hamper the 
furtherance of this aim.
13
 
Despite the US’ initial belief that its patchwork of statutory and common laws were an 
adequate approximation of Art.6bis rights, and perhaps because of the doubts expressed strenuously 
by commentators in the field as well as other Berne members, VARA was enacted shortly after the 
US accession to Berne,
14
 which enhanced the US’ compliance with Berne and assisted in assuaging 
doubters.
15
 The perceived aims of VARA can be discerned from its legislative history.
16
 For instance, 
according to Representative Kastenmeier, apart from protecting the honour and reputations of visual 
artists, an additional goal was to protect the works of art themselves, because ‘society is the ultimate 
loser when these works are modified or destroyed’,
17
 while Representative Markey stated that it was 
‘paramount to the very integrity of our culture that we preserve the integrity of our artworks as 
expressions of the creativity of the artist’.
18
 Despite the grand ambitions underlying VARA, it is in the 
opinion of many that VARA has not lived up to its initial promise.
19
 Apart from flaws in the 
legislation itself, the judiciary has also applied the Act in a conservative and restrictive manner, 
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manifestly reluctant to allow the VARA rights to prevail over the rights of defendants.
20
 A paper 
published in 2014 states that as at 2014, in light of case-law to date, it was now ‘reasonable to 
conclude that VARA has not come close to fulfilling [the US’s] obligations under Article 6bis’.
21
   
Certainly, the process by which VARA was passed into law leaves one with little confidence 
in its effectiveness and robustness. There was relatively little debate or discussion and it would appear 
that the passing of VARA was accidental, in that it was inserted as part of a major bill, the Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1990, which authorised eighty-five judgeships.
22
 Because the senators who 
would otherwise have opposed VARA were anxious to pass these judgeships, they gave their full 
approval to the entire bill, in the process also approving VARA with little opposition.
23
 As a result, 
the somewhat hasty enactment of VARA led to some legislative deficiencies.  
Criticisms have been aimed particularly at, inter alia, VARA’s narrow focus on the fine arts 
to the exclusion of other copyright work (and the narrowness of the types of work which are 
considered to be ‘fine art’ under the Act), the limited duration of rights under the Act, the definition of 
‘recognised stature’, and its relationship with state moral rights legislation, among other issues.
24
 For 
the purposes of this thesis, the most relevant criticisms are the narrowness in the Act’s acceptance of 
the types of fine art works and the definition of ‘recognised stature’. These will be dealt with in turn 
below.   
However, before we embark on a robust criticism of VARA, we should not forget that VARA 
explicitly provides artists with something that the Berne Convention does not: protection against 
destruction.
25
   
b. Definition of ‘works of visual art’ and exceptions under VARA  
VARA does not offer protection to all types of authorial works, only ‘works of visual art’,
26
 which in 
turn is limited to only paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures and ‘photographs... which are produced 
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 Furthermore these are restricted to either one-off unique works or limited 
editions of 200 copies maximum which are signed and consecutively numbered.
28
 VARA excludes 
works which are otherwise typically protected under copyright law, such as films, books or 
advertisements. Applied art and works made for hire i.e. works made by employees in the course of 
employment as well as works specially commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, 
are also excluded from protection. In interpreting and applying the definition section, the courts are 
expected to use common sense and generally accepted standards of the artistic community.
29
  
The definition of VARA protected works is restricted to only certain types of visual art, and 
is not in any way synonymous with the definition of ‘pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ set out 
in the US Copyright Act,
30
 which covers works which qualify for copyright protection and is of much 
wider scope. The reasoning for this very narrow application for VARA has been debated in the HR. 
Representative Moorhead identified that the Act’s purpose of preserving and protecting visual art had 
to be achieved without ‘interfering, directly or indirectly, with the ability of US copyright owners and 
users to further the constitutional goal of ensuring public access to a broad, diverse array of creative 
works’.
31
 He proceeded to detail the various restrictions and exclusions on the types of visual art 
which may be protected under the Act, before concluding that these provisions serve to ‘insulate US 
copyright-intensive industries from liability’ under the Act, which will ‘in no way impede the ability 
of these industries to produce and disseminate US created works or undercut America’s pre-eminent 
copyright status both here and abroad’.
32
  
Representative Fish also voiced his concerns and initial scepticism of moral rights, saying that 
they would ‘create havoc’ if changes deemed necessary by copyright owners were capable of being 
vetoed by creators. However, he was mollified by Moorhead’s reassurances, and observed that the Act 
would ‘not impact on the important activities of the various copyright industries in the country, 
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several of which contribute a surplus to the US trade balance’.
33
 Fish and Moorhead were voicing 
concerns that economically lucrative copyright industries should not be affected by the introduction of 
moral rights into federal law.  
The outcome of the debates thus is a very narrow list of protected works and a substantial list 
of exceptions, aspects of which are considered below.  
i. Interpretation of ‘paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures and photographs’ 
While the range of works covered is narrow, it could be said that both the courts and the legislative 
drafters of VARA have at least displayed an awareness of the different media in which these works 
may exist. The legislative reports on VARA record that Congress had directed that the question of 
whether a work falls within the definition of a ‘work of visual art’ should not be dependent on the 
materials or medium utilised,
34
 and that the courts should utilise ‘common sense and generally 
accepted standards of the artistic community’.
35
 Hence, for instance, arguably, paintings should not 
necessarily be confined to traditional paint on canvas,
36
 and neither is a sculpture limited to a ‘three-
dimensional work made by an artist’s hand’,
37
 or more restrictively, a ‘composition [that] has been 
carved, modelled or made in any of the other ways in which a sculpture is made’,
38
 such definitions 
having been judicially formulated in the UK.  
There are obvious problems with the UK definitions. For example, increasingly, sculptures 
are not created by hand. Today, the easy availability of metal, cement and plastic together with 21
st
 
century technology allow artists to utilise a variety of arms length methods, such as fabrication studios 
or 3-D printing in order to create their work. In the early 20
th
 century, certain avant-garde artistic 
movements, such as Dadaism, Futurism and Cubism, attacked the conventional in art.
39
 An art form 
which arose from these movements was Readymades, a term coined by Marcel Duchamp to describe 
art created out of manufactured objects, which are elevated to high art purely because they have been 
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chosen to be art by the artist.
40
 Such works cannot be said to have been ‘created by hand by the artist’. 
Therefore the rather restrictive and traditional definitions of paintings and sculptures in copyright law 
have led to difficulties in allowing copyright protection of certain works in the UK in the modern age. 
In this respect, the definition of visual art under VARA, read in light of the US Congress’s directive to 
disregard material or medium, appears reasonable. However, it will be seen below that the US courts 
are no less conventional than the UK judges have been in interpreting the meaning of these works.  
The restriction to just ‘paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures and photographs’, together with 
prescribed exceptions (e.g. motion pictures, applied art etc), even if not confined to specific types of 
media or material, results in a traditional interpretation of the type of visual art covered under VARA. 
The restriction still potentially shuts out several forms of art which are highly creative but do not fit 
neatly within these categories, such as tattoos, or conceptual art. The potential for locking out 
alternative art works is also particularly heightened by the courts’ conservative interpretations of 
VARA, which are considered below.  
The highly specific and narrow inclusion of ‘paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures and 
photographs’ was examined by the Seventh Circuit in Kelly v Chicago Parks District,
41
 a case 
concerning Wildflower Works, which consisted of football pitch sized wildflower gardens, which were 
subsequently reduced in size and altered in shape by the defendants without the consent of the artist. 
The district court had accepted that the work was both a painting and sculpture for VARA purposes, 
and this issue was not contested by the defendants. However, the Seventh Circuit was not so 
convinced.  It reasoned that as the VARA visual art definition was so specific and clearly different 
from ‘pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works’ in the US Copyright Act which enjoy copyright 
protection, it must mean that the latter should be interpreted with a degree of flexibility while the 
former should be treated strictly, i.e. a visual art work must really be a painting, drawing, print, 
sculpture or photography, not merely analogously. In other words, the five specific terms listed in the 
definition of visual art under VARA were limiting factors.
42
  
The court then considered dictionary meanings of ‘painting’ and ‘sculpture’. Unfortunately, 
as this issue was not in contention, the Seventh Circuit did not deliver a definitive opinion as to 
whether Wildflower Works itself amounted to a painting or sculpture (instead, the court considered the 
issue of whether Wildflower met the originality standard for copyright protection). However, the court 
did suggest that it was highly unlikely for Wildflower to be considered as either: ‘If a living garden 
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The implications of Kelly on the definition of visual art are profound. Notwithstanding 
Congress issued guidance that the definition should not be confined to particular media or materials, 
the judgement of the Seventh Circuit means that a very traditional notion of painting and sculpture 
still takes hold, thus potentially shutting out many modern works of art, which do not fit neatly within 
these categories. What this means is that, if an artist eschews canvas and uses an unconventional 
material as the base for his painting, it may qualify as a work of visual art, but only as long as it also 
meets our conventional understanding of ‘painting’. The same goes for sculptures – while the use of 
unconventional materials does not matter, the resulting work must still be definable as a sculpture. 
However, if a work cannot meet the traditional definition as a painting or sculpture, it cannot qualify 
as visual art for VARA purposes.
44
 This stance is therefore no better than it is in the UK, as mentioned 
above. 
Indeed in the UK, there has been movement towards finding an ‘artistic purpose’ in a work as 
opposed to merely assessing a work’s materials, medium or method of creation, or otherwise adopting 
a conventional interpretation of painting or sculpture.
45
  Mann J in Lucas v Ainsworth opined that it is 
the ‘underlying purpose that is important’ and found that the Star Wars Stormtrooper helmet lacked 
artistic purpose and hence was not considered an artistic work.
46
 Furthermore, in light of the European 
‘intellectual creation’ test for establishing originality in copyright works,
47
 the question as to whether 
a work is truly a painting or sculpture becomes less relevant in ascertaining whether it is an artistic 
work.
48
 In this way, the UK approach to assessing artistic works appears more forward thinking than 
that in the US. 
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ii. Applied Art Exception 
VARA has not only specified the types of artwork which qualify for protection but has also stipulated 
exceptions. One of these exceptions is ‘applied art’, which qualifies for copyright protection,
49
 but has 
not been defined in VARA. Applied art is defined in the Oxford Dictionary of Art as ‘the design or 
decoration of functional objects so as to make them aesthetically pleasing.’
50
 They include objects 
created in the fields of industrial, graphic, fashion and interior design e.g. furniture or kitchenware. 
Generally, these are mass produced functional objects which are designed with aesthetics in mind but 
the functionality outweighs the aesthetic elements in terms of the purpose of the object. In contrast, 
visual art works, which are considered to be fine art, are created purely for the purpose of giving an 
aesthetic experience and intellectual stimulation.  
The specific exclusion of applied art, as it is understood in such terms, is meaningful as it 
explains the underlying aims of VARA. When the exclusion is considered in conjunction with the 
various statements made in the legislative history on VARA, it is clear that the aim is to focus on the 
fine arts, particularly one-off or limited edition pieces which can be considered as part of the cultural 
heritage of the country.
51
 Such works being created purely for artistic purposes with limited 
availability means that destruction has a particularly devastating consequence. The distinction made 
between applied art and the fine arts is understandable. While economic rights are clearly relevant to 
the applied arts, which are produced on an industrial scale, moral rights are less so. Further, the 
singular uniqueness of fine art pieces justify their protection under VARA whereas, arguably, the 
multiplicity of applied art objects have less need for such protection.   
However, while the ordinary meaning of applied art tends to the mass produced everyday 
functional objects designed with aesthetics in mind, e.g. Murano glass jewellery, there too exist 
artistic works with functional aspects which may be categorised as applied art, but which, because of 
their innate artistic qualities, could also arguably deserve protection as much as the unique piece. 
Examples of such pieces are Picasso’s ceramics, and the elite ceramic potters of Japan such as 
Nakajima Hiroshi. A careless interpretation may result in keeping such works outside the scope of 
VARA and thus potentially subject to abuse.  
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In the absence of legislative guidance, the meaning of ‘applied art’ has been judicially 
formulated. In Cheffins and Jones v Stewart,
52
 the US Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit had to decide if 
La Contessa, a work consisting of a used school bus reconstructed as a replica of a 16
th
 century 
Spanish Galleon, amounted to a ‘work of visual art’. The point turned on whether the work was a 
work of ‘applied art’. The court referred to the Second Circuit’s judgment in Carter v Helmsley-
Spear, Inc,
53
 which involved a sculpture constructed from scrap metal, including parts of an old 
school bus, which were then affixed to a wall in the lobby of the defendant’s building. The Second 
Circuit explained that ‘applied art’ referred to ‘two and three dimensional ornamentation or decoration 
that is affixed to otherwise utilitarian objects’. Although utilitarian objects were involved, the court 
held that the sculpture in Carter was not a work of applied art just because it was affixed to the floor, 
walls and ceiling. To hold otherwise would be to make the protection afforded by VARA 
meaningless, especially where visual art works are installed in buildings. The court however 
emphasised that VARA would not protect a utilitarian piece.  
The Ninth Circuit in Cheffins, after considering the holdings in Carter, emphasised that the 
query should be whether the work in question was utilitarian in nature. On the facts, La Contessa 
began life as a utilitarian object, i.e. a bus, which was then visually and artistically transformed. 
However it still ‘continued to serve a significant utilitarian function’ even though it was no longer 
used as a school bus, because it continued to be used for transportation during festivals, even in its 
final highly elaborate artistic state.
54
 On this basis, La Contessa was applied art, and could not be a 
work of visual art under VARA.  
Judge McKeown, although concurring with the outcome of the majority judgement, was 
concerned that ‘significant utilitarian function’ was not sufficiently nuanced for the purposes of 
VARA. The danger of the majority’s test was that any work which incorporates utilitarian elements 
would be left unprotected by VARA. She asked how significant should the utilitarian function be in 
order to deny it protection, citing several examples of works which are unquestionably works of art 
but which nevertheless can be said to retain utilitarian functions: the Bayeux tapestries, Tracey Emin’s 
My Bed, Rodin’s Gates of Hell and Picasso’s stage curtain for the ballet Le Tricorne. McKeown 
stressed that to give full countenance to the underlying purpose of VARA, the courts should assess the 
work as a whole, and ascertain its primary purpose. The key to the query is whether the artistic 
purpose of the work is secondary to its functional purpose. The point is that any incidental utilitarian 
element to the work should not necessarily mean that it lay beyond the reach of VARA. 
Notwithstanding the finer distinctions of McKeown’s test, however, McKeown still held La Contessa 
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to be applied art, primarily because it spent most of the year hidden under a tarpaulin, only to emerge 
during festival periods in order to ferry festival goers and to perform other functions.  
The issue therefore, of whether a work is applied art or not, is crucial for the purposes of 
invoking protection under VARA. Critically, it should be noted that the parties in Cheffins were in 
agreement about two points: firstly, that La Contessa was indeed a sculpture and secondly, that it was 
a work of recognised stature, both of which are strict requirements for VARA’s application. The work 
did meet these vital requirements, but failed under the exception clause. There are a few observations 
to be made on this. First of all, it is technically questionable as to whether a work can be both a 
sculpture as well as applied art. The US courts have thus far displayed a conventionality in their 
approach. If they remain true to this approach, then, they should not be able to categorise a work as 
both sculpture and applied art. While sculpture is specifically referred to as an accepted form under 
VARA, applied art is specifically referred to as an excluded form. Therefore the two must have been 
different in the eyes of the legislators. Furthermore, conventionally, sculpture is a form of the fine 
arts, which is defined in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Art Terms as: 
‘Art created primarily for aesthetic reasons and not functional use (see Applied Art). 
Examples of fine art: painting, drawing, sculpture and printmaking’.
55
 
Applied art, from the same dictionary, is defined as  
‘Art that is created for useful objects and remains subservient to the functions of those 
objects. The broad range of the applied arts includes ceramics, furniture, glass, leather, 
metalwork, textiles, arms and armour, clocks, and jewellery’.
56
 
Secondly, while perhaps La Contessa’s unique set of circumstances may have possibly 
justified the end result, the dangers of the majority ‘applied art’ test in particular, are apparent where 
art works consisting in part or entirely of utilitarian objects are concerned. It would seem that to be 
completely immune from rejection under the test, the work would have to completely disable its 
functionality e.g. the bus in Carter was completely disabled. Therefore, an item like Picasso’s stage 
curtain for Le Tricorne may not be protected, as it was originally conceived and used as a stage 
curtain, it still remains a stage curtain, and nothing to stop it as functioning as one in future. Another 
example would be Picasso’s ceramic pieces, which consist of vases, plates and jugs, clearly utilitarian 
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pieces which retain a functional element, but which are highly prized for their artistic value.
57
 Even 
under McKeown’s test, when assessed as a whole, the Bayeux tapestries,  Picasso’s stage curtain and 
Picasso’s ceramics are primarily draught-excluding fabric, ballet stage backdrops and crockery 
respectively, albeit designed to an extraordinarily high level of artistry, which transformed them into 
undeniable works of art.  
The point is that such works are arguably the type of works which are contemplated by 
VARA as being deserving of its protection; they are not just merely artistically decorative products. If 
destroyed, their absence will be heartfelt and the cultural heritage to which they belong diminished. 
Karlen has suggested that if a work is intended to be a work of fine art, then a later or even 
simultaneous commercial or functional use should not preclude protection.
58
 Indeed, the destruction of 
La Contessa was met with a sense of utter loss and dismay in the local community.
59
 The lessons to 
be learnt is that precaution should be exercised in defining ‘applied art’ if purely functional works are 
to be excluded.    
iii.  Site Specific works 
The question of whether the removal of site-specific works amounts to a breach of VARA appears 
unresolved. Although, the First Circuit in Philips v Pembroke (discussed below) ruled that VARA did 
not apply to site-specific works,
60
 commentators have either opined that the legislation was interpreted 
wrongly because Congress was well aware of the issues surrounding site-specific works in its debates 
and therefore site-specific works should be protected under VARA,
61
 or that the court had correctly 
interpreted VARA but that the law is wrong on this and should be changed to accommodate site-
specific works.
62
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Site-specific works are, in the words of Richard Serra, ‘determined by the topography of the 
site’,
63
 and are ‘conceived for, dependent upon, and inseparable from their locations’.
64
 Therefore, the 
question is what effect does relocation have on a site specific work? Serra is adamant that ‘to remove 
the work is to destroy the work’.
65
 Other artists are in agreement. Robert Barry said that each of his 
installations was ‘made to suit the place in which it was installed. They cannot be moved without 
being destroyed’,
66
 while Sol LeWitt in an interview, referring to his Wall Drawings, said that 
‘[l]ocation is part of it. It can’t be moved without being destroyed’.
67
 At a minimum, it could be said 
that relocation would give the work a new meaning, or transform it into something else altogether, 
which is wholly unintended by the artist.
68
 Either interpretation of the effects of relocation of a site-
specific work, if accepted, could arguably fall foul of VARA.  
The issue with site-specific works and VARA is that site-specific works are neither explicitly 
included nor excluded in the legislation. However, there are important statutory limitations to the right 
of integrity which are relevant to site-specific works. Under VARA, changes to a work which are 
brought about either by normal degradation or are undertaken for the purposes of public presentation, 
including specifically a change in the placement of the work, are not considered destructions, 
distortions, mutilations, or modifications unless caused by gross negligence.
69
 The question is whether 
a change in the placement of a site-specific work would amount to its destruction. If it is not 
considered destroyed, then such a change does not breach the integrity right. However, as will be seen 
below, the First Circuit in Phillips asked if it was inevitable that any change in the placement of a site-
specific work would amount to destruction. If so, then the question is, why VARA would protect site-
specific works in the first place, only to remove its protection in the form of the public presentation 
exception.   
Briefly, Phillips was commissioned by Pembroke to re-design Eastport Park in Boston. 
Phillips’ vision consisted of creating and situating numerous sculptures and rough stone walls in spiral 
or circular patterns as well as inserting stone paving for walkways. However, soon after completion, 
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maintenance problems with the walls and paving emerged, and the defendants decided to modify the 
park, which would entail including more plants as well as removing and relocating the sculptures. 
However, Phillips objected to this on the basis that all of the sculptures were site-specific. An 
alternative proposal to retain all of the walls and all but one of the sculptures, and to redesign the 
walkways, was similarly rejected by Phillips.  Pembroke responded by removing all components to 
another site.  
The district court decided that Pembroke could remove the various components of Phillips’ 
work under the public presentation exception. In essence, the district court held that a site-specific art 
work, such as Phillips’, was indeed protected under VARA, but that the public presentation exception 
allowed such work to be removed, as long as the removal does not alter, modify or destroy the work. 
Phillips’ appealed, arguing that the exception only envisaged non-permanent changes in placing an art 
work. In his case, he argued that the removal/relocation of any or all of the sculptures or stonework 
amounted to a destruction of his work as a whole, was a permanent change, and hence was not caught 
by the exception.  
Ironically, the First Circuit agreed with him that the relocation of part or the whole of a site-
specific work amounted to a permanent change, indeed destruction. However, because of this 
understanding as to how relocation affects site-specific works, the court went on to say that VARA 
could not have intended to apply to site-specific works in the first place at all. In other words, the 
court opined that it was illogical that VARA intended to protect site-specific works but yet also 
include as an exception, the type of action i.e. changing the placement of a site-specific work, which 
would render it completely destroyed.  
The ruling of the First Circuit thus has serious consequences for site-specific artists; they are 
simply not protected under VARA according to their logic. It can be argued that their logic is flawed, 
for it is conceivable that there are occasions in which a site-specific work may be protected under 
VARA and yet also be subject to the public presentation exception i.e. certain relocations would not 
amount to destruction. It was not necessary to rule that VARA had not intended to protect site-specific 
works at all. Indeed, it is questionable that this was ever the intention of the legislators, particularly in 
light of the aims of VARA. As can be seen from the language employed by its legislators, VARA is 
envisaged not only as a protector of artists and their creations, but also as a keeper of the country’s 
cultural heritage. The First Circuit’s ruling is arguably irreconcilable with the cultural heritage aims of 
VARA. Site-specific art is, after all, a major art form, which boasts numerous internationally 
acclaimed site-specific artists, including Serra (Tilted Arc), LeWitt (Wall Drawings), Smithson (Spiral 
Jetty), Christo (The Gates) and Maya Lin (Vietnam Veterans Memorial), most of whom are based in 
the US. It is therefore arguably inconceivable that site-specific works were not intended to be covered 




The ambiguity in the language employed in VARA led to a US appeal court in blocking out an 
entire art form from VARA’s protection. There are thus lessons to be learned in addressing site-
specific works. This should be specifically addressed in any anti-destruction legislation for the sake of 
clarity.  
c. Recognised Stature 
Unlike the acts of distortion, mutilation and modification which are proscribed for works of visual art 
regardless of stature, the act of destruction is prohibited only where works of ‘recognised stature’ are 
concerned. Several issues arise in respect of this requirement.  
First, it should be noted that ‘recognised stature’ is not a requirement under the Berne 
Convention. The inclusion of the restriction is presumably to prevent frivolous claims from being 
made.
70
 While this aim is laudable, the lack of guidance on the phrase has led to inconsistent 
applications of the requirement.
71
 During the House of Representatives subcommittee hearing on 
VARA, Professor Ginsburg argued that it had the potential of prolonging litigation, as the parties 
would doubtlessly battle it out by adducing extensive expert evidence, and the judges having to make 
sense of the different testimonies on offer.
 72
   
Nevertheless, a test for ‘recognised stature’ has been formulated in Carter v Helmsley. The 
test assumes a two-tier approach: first, the work is shown to have ‘stature’ and secondly, that this 
stature is ‘recognised’ by experts in the artistic community. Notably, the court’s take on ‘recognised 
stature’ was that it represented the custodial aims of VARA, i.e. works which were valued by society 
should be protected. Hence, the court would hear from experts and others in the artistic community, or 
even simply the public in general. The court in Carter noted that there would be heavy reliance on the 
testimony of experts, which would appear to support Ginsburg’s initial concerns about prolonging 
litigation.  These pronouncements in Carter have been followed in subsequent cases, but with 
differing approaches.  
One significant issue that has emerged from Carter and subsequent case-law, is the question 
of whether the court should assess the artistic merits of the work, or whether it should concern itself 
with the extent to which the work is recognised. As pointed out by Karlen, a work of recognised 
stature does not necessarily mean that it possesses aesthetic value, which raises the question as to 
what sort of work is truly deserving of protection: those which are truly artistically meritorious or 
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those which have garnered fame and attention?
73
 This point was raised when Martin v City of 
Indianapolis reached the Seventh Circuit.
74
 Here, the plaintiff had only proffered documentary 
evidence of his ‘recognised stature’, in the form of newspaper articles and miscellaneous letters from 
art critics and academics. The writers of these documents were full of praise for the artistic merits of 
the works. Because the plaintiff had not brought witnesses to court, an issue was raised as to whether 
such documentary evidence was inadmissible hearsay as to establishing the truth of whether the 
plaintiff’s works were any good. At the District Court and at the Seventh Circuit, the documents were 
held not to be hearsay as regards the fact as to whether the plaintiff’s works were truly meritorious; 
this is because they were not offered for that purpose but instead were offered to simply establish that 
the writers concerned had recognised the plaintiff’s works, which was admissible. This therefore 
appears to lay emphasis on the recognition that a work has received, rather than its innate qualities i.e. 
its worthiness of preservation. 
The problem with the interpretation in Martin is that, works which possess artistic excellence 
but have either not attracted attention or have not been publicly displayed, would fail under this 
requirement for ‘recognised stature’. Works which are deemed insignificant at the moment may well 
gain stature in the future.
75
 New and emerging artists would be the least likely to fulfil this criterion, 
as would works which are deemed too difficult or controversial at the time to attract positive attention. 
Is a work of recognised stature because its artist is recognised or is it because it is itself recognised?  
On this point, Ginsburg had also argued during the subcommittee hearing that if a work has not been 
publicly displayed before being mutilated or destroyed, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a 
work to have attained ‘recognised stature’.
76
 Indeed, this was the conclusion reached by the Second 
Circuit in Pollara v Seymour,
77
 where the work in question was destroyed before it became available 
for public viewing.  This appears to suggest that emphasis is placed on the work being ‘recognised’ 
rather than on assessing its innate artistic qualities.  
There are difficulties thus with not only the definition of ‘recognised stature’ but also with 
evidencing ‘recognised stature’. It is uncertain as to the type and standard of proof required, the 
number of expert opinions required, and the type of experts who may be allowed to give testimony. It 
would also be difficult to prove recognised stature in those works which have not acquired stature but 
may actually have the potential to achieve such stature in future.   
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Because ‘recognised stature’ is a phenomenon which fluctuates in time and is difficult to 
assess, it is possible that experts will likely err on the side of finding ‘recognised stature’, as will the 
judges, out of a fear of unwittingly allowing the destruction of a work which, although of doubtful 
stature at the time, may possibly acquire such stature later in the future.
78
 Basically, if either expert or 
judge is in doubt, then both may err on the side of caution, to avoid any possibility of destroying a 
potential masterpiece. If this argument is true, it throws the utility of such a requirement into question. 
The reason for the requirement was to sift out trivial claims. However, the cautious application of the 
courts and experts would compel most owners to preserve the work, and in the process, incur 
substantial costs in respect of something which may never actually gain stature at all.
79
 
While the rationale behind the requirement of ‘recognised stature’ is understandable, i.e. to 
prevent nuisance claims, the lack of definition or guidance in the legislation and the inconsistent 
approaches in the case-law, leaves it riddled with not only practical evidentiary problems but also 
substantive problems, such as whether the query should be aimed at a work’s artistic qualities or at the 
extent of its fame. If VARA’s aims of conserving cultural heritage are to be fulfilled, then there is an 
argument for focusing on a work’s inherent qualities, rather than its fame or lack thereof. This is 
because a work’s fame or its lack of recognition may be wholly undeserving and is subject to the 
fluctuating whims and trends in society. One only has to recall Van Gogh.
80
 However, by focusing on 
the more objective criterion of artistic quality, there is more likelihood of correctly identifying a work 
which is deserving of preservation and which will stand the test of time.   
d. Conclusions – the general impact of VARA 
When VARA was enacted, the initial response of commentators in the field was generally positive. 
Karlen thought that the legislation was sophisticated, detailed and thorough, an opinion he 
subsequently revised in 1993, just two years after VARA’s enactment.
81
 Kwall, writing in 1997, 
regarded VARA as being a step in the right direction at least, a ‘clear response to society’s interest in 
protecting the personal rights of authors and preserving our cultural heritage’ but was also ambivalent 
about its true impact and influence upon the visual arts community.
82
  
Since these early academic opinions, we have had the benefit of several cases which have 
applied VARA. The general conclusion to be drawn is that the US judiciary have clearly attempted to 
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give effect to the legislature’s intent but in so doing, have approached the interpretation of VARA in a 
conservative and restrictive fashion by employing a literal interpretation in many instances, so much 
so to the extent that it could be questioned as to whether the true intent of VARA has actually been 
honoured. This can be seen for instance in the federal judiciary’s approach to site-specific works. If 
the aim of VARA is to be a conservation tool for the fine arts and the country’s cultural heritage as 
was clearly intended in the legislative history, the judiciary’s rejection of site-specific works is 




Has there however been progress more recently? The latest case to invoke VARA involves 
5Pointz, the internationally renowned graffiti mecca situated in New York City, referred to briefly in 
chapter 1. 5Pointz was a hub of artist studios operating out of a disused warehouse. The owners of the 
warehouse had also allowed the artist residents to cover the external walls with extensive striking 
graffiti murals. 5Pointz subsequently gained a reputation as a significant artistic landmark in the 
graffiti community as well as a major tourist destination.
84
 In 2013, the owners reclaimed their 
property, with plans for a major redevelopment into luxury residences. Not only did the artists launch 
an action under VARA for an injunction against demolition,
85
 there were also widespread protests 
from the community as well as celebrity artists such as Banksy.
86
 Owing to the time constraints of the 
preliminary hearing for a temporary injunction, the court could not investigate fully the issue of 
whether the 5Pointz artworks were of ‘recognised stature’.
87
 The judge however reasoned that even if 
5Pointz was of ‘recognised stature’, there would not be irreparable damage, which was the standard to 
be met for an injunction. The underlying reasoning for this conclusion lay in the ephemeral nature of 
the murals in the first place.
88
 The judge doubted that the artists could not be compensated by 
monetary damages for such loss, reasoning that as the works were available for free in the first place, 
their destruction would not lower their market value. Almost immediately after this decision was 
made, the entire building was whitewashed overnight on 19 November 2013, without prior 
consultation of the artists involved, thus denying them any chance of salvaging or otherwise 
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preserving or recording their work. The anger and sense of betrayal at the furtive and underhanded 
manner in which this was carried out was palpable.
89
 VARA had clearly failed the artists at that point.  
There is however hope that VARA may yet serve graffiti artists in general after all. On 31 
March 2017, the Brooklyn Federal Court ruled that the plaintiffs may proceed to a jury trial to seek 
out damages as compensation.
90
 The intensity of the media coverage on the numerous legal battles 
surrounding 5Pointz over the last few years and its destruction arguably assisted in raising its profile 
and increased the chances of a substantial award of damages. On 12 February 2018, after a three week 
jury trial, after having found that a significant number of the artworks had achieved recognised 
stature, Judge Block awarded $6.7 million in damages to the artists.
91
 A significant factor, taken into 
account when assessing damages, was the conduct of the defendant, which was variously described by 
the judge as ‘unrepentant’, ‘recalcitrant’, ‘problematic’ and ‘wilful’. Judge Block was particularly 
unimpressed that the defendant had almost immediately ordered 5Pointz destroyed upon hearing that 
the injunction had been denied, leaving the artists no time in which to record their works, and 
described his actions as one of ‘pure pique and revenge’, and ‘the epitome of wilfulness’.
92
      
It should be noted that Judge Block, in his latest decision, emphasised the deterrent effect of 
such a substantial award:  
‘Without a significant statutory damages award, the preservative goals of VARA cannot be 
met. If potential infringers believe that they can violate VARA at will and escape liability 
because plaintiffs are not able to provide a reliable financial valuation for their works, VARA 
will have no teeth’      
However, an award of damages for the artists of 5Pointz remains a Pyrrhic victory for them as 
artists and for the art world as a whole. 5Pointz was a unique testament to an art form which is 
increasingly recognised as having significant social and cultural value.
93
 Contrary to Judge Block’s 
                                                             
89
  Cara Buckley and Marc Santora, ‘Night Falls, and 5Pointz, a Graffiti Mecca, is Whited Out in Queens’ 
The New York Times (19 November 2013) <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/20/nyregion/5pointz-a-
graffiti-mecca-in-queens-is-wiped-clean-overnight.html>. 
90
  Cohen v. G&M Realty, 13-CV-05612 (FB) (RLM) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017).  
91
  Cohen v G&M Realty, 13-CV-05612 (FB)(RLM) (E.D.N.Y. Feb.12, 2018); Enrico Bonadio, ‘How 21 
artists graffitied one man's property, made it famous, sued him when he knocked it down and won 




  Cohen v G&M Realty (n 91) 44-45. 
93
  Martin Irvine, ‘The Work on the Street: Street Art and Visual Culture’ in Barry Sandwell and Ian 
Heywood (eds), The Handbook of Visual Culture (Berg 2012); Alice Alves, ‘Emerging issues of Street 
Art valuation as Cultural Heritage’ (Lisbon Street-Art & Urban Creativity - International Conference July 




opinion, the loss of 5Pointz is irreversible and irreparable. Significantly, the fact that the court was 
amenable to awarding monetary compensation for the loss of 5Pointz but was reluctant to prevent its 
destruction speaks volumes of the general position on moral rights in the US: there is evidently still an 
emphasis on the economic value of art, and a marked reluctance to recognise non-economic rights of 
artists,
94
 which resulted in the irredeemable loss of a significant work of art and a piece of cultural 
heritage.   
3. Australia Copyright Act 1968 
a.  Background 
On 7 December 2000, Australia amended its Copyright Act 1968 to include moral rights.
95
 s.195AI 
affords the author a right of integrity, which is ‘the right not to have the work subjected to derogatory 
treatment.’ In respect of artistic works, derogatory treatment means either  
(a) The doing,..., of anything that results in a material distortion of, the destruction or 
mutilation of, or a material alteration to, the work that is prejudicial to the author’s 
honour or reputation; or 
(b) An exhibition in public, of the work that is prejudicial to the author’s honour or reputation 
because of the manner or place in which the exhibition occurs; or 
(c) The doing of anything else in relation to the work that is prejudicial to the author’s 
honour or reputation.  
Infringement takes place if a person subjects the work or authorises the work to be subjected to 
derogatory treatment.
96
 The inclusion of authorisation as an infringing act is a point of difference from 
the U.K. CDPA, which does not recognise authorisation as a breach.  
Furthermore, s.195AQ(4) provides that any person who reproduces, publishes, or 
communicates an artistic work which has been derogatorily treated will be in breach of the integrity 
right as well. This differs from the position in the UK which provides that infringement only occurs if 
there has been derogatory treatment of a work AND the work has been dealt with in specified 
circumstances akin to those described under s.195AQ(4) of the Australian Act.
97
 In other words, 
derogatory treatment on its own cannot amount to a breach of the integrity right in the UK; there must 
also be some communication or publication of the derogatorily treated work. However, it appears 
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possible that derogatory treatment on its own may amount to a breach in Australia. As explained in 
chapter 4, these additional requirements i.e. reproduction, publication and communication, in the UK 
CDPA make it difficult,
98
 some say impossible,
99
 for the right to prevent destruction from being 
recognised. This hurdle is absent in the Australian legislation.    
Sundara Rajan has described Australia’s implementation of moral rights, in employing a 
straightforward approach, as a model for the enactment of moral rights doctrine. In respect of the 
integrity right, Sundara Rajan specifically highlights certain positive attributes. Firstly, the Australian 
enactment specifically includes destruction of artistic works as a breach of the integrity right.
100
 
Secondly, it also refers to the manner in which an artistic work is exhibited; should it be prejudicial to 
the author’s honour or reputation, it shall amount to a breach of the integrity right.
101
 In these two 
aspects at least, the Australian legislation provides artists with considerably more protection than 
those afforded by the UK CDPA.  
The history of moral rights implementation in Australia followed a path very similar to that 
trodden by the UK and US. Since its adherence to the Berne Convention in 1928, it resisted moral 
rights on much the same grounds as these other common law countries i.e. practical enforcement 
problems, foreignness of ‘moral rights’, few actual violations in reality, and economic impact on the 
copyright industries.
102
  However, after having faced increasing criticism of its limited 
implementation of the Berne Convention, the Australian government was obliged to introduce moral 
rights into its copyright regime.
103
 Apart from fulfilling its international obligations, there was also a 
palpable need for ensuring greater protection for Australia’s creative community: ‘At its most basic, 
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this bill is a recognition of the importance to Australian culture of literary, artistic, musical and 
dramatic works and of those who create them.’
104
  
However, the government was also mindful of achieving a balance between the rights and 
needs of artists, and those of the copyright industries. This is evidenced by the constant reference to 
‘reasonableness’ in the House debates,
105
 as well as the inclusion of ‘reasonableness’ within the 
Copyright Act itself. s.195AS sets out a list of factors, discussed below, which the courts may take 
into account in order to ascertain if the defendant’s act in subjecting the claimant’s work to derogatory 
treatment was reasonable. In other words, a defendant’s derogatory treatment may not amount to a 
breach if it was deemed reasonable.  
b. Destruction of artistic works  
Where destruction of artistic works is concerned, it is specifically listed as a form of derogatory 
treatment if prejudicial to the author’s honour or reputation, and hence it avoids the interpretation 
problems inherent in s.80 of the UK CDPA i.e. the restrictive limitation of ‘treatment’ to just four 
acts: addition to, deletion from, alteration or adaptation, which prima facie suggests that destruction 
could not be considered as derogatory treatment, an issue which is discussed above in chapter 4. 
Hence, similar to VARA, destruction is unambiguously captured within the act. 
There are limitations to the breach of the integrity right by destruction. First, as mentioned 
above, if the destruction is considered reasonable, it will not amount to a breach. s.195AS provides a 
non-exhaustive list of factors to be taken into account in order to ascertain reasonableness: nature of 
the work, purpose for which the work is used, the manner in which it is used, the context in which it is 
issued, industry practice, whether the work was made in the course of employment or under contract, 
whether it was necessary to avoid a breach of any law and the views of co-authors, if any. The 
purpose of this limitation is to ensure a balance between the interests of the author and those of other 
parties. However, as has been argued throughout this thesis, the destruction of a work of art represents 
an irretrievable loss, which amounts not only to a blow to the artist concerned, but also an injury to 
the cultural heritage to which the art once belonged. It is an act not to be taken lightly. As such, while 
reasonableness as a standard is more than adequate for the other potential infringing acts, such as 
mutilation or alteration, it is questionable if this appropriate for destruction. Destruction is an extreme 
irredeemable act, and hence should be measured by an arguably higher standard such as ‘essential’ or 
‘necessity’ i.e. it was ‘necessary in the circumstances’ that the work in question had to be destroyed.  
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A second limitation lies in s.195AT. Generally, the destruction of a movable artistic work will 
not infringe the integrity right if the destroyer of the work gives the author a reasonable opportunity to 
reacquire the work. However, the act is silent on how ownership of the work as a piece of physical 
property may be resolved.
106
 Where the artistic work in question is fixed to a building which is subject 
to demolition and thus will itself be destroyed, its destruction will not amount to a breach if, after 
having made reasonable inquiries, the author cannot be located.
107
 If the author has been located, he 
must be given notice of the demolition, and a three week opportunity in which to record the work or 
consult with the owner about the changes to the building which might result in the destruction of the 
work.
108
 Similar provisions are made for site-specific works.
109
 In addition, if the remover of a site-
specific work complies with the author’s request that any identification of him as author is removed 
from the work, the removal shall not amount to a breach of the integrity right.  
Although the requirement to give the author an opportunity to remove or otherwise record his 
work is laudable, a criticism lies in the three-week timeframe in which the author has to record his 
work. Some sculptures are indeed difficult to capture by photography,
110
 and as such, more time may 
be required in which an appropriate means of recording the work may be identified and effected. 
Another issue lies in the potentially considerable costs of removal and storage of the work which was 
destined for destruction. The Act is silent as to which party bears the responsibility for removing and 
storing the art work, and as already stated above, it is silent on the ownership of the physical property 
of the work in such event.  
There have been very few cases involving moral rights in Australia and as such it is difficult 
to ascertain the actual extent of the legislation’s impact on artists and how the judiciary will interpret 
the moral rights provisions. However, it is instructive to examine the few cases involving destruction 
of art works, even though they were all eventually settled out of court. Such cases are still useful in 
throwing some light on the impact of the Act.  
One case involved a site-specific sculpture, entitled ‘Distant Conversations’ which was 
situated within and outside the foyer of the Telstra building in Melbourne.
111
 In 2009, Telstra 
contacted the sculptor informing him of their plan to remove the sculpture. As any attempt in 
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removing the work would likely result in its destruction, the sculptor raised s.195AT of the Copyright 
Act 1968, which enabled him to negotiate the sculpture’s removal with the owners of the building. 
The end result was that the work was eventually purchased for a nominal sum by a third party and its 
removal took place under the supervision of the sculptor.
112
 Another recent case involving mosaics 
installed in Sydney Skygarden shopping centre was similarly resolved.
113
 Armed with the backup of 
the moral rights provisions in the Copyright Act, the artist was placed in a better position to negotiate 
the safe removal and storage of his work.   
Another much earlier case involved the maintenance and proper exhibition of a sculpture in 
Hornsby, New South Wales. Victor Cusack’s sculpture, ‘Man, Time and the Environment’ consisting 
of a working clock and other moving parts, was commissioned by the Hornsby Shire Council and 
unveiled in 1993.
114
 In 2003, the sculpture was removed pending renovation of a nearby shopping 
centre. However, it was not re-installed according to Cusack’s instructions, and it fell into disrepair 
and did not work for a number of years. As it was no longer working, the piece became locally 
referred to mockingly as Man, and the Environment Out of Time. This was naturally upsetting to 
Cusack who felt that his honour and reputation were damaged by the lack of care. Armed with legal 
advice about the recent enactment of moral rights however, Cusack was able to negotiate terms with 
Hornsby Shire Council from a strong position, which resulted in his sculpture being repaired to full 
working order.  
c. Conclusions  
The full impact of the amendments to Australia’s Copyright Act 1968 remains to be seen. On its face, 
it would seem that the provisions have been drafted carefully and thoroughly, taking pains to ensure a 
balance is struck between the rights of artists and those of other parties involved. A few criticisms 
may be levied at the details of the provisions, such as for example, the three week timeframe in which 
the artist has to record his work.  
On the whole, the mere existence of the provisions has resulted in positive outcomes for 
artists in Australia, as illustrated in the few cases described above. The mere availability of the moral 
rights provisions have enabled numerous artists to seek out favourable terms for their works, which is 
to be applauded. In the UK, where no such legal support exists, artists are left in a much more 
vulnerable and weaker bargaining position.  
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4. India Copyright Act 1957 
a. Background 
Section 57 of India’s Copyright Act 1957 provides for moral rights. Currently, it provides that the 
author’s integrity right exists independently of his copyright, and it is the right to ‘restrain or claim 
damages in respect of any distortion, mutilation, modification or other act in relation to the said work 
if such distortion, mutilation, modification or other act would be prejudicial to his honour or 
reputation.’ An explanatory note clarifies that ‘failure to display a work or to display it to the 
satisfaction of the author shall not be deemed to be an infringement of the rights conferred by this 
section’. The wording of s.57 thus closely resembles Art.6bis of the Berne Convention.  
However, it has not always been so. s.57 has been amended considerably since its original 
enactment. The interesting thing about the old s.57 was that it was considerably broader in scope and 
afforded the author greater protection than its Art.6bis inspired incarnation. The original s.57 simply 
allowed a claim for ‘any distortion, mutilation or other modification of the…work’. Such claim was 
not dependent upon a finding of prejudice to honour or reputation,
115
  and thus was far less ambiguous 
where destruction is concerned. This is because, as has been discussed previously in this thesis, it is 
generally argued that once a work is destroyed, there would be nothing left which may affect the 
author’s honour or reputation, and hence could not amount to a breach of the author’s integrity right. 
As the original s.57 did not require such prejudice to be shown, then the mere destruction of a work 
would amount to a straightforward breach of the integrity right.
116
   
Sundara Rajan has commented extensively on the mutation of the original s.57 to its current 
more restricted form, explaining that it sheds light particularly on the Indian government’s policies 
and stance on cultural activities.
117
  It is particularly informative from the point of view of this thesis, 
as it also illuminates the relationship between cultural heritage and moral rights, which is a crucial 
theme adopted by the thesis. Fundamentally, Sundara Rajan is of the opinion that India, like several 
other developing countries, embraces a particularly welcoming and expansive attitude to moral rights, 
unlike the more parsimonious approach taken by developed countries.
118
 The key reason, posited by 
Sundara Rajan, was a passionate and urgent post colonial desire to exercise their hard fought 
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freedoms and recover their dignity.
119
 In order to distinguish their countries and cultures from those of 
their colonial masters, there was a resurgence of interest and intense pride in their own cultural 
heritage. Moral rights thus provided these countries with a legal framework in which to protect and 
preserve their cultural heritage, which explains why the initial adoption of moral rights in such 




Specifically, Sundara Rajan posits that India’s own unique development of its moral rights 
regime may be attributed to certain factors: its colonial inheritance from the British, certain vestigial 
influences from Continental Europe due to colonisation by the French and Portuguese, and the 
inherent tensions brought about by India’s dual position as both an importer and exporter of copyright 
works. Although India has undoubtedly inherited its common law tradition from the British, it has 
also been exposed to the legal and cultural influences of Continental Europe. Indeed the generous 
wording of the original s.57 is more broadly reminiscent of French law than the English where moral 
rights were concerned. s.57 was thought to have been modified in response to a High Court interim 
ruling delivered in 1992 in the seminal case of Amar Nath Sehgal v Union of India.
121
  
b. Amar Nath Sehgal v Union of India  
Sehgal was a prominent sculptor who was commissioned by the Indian government to create a mural 
to be installed in a major public building. After five years of toil, the mural was finally completed in 
1962 and took pride of place in the building’s main lobby to critical acclaim. However, in 1979, the 
mural was dismantled and placed in storage, and in the process suffered extensive damage and loss. 
Sehgal sought an injunction to prevent further harm, and the interim injunction granted in 1992, 
established two important principles, which were later confirmed and expanded in the Delhi High 
Court’s final judgement of 2005.  The two principles were that moral rights could recognise a right 
against the destruction of a work, and that the government had a duty of care towards artworks in its 
care.
122
 Shortly after the delivery of the interim ruling, s.57 was amended in 1994 to include the 
reference to ‘honour or reputation’ and also the explanatory note which makes the failure to display a 
work immune from infringement.
123
 It had become apparent to the government of the day that the 
extensive protection under the original section could open up the government to a greater likelihood 
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of liability for their possession and upkeep of cultural works.
124
  There were possibly other reasons as 
well. India’s accession to the Berne Convention meant that their moral rights would also be extended 
to foreign authors. As such access to foreign works could be hindered by India’s uniquely generous 
set of moral rights, which in turn could prove deleterious to India’s progress as a developing nation.
125
 
It was thus undesirable to have unduly strong moral rights. Furthermore, strong moral rights could 
also prove to be an obstacle to foreign investment in India’s growing cultural industries, particularly 
Bollywood.
126
 All of these reasons played a part in the eventual erosion of strong moral rights in 
India.    
The High Court which delivered the final judgement in Sehgal virtually ignored the new 
amendments to s.57 however. It could have decided in one of two conventional ways: either the new 
s.57 was not applicable because Sehgal was brought to court prior to its amendment, or the new s.57 
was applicable because it was in force at the time of the final judgement and therefore, there was no 
claim available for the destruction of the mural. However, Judge Nandrajog chose to read the Indian 
provisions on moral rights, specifically the new s.57, in light of the broader public policies at play 
here. In paragraphs 37 to 56 of his judgement, he made extensive references to the rich cultural 
heritage of India, the Indian Government’s Five Year Plan for Art and Culture, as well as the 
numerous international conventions on cultural property to which India was a party. The essence of 
his decision was that a failure to prevent the destruction of a cultural treasure was not only at odds 
with the aims of these conventions, but would also undermine the cultural heritage of India. 
Therefore, he urged, in paragraph 56, that ‘there would be urgent need to interpret s.57 of the 
Copyright Act 1957 in its wider amplitude to include destruction of a work of art’. Significantly, the 
judge accepted the argument, raised by Anand, counsel to Sehgal, that the destruction of his work 
would reduce his creative corpus, thus damaging his reputation in turn.  
The High Court in Sehgal thus chose to look at the broader picture underlying India’s 
copyright regime and its moral rights provisions. It clearly questioned the aims of moral rights and 
also clearly understood the needs of India’s cultural heritage.  In so doing, the High Court was able to 
articulate a legal principle which combined the two, showing how moral rights could and should serve 
the needs of a country’s cultural heritage.  
c. Conclusions 
The High Court’s final judgenment in Sehgal is inspiring for it clearly chose to place the country’s 
cultural heritage needs at the heart of its interpretation of s.57. In so doing, it also called into question 
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Art.6bis of the Berne Convention, after which its s.57 is modelled, and its minimal standards for the 
integrity right. Even if the aim of moral rights was simply to protect an author’s honour or reputation, 
it is reasonable to accept that his honour or reputation could well be damaged by the destruction of his 
work, since it will result in a reduced pool of creations which may serve as proof of his artistry and 
skill. However, the Indian court had also recognised the wider implications of moral rights. The 
reason why moral rights aim to protect an author’s honour or reputation is because it recognises that 
the artist’s ‘creativity and ingenuity is amongst the valuable cultural resources of a nation’.
127
 The 
court correctly recognised that the issues are interlinked. Artists are protected because without them, 
there isn’t a cultural heritage to speak of. Moral rights serve to protect artists, and in turn also protect 
their works, which are valuable cultural resources.  
There is a further public interest reason, discussed above in chapter 2. There is a public 
interest in maintaining the true integrity of its cultural resources for the benefit of future generations. 
This was a point also raised by Justice Nandrajog in Sehgal when he quoted the following from 
Sundara Rajan’s article: ‘…moral rights are closely linked to a public interest in the maintenance of 
historical truth and cultural knowledge’.
128
 
The UK’s former colony has displayed a refreshing and courageous willingness to see beyond 
the limitations of Art.6bis in order to preserve its valuable cultural heritage. While there have not been 
many cases to have litigated upon s.80 of the CDPA, and none on destruction of art specifically, there 
is some indication that the UK judges may also be just as willing to abide by the example of Judge 
Nadrajog. HHJ Fysh has already indicated such willingness in Harrison v Harrison,
129
 discussed 
above in chapter 5. He saw no reason why the UK’s equivalent provisions should be limited to 
covering acts short of destruction.   
5. Conclusions: Lessons Learned from the US, Australia and India 
The legal landscapes of the US, Australia and India, look familiar and different at the same time. All 
have derived the common law basis of their legal systems from the UK, and where copyright law is 
concerned, there is a clear lineage from the Statute of Anne. In the US and Australia, concerns 
regarding the foreignness of moral rights and its potential to disrupt the exercise of the copyright 
owner’s economic rights are concerns also shared by the UK.
130
  These jurisdictions have also 
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consistently displayed a greater emphasis and concern for the economic rights bound up in a copyright 
work, rather than the non-economic authorial rights. In this way, they have failed to also recognise 
that the copyright industries cannot exist without the original input of the individual author, and 
therefore his rights should also be given equal, if not greater, regard. However, it is clear that this 
understanding has gradually dawned upon the lawmakers in these countries. The enactment of VARA 
and the amendments to the Australian Copyright Act, flawed as they may be, indicate a willingness at 
least to confront the apparently conflicting interests of individual author and copyright owners or 
property owners.  
More significantly, especially where unique original works of art is concerned, there is clearly 
a growing understanding in these jurisdictions that moral rights play a substantial role in the 
protection of cultural heritage, by protecting the non-economic needs of artists and also by 
recognising the irretrievable damage inflicted by destruction on both the artist and the country’s 
cultural heritage.   They have thus shown the way, by enacting innovative albeit flawed legislation, to 
this effect. By contrast, India still retains the restrictive wording of Art.6bis, but nevertheless has 
shown that it is possible to read into it, through judicial ingenuity, an underlying desire to protect 
cultural heritage and to protect valuable cultural property from utter destruction.  
 It is intended that this chapter’s extensive analysis of the key legislative provisions and case 
law as well as their respective legislative histories, serve to fulfil the following objectives. Firstly, it is 
hoped that this exercise would help highlight key arguments in support of a right against destruction, 
and which have been readily accepted by the legislative bodies and judiciary in these jurisdictions. 
Secondly, the analysis has highlighted key potential loopholes and pitfalls which may befall the UK 
legislature and judiciary, should either be involved in the formulating or interpretation of new rights 
against destruction in the future. And finally, these countries have clearly revealed a willingness to 
adapt their copyright policies and laws when necessary to adopt more extensive moral rights, instead 
of adhering stubbornly to the utilitarian philosophy that underpins their copyright regimes, which 
favours economic rights over moral rights.  
The lessons highlighted in this chapter have been invaluable in informing the construction and 
drafting of the proposed new section 80A referred to earlier in chapter 1 and set out in the concluding 
chapter. Particular concerns are addressed in the draft section as follows.  
As discussed in this chapter, a blanket prohibition on all types of applied art without more, as 
is the case in VARA, is not sufficiently nuanced to avoid inclusion of works, which although 
utilitarian, are however of considerable artistic value, such as Picasso’s ceramics. Section 80A(3)(ii) 
addresses this by indicating that applied art works are excluded from protection unless primarily 




Under VARA, limited edition works are restricted to only 200 copies, which may be criticised 
as being rather ungenerous. This is addressed in the proposed section 80A which increases the number 
of limited edition copies to 850, a number which is based on recommendations made by the Fine Art 
Trade Guild in the UK.
131
 Site-specific works are neither explicitly included nor excluded under 
VARA which has led to uncertainties surrounding the protection of such works. Section 80A 
addresses this by referring explicitly to site-specific works, which is defined in subsection (5) and also 
described in the accompanying explanatory notes, thus avoiding the problems arising from the lack of 
clarity in VARA.  
Section 80A does not explicitly restrict the right against destruction to only works of 
‘recognised stature’ as is in the case of VARA. As discussed in this chapter, the explicit requirement 
of ‘stature’ may only serve to protect works which have acquired fame or notoriety, rather than 
possessing some inherent artistic quality which makes the work deserving of protection. It is thus 
provided in section 80(6) that stature is simply one factor, alongside ‘artistic quality’ as a separate 
factor, which may be taken into account when determining whether or not it is reasonable to destroy 
an artistic work.  
Finally, inspiration is taken from Australia’s legislation, which attempts to strike a balance 
between authors and those who seek to destroy an artistic work for various reasons. Section 80A 
acknowledges that there may well be circumstances in which an artistic work may have to be 
destroyed and likewise, utilises a reasonableness standard to assess such circumstances. Subsection 
(8) also prescribes steps to be taken by both author and the person seeking destruction, which may not 
only assist in mitigating the loss which the author may suffer, but also in offering both parties a clear 
and fair process in which the removal or if inevitable, the destruction of a work, may take place. 
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Chapter 10 - Conclusion 
‘This is a debate about the dignity with which society regards artists and the value society 
places on the integrity of artistic endeavours’ 
Sydney Pollack*  
1. Introduction – the question asked and its importance 
The question that led to the writing of this thesis was why UK moral rights do not include a right to 
object to the destruction of works. It seems an incongruous state of affairs when a cartoonist is able to 
bring a prima facie suit against the colourisation of his dinosaur cartoons,
1
 or a garage band may 
claim for the superimposition of their track,
2
 but an artist is unable to claim against the destruction of 
his work.  
Four apparently straightforward reasons have been advanced to account for this omission: (1) the 
definition of treatment in s.80 CDPA 1988; (2) as destruction leaves nothing behind, the artist’s 
reputation is not harmed; (3) the copyright work is intangible and hence cannot be destroyed; and (4) 
owners of the physical form of copyright works may do as they please with their property. One of the 
main tasks of the research undertaken was to investigate and probe the robustness of these traditional 
reasons which have previously been offered and accepted largely at face value and subjected to little 
or no critical scrutiny. By engaging with a selection of relevant but disparate sources and academic 
fields, ranging from art ontology to anthropological studies on honour, this research demonstrates that 
these reasons are not incontestable, and that a case can be made that a continued refusal to recognise a 
right against destruction is unsustainable.    
In addition to rebutting those reasons, the research has also delved deeper into the main question, 
for it clearly raises further questions about the foundations of copyright law and moral rights as a 
whole. Why does the integrity right stop short of recognising claims against destruction? It makes 
little sense considering the brutality and finality of a destructive act. This is particularly so where the 
fine arts are concerned, as they typically exist in unique singular forms, or at least in limited editions. 
Why are artists, whose works would generally be recognised and protected by copyright law, left 
vulnerable and impotent in the face of destruction? Should such an outcome be countenanced by 
copyright law and moral rights doctrine?  
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If we accept that a primary aim of copyright law is to encourage the production of more creative 
works, then to allow the destruction of creative works is illogical and irreconcilable. This is because 
destruction of a copyright work nullifies not only other moral rights, such as the paternity right or 
droit de suite, but also the economic rights afforded by copyright, such as the reproduction right.
3
 
These rights all play a role in incentivising literary and artistic creation. For instance, royalties 
generated from exercising the reproduction right reward and encourage artists to create.
4
 That the aim 
of copyright is to encourage creativity is reflected historically in the Preamble to the Statute of Anne 
which emphasised the ‘encouragement of learning’ and in the US Constitution, which states that the 
purpose of copyright is to ‘promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts’. Similarly, the 
preamble to the WIPO Copyright Treaty recognises the ‘the outstanding significance of copyright 
protection as an incentive for literary and artistic creation’. The incentives, encouragements and 
rewards afforded in the manner of royalties through the reproduction right are however effectively 
neutralized once the original artistic work is destroyed.   
The recognition of such a right against destruction is clearly not inconceivable, bearing in mind 
the many jurisdictions which do recognise the right. The examples of the copyright regimes in the US, 
Australia and India bear witness to the evolution and eventual acceptance of the right. In contrast, 
Singapore, like the UK, fails to recognise the right against destruction, indeed Singapore fails to 
recognise the integrity right altogether. The favoured treatment of profit generating creative industries 
over that of the fine arts in Singapore as described in chapter 8 serve to reflect the failings of a 
copyright policy that eschews substantive moral rights.  
Finally, it may be asked why such a question should be addressed in the first place. The copyright 
works and copyright authors who stand to lose most from this gap in the law are those situated within 
the fine arts,
5
 which almost invariably consist of works that are unique and irreplaceable once 
destroyed. Throughout the thesis, and in particular chapter 3, care has been taken in emphasising the 
importance of the fine arts in our lives, and the indispensable role they play in enriching our lives and 
those of future generations.  
It is recognised that an artist’s right against destruction would not be adequate to address acts of 
mass destruction, such as the Bonfire of the Vanities, or the Nazi bonfires, which are referred to in the 
title to the thesis and in chapter 3. It is not suggested that a modest right against destruction such as 
the one championed in this thesis will resolve such devastation. However, owing to the sheer 
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magnitude of these atrocities and their notoriety, they serve the purpose of accentuating the sense of 
profound loss and horror which we experience whenever a work of art is wantonly destroyed, hence 
the reference in the title and their discussion in chapter 3. These examples help to bring home the 
point made repeatedly in this thesis: that a loss of a work of art is a loss to humanity. A closing of the 
gap identified within our copyright regime is at least a small step in the right direction, which serves 
to protect our artists and preserves their works for the benefit of our children’s children.  
2. Thesis findings 
Set out below is a summary of the key findings in the research, which address not only the 
main question - why do UK moral rights not include a right to object to destruction? - but also the 
following supplementary questions: 
i. Are the aims of copyright law and moral rights doctrine undermined by the lacuna?  
ii. Are the reasons for denying the recognition of such a right defensible?  
iii. What should be considered best practice for the UK copyright system? 
 
Supplementary Question i: are the aims of copyright law and moral rights doctrine 
undermined by the lacuna?  
Finding (1) - The aims of copyright law and moral rights doctrine – fulfilling the public 
interest 
The research focused on the interrelationship between copyright and moral rights. Much has 
already been written about this. However, the research examined this aspect from three particular 
angles, primarily in chapter 2. Firstly, in examining the historical development of copyright law in 
the UK, it was argued that the idea of moral rights was never as alien as has often been suggested.  
Secondly, in examining the UK copyright law’s utilitarian approach, it could be argued that the 
public interest in the ‘encouragement of learning’ is not only served by the grant of economic 
rights, but also by the recognition of stronger authorial rights. Finally, from an examination of the 
interlinked roles of moral rights and copyright, particularly in relation to the part they play in 
fostering the arts, creativity and cultural heritage, it was concluded that moral rights play an 
indispensible role in helping copyright law achieve its overarching aim of encouraging learning.   
Copyright and moral rights – a common beginning in the UK 
Copyright law and moral rights have been traditionally presented as opposing forces, with 
copyright focused on bestowing economic benefits on authors while moral rights are focused on 




traced back to an understanding that the author possesses natural rights in his work. This was not 
only understood in the authorial rights countries such as France and Germany, but also in England 
in the 18
th
 century, through dicta in early case-law and legal commentaries. The development in 
the common law of a utilitarian conception of author’s rights led to an emphasis on granting 
economic rights in return for the production of new works for the benefit of the public. In 
contrast, the emphasis on the natural rights of the author in the civil law countries led to a 
strengthening of the moral rights that we know today. These developments have led to the 
commonly held belief that there is a clear distinction between copyright and moral rights, whereas 
recent scholarship has revealed that the delineation is not as strict as it appears. 
Copyright and moral rights – complementary roles in upholding the public interest  
In the UK, the public interest has been maintained as the underlying justification for its utilitarian 
approach to copyright, with a minimal moral rights regime. The public interest is conceived as 
lying in the proliferation of new works and the wide dissemination of such works. These 
objectives are to be attained by rewarding authors with economic benefits, which assist in an 
efficient exploitation and distribution of works. However this emphasis on economic benefits has 
led to a corresponding neglect of the original goals of UK copyright.   
What has been forgotten in all this is an understanding of how and why people create. If law 
makers are to fulfil the public interest in encouraging learning, then they should seek to 
understand the process of creation. The research draws from not only commentaries on this aspect 
from legal academics such as Kwall and Merryman, but also commentaries from authors living at 
the time of the Statute of Anne. It is clear from such authors, some of whom were instrumental in 
the early debates surrounding the enactment of the Statute of Anne, that they were, first and 
foremost, profoundly concerned about the integrity of their works. These were their true concerns. 
Building on this, the research has also gathered together evidence of how and why the established 
great artists in literature, music and art come to create. The material is further bolstered by 
evidence from art philosophers and social psychologists.   
Copyright, in focusing primarily on economic rights, does not take into account that which 
truly drives creative people. The belief that monetary benefits are essential for promoting 
creativity does not account for the multitude of creative works produced in times when copyright 
did not exist.
6
 While artists make a living from producing artistic works, it seems clear from the 
evidence examined in chapter 2 and 3 that financial rewards are not the true drivers of creativity. 
Reference was made in chapter 2 to Mozart and his astounding levels of creativity as an example 
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of this. While Mozart gladly accepted commissions, indeed actively sought them out, some of his 
greatest works were the result of spontaneous creativity, and not as a result of a financial 
incentive. Examples include his final three symphonies, no. 39 in E-flat, no. 40 in G minor and 
no. 41 in C major (‘the Jupiter’), which were written in the space of two months, and were 
reportedly neither published nor performed in his lifetime. They were not written for any 
commission,
7
 particular occasion or purpose,
8
 yet they were towering masterpieces. ‘The Jupiter’ 
in particular was once heralded to be ‘the highest triumph of instrumental composition’.
9
 These 
monumental works were the result purely of Mozart’s creative impulses.
10
  
Although it may be argued that without the offer of substantial commissions for some of his 
operas, Mozart might not have produced them, this may be countered by the argument that such 
commissions were necessary for practicalities, such as staging their performances and meeting his 
living expenses, but were not instrumental in encouraging or inspiring his innate creative instincts 
as such – commissions were a means to an end and not an end in themselves. A distinction 
between the practical necessity of economic returns from creative work and the natural creative 
urges which are crucial for the production of creative work should be recognised.     
Something beyond monetary rewards clearly drives creativity. This is evidenced today in the 
so-called ‘IP-negative spaces’, i.e. creative industries which are excluded from IP protection but 
nevertheless thrive in the absence of IP.
11







 and stand-up comedy.
15
 Clearly some of these industries are financially 
driven to an extent e.g. haute cuisine and stand-up comedy, but others are not e.g. graffiti art. 
However, even within the more economically driven industries, there is a sense that their 
creations are not mere products which are churned out indiscriminately. With respect to haute 
cuisine for instance, there is an abundance of literature on the art of cookery, ranging from 18
th
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century writer-philosophers such as Brillat-Savarin,
16
 to Elizabeth Telfer in the present day,
17
 who 
all extol the aesthetic qualities of cuisine.  According to DeSalis, the art of cookery has become a 
high art,
18
 and she tells of a chef who was inspired by one of Donizetti’s operas to create a 
sorbet.
19
 Acclaimed chef Ferran Adria was recently celebrated in an international art exhibition 
entitled Ferran Adria, Notes on Creativity.
20
 Innovation clearly drives Adria and he has claimed 
that his famous restaurant, el Bulli, despite charging astronomical prices, made little or even no 
money, saying that he had no interest in making money.
21
 Studies of IP-negative industries reveal 
that ‘the assumptions underlying the IP system largely ignore the range of powerful non-
economic motivations that compel creative efforts.’
22
  
In this way, in failing to accommodate the true motivations that lie behind creative work, 
copyright fails creators and ultimately the public interest it professes to uphold. Moral rights can 
play a role in closing this gap, for it recognises that which creators truly value.  
There is a further way in which the public interest is upheld by the integrity right. If it is in the 
public interest to have access to new works for the encouragement of learning, it makes sense to 
ensure that the works to which the public has access are accurate, of high quality and can endure. 
This is because the quality of the public’s learning depends in turn on the quality and accuracy of 
that from which they gather their knowledge. The longevity of creative works is also important as 
knowledge is cumulative, growing by building on pre-existing knowledge and works which have 
come before.
23
 The loss of a creative work cuts off a potential source of knowledge and insight. 
This is not to argue that every source of knowledge and insight shall prove to be of everlasting 
value; indeed some sources of knowledge or insight may subsequently be found to be flawed. 
However, this does not mean that we should not attempt to preserve such sources. The 
understanding that knowledge and insight may be flawed should not after all come as a surprise, 
for human beings are not infallible. Even the rigorous research processes in the sciences are 
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imperfect. Richard Horton, editor of The Lancet has lamented that ‘much of the scientific 
literature, perhaps half, may simply be untrue’.
24
 The point is, the converse may however be true; 
insights initially thought or even dismissed as useless may turn out to be useful in future.
25
  
A work of art may not mean anything to anybody today, but tomorrow or in a hundred years, 
it may bring new insight to someone, thus adding to the body of knowledge. If it is destroyed 
today, the knowledge, insights, inspiration and other goods that it offers are lost forever. The 
integrity right thus serves to ensure the encouragement of learning. However, its effectiveness in 
achieving this aim is undermined by an inability to also protect against the destruction of works.   
Supplementary Question ii: To what extent are the reasons for denying the recognition of 
such a right defensible?  
Finding (2) - Doctrinal analysis of Art.6bis Berne Convention and s.80 CDPA 
A close analysis of Art.6bis and s.80 CDPA was undertaken and discussed in chapter 4. The 
debates which took place on the various Berne Convention conferences as well as those in the UK 
Parliament in debates surrounding moral rights have also been closely scrutinised.  
Finding 2.1  
The first finding, after an analysis of the debates which took place at the Rome and Brussels 
conferences was that the right to object to the destruction of works may well have been accepted 
as part of the integrity right by the members of the Berne Convention, including the UK. 
Finding 2.2 
The second finding of significance was that at the time of the Rome debates on Art.6bis, several 
members had emphasised focusing on the integrity of the author’s work, and that damage to the 
integrity of an author’s work is not necessarily dependent on damage to the author’s honour or 
reputation as well. Indeed, although it appears to be a prerequisite in the UK, this remains the 
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The third finding was that there was evidence in the Rome debates of a belief in the role of moral 
rights in safeguarding cultural heritage. The very fact that moral rights endure beyond the author’s 
death indicates a conception of moral rights that includes a role in the protection of cultural 
heritage. If so, a right against destruction fits in neatly with such a role, as evidenced for instance, 
in the debates surrounding VARA and in the underlying justification for an expansive 
interpretation of s.57 of the Indian Copyright Act 1957.  
Finding 2.4 
The fourth finding stems from an analysis of the Parliamentary debates which took place before 
the enactment of the CDPA. It revealed that apart from the government’s representative, Lord 
Beaverbrook, the participating members were very concerned about the non-economic rights of 
authors. Lord Beaverbrook’s response however was evidence of a government very much focused 
on the economic, rather than the non-economic rights afforded to the author.  
Finding 2.5 
The final finding based on an interrogation of s.80 CDPA is that the generally held view that the 
definition of ‘treatment’ excludes destruction is unfounded as is the argument that the additional 
public communication requirements (i.e. the integrity right is only breached if the derogatory 
treatment of the work is communicated in certain ways) would tend to exclude destructive acts.  
Finding (3) - Destruction prejudices the author’s ‘Honour’ 
‘Honour’ as a subject has been paid little attention by scholars in the field of copyright law. It is a 
concept also generally ignored by UK judges, who prefer to address the other requirement in s.80 
CDPA: reputation. This is because reputation is a familiar concept, rooted in the law of 
defamation. As such, because destruction leaves nothing behind that could ruin the author’s 
reputation, it is generally argued that destruction cannot amount to a breach of the integrity right. 
However, how does destruction affect honour? It depends on how ‘honour’ is defined.   
The research has subjected the concept to a rigorous analysis, never previously conducted in 
the field, and has drawn evidence of its meaning and possible applications from three key sources: 
anthropological studies on the concept of ‘honour’, the Roman concept of iniuria and early 
Anglo-Saxon laws involving the concept of honour. The conclusions which may be drawn from 
such research include that ‘honour’ may be conceived as a ‘right to respect’ or a ‘right not to be 
insulted’. If so, then the destruction of a work would almost invariably prejudice ‘honour’ as the 




someone’s work. The prima facie intent behind an act of destruction is generally disrespect or a 
disregard for the honour of the author.  
Finding (4) - The conception of art in copyright law 
The particular conception of the artistic work in copyright law makes it difficult to justify the 
recognition of a right against destruction. This is because the protectable essence of authorial 
works is the intangible content, not their physical embodiment. This means that the destruction of 
the physical embodiment will leave the work intact for copyright purposes; in other words, a work 
does not lose copyright simply because it has been destroyed. Therefore, it has been argued that 
where art works are concerned, the picture in a painting is the protectable work, not its physical 
support i.e. the canvas and pigments. Under copyright law, even if the canvas and paint have been 
destroyed, the work for the purposes of copyright is not also destroyed. It then follows that if 
copyright works cannot be destroyed, it is meaningless to have a right against destruction of 
works.  
While this particular conception does not affect textual or notational works which generally 
exist in multiple copies such as poems, music or novels, it affects artistic works such as paintings 
and sculptures in a profound way. Such works are utterly dependent on their physical embodiment 
for their existence.  
The argument put forward in chapter 6 is that art philosophers, artists and indeed ordinary 
people perceive and treat the physical support as the art work. The destruction of the physical 
support also destroys the art work. This is supported by research into the different views of art 
philosophers who have debated the ontology of art, as well as drawing from recent empirical 
research conducted by psychologists at the Universities of Texas and Yale. All point towards an 
understanding of art in the art world as well as by the ordinary public which is profoundly at odds 
with that conceptualised within the law of copyright.  Copyright law possesses an understanding 
and theory of art which conflicts too violently with how art is ordinarily perceived, not only by art 
experts but by non-experts as well. 
Finally, it may be asked: does it matter that the public is able to view the original work? Do 
they not benefit anyway from merely viewing a copy? It was argued in Chapter 6 that it does 
matter. Firstly, the sheer impact from viewing large scale masterpieces such as Renoir’s 
Waterlilies murals or Jackson Pollock’s Mural or more pertinently, large scale installations such 
as Serra’s Tilted Arc, cannot be replicated on copies in prints or coffee table art books.  Secondly, 
even if their works can be reproduced to size faithfully utilising the very same materials, the 




art philosopher Dutton who argues that an original art work has a human origin which a copy will 
never have.  
It may be argued that if there are no discernible technical or material differences between an 
original and its copy, then it follows that there are no aesthetic differences between the two, and 
hence it does not matter if the original is lost forever as long as there are good copies around. It 
may also be cynically argued that the only reason why the authenticity of art works is so 
rigorously assessed is because collectors and investors are concerned about the monetary value of 
their Rembrandts and Picassos, which would drop significantly if they are found to be fakes.  
However, it is argued that an original art work means so much more than simply a commodity 
whose value depends on its authenticity, and that the loss of the original is a profound loss, 
notwithstanding the existence of good copies. The empirical research conducted by experimental 
psychologists at Yale, referred to in chapter 6, arrived at two plausible explanations for why we 
cherish originals: firstly, we appreciate the original creative performance behind the creation of 
the work, and secondly, we believe that it is imbued with a special quality – an aura – through its 
original connection with its creator.
27
  
Originals are important because when we confront the original directly, we confront 
something that has come into being through an original creative process or performance – we 
appreciate the creativity, innovation, blood, sweat and tears that went into the conception of the 
original work. We appreciate our good fortune in being able to encounter the end product of such 
an extraordinary process. Dutton argues that ‘all art, … incorporates at some level the idea of 
performance’ of virtuosity, skill and creativity,
28
 and that we are deeply appreciative of the 
herculean efforts in achieving the end-result of a performance. A copy, especially one that is 
achieved through automated or mechanical means, is not representative of the effort or virtuosic 
performance which went into the creation of the original in the first instance. This is why a direct 
encounter with the originals of art works is so deeply meaningful and that is why we should 
endeavour to preserve them as best as we can, so as to enable future generations to also benefit 
from such encounters.   
Finding (5) -Private property rights do not always trump moral rights 
One of the main obstacles to recognising a right against destruction is the primacy of private 
property rights. The liberal theory of property recognises a right to destroy, ius abudenti, which 
conflicts with the author’s right to object to destruction. The research, described and discussed in 
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chapter 7, sought to enquire the extent to which ius abudenti is applicable even in relation to 
works of art. The argument raised is that art works should be treated differently from ordinary 
objects. Even the strongest proponents of ius abudenti like Strahilevitz, Honore and Epstein have 
indicated that it is possibly inapplicable where at least valuable, unique and irreplaceable works 
are concerned. Drawing on the concept of the common good, it is argued that the fine arts are a 
common good, the stewardship of which is in the public interest. If so conceived, then it is 
incongruous for moral rights to reject a right against destruction. 
Supplementary Question iii: What is the best practice for the UK? 
Lessons learned from other jurisdictions 
Alongside the close examination of moral rights provisions of the US, Australia and India in 
chapter 9, the respective legislative histories were reviewed to ascertain the concerns and issues 
which influenced the eventual drafting of the provisions. While all three jurisdictions generally 
justified the provision of the right against destruction on the basis of preserving cultural heritage, 
the manner in which the provisions operate and the way in which they have been interpreted by 
the local courts differ in subtle ways.  In the future drafting of any anti-destruction legislation, the 
UK lawmakers should be well advised to pay special attention to the strengths and weaknesses of 
the legislation in these countries.  
In the US, VARA’s provisions are subject to a number of limitations. It is firstly applicable 
only to the fine visual arts, such as paintings and sculptures. The underlying reason lies in the 
uniqueness of such works, unlike the applied arts, which are commercially mass-produced. As 
pointed out, care should be taken in the drafting of the applied arts exception, as there are certain 
works of art which may straddle both the fine arts and the applied arts, for example Picasso’s 
stage curtain for Le Tricorne. 
The issue of whether claims may only be brought in respect of works of ‘recognised stature’ 
is something which has to be carefully considered. The justification is understandable for it serves 
to weed out frivolous claims. However, it should also be borne in mind that many works of art 
only gain stature after a period of time. Furthermore, the US courts have been unclear and 
inconsistent in their interpretation of ‘recognised stature’.  There is present uncertainty as to 
whether the merits of the work should be considered, or merely its status. The problem with the 
latter is that, ‘status’ may be manufactured through publicity and notoriety. A fairer approach may 
be to undertake a more objective assessment of a work’s merits, utilising a combination of 




There are currently uncertainties in the status of site-specific works under VARA. It is 
suggested that there is no justifiable reason for treating such works any differently from other 
forms of visual art. They are not of lesser quality as compared to other forms. However, it is 
acknowledged that the public nature and generally considerable size of site-specific works mean 
that they tend to arouse strong feelings on the part of those who are compelled to encounter the 
works on a daily basis. A balance must therefore be sought and struck between the public 
audience and the artist, perhaps requiring the work to be removed to another suitable site with the 
consent of the artist if absolutely necessary. 
Australia’s legislation is generally straightforward and comprehensive. It does not necessarily 
limit the anti-destruction provision to any particular form of art or indeed any particular standard 
of art work. The more positive elements lie in its fairly detailed provisions on the removal or 
recording of works destined for destruction. The provisions are not without flaws however, and 
these are highlighted and discussed in detail in chapter 9.  
India’s approach has been particularly bold and ambitious. It appears that although s.57 
Copyright Act 1957 has been modified such that it may be possible to disallow claims against 
destruction, the Indian courts have demonstrated that they are willing to interpret the section 
differently. They do so in the name of preserving their rich cultural history. This is perhaps not 
unlike HHJ Fysh in the UK case of Harrison v Harrison who could think of no reason why 
destruction should not also be covered under s.80.     
Aside from the US, Australia and India, there are other countries which have chosen, either 
by way of legislation or through case-law, to recognise a right against destruction. For instance, 
although not included expressly in their copyright legislation, the jurisdictions of Canada and 
Israel, both being common law copyright countries, have indicated through case-law that such a 
right against destruction may be recognised. The crux of the arguments mapped out in chapters 4, 
5, 6 and 7 is that essentially the currently accepted objections to a right against destruction in the 
UK are unsustainable, and that the courts should not be hesitant in allowing prima facie claims on 
this basis.  
The way forward however, for the sake of clarity and certainty in the law, is to legislate for 
such a right explicitly and unambiguously within the CDPA. It is acknowledged that such a right, 
in order to be workable, cannot assume an absolute stance. A balance has to be struck between the 
rights and claims of the artist and those of affected third parties. It is suggested that some form of 
the ‘reasonableness’ standard incorporated in s.195AS(1) of the Australian Copyright Act may be 
contemplated. Furthermore, the Australian Act stipulates that by offering artists the opportunity to 




provision is not without its flaws, e.g. it is not clear who shall bear the costs of such a potentially 
costly procedure.  
There are other legislative examples apart from those discussed in this thesis. For instance, 
the copyright legislation in Switzerland also allows for claims against destruction,
29
 stipulating 
that artists may purchase their own works at the market value of the cost of the materials used in 
their works. The downside in this is that should the work consist of expensive materials such as 
gold or precious stones, this might prove very costly for the artist.
30
  
Proposed section 80A Right to object to destruction of artistic work 
The following proposed section 80A and accompanying explanatory notes were drafted with the 
points noted above and the lessons illuminated in chapter 9 in mind.  
80A Right to object to destruction of artistic work 
(1) Independent of the exclusive rights provided for in section 80, the author of an artistic work, 
as defined in section 4(1)(a) above, has the right to object to any intentional or grossly 
negligent destruction of his work by any person, including the owner of the physical 
embodiment of the work, subject to the exceptions set out in subsection (3) below.  
(2) The author of an artistic work has the right conferred by subsection (1) in his work, whether 
or not the author is copyright owner of the work.  
(3) The right to object to destruction does not apply where the work is 
(i) a work of architecture in the form of a building, or a model for a building. 
(ii) a work of artistic craftsmanship or applied art, unless the work is primarily intended 
to be an artistic work and its utilitarian features are secondary to its artistic purpose; 
(iii) a copy of an artistic work, unless the copy is one of a limited edition of 850 copies, 
that are signed or otherwise marked by the author and consecutively numbered by the 
author, or in the case of a sculpture, one of multiple casts limited to 850 in number, 
that are signed or otherwise marked by the author and consecutively numbered by the 
author.  
(iv) a technical drawing, diagram, model, poster, map, chart, plan or similar work.  
(v) an item created for merchandising, advertising or promotional purposes.  
(vi) an item for the purposes of producing packaging or container material.   
(4) Anything done in good faith to restore or preserve an artistic work is not, by that act alone, an 
infringement of the author’s right to object to destruction of his work.  
(5) The removal or relocation of a site-specific work, that is, an artistic work that is situated at a 
place that is accessible to the public, and was made specifically for installation in that place, 
shall be considered as destruction of the work, subject to subsections (6), (7), (8) and (9).   
(6) A person does not, by destroying an artistic work, or authorising an artistic work to be 
destroyed, infringe the author’s right to object to destruction of his artistic work if the person 
establishes that it was reasonable in all the circumstances to destroy the work, taking into 
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account but not limited to the following factors to determine whether it was reasonable to 
destroy an artistic work: 
(i) whether or not the work exists as a singular entity, or in multiple copies or editions.  
(ii) the stature of the work. 
(iii) the artistic quality of the work. 
(iv) any health and safety issues surrounding the structural integrity, nature and placement 
of the work. 
(v) where the destruction was required by law or was otherwise necessary to avoid a 
breach of any law. 
(vi) where the work has 2 or more authors, their views about the destruction. 
 
(7) The destruction of an artistic work, or site-specific work as defined in subsection (5), is not an 
infringement of the author’s right to prevent destruction if the person who destroyed the work 
or authorised the destruction of the work, gave the author or the author’s representatives, a 
reasonable opportunity to do one of the following before destruction:  
(i) remove the work from the place where it was situated.  
(ii) where the work may not be removed without being destroyed, to make a record 
of the work.   
(iii) where the work is affixed to or forms part of a building which is subject to 
relocation, demolition or destruction, to remove the work if possible to do so, or 
to record the work.  
 
(8) The removal or recording of an artistic work referred to in subsection (7) above is  subject to 
the following: 
 
(i) the costs of removal or recording of the work shall be borne equally by the person 
intending to destroy or authorise the destruction of the work, or the owner of the 
building to which the work is affixed, and the author.  
(ii) the person intending to destroy or authorise the destruction of the work, or the owner 
of the building to which the work is affixed must provide the author or the author’s 
representative a notice of intention to destroy the work. 
(iii) the author or author’s representative has 4 weeks from the date of receipt of the notice 
required in subsection (8)(ii) to respond to the person who provided the notice 
indicating if the work is to be removed or recorded, and to request access to the work 
in order to carry out either removal or recording. 
(iv) within 4 weeks of receipt of the response from the author or author’s representative, 
access to the work in question must be given to the author and/or his representatives 
in order to remove or record the work.  
(v) the author and/or his representatives to have such period, as may be agreed between 
the author and/or his representatives and the person intending to destroy the work, of 
not less than 4 weeks to have continued access to the work in order to remove or 
record the work, which such period may be extended at the sole discretion of the 
author for a further and final period of 4 weeks.  
  
(9) The destruction, removal or relocation of an artistic work does not infringe the author’s right 
to prevent destruction if the person who destroyed or authorised the destruction of the work, 
after making reasonable inquiries, cannot discover the identity and location of the author or a 





(10) The destruction or demolition of a building to which an artistic work is affixed does not 
infringe the author’s right to prevent destruction if the owner of the building, after making 
reasonable inquiries, cannot discover the identity and location of the author or a person 




1. The main purpose of the Bill is to amend the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (“the 
Copyright Act”) to provide a new right to prevent destruction of artistic works for the benefit 
of authors of artistic works.  
Legislative context 
2. Presently all authors of literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works have the right to object 
to the derogatory treatment of their works, which is provided for under section 80 of the 
Copyright Act. This right entitles the author to object to certain types of treatment of his work 
which may be prejudicial to honour or reputation. The definition of treatment under section 
80(2)(a) does not explicitly encompass destruction of copyright works. The bill amends the 
Copyright Act to insert a new section 80A which provides authors of artistic works a clear 
right to object to the destruction of their works. The right is not extended to authors of the 
other copyright works and is limited only to authors of artistic works.  
Right to object to destruction of artistic work 
3. The new section 80A provides authors of artistic works with a right to object to the 
destruction of their works.  
4. Subsection (1) provides an additional right to authors of artistic works, which is independent 
of the other rights provided for under Chapter IV of the Copyright Act, to object to the 
destruction of their works by any person.  
5. Subsection (2) makes clear that the new right conferred under section 80A exists 
independently of copyright in the work and is conferred only on the author.  
6. Subsection (3) lists the types of works which are excluded from protection from destruction 
under the right. The types of excluded works listed here are either copies of original artistic 
works (unless the copies are limited signed editions) or typically works which are of a 
utilitarian or commercial nature, for example, technical drawings or commercial packaging. 
The works listed in subsection (3)(i) include the works listed under section 4(1)(b) and 
section 4(1)(c) of the Copyright Act.  
7. As acts undertaken to preserve or restore artistic works bear some risk of resulting in the 
destruction of the works, subsection (4) makes clear that such acts, conducted in good faith, 
do not amount to an infringement of the author’s right to object to destruction. 
8. Site-specific works are defined in subsection (5) as artistic works which are created 
specifically for particular locations. With respect to such works, the location is intimately 
linked with the installation created in its place. As such, authors of site-specific works regard 
the removal of such works from their locations as necessarily impacting negatively on their 




relocation or removal of site-specific works from their locations amount to a destruction of 
the works subject to subsections (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10).  
9. Subsection (6) provides that a person does not infringe the author’s right to object to 
destruction if the person establishes that it was reasonable in all the circumstances to destroy 
the work. Subsection (6) also provides a non-exhaustive list of factors to be taken into 
account when determining whether it was reasonable in the circumstances to destroy the 
work.  
10. Subsection (7) provides that the destruction of works is not an infringement of the author’s 
right to object to destruction if the author was given a reasonable opportunity to either remove 
or record the work first. This also applies to situations where the work is affixed to or is part 
of a building which is to be relocated, demolished or destroyed, and where the relocation, 
demolition or destruction of the building will necessarily result in destruction of the work.  
11. Subsection (8) sets out the specific manner in which the reasonable opportunity to remove or 
record the work referred to in subsection (7) is to operate. This includes a requirement to give 
notice to the author or his representative that the work is to be destroyed and that the author or 
his representative has a reasonable opportunity to remove or record the work.  
12. Subsection (9) provides that where the person who destroys or authorises the destruction of a 
work is unable to identify or locate the author or his representative in order to give notice of 
intention to destroy the work, the destruction of such work does not constitute an 
infringement of the author’s right to object to destruction of the work.  
13. Subsection (10) provides, in a similar way to subsection (9) that where the owner of a 
building which is relocated, destroyed or demolished is unable to identify or locate the author 
or his representative in order to give notice of intention to destroy the work, the relocation, 
destruction or demolition of such building which results in the destruction of the work does 
not amount to an infringement of the author’s right to object to destruction of the work.   
3. Contributions to the law of copyright and moral rights 
The above findings contribute to the current scholarly literature available on moral rights, particularly 
in the UK, its relationship with copyright and its role in the preservation of cultural heritage.  
In seeking out answers to the main question posed, the in-depth research undertaken drew from a 
wide variety of disparate yet related areas of scholarly work, both within but also outside the legal 
sphere. The primary uniqueness in the study conducted is its synthesis of understandings not only 
from the usual legal sources of parliamentary debates and similar sources, but also the fields of 
anthropology, art philosophy, Roman law, early English law, copyright legal history, and property 
theory. Further, in the course of examining the cultural scene and cultural policies adopted in 
Singapore in chapter 8, the research has also drawn insights from aspects of Confucian thinking 
regarding authorship, which shed further light on how Confucianism supports the recognition of 
strong moral rights.  These understandings all serve to underpin the arguments raised in support of 
recognising a right against destruction in moral rights. The end result of engaging critically with a 
variety of carefully selected sources is a far richer and deeper understanding of the impact that the 




In particular, the research has advanced new interpretations of the key concept of ‘honour’ in the 
field of moral rights, by drawing inspiration from anthropological studies on the concept as well as the 
Roman law concept of iniuria. The research also gives fresh insight into an understanding of ‘work’ 
in copyright law, and how current understandings impact negatively upon art works.   
The analysis of the position in Singapore demonstrates how copyright policy is reflected in a 
country’s cultural policy or cultural ambitions. Little research has been undertaken in respect of the 
link between moral rights and Singapore’s cultural scene. For a long time, Singapore looked askance 
at the pursuit of cultural activities, and while its copyright regime expanded exponentially in tandem 
with its development as a nation, scant regard was given to the notion of moral rights. Confucianism 
has been put forward as a reason for this attitude, but a closer analysis revealed that while 
Confucianism may be contrary to the economic rights offered by copyright, it is wholly compatible 
with the concept of moral rights. The pragmatic and soft authoritarian governing of Singapore are 
possible reasons for its conservative and commercially minded cultural policies, which in turn reflects 
its copyright policy, which rejects moral rights. Moral rights have traditionally been ignored in 
Singapore and they continue to be today – with the exception of attribution rights, the other core 
moral right, the integrity right, was conspicuously absent in the recent call for reform of its copyright 
regime.
31
 There are therefore many unique reasons for Singapore’s lack of moral rights, such reasons 
being absent in the UK.  
What appears to be also uncovered by the research undertaken is that the UK’s copyright regime 
has increasingly emphasised the breadth and strength of its economic rights. With such heavy 
emphasis on the economic rather than the non-economic needs of artists, the UK’s copyright regime 
fails to recognise and protect their needs, and in turn fails to truly fulfil its public interest aims. One 
such need is the artist’s quest for protection and preservation of his creation. In failing to simply 
extend the integrity right to close this gap, the UK arguably fails to protect its artists and their 
creations. 
4. Future research 
The research has thus far focused on the theoretical underpinnings of copyright law and moral rights. 
It has interrogated and dismantled the various objections to the recognition of a right against 
destruction. It has drawn from a variety of legal and non-legal written sources.  
There is scope for further research which would be useful in confirming the initial findings of this 
present research. One would be a comparative analysis of the moral rights legislation of the Berne 
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Convention countries, to ascertain the extent to which they have provided a right to object to 
destruction, how they have implemented it and in practice, the sort of outcomes they have 
experienced. While the seminal texts on moral rights by Adeney, Sundara Rajan, Davies and Garnett 
offer comprehensive overviews of the different moral rights approaches in selected jurisdictions, their 
studies have not looked at the issue of destruction as comprehensively. As such, there is a need for an 
analysis of different moral rights provisions, as well as applicable case-law on destruction claims. 
Insights gleaned from such a study will enable us to better understand the potential pitfalls in 
formulating laws in this area.  
Another research plan would be empirically based and would serve to test the propositions 
asserted in the thesis. As moral rights are perceived as personality rights, the views of living artists 
would prove invaluable. How do artists actually perceive the extent of the impact of the destruction of 
their works on society, themselves as artists, and the progress and development of art? Questions may 
be asked of artists whose works have actually been destroyed as to inter alia the facts surrounding 
such destruction, their involvement, if any, in the event, their immediate reactions and perceptions at 
the time of destruction, and their reflections on the loss of their works. Such research is not 
unproblematic. Firstly, artists are popularly known to have introverted or reclusive tendencies,
32
 
which might make them difficult interview subjects, and secondly, the destruction of cherished works 
is a sensitive subject. There are clear difficulties in broaching such issues and evoking long buried 
memories of lost works. However, there are benefits to be had from such research as it will give a 
voice to lesser known and less established artists, who would stand to benefit from such a right, 
perhaps even more so than more established artists.  
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APPENDIX A – SECTION 80 CDPA 1988 
Section 80 Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 
s.80. Right to object to derogatory treatment of work. 
(1) The author of a copyright literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, and the director of a 
copyright film, has the right in the circumstances mentioned in this section not to have his work 
subjected to derogatory treatment. 
(2) For the purposes of this section— 
(a) “treatment” of a work means any addition to, deletion from or alteration to or adaptation of 
the work, other than— 
(i) a translation of a literary or dramatic work, or 
(ii) an arrangement or transcription of a musical work involving no more than a change of 
key or register; and 
(b) the treatment of a work is derogatory if it amounts to distortion or mutilation of the work or is 
otherwise prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author or director; 
and in the following provisions of this section references to a derogatory treatment of a work shall be 
construed accordingly.  
(3) In the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work the right is infringed by a person who— 
(a) publishes commercially, performs in public or communicates to the public a derogatory 
treatment of the work; or 
(b) issues to the public copies of a film or sound recording of, or including, a derogatory 
treatment of the work. 
(4) In the case of an artistic work the right is infringed by a person who— 
(a) publishes commercially or exhibits in public a derogatory treatment of the work, or 
communicates to the public a visual image of a derogatory treatment of the work, 
(b) shows in public a film including a visual image of a derogatory treatment of the work or 
issues to the public copies of such a film, or 
(c) in the case of— 
(i) a work of architecture in the form of a model for a building, 
(ii) a sculpture, or 




issues to the public copies of a graphic work representing, or of a photograph of, a derogatory 
treatment of the work.  
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to a work of architecture in the form of a building; but where the 
author of such a work is identified on the building and it is the subject of derogatory treatment he has 
the right to require the identification to be removed. 
(6) In the case of a film, the right is infringed by a person who— 
(a) shows in public or communicates to the public a derogatory treatment of the film; or 
(b) issues to the public copies of a derogatory treatment of the film, 
(7) The right conferred by this section extends to the treatment of parts of a work resulting from a 
previous treatment by a person other than the author or director, if those parts are attributed to, or are 
likely to be regarded as the work of, the author or director. 





APPENDIX B – ARTICLE 6BIS BERNE CONVENTION 
Article 6bis Berne Convention (Paris Text 1971) 
Moral Rights: 
1. To claim authorship; to object to certain modifications and other derogatory actions; 
2. After the author's death; 3. Means of redress 
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the 
author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation 
or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be 
prejudicial to his honor or reputation. 
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall, after his death, 
be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons 
or institutions authorized by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed. However, 
those countries whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or accession to this Act, does 
not provide for the protection after the death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding 
paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained. 
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be governed by the 





APPENDIX C – STATUTE OF ANNE 1710 
Statute of Anne 1710 
8 Anne, c. 19 (1710) 
An act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or 
purchasers of such copies, during the times therein mentioned. 
I. Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have of late frequently taken the liberty of 
printing, reprinting, and publishing, or causing to be printed, reprinted, and published, books 
and other writings, without the consent of the authors or proprietors of such books and writings, 
to their very great detriment, and too often to the ruin of them and their families: for preventing 
therefore such practices for the future, and for the encouragement of learned men to compose 
and write useful books; may it please your Majesty, that it may be enacted, and be it enacted by 
the Queen's most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual 
and temporal, and commons, in this present parliament assembled, and by the authority of the 
same; 
II. That from and after the tenth day of April, one thousand seven hundred and ten, the author of 
any book or books already printed, who hath not transferred to any other the copy or copies of 
such book or books, share or shares thereof, or the bookseller or booksellers, printer or printers, 
or other person or persons, who hath or have purchased or acquired the copy or copies of any 
book or books, in order to print or reprint the same, shall have the sole right and liberty of 
printing such book and books for the term of one and twenty years, to commence from the said 
tenth day of April, and no longer; and That the author of any book or books already composed, 
and not printed and published, or that shall hereafter be composed, and his assignee or assigns, 
shall have the sole liberty of printing and reprinting such book and books for the term of 
fourteen years, to commence from the day of the first publishing the same, and no longer; and 
That if any other bookseller, printer or other person whatsoever, from and after the tenth day of 
April, one thousand seven hundred and ten, within the times granted and limited by this act, as 
aforesaid, shall print, reprint, or import, or cause to be printed, reprinted, or imported, any such 
book or books, without the consent of the proprietor or proprietors thereof first had and 
obtained in writing, signed in the presence of two or more credible witnesses; or knowing the 
same to be so printed or reprinted, without the consent of the proprietors, shall sell, publish, or 
expose to sale, or cause to be sold, published, or exposed to sale, any such book or books, 
without such consent first had and obtained, as aforesaid: then such offender or offenders shall 
forfeit such book or books, and all and every sheet or sheets, being part of such book or books, 
to the proprietor or proprietors of the copy thereof, who shall forthwith damask, and make 




for every sheet which shall be found in his, her, or their custody, either printed or printing, 
published, or exposed to sale, contrary to the true intent and meaning of this act; the one moiety 
thereof to the Queen's most excellent majesty, her heirs and successors, and the other moiety 
thereof to any person or persons that shall sue for the same, to be recovered in any of her 
Majesty's courts of record at Westminister, by action of debt, bill, plaint, or information, in 
which no wager of law, essoin, privilege, or protection, or more than one imparlance shall be 
allowed. II. And whereas many persons may through ignorance offend against this act, unless 
some provision be made, whereby the property in every such book, as is intended by this act to 
be secured to the proprietor or proprietors thereof, may be ascertained, as likewise the consent 
of such proprietor or proprietors for the printing or reprinting of such book or books may from 
time to time be known; be it therefore further enacted by the authority aforesaid, 
That nothing in this act contained shall be construed to extend to subject any bookseller, 
printer, or other person whatsoever, to the forfeitures or penalties therein mentioned, for or by 
reason of the printing or reprinting of any book or books without such consent, as aforesaid, 
unless the title to the copy of such book or books hereafter published shall, before such 
publication, be entered in the register book of the company of stationers, in such manner as hath 
been usual, which register book shall at all times be kept at the hall of the said company, and 
unless such consent of the proprietor or proprietors be in like manner entered as aforesaid, for 
every of which several entries, six pence shall be paid, and no more; which said register book 
may, at all seasonable and convenient time, be resorted to, and inspected by any bookseller, 
printer, or other person, for the purposes before-mentioned, without any fee or reward; and the 
clerk of the said company of stationers shall, when and as often as thereunto required, give a 
certificate under his hand of such entry or entries, and for every such certificate may take a fee 
not exceeding six pence. 
III. Provided nevertheless, That if the clerk of the said company of stationers for the time being, 
shall refuse or neglect to register, or make such entry or entries, or to give such certificate, 
being thereunto required by the author or proprietor of such copy or copies, in the presence of 
two or more credible witnesses, That then such person and persons so refusing, notice being 
first duly given of such refusal, by an advertisement in the Gazette, shall have the like benefit, 
as if such entry or entries, certificate or certificates had been duly made and given; and that the 
clerks so refusing, shall, for any such offence, forfeit to the proprietor of such copy or copies 
the sum of twenty pounds, to be recovered in any of her Majesty's courts of record at 
Westminster, by action of debt, bill, plaint, or information, in which no wager of law, essoin, 
privilege or protection, or more than one imparlance shall be allowed. 
IV. Provided nevertheless, and it is hereby further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That if any 




March, one thousand seven hundred and ten, set a price upon, or sell, or expose to sale, any 
book or books at such a price or rate as shall be conceived by any person or persons to be too 
high and unreasonable; it shall and may be lawful for any person or persons, to make complaint 
thereof to the lord archbishop of Canterbury for the time being, the lord chancellor, or lord 
keeper of the great seal of Great Britain for the time being, the lord bishop of London for the 
time being, the lord chief justice of the court of Queen's Bench, the lord chief justice of the 
court of Common Pleas, the lord chief baron of the court of Exchequer for the time being, the 
vice chancellors of the two universities for the time being, in that part of Great Britain called 
England; the lord president of the sessions for the time being, the lord chief justice general for 
the time being, the lord chief baron of the Exchequer for the time being, the rector of the 
college of Edinburgh for the time being, in that part of Great Britain called Scotland; who, or 
any one of them, shall and have hereby full power and authority, from time to time, to send for, 
summon, or call before him or them such bookseller or booksellers, printer or printers, and to 
examine and enquire of the reason of the dearness and inhauncement of the price or value of 
such book or books by him or them so sold or exposed to sale; and if upon such enquiry and 
examination it shall be found, that the price of such book or books is inhaunced, or any wise too 
high or unreasonable, then and in such case the said archbishop of Canterbury, lord chancellor 
or lord keeper, bishop of London, two chief justices, chief baron, vice chancellors of the 
universities, in that part of Great Britain called England, and the said lord president of the 
sessions, lord justice general, lord chief baron, and the rector of the college of Edinburgh, in 
that part of Great Britain called Scotland, or any one or more of them, so enquiring and 
examining, have hereby full power and authority to reform and redress the same, and to limit 
and settle the price of every such printed book and books, from time to time, according to the 
best of their judgments, and as to them shall seem just and reasonable; and in case of alteration 
of the rate or price from what was set or demanded by such bookseller or booksellers, printer or 
printers, to award and order such bookseller and booksellers, printer and printers, to pay all the 
costs and charges that the person or persons so complaining shall be put unto, by reason of such 
complaint, and of the causing such rate or price to be so limited and settled; all which shall be 
done by the said archbishop of Canterbury, lord chancellor or lord keeper, bishop of London, 
two chief justices, chief baron, vice chancellors of the two universities, in that part of Great 
Britain called England, and the said lord president of the sessions, lord justice general, lord 
chief baron, and rector of the college of Edinburgh, in that part of Great Britain called Scotland, 
or any one of them, by writing under their hands and seals, and thereof publick notice shall be 
forthwith given by the said bookseller or booksellers, printer or printers, by an advertisement in 
the Gazette; and if any bookseller or booksellers, printer or printers, shall, after such settlement 
made of the said rate and price, sell, or expose to sale, any book or books, at a higher or greater 




case such bookseller and booksellers, printer and printers, shall forfeit the sum of five pounds 
for every such book so by him, her, or them sold or exposed to sale; one moiety thereof to the 
Queen's most excellent majesty, her heirs and successors, and the other moiety to any person or 
persons that shall sue for the same, to be recovered, with costs of suit, in any of her Majesty's 
courts of record at Westminster, by action of debt, bill, plaint or information, in which no wager 
of law, essoin, privilege, or protection, or more than one imparlance shall be allowed. 
V. Provided always, and it is hereby enacted, That nine copies of each book or books, upon the 
best paper, that from and after the said tenth day of April, one thousand seven hundred and ten, 
shall be printed and published, as aforesaid, or reprinted and published with additions, shall, by 
the printer and printers thereof, be delivered to the warehouse keeper of the said company of 
stationers for the time being, at the hall of the said company, before such publication made, for 
the use of the royal library, the libraries of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, the 
libraries of the four universities in Scotland, the library of Sion College in London, and the 
library commonly called the library belonging to the faculty of advocates at Edinburgh 
respectively; which said warehouse keeper is hereby required within ten days after demand by 
the keepers of the respective libraries, or any person or persons by them or any of them 
authorized to demand the said copy, to deliver the same, for the use of the aforesaid libraries; 
and if any proprietor, bookseller, or printer, or the said warehouse keeper of the said company 
of stationers, shall not observe the direction of this act therein, that then he and they so making 
default in not delivering the said printed copies, as aforesaid, shall forfeit, besides the value of 
the said printed copies, the sum of five pounds for every copy not so delivered, as also the value 
of the said printed copy not so delivered, the same to be recovered by the Queen's majesty, her 
heirs and successors, and by the chancellor, masters, and scholars of any of the said 
universities, and by the president and fellows of Sion College, and the said faculty of advocates 
at Edinburgh, with their full costs respectively. 
VI. Provided always, and be it further enacted, That if any person or persons incur the penalties 
contained in this act, in that part of Great Britain called Scotland, they shall be recoverable by 
any action before the court of session there. 
VII. Provided, That nothing in this act contained, do extend, or shall be construed to extend to 
prohibit the importation, vending, or selling of any books in Greek, Latin, or any other foreign 
language printed beyond the seas; any thing in this act contained to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 
VIII. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That if any action or suit shall be 
commenced or brought against any person or persons whatsoever, for doing or causing to be 




issue, and give the special matter in evidence; and if upon such action a verdict be given for the 
defendant, or the plaintiff become nonsuited, or discontinue his action, then the defendant shall 
have and recover his full costs, for which he shall have the same remedy as a defendant in any 
case by law hath. 
IX. Provided, That nothing in this act contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, either to 
prejudice or confirm any right that the said universities, or any of them, or any person or 
persons have, or claim to have, to the printing or reprinting any book or copy already printed, or 
hereafter to be printed. 
X. Provided nevertheless, That all actions, suits, bills, indictments or informations for any offence 
that shall be committed against this act, shall be brought, sued, and commenced within three 
months next after such offence committed, or else the same shall be void and of none effect. 
XI. Provided always, That after the expiration of the said term of fourteen years, the sole right of 
printing or disposing of copies shall return to the authors thereof, if they are then living, for 





APPENDIX D – US VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT  
17 U.S.C. 
 United States Code, 2011 Edition 
Title 17 - COPYRIGHTS 
CHAPTER 1 - SUBJECT MATTER AND SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT 
Sec. 106A - Rights of certain authors to attribution and integrity 
From the U.S. Government Printing Office, <www.gpo.gov> 
§106A. Rights of certain authors to attribution and integrity 
(a) Rights of Attribution and Integrity.—Subject to section 107 and independent of the exclusive 
rights provided in section 106, the author of a work of visual art— 
(1) shall have the right— 
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and 
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or 
she did not create; 
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual 
art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be 
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation; and 
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shall have the right— 
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work 
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, 
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right, and 
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly 
negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right. 
(b) Scope and Exercise of Rights.—Only the author of a work of visual art has the rights conferred by 
subsection (a) in that work, whether or not the author is the copyright owner. The authors of a joint 
work of visual art are coowners of the rights conferred by subsection (a) in that work. 
(c) Exceptions.—(1) The modification of a work of visual art which is a result of the passage of time 
or the inherent nature of the materials is not a distortion, mutilation, or other modification described in 
subsection (a)(3)(A). 
(2) The modification of a work of visual art which is the result of conservation, or of the public 
presentation, including lighting and placement, of the work is not a destruction, distortion, 
mutilation, or other modification described in subsection (a)(3) unless the modification is 




(3) The rights described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) shall not apply to any 
reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of a work in, upon, or in any connection with 
any item described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of the definition of “work of visual art” in 
section 101, and any such reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of a work is not a 
destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification described in paragraph (3) of 
subsection (a). 
(d) Duration of Rights.—(1) With respect to works of visual art created on or after the effective date 
set forth in section 610(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, the rights conferred by subsection 
(a) shall endure for a term consisting of the life of the author. 
(2) With respect to works of visual art created before the effective date set forth in section 
610(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, but title to which has not, as of such effective 
date, been transferred from the author, the rights conferred by subsection (a) shall be 
coextensive with, and shall expire at the same time as, the rights conferred by section 106. 
(3) In the case of a joint work prepared by two or more authors, the rights conferred by 
subsection (a) shall endure for a term consisting of the life of the last surviving author. 
(4) All terms of the rights conferred by subsection (a) run to the end of the calendar year in 
which they would otherwise expire. 
(e) Transfer and Waiver.—(1) The rights conferred by subsection (a) may not be transferred, but those 
rights may be waived if the author expressly agrees to such waiver in a written instrument signed by 
the author. Such instrument shall specifically identify the work, and uses of that work, to which the 
waiver applies, and the waiver shall apply only to the work and uses so identified. In the case of a 
joint work prepared by two or more authors, a waiver of rights under this paragraph made by one such 
author waives such rights for all such authors. 
(2) Ownership of the rights conferred by subsection (a) with respect to a work of visual art is 
distinct from ownership of any copy of that work, or of a copyright or any exclusive right under 
a copyright in that work. Transfer of ownership of any copy of a work of visual art, or of a 
copyright or any exclusive right under a copyright, shall not constitute a waiver of the rights 
conferred by subsection (a). Except as may otherwise be agreed by the author in a written 
instrument signed by the author, a waiver of the rights conferred by subsection (a) with respect 
to a work of visual art shall not constitute a transfer of ownership of any copy of that work, or 
of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive right under a copyright in that work. 
(Added Pub. L. 101–650, title VI, §603(a), Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5128.) 
References in Text 
Section 610(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 [Pub. L. 101–650], referred to in subsec. 





Section 610 of title VI of Pub. L. 101–650 provided that: 
“(a) In General.—Subject to subsection (b) and except as provided in subsection (c), this title 
[enacting this section, amending sections 101, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, and 506 of this title, 
and enacting provisions set out as notes under this section and section 101 of this title] and the 
amendments made by this title take effect 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act 
[Dec. 1, 1990]. 
“(b) Applicability.—The rights created by section 106A of title 17, United States Code, shall apply 
to— 
“(1) works created before the effective date set forth in subsection (a) but title to which has not, 
as of such effective date, been transferred from the author, and 
“(2) works created on or after such effective date, but shall not apply to any destruction, 
distortion, mutilation, or other modification (as described in section 106A(a)(3) of such title) of 
any work which occurred before such effective date. 
“(c) Section 608.—Section 608 [set out below] takes effect on the date of the enactment of this 
Act.” 
Studies by Copyright Office 
Section 608 of Pub. L. 101–650 provided that: 
“(a) Study on Waiver of Rights Provision.— 
“(1) Study.—The Register of Copyrights shall conduct a study on the extent to which rights 
conferred by subsection (a) of section 106A of title 17, United States Code, have been waived 
under subsection (e)(1) of such section. 
“(2) Report to Congress.—Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act 
[Dec. 1, 1990], the Register of Copyrights shall submit to the Congress a report on the progress 
of the study conducted under paragraph (1). Not later than 5 years after such date of enactment, 
the Register of Copyrights shall submit to the Congress a final report on the results of the study 
conducted under paragraph (1), and any recommendations that the Register may have as a 
result of the study. 
“(b) Study on Resale Royalties.— 
“(1) Nature of study.—The Register of Copyrights, in consultation with the Chair of the 
National Endowment for the Arts, shall conduct a study on the feasibility of implementing— 
“(A) a requirement that, after the first sale of a work of art, a royalty on any resale of the 
work, consisting of a percentage of the price, be paid to the author of the work; and 
“(B) other possible requirements that would achieve the objective of allowing an author 




“(2) Groups to be consulted.—The study under paragraph (1) shall be conducted in consultation 
with other appropriate departments and agencies of the United States, foreign governments, and 
groups involved in the creation, exhibition, dissemination, and preservation of works of art, 
including artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art, and curators of art museums. 
“(3) Report to Congress.—Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act 
[Dec. 1, 1990], the Register of Copyrights shall submit to the Congress a report containing the 





APPENDIX E – AUSTRALIA COPYRIGHT ACT 1968 
Division 4—Right of integrity of authorship of a work 
s.195AI Author’s right of integrity of authorship 
(1) The author of a work has a right of integrity of authorship in respect of the work. 
(2) The author’s right is the right not to have the work subjected to derogatory treatment. 
s.195AQ Infringement of right of integrity of authorship 
(1) This section has effect subject to this Subdivision. 
(2) A person infringes an author’s right of integrity of authorship in respect of a work if the 
person subjects the work, or authorises the work to be subjected, to derogatory treatment. 
(3) If a literary, dramatic or musical work has been subjected to derogatory treatment of a kind 
mentioned in paragraph (a) of the definition of derogatory treatment in section 195AJ that 
infringes the author’s right of integrity of authorship in respect of the work, a person 
infringes the author’s right of integrity of authorship in respect of the work if the person 
does any of the following in respect of the work as so derogatorily treated: 
(a) reproduces it in a material form; 
(b) publishes it; 
(c) performs it in public; 
(d) communicates it to the public; 
(e) makes an adaptation of it. 
(4) If an artistic work has been subjected to derogatory treatment of a kind mentioned in 
paragraph (a) of the definition of derogatory treatment in section 195AK that infringes the 
author’s right of integrity of authorship in respect of the work, a person infringes the 
author’s right of integrity of authorship in respect of the work if the person does any of the 
following in respect of the work as so derogatorily treated: 
(a) reproduces it in a material form; 
(b) publishes it; 
(c) communicates it to the public. 
(5) If a cinematograph film has been subjected to derogatory treatment of a kind mentioned in 
paragraph (a) of the definition of derogatory treatment in section 195AL that infringes the 




right of integrity of authorship in respect of the film if the person does any of the following 
in respect of the film as so derogatorily treated: 
(a) makes a copy of it; 
(b) exhibits it; 
(c) communicates it to the public. 
s.195AS No infringement of right of integrity of authorship if derogatory treatment or other 
action was reasonable 
(1) A person does not, by subjecting a work, or authorising a work to be subjected, to 
derogatory treatment, infringe the author’s right of integrity of authorship in respect of the 
work if the person establishes that it was reasonable in all the circumstances to subject the 
work to the treatment. 
(2) The matters to be taken into account in determining for the purposes of subsection (1) 
whether it was reasonable in particular circumstances to subject a literary, dramatic, musical 
or artistic work to derogatory treatment include the following: 
(a) the nature of the work; 
(b) the purpose for which the work is used; 
(c) the manner in which the work is used; 
(d) the context in which the work is used; 
(e) any practice, in the industry in which the work is used, that is relevant to the work or 
the use of the work; 
(f) any practice contained in a voluntary code of practice, in the industry in which the 
work is used, that is relevant to the work or the use of the work; 
(g) whether the work was made: 
(i) in the course of the author’s employment; or 
(ii) under a contract for the performance by the author of services for another 
person; 
(h) whether the treatment was required by law or was otherwise necessary to avoid a 
breach of any law; 
(i) if the work has 2 or more authors—their views about the treatment. 
(3) The matters to be taken into account in determining for the purposes of subsection (1) 
whether it was reasonable in particular circumstances to subject a cinematograph film to 
derogatory treatment include the following: 




(b) whether the primary purpose for which the film was made was for exhibition at 
cinemas, for broadcasting by television or for some other use; 
(c) the purpose for which the film is used; 
(d) the manner in which the film is used; 
(e) the context in which the film is used; 
(f) any practice, in the industry in which the film is used, that is relevant to the film or the 
use of the film; 
(g) any practice contained in a voluntary code of practice, in the industry in which the 
film is used, that is relevant to the film or the use of the film; 
(h) whether the film was made in the course of the employment of the director, producer 
or screenwriter who alleges that the treatment was derogatory; 
 i) whether the treatment was required by law or was otherwise necessary to avoid a 
breach of any law. 
(4) A person who does any act referred to in subsection 195AQ(3), (4) or (5) in respect of a 
work that has been subjected to derogatory treatment of a kind mentioned in that subsection 
does not, by doing that act, infringe the author’s right of integrity of authorship in respect of 
the work if the person establishes that it was reasonable in all the circumstances to do that 
act. 
s.195AT Certain treatment of works not to constitute an infringement of the author’s right of 
integrity of authorship 
(1) The destruction of a moveable artistic work is not an infringement of the author’s right of 
integrity of authorship in respect of the work if the person who destroyed the work gave the 
author, or a person representing the author, a reasonable opportunity to remove the work 
from the place where it was situated. 
(2) A change in, or the relocation, demolition or destruction of, a building is not an 
infringement of the author’s right of integrity of authorship in respect of an artistic work that 
is affixed to or forms part of the building if: 
(a) the owner of the building, after making reasonable inquiries, cannot discover the 
identity and location of the author or a person representing the author; or 
(b) if paragraph (a) does not apply—the owner complies with subsection (2A) in relation 
to the change, relocation, demolition or destruction. 
(2A) This subsection is complied with by the owner of a building in relation to a change in, or 




(a) the owner has, in accordance with the regulations and before the change, relocation, 
demolition or destruction is carried out, given the author or a person representing the 
author a written notice stating the owner’s intention to carry out the change, 
relocation, demolition or destruction; and 
(b) the notice stated that the person to whom the notice was given may, within 3 weeks 
from the date of the notice, seek to have access to the work for either or both of the 
following purposes: 
(i) making a record of the work; 
(ii) consulting in good faith with the owner about the change, relocation, demolition 
or destruction; and 
(c) the notice contained such other information and particulars as are prescribed; and 
(d) where the person to whom the notice was given notifies the owner within the period 
of 3 weeks referred to in paragraph (b) that the person wishes to have access to the 
work for either or both of the purposes mentioned in that paragraph—the owner has 
given the person a reasonable opportunity within a further period of 3 weeks to have 
such access; and 
(e) where, in the case of a change or relocation, the person to whom the notice was given 
notifies the owner that the person requires the removal from the work of the author’s 
identification as the author of the work—the owner has complied with the 
requirement. 
(3) A change in, or the relocation, demolition or destruction of, a building is not an 
infringement of the author’s right of integrity of authorship in respect of the building, or in 
respect of any plans or instructions used in the construction of the building or a part of the 
building if: 
(a) the owner of the building, after making reasonable inquiries, cannot discover the 
identity and location of the author or a person representing the author, or of any of the 
authors or persons representing the authors, as the case may be; or 
(b) if paragraph (a) does not apply—the owner complies with subsection (3A) in relation 
to the change, relocation, demolition or destruction. 
(3A) This subsection is complied with by the owner of a building in relation to a change in, or 
the relocation, demolition or destruction of, the building if: 
(a) the owner has, in accordance with the regulations and before the change, relocation, 
demolition or destruction is carried out, given the author or a person representing the 




location the owner knows, a written notice stating the owner’s intention to carry out 
the change, relocation, demolition or destruction; and 
(b) the notice stated that the person to whom the notice was given may, within 3 weeks 
from the date of the notice, seek to have access to the building for either or both of the 
following purposes: 
(i) making a record of the artistic work; 
(ii) consulting in good faith with the owner about the change, relocation, demolition 
or destruction; and 
(c) the notice contained such other information and particulars as are prescribed; and 
(d) where the person to whom the notice was given notifies the owner within the period 
of 3 weeks referred to in paragraph (b) that the person wishes to have access to the 
building for either or both of the purposes mentioned in that paragraph—the owner 
has given the person a reasonable opportunity within a further period of 3 weeks to 
have such access; and 
(e) where, in the case of a change or relocation, the person to whom the notice was given 
notifies the owner that the person requires the removal from the building of the 
author’s identification as the author of the artistic work—the owner has complied 
with the requirement. 
(4) Subsections (2), (2A), (3) and (3A) do not limit the operation of section 195AG. 
(4A) The removal or relocation by a person (the remover) of a moveable artistic work that is 
situated at a place that is accessible to the public, and was made for installation in that place, 
is not an infringement of the author’s right of integrity of authorship in respect of the work if 
the remover: 
(a) after making reasonable inquiries, cannot discover the identity and location of the 
author or a person representing the author; or 
(b) if paragraph (a) does not apply—complies with subsection (4B) in relation to the 
removal or relocation. 
(4B) This subsection is complied with by the remover in relation to the removal or relocation of 
a moveable artistic work if: 
(a) the remover has, in accordance with the regulations and before the removal or 
relocation is carried out, given the author or a person representing the author a written 




(b) the notice stated that the person to whom the notice was given may, within 3 weeks 
from the date of the notice, seek to have access to the work for either or both of the 
following purposes: 
(i) making a record of the work; 
(ii) consulting in good faith with the remover about the removal or relocation; and 
(c) the notice contained such other information and particulars as are prescribed; and 
(d) where the person to whom the notice was given notifies the remover within the period 
of 3 weeks referred to in paragraph (b) that the person wishes to have access to the 
work for either or both of the purposes mentioned in that paragraph—the remover has 
given the person a reasonable opportunity within a further period of 3 weeks to have 
such access; and 
(e) where the person to whom the notice was given notifies the remover that the person 
requires the removal from the work of the author’s identification as the author of the 
work—the remover has complied with the requirement. 
(5) Anything done in good faith to restore or preserve a work is not, by that act alone, an 





APPENDIX F – SECTION 57 INDIA COPYRIGHT ACT 1957 (AS 
AMENDED) 
Section 57.Authors special rights:- (1) Independently of the author's copyright and even after the 
assignment either wholly or partially of the said copyright, the author of a work shall have the right to 
claim the authorship of the work as well as the right to restrain, or claim damages in respect of, --- 
(a) any distortion, mutilation or other modification of the said work; or 
(b) any other action in relation to the said work which would be prejudicial to his 
honour or reputation. 
(2) The right conferred upon an author of a work by sub-section (1), other than the right to claim 




APPENDIX G – 17 US CODE §101 ‘DEFINITIONS’ 
 
A “work of visual art” is— 
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 
200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a 
sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively 
numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or 
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy that is 
signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively 
numbered by the author. 
A work of visual art does not include— 
(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or 
other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information 
service, electronic publication, or similar publication; 
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging material 
or container; 
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii); 
(B) any work made for hire; or 
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